

ANNEXE 1

DÉCISIONS DE LA FERC VISANT À LA FORMATION D'UNE RTO UNIQUE
POUR LE NORD-EST DES États-Unis

(Juillet - Août 2001)

ARGUMENTATION
ANNEXE 1
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POUR LE NORD-EST DES ÉTATS-UNIS

STRATÉGIES ÉNERGÉTIQUES - GROUPE STOP

RÉGIE DE L'ÉNERGIE - DOSSIER R-3401-98
CAUSE TARIFAIRE 2001 DE TRANSPORT D'ÉLECTRICITÉ PAR HYDRO-QUÉBEC

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before Commissioners: Curt Hébert, Jr., Chairman;
 William L. Massey, Linda Breathitt,
 Pat Wood, III and Nora Mead Brownell.

Bangor Hydro-Electric Company
 Central Maine Power Company
 National Grid USA
 Northeast Utilities Service Company
 The United Illuminating Company
 Vermont Electric Power Company
 ISO New England Inc.

Docket No. RT01-86-000

NSTAR Services Company

Docket No. RT01-94-000

ORDER GRANTING, IN PART, AND DENYING,
 IN PART, PETITION FOR DECLARATORY ORDER

(Issued July 12, 2001)

[Excerpts]

On January 16, 2001, ISO New England Inc. (ISO-NE) and a group of New England transmission owners ¹ (collectively, Petitioners) filed a joint petition for a declaratory order in Docket No. RT01-86-000, seeking a determination that a hybrid transmission entity, i.e., the New England Regional Transmission Organization (NERTO), satisfies the requirements set forth by the Commission in its order on Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs).² Petitioners also seek a determination that the existing arrangements between ISO-NE, the New England TOs, and the New England Power Pool (NEPOOL) fail to satisfy the requirements of Order No. 2000, and that the Petitioners are authorized pursuant to Order No. 2000 and the Restated NEPOOL Agreement (RNA) to make the necessary filings to create NERTO.

¹ Bangor Hydro-Electric Company, Central Maine Power Company, National Grid USA, Northeast Utilities Service Company, The United Illuminating Company, and the Vermont Electric Power Company (collectively, New England TOs).

² Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 809 (January 6, 2000), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 (1999) (Order No. 2000), order on reh'g, Order No. 2000-A, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,088 (March 8, 2000), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,092 (2000), petitions for review pending sub nom., Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, Washington v. FERC, Nos. 00-1174, et al. (D.C. Cir).

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Also on January 16, 2001, NSTAR Services Company (NSTAR) submitted a separate RTO compliance filing in Docket No. RT01-94-000, in which it sets forth its conditional support of NERTO.³

As discussed below, we find that NERTO would comply with some but not all of the minimum characteristics and functions set forth by the Commission in Order No. 2000. In particular, we find that NERTO's proposed scope and regional configuration would be insufficient to permit the RTO to effectively perform its required functions and to support competitive power markets. We find that at a minimum, the Northeast United States constitutes a single region that should not be divided up into multiple RTOs. In a separate order to be issued concurrently, we direct the participants in the proceedings involving the proposed Northeastern RTOs⁴ to participate in mediation on forming a single Northeastern RTO.

The Commission has been attempting to facilitate the development of large, regional transmission organizations reflecting natural markets since we issued Order No. 2000. We favor the development of one RTO for the Northeast, one RTO for the Midwest, one RTO for the Southeast and one RTO for the West. Through their independence from market participants, RTOs can ensure truly non-discriminatory transmission service and will instill confidence in the market that will support the billions of dollars of capital investment in generation and demand side projects necessary to support a robust, reliable and competitive electricity marketplace. RTOs are the platform upon which our expectations of the substantial generation cost savings to American customers are based.

[...]

³ NSTAR, which is comprised of three operating companies (Boston Edison Company, Cambridge Electric Light Company, and Commonwealth Electric Company), is a transmission-owning utility and a member of NEPOOL. Pursuant to Order No. 2000, all transmission-owning utilities that are participants in a regional entity under Order No. 888, were required to make a filing with the Commission by January 16, 2001 explaining the extent to which the transmission entity in which it participates meets the minimum characteristics and functions outlined in Order No. 2000, or explains its efforts, obstacles or plans with respect to conforming to these standards.

⁴ See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., et al., 95 FERC ¶61,___ (2001) (PJM RTO Order; See also New York Independent System Operator, Inc, et al., 95 FERC ¶ 61,___ (2001); and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. and Allegheny Power, 95 FERC ¶ 61,___ (2001).

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RTO Characteristic No. 2: Scope and Regional Configuration

The RTO must serve an appropriate region

[...]

4. Discussion

In Order No. 2000, we held that an RTO must serve an appropriate region, *i.e.*, a region of sufficient scope and configuration to permit the RTO to effectively perform its required functions and to support efficient and non-discriminatory power markets.²³ We also stated that in evaluating an RTO's proposed scope and regional configuration, we would consider, among other things, the extent to which the proposed boundaries recognize trading patterns:

Given that a goal of this initiative is to promote competition in electricity markets, regions should be configured so as to recognize trading patterns, and be capable of supporting trade over a large area, and not perpetuate unnecessary barriers between energy buyers and suppliers. There may exist today some infrastructure or institutional barriers unnecessarily inhibiting trade between regions that could be economically reduced. RTO boundaries should not perpetuate these unnecessary and uneconomic boundaries.^[24]

Applying this criteria, we note, first, that inter-regional trading among the three Northeast ISOs is significant and growing.²⁵ Indeed, to a certain extent, the Northeast ISOs rely on each other to meet their energy needs, whether to acquire supplies or to sell unused capacity.²⁶ The interconnected nature of this market is often reflected in the Northeast ISOs' respective market prices.²⁷ As this evidence suggests, there is a natural market which spans the Northeast region.

However, the vitality of this natural market is hampered by the balkanized set of market rules that have developed in the Northeast ISOs since their inception. These market rules vary in numerous ways, from limits placed on ramp rates for external transactions to the manner in which transmission rights are allocated and from transaction scheduling to the type of ancillary services available in the spot market. The divergence of these rules, moreover, creates uncertainty among market participants and may

²³ Order No. 2000 at 31,079.

²⁴ *Id.* at 31,084.

²⁵ The NYISO, for example, reports that energy imports of 1000 MW or greater into the NYISO from PJM were scheduled approximately 56 percent of the time during the year 2000. NYISO exports to New England of at least 500 MW or more were scheduled approximately 37 percent of the time, and NYISO scheduled imports from ISO-NE approximately 12 percent of the time. *See* NYISO, *Aff. of Ricardo T. Gonzales*, September Report filed in Docket No. ER00-3591-000.

²⁶ The NYISO has noted that in the year 2000 it was a net importer of energy, importing energy about 97 percent of the time. In January 2000, import energy schedules from neighboring control areas exceeded 1000 MW nearly 85 percent of the time, and exceeded 2000 MW 34 percent of the time. *Id.*

²⁷ In January 2001, for example, ISO-NE's 5-minute energy clearing price was set by external dispatchable contracts 14.6 percent of the time. *See* ISO-NE's January 2001 Monthly Market Report at 12.

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discourage trade in and across the Northeast ISOs.²⁸ In sum, the narrow configuration of the existing Northeast ISOs creates artificial constraints within the broader market that spans the Northeast region. In order to successfully encompass the natural market for bulk power in the Northeast, it is necessary that the Northeast transmission owners combine to form a single RTO.

We note that the Northeast ISOs have recognized the constraints placed on trade by their different market rules, and have entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which sets forth their commitment to seek interregional coordination amongst themselves.²⁹ Pursuant to the MOU and its spirit of greater coordination, the Northeast ISOs have already taken many preliminary steps toward addressing constraints on trade, including: (i) the sponsorship of a study addressing the feasibility of implementing a combined day-ahead energy market for the Northeast; (ii) an agreement that provides for the sharing of 10 minute reserves between the NYISO and ISO-NE; (iii) an interregional congestion management redispatch mechanism that may be implemented between PJM and the NYISO; and (iv) a commitment among the Northeast ISOs to identify and implement the "best practices" followed by each.

While the MOU showed promise at the time the parties signed it, the effort has proven disappointing in implementation. The three ISOs have proceeded very slowly. Moreover, we are concerned that the MOU process does not go far enough to address seams issues in the Northeast market. This may be due to the fact that the MOU process, to date, has failed to comprehensively address the fundamental market rule differences that exist in the region. Further, as we explain in our RTO companion orders being issued today, the existing MOU, while a promising and beneficial approach to resolving regional issues, is insufficient to be considered a strong cooperative agreement with neighboring RTOs that would create a seamless trading area. The MOU initiative cannot be considered the practical equivalent of eliminating these seams, since it has not and likely would not forge a single Northeast market.

In Order No. 2000, we held that an RTO application that proposes to rely on "effective scope" to satisfy our scope requirement would be required to show that its plan would be the functional equivalent of a larger RTO.³⁰ Petitioners have not demonstrated that what they are pursuing under the MOU, even were it to be achieved, would be the functional equivalent of a single Northeast RTO.

In the PJM RTO Order, we conclude that PJM's proposed scope and regional configuration represents a platform that can and should be expanded upon. We also encourage the three existing Northeast ISOs to look at the best practices in all three ISOs and to adopt those market rules that would be appropriate for a single Northeast RTO. Consistent with this ruling, and in consideration of the above, we are issuing concurrent with this order, a separate order that directs the parties in this proceeding and the parties in Docket Nos. RT01-2-000 (PJM), RT01-95-000 (New York) and RT01-98-000 and RT01-10-000 (PJM West), to participate in settlement discussions for 45 days before a mediator and appropriate

²⁸ In March 2000, for example, PJM threatened to discontinue prescheduling transactions with the NYISO due to the frequency of transaction curtailments imposed by the NYISO under its market rules.

²⁹ The MOU was executed by ISO-NE, the NYISO and PJM in August 1999. The Ontario IMO joined the MOU later in 1999.

³⁰ Order No. 2000 at 31,083.

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consultants to assist and provide advice during the mediation.³¹ The order directing mediation requires the mediator to file a report within 10 days after the 45 day period, which includes an outline of the proposal to create a single Northeastern RTO, milestones for completion of intermediate steps and a deadline for submitting the joint proposal. We intend to review the report and may issue a subsequent order.

We encourage the state commissions to participate in these efforts. We believe their participation will further the resolution of this matter. Similarly, we encourage Canadian entities that are part of the Northeast Power Coordinating Council to participate in the discussions to the extent consistent with their status as subjects of a foreign sovereign nation.

[...]

The Commission orders:

(A) Petitioners' request for a declaratory order seeking a determination that NERTO, as a hybrid transmission entity, satisfies the requirements of Order No. 2000, is hereby denied for the reasons discussed in this order.

[...]

By the Commission.

Commissioner Breathitt dissented in part with a separate statement attached.

Commissioner Wood concurred with a separate statement attached.

David P. Boergers,
Secretary.

³¹ See order issued concurrently in Docket No. RT01-99-000.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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Bangor Hydro-Electric Company
Central Maine Power Company
National Grid USA
Northeast Utilities Service Company
The United Illuminating Company
Vermont Electric Power Company
ISO New England Inc.

Docket No. RT01-86-000

NSTAR Services Company

Docket No. RT01-94-000

(Issued July 12, 2001)

Breathitt, Commissioner, dissenting, in part:

Since the Commission began promoting RTOs as a means to remove barriers and impediments to wholesale electricity markets, I have been fully committed to the goal of implementing RTOs. However, I am dissenting, in part, to express my objections to specific language in this order and other RTO orders on today's agenda supporting the creation of four RTOs in the country. I agree with the majority's claim that the Commission has been attempting to facilitate the development of large RTOs reflecting natural markets since we issued Order No. 2000. That was our stated goal and one that I have actively pursued. However, today's orders go further by stating that the Commission "favors the development of one RTO for the Northeast, one RTO for the Midwest, one RTO for the Southeast, and one RTO for the West." I do not necessarily favor such development.

When the Commission deliberated over how to attain our mutual objective of RTO formation, we decided to adopt an open collaborative process that relied on voluntary regional participation. The intent was to design RTOs so that they could be tailored to the specific needs of each region. We specifically declined to propose fixed or specific regional boundaries under section 202(a) of the FPA. Instead, we concluded, as a matter of policy, that we would not attempt to draw boundaries, based upon our conviction that transmission owners, market participants, and regulators in a particular region have a better understanding of the dynamics of the transmission system in that region, and that they should propose the appropriate scope and regional configuration of an RTO. We did not specifically endorse one particular scheme of RTO configuration, but opted instead to establish appropriate guidelines to aid in RTO development. In fact, our regulation requires only that an appropriate region is one of sufficient scope and configuration to permit an RTO to maintain reliability, effectively perform its required functions, and support efficient and non-discriminatory power markets.

Today's order represents a dramatic departure from the approach we pursued in Order No. 2000 to the extent that it directs the formation of four specific RTOs. Just as some commenters to our RTO rulemaking feared, the Magic Markers have come out, and the boundaries are being drawn with little

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regard to the status and timing of RTO formation efforts in various regions of the country. This was not my intent at the time we issued Order No. 2000; and the events since we issued Order No. 2000 do not compel me to embrace this policy shift. Parties have spent many hours and countless resources in negotiations, collaborations, and complicated business strategy sessions to develop reasonable RTO approaches. The impact of the majority's directive that these four RTOs be formed could be to render these efforts useless and force parties to begin the difficult and time-consuming process anew. For example, the Midwest ISO -Alliance settlement, which the Commission approved and which represented a tremendous effort by many parties, could unravel.

If the majority believes that the Commission should depart from the basic philosophies embodied in Order No. 2000, then I believe it would be only appropriate to initiate a formal notice-and-comment rulemaking proceeding so that we could make a reasoned decision informed by the views of the stakeholders in this process – state commissions, chief among others.

Finally, I do not adopt the majority's assertion that forming larger RTOs will result in lower wholesale electricity prices. This is a laudable goal, and as such, I embrace it. As a general proposition, Order No. 2000 encouraged the development of large RTOs. However, the promise of lower wholesale electricity prices is one that I, as a federal official, am not willing to make to consumers at this time.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

Linda K. Breathitt
Commissioner

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 66 FERC ¶ 61,065
 FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before Commissioners: Curt Hébert, Jr., Chairman;
 William L. Massey, Linda Breathitt,
 Pat Wood, III and Nora Mead Brownell.

Regional Transmission Organizations

Docket No. RT01-99-000

ORDER INITIATING MEDIATION

(Issued July 12, 2001)

In separate orders to be issued concurrently with this order, the Commission concludes that it is necessary that the three independent system operators in the Northeastern United States combine to form one Regional Transmission Organization (RTO). In this order, the Commission initiates mediation for the purpose of facilitating the formation of a single RTO for the Northeastern United States.¹

Pursuant to the Commission's requirements in Order No. 2000,² public utilities throughout the country submitted proposals seeking authorization to establish themselves as RTOs. Among those filing proposals were Bangor Hydro-Electric Company, *et al.*, in Docket No. RT01-86-000, the New York Independent System Operator, Inc., *et al.*, in Docket No. RT01-95-000, and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM), *et al.*, in Docket No. RT01-2-000. In addition, PJM and Allegheny Power propose to create an RTO in the Mid-Atlantic region to be known as PJM West, in Docket No. RT01-98-000. The Commission addresses the merits of these proposals in separate orders to be issued concurrently with this order. In each, the Commission concludes that, while the scope and regional configuration of the proposed RTOs either are provisionally consistent with Order No. 2000 or do not meet Order No. 2000's scope characteristic, in order to successfully address seams issues among the three existing Northeast ISOs and establish efficient markets in the Northeast, it is necessary that all four entities combine to form a single RTO.

We believe that the resolution of issues associated with the formation of a single Northeastern RTO should be the subject of good faith negotiations among the parties in all of these proceedings. To aid

¹ We will consider using mediation in other RTO regions in the future as appropriate.

² Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 809 (January 6, 2000), FERC Statutes and Regulations, Regulations Preambles July 1996-December 2000 ¶ 31,089 (1999), *order on reh'g*, Order No. 2000-A, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,088 (March 8, 2000), FERC Statutes and Regulations, Regulations Preambles July 1996-December 2000 ¶ 31,092 (2000), *petitions for review pending sub nom*, Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, Washington v. FERC, Nos. 00-1174, *et al.* (D.C. Cir.).

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the parties in this goal, the Commission will direct Administrative Law Judge H. Peter Young and appropriate consultants to convene a meeting of the parties and to mediate settlement discussions for a period of 45 days, beginning within one week of the date this order issues. Judge Young will be directed to file a report within 10 days after the 45 day period, which will include an outline of the proposal to create a single Northeastern RTO, milestones for the completion of intermediate steps, and a deadline for submitting a joint proposal. Judge Young should coordinate closely with the appointed consultants particularly with respect to milestones and deadlines. The Commission will review the report and may issue further orders as needed. Consistent with Rule 601 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, any person appearing at the settlement discussions in a representative capacity must be authorized to act on behalf of that person's principal with respect to matters to be addressed there.³

The Commission orders:

(A) The parties in Docket Nos. RT01-2-000, RT01-86-000, RT01-95-000, and RT01-98-000 are hereby directed to participate in mediation, as discussed in the body of this order.

(B) Judge Young is hereby directed to file a report with the Commission within 10 days of the conclusion of the 45 day period, as discussed in the body of this order.

By the Commission.
Commissioner Massey concurred with a separate statement attached.
(S E A L)

David P. Boergers,
Secretary.

³ 18 C.F.R. § 385.601(b)(2) (2000).

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Regional Transmission Organizations

Docket No. RT01-99-000

(Issued July 12, 2001)

MASSEY, Commissioner, concurring:

Today marks a watershed in the evolution of our RTO policy. For the first time we set a clear objective for RTO topography, meaning geographic scope, and indicate a fresh resolve to get the RTO job done.

In the orders addressing the Northeast RTO proposals⁴ and the Southeast RTO proposals,⁵ the Commission adopts as its firm objective a single RTO for the Northeast, one for the Southeast, one for the Midwest, and one for the West. We state this objective for four RTOs covering the entire nation. With this clear statement, we at long last provide much needed guidance to the industry for getting RTOs in place and delivering their benefits to the nation's electricity consumers. This guidance is long overdue. I have long advocated providing such guidance, and believe we could have saved valuable time by articulating it eighteen months ago instead of now. But better late than never. I am pleased that we are moving ahead today.

We show a new resolve today also by directing the parties in the Northeast and those in the Southeast to formal mediation in order to establish a plan for forging a single RTO for their regions and a timetable for doing so. I strongly support this approach. A skilled, neutral judge will help resolve the tough issues that will surely arise and will be able to provide trusted advice to the Commission if and when we need to step in. If this job is going to get done in due time, the presence of a mediator is absolutely necessary.

Each of the regions present their own unique challenges to the mediator. In the Northeast, it is to bring together three ISOs that have done truly pioneering work. They blazed the trail for grid regionalization long before Order No. 2000. Their hard work showed us the way in many respects and

⁴ Docket Nos. RT01-2-000, RT01-98-000, RT01-10-000, RT01-95-000, RT01-86-000, and RT01-94-000.

⁵ Docket Nos. RT01-74-002 and -003, RT01-77-000, RT01-34-000 and -002, and RT01-75-000 and -003.

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brought benefits to their customers. We owe them our thanks. In the Southeast, the challenge is to kick start a region that has been sorely lagging the rest of the nation in grid regionalization. It's long past time to move forward.

I am also heartened that today's orders addressing the Northeast clearly set PJM as the platform upon which the Northeast RTO will be built. The PJM market design, which is based upon locational marginal pricing, has proven itself again and again. The PJM market design works, and so I am particularly pleased that our chosen platform for Northeast RTO development is PJM. Indeed, the fact that the New England ISO decided to acquire the PJM market design speaks volumes. Setting PJM as the platform for the region is yet another indication of our firm resolve to achieve a single RTO in the Northeast.

While I am very pleased with the resolve we are showing in the Northeast and the Southeast, I am disappointed that we are not applying that same resolve in all regions, and for that reason I will concur with that aspect of several of today's orders.

To facilitate the timely development of the single Midwest RTO, which our orders today state as a clear objective, I would direct Alliance, the Midwest ISO, and the Southwest Power Pool to a mediation proceeding with the same objective and timetable as that for the Northeast and Southeast RTOs. The settlement that we approved between the Alliance and Midwest ISO was a bold step in the right direction, but those institutions should have been directed toward a single RTO from the outset. And SPP would add even greater scope to the Midwest RTO. We direct SPP to the Southeastern mediation but recognize they may well belong in the Midwest. I believe they do and we should provide now the needed direction and forum for SPP to accomplish its RTO responsibilities. Although I am pleased with the progress we make today, I am somewhat disappointed that we once again miss a golden opportunity to achieve in the Midwest what we insist upon in the Southeast and the Northeast.

RTO West provides a superb start toward a single RTO for the West. It is a worthy anchor institution for the region. The events of the past year have dramatically shown that the West is truly a single regional market that needs single grid management. I recognize the exceptionally tough challenges to attaining a Western RTO. That's why I believe formal mediation and a timetable for resolution is essential now for the West aimed at a single RTO, and I am disappointed we do not take such a step today.

We must get in place the organizational as well as the physical infrastructure needed to support well-functioning competitive electricity markets. RTOs are a critical part of the competitive infrastructure.

And finally, in the orders addressing the Northeast RTO proposals, the Commission expresses its intention to evaluate in the near future the importance of standardizing generation interconnection procedures. I've long advocated such standardization so this is a big step in the right direction. But again, I would have been clearer and firmer in expressing our resolve to standardize interconnection procedures. For me, the time to evaluate whether to do so is past. It's time simply to do it.

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Interconnection standardization is good for the market. Generators should make location decisions based on economics, not on the basis of a patchwork of idiosyncratic interconnection standards. Establishing uniform standards will be good for generation investment and good for consumers. And standardization would be good for the Commission's staff resources. It's no secret that the staff is laboring under a crushing work load. Processing a multitude of interconnection filings eats up staff time. Standardization will free staff for other important work.

I heartily welcome the bold steps we take today. This action is needed if we hope to get RTOs that are consistent with the standards and goals of Order No. 2000 in place in the near future. Nevertheless, I would have taken even bolder action in the respects I have underscored.

Therefore, I concur with today's order.

William L. Massey
Commissioner

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Regional Transmission Organizations

Docket No. RT01-99-000

NOTICE GRANTING INTERVENTIONS

(August 1, 2001)

On July 27, 2001, Transenergie filed respective a Motion to Intervene in the above-docketed proceeding.

Pursuant to Rule 214 (18 CFR 385.214 (2001)), the Motion to Intervene in this proceeding is granted, subject to the Commission's rules and regulations.

David P. Boergers
Secretary

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PLAN STRATÉGIQUE 1998-2002 D'HYDRO-QUÉBEC
TEL QU'APPROUVÉ PAR LE GOUVERNEMENT DU QUÉBEC

D. 51-98, 14 janvier 1998, (1998) 130 G.O. // 1222.
D. 887-98, 22 juin 1998, (1998) 130 G.O. // 4013.

(Extraits)
[v.r.]

PLAN STRATÉGIQUE 1998-2002 D'HYDRO-QUÉBEC
TEL QU'APPROUVÉ PAR LE GOUVERNEMENT DU QUÉBEC

D. 51-98, 14 janvier 1998, (1998) 130 G.O. II 1222.
D. 887-98, 22 juin 1998, (1998) 130 G.O. II 4013.

(Extraits)

Nous soumettons respectueusement que la Régie a connaissance judiciaire de ce *Plan*, qui est un acte du gouvernement, approuvé par décret. À défaut, nous prions la Régie de recevoir les quatre extraits suivants, cités à la présente argumentation, à titre de complément de preuve:

"L'évolution plus récente – notamment la multiplication des intermédiaires et les nombreuses offres de partenariat venant d'intervenants majeurs dans l'industrie – permet de croire qu'Hydro-Québec aura le choix, soit de transiger directement dans les marchés avec le permis émis par la FERC, soit de transiger à des conditions attrayantes avec un nombre important d'intermédiaires à la frontière du Québec." (p. 18)

"La croissance et la rentabilité d'Hydro-Québec doivent s'appuyer sur une meilleure appréciation, à l'interne comme à l'externe, de son bilan environnemental largement positif. L'entreprise fera donc en sorte de mieux faire connaître les avantages de sa filière de production hydroélectrique, généralement reconnue comme une énergie verte et peu polluante. [...]"

Par ailleurs, l'énergie hydroélectrique apporte une contribution importante au développement durable sur le continent, notamment en ce qui concerne l'atteinte des objectifs en matière de réduction des émissions de CO₂. Hydro-Québec entend intervenir davantage auprès des organisations nationales et internationales afin de promouvoir l'hydroélectricité, en particulier en Amérique du Nord. Elle veut associer à cette démarche des partenaires québécois, canadiens et internationaux." (pp. 38-39)

"[...] d'ici 2002, l'entreprise prévoit implanter la norme ISO 14001, qui permettra d'encadrer la gestion des répercussions environnementales des activités de

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PLAN STRATÉGIQUE 1998-2002 D'HYDRO-QUÉBEC
TEL QU'APPROUVÉ PAR LE GOUVERNEMENT (Extraits)

STRATÉGIES ÉNERGÉTIQUES - GROUPE STOP

RÉGIE DE L'ÉNERGIE - DOSSIER R-3401-98**CAUSE TARIFAIRE 2001 DE TRANSPORT D'ÉLECTRICITÉ PAR HYDRO-QUÉBEC**

l'entreprise en production, transport et distribution, dans un processus d'amélioration continue. Pour le volet production, le système sera implanté progressivement d'ici l'an 2000. L'entreprise entend également continuer de participer au Programme d'engagement et de responsabilité en environnement de l'Association canadienne de l'électricité." (p. 39)

"2. Offrir des services intégrés de transport électrique reliant les zones de production aux marchés de consommation

TransÉnergie entend être active sur les marchés hors Québec; elle veut aussi proposer un tarif uniforme de transport pour l'ensemble des marchés qu'elle dessert. Cette approche repose sur les principes tarifaires suivants :

- la tarification au coût moyen, pour tous les ajouts de capacité (approche dite de rolled-in) ;*
- la tarification uniforme de type timbre-poste, sur tout le réseau de TransÉnergie ;*
- l'inclusion, dans le service de base de TransÉnergie, de composantes de transport hors Québec pour les zones de marché et de production qui s'intègrent au réseau étendu de TransÉnergie (approche dite de transmission par des tiers).*

L'approche tarifaire proposée pour le transport de l'électricité correspond en grande partie à l'approche retenue pour le transport du gaz naturel et du pétrole. En soi, elle vise le traitement équitable du transport des différentes formes d'énergie.

Parallèlement aux actions qu'entreprendra sa division TransÉnergie, Hydro-Québec entend :

3. Réserver par contrat les axes stratégiques de transport pour optimiser la production et la commercialisation d'énergie

Cette mesure s'inscrit dans les efforts déployés par l'entreprise pour faire du Québec une plaque tournante de l'énergie en Amérique du Nord. Les capacités contractées s'étendront le plus souvent jusqu'aux points de transactions finales de l'énergie dans les marchés québécois et hors Québec. (p.38)

<i>Principes pour le tarif de transport</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><i>• Tarif uniforme</i><i>• Tarif au coût moyen</i><i>• Transport hors Québec inclus</i>
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STRATÉGIES ÉNERGÉTIQUES - GROUPE STOP