RESPONSE TO SOCIÉTÉ EN COMMANDITE GAZ MÉTRO (GAZ MÉTRO) TO THE INFORMATION REQUEST NO. 3 FROM EXPERT PAUL L. CHERNICK ON THE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE OF GAZ MÉTRO

1. Source:

R-3867-2013, B-0278, Review of Methodologies for Evaluating the Profitability of System Extension Projects – Black and Veatch evidence, (Gaz Métro-7, Document 5), p. 2.

Preamble:

"Acceptability criteria [is] IRR greater than the Prospective WACC."

Questions:

1.1. Please explain why Gaz Métro intends to use the IRR test, rather than the net present value at the WACC or other discount rate.

Response:

The IRR and the WACC are two investment evaluation concepts that are strongly linked to one another, the IRR being the discount rate for which a WACC is equal to 0. The use of the IRR simplifies comparison with the capital cost; an IRR above the capital cost means that the project is economically profitable (reduction of the rates over the analysis period) whereas an IRR below the capital cost means that the project is not economically profitable (increase of rates over the analysis period). Nevertheless, the decision-making processes to accept (or not accept) a project based on either the IRR or the WACC are equivalent; an IRR greater than the capital cost implies a WACC above 0 and, therefore, the project is economically profitable and thus accepted. For the sake of simplicity, the IRR is the tool used by Gaz Métro to determine whether a project is above the prospective capital cost. This method was approved by the Régie in its decision D-97-25.

1.2. Since customers will pay the net revenue requirements of the extension project, why does Gaz Métro propose to use the WACC rather than an estimate of the cost of capital to its customers?

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Response:

Investments are financed by a capital structure authorized by the Régie (debt and equity), the weighted average cost of the prospective capital therefore being the representative cost of funding the investment. This method was approved by the Régie in its decision D-97-25.

a. Please provide any available estimate of the cost of capital for any of Gaz Métro's rate classes.

Response:

See response to previous question.

b. Please provide and available estimate of the percentage of Gaz Métro residential customers who carry a credit-card balance.

Response:

Gaz Métro has no information regarding the credit card balances of its customers.

2. Source:

R-3867-2013, B-0278, Review of Methodologies for Evaluating the Profitability of System Extension Projects – Black and Veatch evidence, (Gaz Métro-7, Document 5), p. 2.

Preamble:

- "[...] the cost of a distribution system project undertaken by a gas utility to replace a segment of its existing distribution mains or the cost to replace a gas service line or gas meter at a particular customer's location would not constitute an incremental cost. It is simply the cost of maintaining the existing level of output and not an incremental cost to increase the utility's output."
- "Current costs should be used to determine the directly attributable, capital-related costs to connect a new customer (e.g., main extension, service line, meter and regulator)"

Questions:

2.1. Please explain in detail how Gaz Métro reflects the costs of maintenance capital expenditures for the "directly attributable" additions over the life of the analysis.

Response:

The cost of maintenance capitalizable expenditures are used to either prolong the lifespan of an asset, or to replace it and therefore continue the service. For Gaz Métro, these investments are seen as improvements to the system and ensure the maintenance of safe and viable assets. Therefore, investments in system improvements do not constitute incremental costs and are not taken into account in the profitability analysis as is indicated in exhibits provided by Gaz Métro¹ and the expert².

- **2.2.** Please provide any available data on the retirements and replacements of each of the following by age of the installation:
 - a. Mains;
 - b. Service lines;
 - C. Meters;
 - d. Regulators.

Answer:

Retirement amount (\$)					
Age of assets	Between 0 and 10 years			Between 31 and 40 years	Total by category
Steel and direct plastic connections	(257,817)	(622,593)	(847,218)	(1,106,940)	(2,834,568)
Steel and direct plastic service lines	(338,340)	(181,641)	(501,182)	(2,390,752)	(3,411,915)
Meters	(851,680)	(1,773,798)	(3,550,513)	0	(6,175,991)
Total per age group	(1,447,837)	(2,578,032)	(4,898,913)	(3,497,691)	(12,422,473)

¹ B-0277, Gaz Métro-7, Document 4. ² B-0278, Gaz Métro-7, Document 5.

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Retirements related to regulators are included with those of connections. Gaz Métro does not have a separate asset category for regulators.

In the majority of cases, a retirement is carried out following an asset replacement project.

3. Source:

R-3867-2013, B-0278, Review of Methodologies for Evaluating the Profitability of System Extension Projects – Black and Veatch evidence, (Gaz Métro-7, Document 5), pp. 3 and 34.

Preamble:

"As long as the incremental revenues from a new customer to be served by the gas utility can recover, at a minimum, the directly attributable costs of the proposed new connection to the utility's gas distribution system, any revenues above that minimum level will provide a positive contribution to the recovery of the gas utility's fixed costs that are common to the specific activities and functions of the gas utility's development efforts to add new customers and to continue to serve existing customers."

Questions:

3.1. Please explain how this statement applies if Gaz Métro needs to add upstream capacity during the analysis period to meet the combined load of this new customer, other new customers on the line extension, new customers on other line extensions, new customers along existing lines, and additional load from existing customers.

Response:

Black & Veatch

The statement will also apply in this situation because each of the new customers will provide a positive contribution to the recovery of Gaz Métro's fixed costs of the added upstream capacity during the analysis period, while its existing customers will also contribute to the recovery of those development costs when they are eventually reflected in Gaz Métro's rates.

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3.2. If a new customer would require service-extension investment and expenses (including metering, billing, and the like) with a present value of \$1 million, provide GM with revenues of \$1.3 million and require a \$1 million upgrade in the upstream distribution system about five years after it comes on line, would that customer be profitable to Gaz Métro?

Response:

Black & Veatch

The profitability of the assumed upstream distribution system project should not be evaluated solely on the basis of the profitability of a single customer. As explained in the response to FCEI question 9.1 (Gaz Métro-9, Document 11), in this type of situation, Gaz Métro would review the potential for creating future customer benefits from the upstream distribution system investment. Moreover, as explained in the responses to guestions 12.1 and 12.3 below, distribution networks are complex and it is not possible to generalize the impact of network reinforcement. Some reinforcements have an impact on a small part of the network, while other reinforcements impact the entire Gaz Métro network. The inclusion of the System Incremental Capital Investment at the portfolio level is efficient because it would avoid having to develop a process and methodology to apportion the cost of the System Incremental Capital Investment to individual projects, and possibly to Gaz Métro's existing customers. This method is equitable because it recognizes the lumpy nature of the investment by aligning the number of new customers to be served and their capacity needs over the analysis time period with the investment level needed to satisfy those customer requirements rather than attributing the entire cost of the investment to the "next customer" at the margin causing the need for the investment. Finally, the inclusion of the System Incremental Capital Investment at the portfolio level is straightforward and not subject to variations in interpretation or application.

Nevertheless, in the example posed in the question which is a very rare occurrence, if the upstream distribution system investment is only to be used to serve this one customer, with no possibility of serving future customers or creating other system benefits, then this project would not be deemed to be profitable because the directly assignable costs for this customer would also include the costs of the upstream investment.

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4. Source:

R-3867-2013, B-0278, Review of Methodologies for Evaluating the Profitability of System Extension Projects – Black and Veatch evidence, (Gaz Métro-7, Document 5), pp. 3 and 11.

Preamble:

"Using LRIC costing concepts to establish each cost component in a gas utility's economic evaluation of system extension projects could violate the "matching principle" of utility ratemaking (i.e., a utility's revenues derived from rates must match its total cost of service or total revenue requirement approved by the regulator)."

Questions:

- **4.1.** Please define as precisely as possible what is meant by "LRIC" in this context.
 - Does "long-run" in this context mean the average expected incremental cost to a. the system due to this incremental load over the analysis period?

Response:

Black & Veatch

Conceptually, Long-Run Incremental Cost ("LRIC") is a variant of Long-Run Marginal Cost ("LRMC") that examines changes in costs associated with a multiple unit (i.e., incremental) change in utility service or output. For both LRIC and LRMC, such costs are derived over a sufficiently long period of time in which all inputs of production are considered to be variable. As a result of using an incremental change in output, because capacity additions tend to be lumpy, LRIC may reflect more capacity additions than those required to serve the increment of load assumed for any one particular project or group of projects.

For purposes of Gaz Métro's profitability analysis, LRIC reflects the change in capital costs associated with the expansion of Gaz Métro's gas distribution system to serve new customers. These capital costs are derived based on the specific facilities required to connect the new customers to the utility's existing gas distribution system and to serve the customer's peak capacity requirements. Where this type of cost determination can be made, the LRIC amount should not be derived based on a generalized measure of the change in costs across the utility's system (i.e., as would be derived in an LRIC study) and added into the profitability analysis, irrespective of whether such facilities are actually required to serve the new customers that are being evaluated. It is

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not appropriate to use a generalized measure of LRIC in a profitability analysis for system extension projects because the resulting level of costs does not reflect the actual cost of the facilities required to connect the new customers to the gas utility's existing gas distribution system.

b. Does "long-run" in this context mean the average cost of replacing the entire Gaz Métro system at current prices?

Response:

Black & Veatch

No. Please see the response to question 4.1 above.

4.2. Please explain whether this statement is intended to suggest that using LRIC concepts in the economic evaluation of system extension projects could result in Gaz Métro receiving revenues exceeding its revenue requirement.

Response:

Black & Veatch

The statement is intended to suggest caution when determining the level of incremental costs that should be attributed to new customers under Gaz Métro's evaluation of the profitability of its system extension projects. For example, based on the results of an LRIC study, all new customers would be assigned the LRIC of a main extension, but only some new customers will actually require this capital investment based on where they are located in relation to the utility's existing gas distribution grid. The attribution of additional costs to these customers under this situation could create the need for a contribution from the customer, where one is not needed.

a. If so, please explain how this could occur and provide numerical examples of this effect.

Response:

Black & Veatch

Please see the response to question 4.2 above.

b. If not, please explain what this assertion means.

Response:

Black & Veatch

Please see the response to question 4.2 above.

4.3. Please explain why the word "each" is italicized in this passage on page 3.

Response:

Black & Veatch

The word "each" was italicized to emphasize the cautionary note indicating that the results of a LRIC study should not always be used as the basis for valuing the cost of each and every plant component required to serve new customers.

5. Source:

R-3867-2013, B-0278, Review of Methodologies for Evaluating the Profitability of System Extension Projects – Black and Veatch evidence, (Gaz Métro-7, Document 5), p. 11.

Preamble:

"[C]aution must be exercised in order to prevent a mismatch between the embedded costs used to set rates for the utility's existing customers (which are the same rates used to derive the revenues expected from new customers) and the LRIC used to derive the profitability of serving new customers, and the level of any customer contribution required of new customers."

Questions:

5.1. Please define the "mismatch" and provide numerical examples of the problems that B&V anticipates could arise from this mismatch.

Response:

Black & Veatch

The "mismatch" described in the referenced document could occur If a generalized measure of LRIC is used (as derived in a LRIC study) in the gas utility's profitability

analysis instead of using the actual incremental costs of connecting its new customers at the time the evaluation of the system extension project is being conducted. Under a LRIC study, the capital-related costs that are derived represent a system-wide measure of the change in costs over a long-term period caused by changes in the number of customers served and the level of capacity available to satisfy customers' demand requirements. As such, it does not necessarily reflect the actual change in costs associated with a particular system extension project or group of projects to serve new customers.

Taking the use of LRIC values to an extreme, the profitability of new customers would be evaluated using incremental revenues derived from rates based on embedded costs while the cost inputs into the gas utility's system extension profitability analysis would be valued on a LRIC basis, thereby potentially overburdening new customers with costs they are not actually causing the gas utility to incur. This situation would create a "mismatch" between the revenues and costs reflected in the profitability analysis which could create a below target financial outcome and the need for a customer contribution. This mismatch of revenues and costs would indicate the need for a customer contribution where, in reality, such a contribution would not be required if the actual capital costs of the facilities were utilized in the profitability analysis.

5.2. Please explain whether this statement implies that the Régie cannot require that Gaz Métro charge new customers more than it charges existing customers, since that would result in a "mismatch" between the costs used in setting charges for existing customers and the costs used in setting charges for new customers.

Response:

Black & Veatch

While Black & Veatch cannot offer a legal opinion on the ability of the Régie to undertake certain ratemaking actions, Black & Veatch's referenced statement was provided to highlight the importance of properly matching the change in rate revenues with capital-related costs actually caused by new customers within the context of Gaz Métro's analysis to evaluate the profitability of its system extension projects.

5.3. Please provide citations to any legal or other authority that B&V or Gaz Métro believe indicate that Gaz Métro cannot impose different charges on existing and new customers.

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Response:

Black & Veatch

Please see the response to question 5.2 above.

6. Source:

R-3867-2013, B-0278, Review of Methodologies for Evaluating the Profitability of System Extension Projects – Black and Veatch evidence, (Gaz Métro-7, Document 5), p. 3 and 34.

Preamble:

"If LRIC is used as the cost basis in a gas utility's economic evaluation of system extension projects, new customers could subsidize existing customers because the gas utility's revenue requirement and current rates are based on historical, embedded costs while the costs in the profitability model would be based on LRIC which could be higher than the level of embedded costs underlying the gas utility's current rates."

Questions:

6.1. Please explain how this subsidization would happen.

Response:

Black & Veatch

Please see the response to question 5 above. In some of the LRIC studies that Black & Veatch has conducted for gas utilities, the results indicated that the gas utility's total revenue requirement based on LRIC was higher than the level of its total revenue requirement based on embedded or historical costs.

6.2. Please explain whether this subsidization would only occur if the incremental costs due to the system extension project were less than the upstream LRIC assumed in the economic evaluation.

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Response:

Black & Veatch

This type of subsidization could occur under the conditions described in the response to question 5 above.

If this subsidization would only occur in other situations, please describe those a. situations.

Response:

Black & Veatch

Please see the response to question 6.2 above.

6.3. Please explain whether the incremental costs due to the system extension project could be higher than the average upstream LRIC assumed in the economic evaluation.

Response:

Black & Veatch

Please see the response to question 6.2 above.

If so, would those circumstances result in existing customers subsidizing the a. new customers on the service extension?

Response:

Black & Veatch

Please see the response to question 6.2 above.

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7. Source:

R-3867-2013, B-0278, Review of Methodologies for Evaluating the Profitability of System Extension Projects – Black and Veatch evidence, (Gaz Métro-7, Document 5), p. 3 and 34.

Preamble:

"Under this approach, the common fixed costs of providing utility service to a
particular rate class are attributed to all customers within the class – not to any one
customer."

Questions:

- **7.1.** Does this statement also apply to :
 - **a.** all the new customers on a service extension?

Response:

Black & Veatch

Yes, if a "service extension" is defined as a single system extension project.

b. all the new customers on all service extensions in a capital plan?

Response:

Black & Veatch

Yes, if all the new customers on all service extensions are included in the portfolio of projects.

c. all the new customers on all service extensions over the next 40 years?

Response:

Black & Veatch

No. The referenced statement is applicable to a 12-month test year that would be used as the basis for a gas utility's cost of service study, class revenues and rate design.

7.2. Does B&V mean to suggest that new customers should not be charged for their contribution to adding or advancing system reinforcements that serve both new and existing customers?

Response:

Black & Veatch

No. The capital-related costs of system reinforcements will be included in Gaz Metro's profitability analysis conducted on a project portfolio basis and will be included in future base rates that will be charged to all customers.

If so, please provide the rational for prohibiting such charges.

Response:

Black & Veatch

Not Applicable.

If new customers require expensive upstream additions (i.e., additions not dedicated to the new customers) over the analysis period, but pay only the average embedded costs, could existing customers wind up subsidizing the new customers?

Response:

Black & Veatch

No. Please see the response to question 12 below. The profitability analysis conducted on a portfolio basis would include the cost of System Incremental Capital Investments and is targeted to have a Profitability Index (P.I.) of 1.1. If the portfolio P.I. is greater than 1.0, new customers are effectively providing more revenues than their incremental costs so there would be no subsidy from existing customers to new customers. In other words, the inclusion of the costs of additional upstream additions in future base rates will not increase the rates charged to existing customers if the portfolio P.I. is greater than 1.0 for all new projects. This outcome occurs because Gaz Métro's profitability analysis conducted on a portfolio basis is a conservative approach since it reflects the entire cost of System Incremental Capital Investments in evaluating the profitability of its new customers.

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Moreover, to the extent upstream main reinforcements also provide additional capacity and operational flexibility to Gaz Métro's existing customers, attributing the entire cost of such investment to new customers should be viewed as a conservative approach to evaluating the profitability of system extension projects since a portion of those facilities will also provide benefits to Gaz Métro's existing customers.

8. Source:

R-3867-2013, B-0278, Review of Methodologies for Evaluating the Profitability of System Extension Projects – Black and Veatch evidence, (Gaz Métro-7, Document 5), p. 3 and 34.

Preamble:

"Determination of the portion of upstream main reinforcements attributable to each new customer can be difficult since the main investment could provide future service to new customers, to all future customers, and/or to existing customers who require additional capacity over the life of the new facilities - which would be viewed as a lumpy system investment."

Questions:

8.1. Does B&V believe that values that "can be difficult" to determine should be set to zero?

Response:

Black & Veatch

No. The issue is not whether all or a portion of the cost of an upstream main reinforcement should be excluded from the profitability analysis, but rather at what point in time should those costs be valued and included in the analysis, and how should that be accomplished. Black & Veatch's recommendation is to include Gaz Métro's upstream main reinforcement costs in its profitability analysis on a portfolio basis rather than on an individual project basis. There is much greater certainty when calculating total upstream reinforcement costs at a portfolio level compared to at an individual project level. Therefore, inclusion of upstream reinforcement costs in the profitability analysis for an individual project adds unnecessary uncertainty and variability to the resulting calculations. This is due to the fact that any method of

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attributing upstream reinforcement costs to an individual project will be imperfect, and would by its very nature likely create an overstatement of the incremental investment costs required to provide the level of capacity for the new customers associated with that single project. The attribution of additional costs to these customers under this situation could create the need for a contribution from the customer, where one is not needed and therefore some projects taken individually could not meet the profitability index criteria. This situation would result in the utility foregoing an opportunity to take advantage of economies of scale and scope missing an opportunity to decrease rates for its existing customers. As such, it is best to measure the profitability of upstream system reinforcement investments over the entire portfolio of projects rather than for each individual project.

Please, also see the response to question 9.1 in the Information Request from OC (Gaz Métro-9, Document 12).

a. If not, does B&V agree that a portion of future "upstream main reinforcements" should be attributed to load growth from new customers?

Response:

Black & Veatch

Please see the responses to questions 4.1 and 8.1 above.

9. Source:

R-3867-2013, B-0278, Review of Methodologies for Evaluating the Profitability of System Extension Projects – Black and Veatch evidence, (Gaz Métro-7, Document 5), p. 3 and 34.

Preamble:

(i) "The evaluation of the profitability of system extension projects to serve new customers provides the gas utility with the flexibility needed to add new customers to the gas distribution system who can recover through rates their direct incremental costs of connection (i.e., the main extension, service, meter and regulator) and to

> recognize that all new customers as a group contribute to the recovery of the gas utility's common fixed costs as part of an overall project portfolio."

Questions:

9.1. To the extent that a new customer, or a group of new customers, requires additional common fixed costs exceeding the average cost of service, does B&V believe that the existing customers should subsidize these new customers?

Response:

Black & Veatch

This question assumes that a gas utility's additional common fixed costs can be allocated to new customers or to a group of new customers. By definition, a gas utility's common fixed costs represent the costs of gas utility activities that support the provision of gas service to all customers. Additional common fixed costs are incurred to support all customers, not just to support a subset of those customers. Often the level of additional common fixed costs incurred is caused by a number of operating considerations, and not solely due to the addition of new customers. For example, a gas utility's additional investment in Information Technology (IT) systems to operate a utility's call center has more to do with the economic trade-off between labor and capital (the leveraging of technology) than to the number of customers served, or the desire to enhance customer service.

The nature of common fixed costs requires that they be allocated to entire rate classes when setting base rates and not to new and existing customers separately. Any split of common fixed costs between new and existing customers would be arbitrary and likely be a poor representation of cost causation. In the example above, it would be arbitrary to attribute to new customers only a portion of the additional IT costs for the call center since these costs are incurred on a system-wide basis to serve all customers.

As explained in the Black and Veatch report (B-0278, Gaz Métro-7, Document 5), the only capital-related costs that can be attributed to new customers on an individual project basis are those that are the direct incremental costs of connection (i.e., the main extension, service, meter and regulator), which are referred to in the Black & Veatch report as Direct Incremental Development Costs. The Indirect General Capitalized Development Costs referred to in the Black & Veatch report are costs that are incurred by Gaz Métro on annual basis and are fixed for a certain range of projects that are undertaken by year so they do not change directly based on the number of new customers connected in that year. In other words, these costs are not related to any particular single project. As a result, Black & Veatch

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recommends that it is reasonable and appropriate to assign these costs to new customers on a project portfolio basis only because they are indirect common costs that are incurred by Gaz Métro to support the entirety of its development activities for all new customers. The profitability analysis conducted on a portfolio basis would include these indirect general capitalized development costs and is targeted to have a Profitability Index (P.I.) of 1.1. If the portfolio P.I. is greater than 1.0, new customers are effectively providing more revenues than their incremental costs so there would be no subsidy from existing customers to new customers. In other words, the inclusion of the indirect general capitalized development costs in future base rates will not increase the rates charged to existing customers if the portfolio P.I. is greater than 1.0 for all new projects.

a. If so, please explain why.

Response:

Black & Veatch

See response to question 9.1 above.

b. If not, please explain how B&V and Gaz Métro would avoid that outcome.

Response:

Black & Veatch

See response to question 9.1 above.

10. Source:

R-3867-2013, B-0278, Review of Methodologies for Evaluating the Profitability of System Extension Projects – Black and Veatch evidence, (Gaz Métro-7, Document 5), p. 4, 35 and Table 3.

Preamble:

- "Black & Veatch recommends that Gaz Métro continue using its current valuation period of forty (40) years, which is the most common valuation period utilized by the Peer Group utilities and reflects the average life of the capital placed into service during a system extension project."

Questions:

10.1.Please provide all the data, analysis and other sources on which B&V reviewed in making this recommendation, other than the Table 3 at p. 18 and 19.

Response:

Black & Veatch

Black & Veatch understands that the Régie renewed the use of a 40-year valuation period by Gaz Métro in R-3173-89-E (Decision D-90-60,). In addition, during the course of its project with Gaz Métro, Black & Veatch was made aware of the average service lives of the facilities placed into service in conjunction with Gaz Métro's system extension projects, and the lives were within a reasonable range of the 40-year valuation period.

Gaz Métro

For more information, please see the Régie's response to question 13.1 Gaz Métro-9, Document 9).

10.2.Please provide any evidence available to B&V regarding the probability that a customer will continue to take service from Gaz Métro at an existing location for 40 years.

Response:

Black & Veatch

Black & Veatch did not evaluate the longevity of customers taking gas service from Gaz Métro.

Gaz Métro

Please see the response to question 7.1 of the FCEI's Request for Information no. 2 (B-0257, Gaz Métro-9, Document 3).

10.3. Please provide any evidence available to B&V regarding the likelihood of customers reducing their energy consumption or abandoning a location over the next 40 years.

Response:

Black & Veatch

Black & Veatch did not evaluate the likelihood of Gaz Métro's customers reducing their energy consumption or abandoning a location over the next 40 years, However, to the extent new customers added to Gaz Métro's gas distribution system reduce their future energy consumption in a similar manner to its existing customers. Gaz Métro's rates will increase over time to account for the lower annual volumes over which costs will be recovered, and all customers will be charged those higher rates.

10.4. Please provide any analysis that B&V has conducted regarding the amount of natural gas that Québec can utilize and still meet its obligation under Canada's and Quebec's plans for greenhouse-gas reductions.

Response:

Black & Veatch

Black & Veatch did not conduct any analyses regarding the amount of natural gas that Québec can utilize and still meet its obligation under Canada's and Quebec's plans for greenhouse-gas reductions.

Gaz Métro

For more information, please see the response to question 7.10 of the request for information the ROEÉ's expert (B-0264, Gaz Métro-9, Document 6).

11. Source:

R-3867-2013, B-0278, Review of Methodologies for Evaluating the Profitability of System Extension Projects – Black and Veatch evidence. (Gaz Métro-7, Document 5), p. 4, 35 and 36.

Preamble:

"Black & Veatch finds that the approach utilized by FortisBC, Union Gas Limited and Enbridge Gas Distribution is a reasonable and well-balanced approach. This

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method utilizes an individual project P.I. of 0.8 and a project portfolio P.I. of 1.1 as the appropriate profitability targets. Black & Veatch recommends that Gaz Métro adopt this type of approach."

"[...] adopt a P.I. of 0.8 for individual projects (if further growth is anticipated) [...]"

Questions:

11.1. Please explain whether the 0.8 project P.I. "target" would mean that projects would only be required to provide an IRR equal to 80% of the WACC.

Response:

No, a P.I. target of 0.8 does not mean that the required IRR would be equal to 80% of the WACC.

a. If not, what does that the 0.8 target mean?

Response:

The profitability index, also known as the cost/benefit ratio, relates a project's positive flows (or operational flows) and its negative flows (or project costs). The target PI of 0.8 means that the ratio between the operational flows (discounted to the PCC) and the project costs (also discounted) must be at least 0.8. In other words, a target PI of 0.8 means that for each dollar invested, a project must generate a minimum of \$0.80 in actual value.

- b. If the capital anticipated for a service extension were \$1 million, and the present value of the operating expenses were \$200,000, how much would the present value of revenues need to be for the project to pass the 0.8 P.I. threshold?
 - Please explain why it is fair for the existing customers, and profitable (i) new customers, to pay for this unprofitable service extension.

Response:

The actual value of the revenues, in the above example, should be \$1 million.

Please refer to the response to question 3.6 of the ACIG'S Request for Information no. 3 (Gaz Métro-9, Document 10).

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11.2. Please explain how B&V found the 0.8 project P.I. to be appropriate.

Response:

Black & Veatch

Black & Veatch's review of the Peer Group research noted that FortisBC, Union Gas Limited and Enbridge Gas Distribution each use the 0.8 project P.I., Black & Veatch also reviewed the additional evidence filed by Gaz Métro on January 20, 2017 in R-3867-2013. That evidence showed that the profitability of the extension projects analyzed by Gaz Métro increased an average of 4.48% (i.e., the internal rate of return or IRR increased by 4.48%). This data indicates that historically there has been an increase in the a priori profitability and the profitability actually realized. As stated in Gaz Metro's evidence, this result supports a 2% acceptable minimum threshold. This also provides strong evidence that the individual project P.I. should be set at a level below 1.00.

Using an acceptable minimum threshold IRR of 2% in a profitability analysis is equivalent to a project P.I. of 0.6, which is below the P.I. of 0.8 used in Ontario and British Columbia. Based on this evidence, Black & Veatch concluded that a conservative approach would be to utilize a P.I. of 0.8, which is the same value used by multiple gas utilities in the Peer Group.

11.3.Please provide B&V's estimate of the growth that should be anticipated "if further growth is anticipated."

Response:

Black & Veatch

Black & Veatch did not estimate of the growth that should be anticipated.

Gaz Métro

Please refer to the response to question 3.6 of the ACIG'S Request for Information no. 3 (Gaz Métro-9, Document 10).

a. Please provide the basis for that estimate.

Response:

Please refer to the response to question 11.3.

b. Please explain how that growth rate justifies the 0.8 P.I. threshold.

Response:

Please refer to the response to question 11.3.

11.4. Please explain how B&V expects that Gaz Métro would be able to determine whether further growth should be anticipated.

Response:

Please refer to the response to question 11.3.

How much further growth should be anticipated to invoke the 0.8 P.I. a. threshold?

Response:

Please refer to the response to question 11.3.

b. How would the determination of future growth reflect the costs associated with the future growth (service lines, meters, metering, billing and customer service, further main extension, etc.)?

Response:

In Phase 2 of its governance process, Gaz Métro conducts sensitivity analyses to evaluate the number of customers in addition to those identified a priori will be needed to achieve a profitability equal to a PI of 1. Gaz Métro notes that there are costs are associated these additional customers.

For more information on the governance process, please refer to Schedule Q-18.1 of the Régie's Request for Information no. 11 (Gaz Métro-9, Document 9).

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12. Source:

R-3867-2013, B-0278, Review of Methodologies for Evaluating the Profitability of System Extension Projects – Black and Veatch evidence, (Gaz Métro-7, Document 5), p. 32, 34.

Preamble:

p. 32 (B-0278): "System Incremental Capital Investment – includes the capital-related costs incurred to increase the capacity and operating flexibility of the gas distribution system caused by the addition of new customers (i.e., caused by development activities).

These common capital-related investment costs should be assigned to those customers who created the need for the investment. This type of incremental investment could be required to serve new customers, all future customers, and/or existing customers who require additional capacity depending on the purpose of the investment and the timeframe considered in conjunction with the utility's ongoing distribution system planning activities.

Those costs should also be considered for inclusion at the portfolio level when the profitability of all the development activities is evaluated."

p. 34 (B-0278): "[...] the utility's fixed costs that are lumpy in nature and support gas service to both new and existing customers should not be attributed only to new customers in any one particular project, but should be attributed to all new customers on a project portfolio basis."

Questions:

12.1.Are all System Incremental Capital Investments required equally for load growth on the Gaz Métro system, or are some System Incremental Capital Investments required for load growth on some parts of the system, but not other parts?

Response:

Distribution systems are complex and it is not possible to generalize the impact of system reinforcements. In fact, certain reinforcements impact on a limited section of a system, whereas others impact on Gaz Métro's entire system.

12.2.Please provide the System Incremental Capital Investment associated with each system extension and each annual portfolio over the last ten years.

Response:

Please refer to the list of reinforcement projects provided in question 1.6 of the Request for Information no. 2 of the ROEÉ's expert (B-0264, Gaz Métro-9, Document 6, page 3).

a. Identify the type, cost and timing of System Incremental Capital Investment assumed.

Response:

Please refer to the list of reinforcement projects provided in question 1.6 of the Request for Information no. 2 of the ROEÉ's expert (B-0264, Gaz Métro-9, Document 6, page 3).

b. To the extent possible, provide the derivation of the estimate of the cost of the System Incremental Capital Investment.

Response:

Costs appearing in the list of projects in a) are actual costs with the exception of upcoming reinforcement projects for which an estimation was provided.

12.3.Please explain why the inclusion of the System Incremental Capital Investment only at the portfolio level would be efficient and equitable.

Response:

Black & Veatch

Please, also see the response to question 9.1 in the Information Request from OC (Gaz Métro-9, Document 12).

Please see the responses to question 8.1 above and to question 9.1 in the Information Request from OC (Gaz Métro-9, Document 12). The inclusion of the System Incremental Capital Investment at the portfolio level is efficient because it would avoid having to develop a process and methodology to apportion the cost of the System Incremental Capital Investment to individual projects, and possibly to Gaz Métro's existing customers. This method is equitable because it recognizes the

lumpy nature of the investment by aligning the number of new customers to be served and their capacity needs over the analysis time period with the investment level needed to satisfy those customer requirements rather than attributing the entire cost of the investment to the "next customer" at the margin causing the need for the investment. Finally, the inclusion of the System Incremental Capital Investment at the portfolio level is straightforward and not subject to variations in interpretation or application. As noted at page 30 of its evidence (B-0278, Gaz Métro-7, Document 5), Black & Veatch recently conducted an electric line extension policy project where one of the focus areas specifically addressed the determination of when to attribute system reinforcement costs to a particular line extension project. The general findings were that it is quite difficult to do so, and when it was attempted, it was the basis of significant contention between new customers and the utility.

- **a.** If the portfolio exceeds the target return, would B&V and Gaz Métro propose that existing customers subsidize the new customers who require the System Incremental Capital Investment?
 - (i) If so, please explain why that is equitable.
 - (ii) If so, please explain whether that would be the position of Gaz Métro and B&V, even if the service extension(s) that require the System Incremental Capital Investment would fail the economic test if the cost of the System Incremental Capital Investment were included in the analysis.

Response:

Black & Veatch

- (i) Under the situation where the System Incremental Capital Investment was included in the profitability analysis, new customers would induce decreasing tolls for existing customers because the profitability analysis for the portfolio of projects resulted in a P.I. in excess of the target P.I.
- (ii) Black & Veatch would not recommend to Gaz Métro that its existing customers should subsidize new customers if the results of the profitability analysis (which included the cost of its System Incremental Capital Investment) indicated a P.I. of below 1.1.

- How would the costs of the System Incremental Capital Investment be b. allocated among the new customers on the service extensions in the portfolio?
 - If the System Incremental Capital Investment results in the portfolio (i) missing its profitability target, how would Gaz Métro decide which customers must contribute more to finance the service extensions?

Response:

Gaz Métro reiterates that the distribution system reinforcement costs are considered in the overall profitability of the development plan. The development plan includes all sales approved throughout the fiscal year.

Gaz Métro will prioritize the reinforcement projects that are the most profitable and will seek to ensure that the development plan achieves a profitability index greater than or equal to 1.1.

12.4. Please explain why B&V believes that new customers whose location does not contribute to the need for a System Incremental Capital Investment should be attributed to those customers as part of the "portfolio" of service extensions.

Response:

Black & Veatch

A primary basis for including the costs of the System Incremental Capital Investment in the profitability analysis at the portfolio level, and not at the individual project level, is that it is not necessary to determine which new customers create the need for the system investment. As such, all system extension projects and the associated new customers would be included in the profitability analysis for the project portfolio. Please also see the response to question 12.3 above.

13. Source:

R-3867-2013, B-0278, Review of Methodologies for Evaluating the Profitability of System Extension Projects – Black and Veatch evidence, (Gaz Métro-7, Document 5), p. 13, 14 (Section 3.2).

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Preamble:

- B&V selected a peer group of five Canadian utilities and five US utilities (one of which is a holding company of six utilities).

Questions:

13.1.Please list all Canadian gas utilities.

Response:

Gaz Métro

Please refer to the response to question 10.1 of the CFIB's request for information no. 3 (Gaz Métro-9, Document 11).

13.2.Please list all US gas utilities.

Response:

Black & Veatch

Please see the attachment to this response, "ROEE-Expert 13.2 Attachment 1.pdf" for a list of investor owned gas utilities that operate in the U.S.

13.3. Please explain why B&V selected these peers and not others.

Response:

Canadian utilities (Gaz Métro)

Please refer to the response to question 10.1 of the CFIB's request for information no. 3 (Gaz Métro-9, Document 11).

American utilities (Black & Veatch)

Please see the response to question 10 in the Information Request from FCEI (Gaz Métro-9, Document 11).

13.4.Please provide the documents on which B&V relied in describing the policies and practices of each of the members of the peer group as regards methodologies for evaluating the profitability of system extension projects.

Gaz Métro Limited Partnership

Application relating to the marginal costs of long-term service delivery applied to the profitability analysis, R-3867-2013

Response:

Black & Veatch

The documents on which B&V relied are voluminous in nature and can, for most of them, be referred to on the internet. Given that situation, B&V refers to the attached list of the references of the said documents (ROEÉ-Expert 13.4 Attachment 1). B&V is willing to provide on request any document specifically identified, should it be difficult or impossible for the ROEÉ to consult on the internet.

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Line No.	Name	Company Name	Ultimate Parent Company Name	State
2	Alabama Gas Corporation- AL	Alabama Gas Corporation	Spire Inc.	AL
3	Ameren Illinois Company- IL	Ameren Illinois Company	Ameren Corporation	IL
4	Virginia Gas Distribution Co VA	Appalachian Natural Gas Distribution Company	ANGD LLC	VA
5	Arkansas Oklahoma Gas Corp AR	Arkansas Oklahoma Gas Corp.	A.O.G. Corporation	AR
6	Atlanta Gas Light Company- GA	Atlanta Gas Light Company	Southern Company	GA
7 8	Atmos Energy Louisiana Division- LA Atmos Energy West Texas Division- TX	Atmos Energy Corporation Atmos Energy Corporation		LA TX
9	Atmos Energy Colorado-Kansas Division- CO	Atmos Energy Corporation		CO
10	Atmos Energy Kentucky Division- KY	Atmos Energy Corporation		KY
11	Atmos Energy Mississippi Valley Gas- MS	Atmos Energy Corporation		MS
12	Atmos Energy Colorado-Kansas Division- KS	Atmos Energy Corporation		KS
13	Atmos Energy Mid-States Division- GA	Atmos Energy Corporation		GA
14	Atmos Energy Mid-States Division- IA	Atmos Energy Corporation		IA
15	Atmos Energy Mid-States Division- IL	Atmos Energy Corporation		IL.
16	Atmos Energy Mid-States Division- TN	Atmos Energy Corporation		TN
17 18	Atmos Energy Mid-States Division- VA Atmos Energy Mid-Tex Division- TX	Atmos Energy Corporation Atmos Energy Corporation		VA TX
19	Atmos Energy Corporation- MO	Atmos Energy Corporation		MO
20	Avista Corporation- ID	Avista Corporation		ID
21	Avista Corporation- OR	Avista Corporation		OR
22	Avista Corporation- WA	Avista Corporation		WA
23	Baltimore Gas and Electric Company- MD	Baltimore Gas and Electric Company	Exelon Corporation	MD
24	Bangor Gas Company, LLC- ME	Bangor Gas Company, LLC	Gas Natural Inc.	ME
25	Bay State Gas Company- MA	Bay State Gas Company	NiSource Inc.	MA
26	Berkshire Gas Company- MA	Berkshire Gas Company	Iberdrola, S.A.	MA
27 28	Black Hills Colorado Gas Utility Company, LP- CO Black Hills Energy Arkansas, Inc AR		Black Hills Corporation Black Hills Corporation	CO AR
28 29	Black Hills Gas Distribution LLC- WY	Black Hills Energy Arkansas, Inc. Black Hills Gas Distribution LLC	Black Hills Corporation	WY
30	Black Hills Iowa Gas Utility Company, LLC- IA	Black Hills Iowa Gas Utility Company, LLC	Black Hills Corporation	IA
31		Black Hills Kansas Gas Utility Company, LLC	Black Hills Corporation	KS
32	Black Hills Nebraska Gas Utility Company LLC- NE		Black Hills Corporation	NE
33	Black Hill Northwest Gas Utility Company, LLC d/b/	Black Hills Northwest Wyoming Gas Utility Company, LLC	Black Hills Corporation	WY
34	Bluefield Gas Company- WV	Bluefield Gas Company	ANGD LLC	WV
35	Boston Gas Company- MA	Boston Gas Company	National Grid plc	MA
36	Brainard Gas Corp OH	Brainard Gas Corp.	Gas Natural Inc.	OH
37	Brooklyn Union Gas Company- NY	Brooklyn Union Gas Company	National Grid plc	NY
38 39	Cascade Natural Gas Corporation- OR Cascade Natural Gas Corporation- WA	Cascade Natural Gas Corporation Cascade Natural Gas Corporation	MDU Resources Group, Inc. MDU Resources Group, Inc.	OR WA
40	CenterPoint Energy-Entex- TX	CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp.	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	TX
41	CenterPoint Energy-Minnesota Gas- MN	CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp.	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	MN
42	CenterPoint Energy-Arkla- AR	CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp.	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	AR
43	CenterPoint Energy-Arkla- LA	CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp.	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	LA
44	CenterPoint Energy-Oklahoma Gas- OK	CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp.	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	OK
45	CenterPoint Energy-Arkla- TX	CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp.	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	TX
46	CenterPoint Energy-Entex- LA	CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp.	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	LA
47	CenterPoint Energy-Mississippi Gas- MS	CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp.	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	MS
48 49	Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation- NY	Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation Chattanooga Gas Company	Fortis Inc. Southern Company	NY TN
50	Chattanooga Gas Company- TN Chesapeake Utilities-Delaware Division- DE	Chesapeake Utilities Corporation	Southern Company	DE
51	Chesapeake Utilities-Florida Division- FL	Chesapeake Utilities Corporation		FL
52	Chesapeake Utilities-Maryland Division- MD	Chesapeake Utilities Corporation		MD
53	Cheyenne Light, Fuel and Power Company- WY	Cheyenne Light, Fuel and Power Company	Black Hills Corporation	WY
54	Citizens Gas- IN	Citizens Energy Group		IN
55	Citizens Gas Fuel Company- MI	Citizens Gas Fuel Company	DTE Energy Company	MI
56	Colonial Gas Company- MA	Colonial Gas Company	National Grid plc	MA
57	Colorado Natural Gas, Inc CO Columbia Gas of Kentucky, Incorporated- KY	Colorado Natural Gas, Inc.	JPMorgan Chase & Co.	CO
58 59	Columbia Gas of Maryland, Incorporated- MD	Columbia Gas of Kentucky, Incorporated Columbia Gas of Maryland, Incorporated	NiSource Inc. NiSource Inc.	KY MD
60	Columbia Gas of Ohio, Incorporated- OH	Columbia Gas of Ohio, Incorporated	NiSource Inc.	OH
61	Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania, Inc PA	Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania, Inc.	NiSource Inc.	PA
62	Columbia Gas of Virginia, Incorporated- VA	Columbia Gas of Virginia, Incorporated	NiSource Inc.	VA
63	Connecticut Natural Gas Corporation- CT	Connecticut Natural Gas Corporation	Iberdrola, S.A.	CT
64	Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc N	Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.	Consolidated Edison, Inc.	NY
65	Consumers Energy Company- MI	Consumers Energy Company	CMS Energy Corporation	MI
66	Corning Natural Gas Corporation- NY	Corning Natural Gas Corporation	Corning Natural Gas Holding Corporation	NY
67	Cut Bank Gas Co- MT	Cut Bank Gas Co	Gas Natural Inc.	MT
68	Delmarva Power & Light Company- DE	Delmarva Power & Light Company	Exelon Corporation	DE
69 70	Delta Natural Gas Company, Inc KY DTE Gas Company- MI	Delta Natural Gas Company, Inc. DTE Gas Company	DTE Energy Company	KY MI
71	Duke Energy Kentucky, Inc KY	Duke Energy Kentucky, Inc.	Duke Energy Corporation	KY
72	Duke Energy Ohio, Inc OH	Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.	Duke Energy Corporation	OH
73	East Ohio Gas Company- OH	East Ohio Gas Company	Dominion Energy, Inc.	OH
74	Eastern Natural Gas Company- OH	Eastern Natural Gas Company	Utility Pipeline Ltd	ОН
75	Empire District Gas Company- MO	Empire District Gas Company	Empire District Electric Company	MO
76	Energy West - Great Falls- MT	Energy West, Incorporated	Gas Natural Inc.	MT
77	Energy West - Cascade- MT	Energy West, Incorporated	Gas Natural Inc.	MT
78	ENSTAR Natural Gas Company- AK	ENSTAR Natural Gas Company	AltaGas Ltd.	AK
79 80	Entergy Gulf States Louisiana, L.L.C LA	Entergy Gulf States Louisiana, L.L.C. Equitable Gas Company, LLC	Entergy Corporation	LA PA
80 81	Equitable Gas Company, LLC- PA Equitable Gas Company, LLC- WV	Equitable Gas Company, LLC Equitable Gas Company, LLC	SteelRiver Infrastructure Partners, LP SteelRiver Infrastructure Partners, LP	WV
82	Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Company- MA	Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Company	Unitil Corporation	MA
-	3	3 1 7	•	

Line No. 83	Name Indiantown Division- FL		Ultimate Parent Company Name Chesapeake Utilities Corporation	State FL
84	Gas division- FL	• •	Chesapeake Utilities Corporation	FL
85	Frontier Natural Gas LLC- NC	• •	Gas Natural Inc.	NC
86	Molokai Gas District- HI		Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation	HI
87	Lanai Gas District- HI	Gas Company, LLC	Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation	HI
88	Oahu Gas District- HI		Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation	HI
89	Hilo Gas District- HI	• • •	Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation	HI
90	Maui Gas District- HI	• •	Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation	HI
91	Kauai Gas District- HI		Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation	HI
92	•		Dominion Energy, Inc.	WV
93	Illinois Gas Company- IL	Illinois Gas Company		IL.
94	Indiana Gas Company, Inc IN	• •	Vectren Corporation	IN
95	Intermountain Gas Company- ID	. ,	MDU Resources Group, Inc.	ID
96	Interstate Power and Light Company- IA		Alliant Energy Corporation	IA
97 98	Interstate Power and Light Company- MN Kansas Gas Service Company- KS		Alliant Energy Corporation ONE Gas, Inc.	MN KS
99	KeySpan Gas East Corporation- NY	• •	National Grid plc	NY
100		• •	Spire Inc.	MO
101	Liberty Utilities (EnergyNorth Natural Gas) Corp N		Algonquin Power & Utilities Corp.	NH
102	Liberty Utilities (EnergyNorth Natural Gas) - Keene		Algonquin Power & Utilities Corp.	NH
103			Algonquin Power & Utilities Corp.	IL
104	Liberty Utilities (Midstates Natural Gas) Corp- MO		Algonquin Power & Utilities Corp.	MO
105			Algonquin Power & Utilities Corp.	IA
106		Liberty Utilities (New England Natural Gas Company) Corp.		MA
107	Liberty Utilities (Peach State Natural Gas) Corp- GA		Algonquin Power & Utilities Corp.	GA
108			PPL Corporation	KY
109	Madison Gas and Electric Company- WI	Madison Gas and Electric Company	MGE Energy, Inc.	WI
110	Maine Natural Gas- ME	Maine Natural Gas	Iberdrola, S.A.	ME
111		MDU Resources Group, Inc.		MN
112		MDU Resources Group, Inc.		ND
113		MDU Resources Group, Inc.		MT
114		MDU Resources Group, Inc.		ND
115			WEC Energy Group, Inc.	MI
116	•		Berkshire Hathaway Inc.	IA
117	•		Berkshire Hathaway Inc.	IL SD
118 119		MidAmerican Energy Company Midwest Energy, Inc.	Berkshire Hathaway Inc.	KS
120	• •	Midwest Natural Gas Corporation		IN
121	·	Midwest Natural Gas, Inc.		WI
122			WEC Energy Group, Inc.	MN
123			WEC Energy Group, Inc.	MN
124			Spire Inc.	MO
125	••	••	Spire Inc.	AL
126	Mountaineer Gas Company- WV		Mountaineer Gas Holdings Ltd Partnership	WV
127	Mt. Carmel Public Utility Company- IL	Mt. Carmel Public Utility Company	•	IL
128	Narragansett Electric Company- RI	Narragansett Electric Company	National Grid plc	RI
129	National Fuel Gas Distribution Corporation- NY	National Fuel Gas Distribution Corporation	National Fuel Gas Company	NY
130	National Fuel Gas Distribution Corporation- PA	·	National Fuel Gas Company	PA
131			New Jersey Resources Corporation	NJ
132			Emera Incorporated	NM
133	New York State Electric & Gas Corporation- NY	•	Iberdrola, S.A.	NY
134	Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation- NY	•	National Grid plc	NY
135	North Shore Gas Company- IL		WEC Energy Group, Inc.	IL OU
136	·	•	Gas Natural Inc.	OH
137 138			Southern Company NiSource Inc.	IL IN
139		. ,	Xcel Energy Inc.	ND
140	Northern States Power Company - MN- MN Northern States Power Company - MN- MN		Xcel Energy Inc. Xcel Energy Inc.	MN
141		. ,	Xcel Energy Inc.	MI
142			Xcel Energy Inc.	WI
143			Unitil Corporation	ME
144	•	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Unitil Corporation	NH
145	•	Northwest Natural Gas Company	•	OR
146		Northwest Natural Gas Company		WA
147		NorthWestern Corporation		SD
148		NorthWestern Corporation		MT
149	NSTAR Gas Company- MA	NSTAR Gas Company	Eversource Energy	MA
150	Ohio Gas Company- OH	. ,	Nwo Resources Inc	ОН
151	Ohio Valley Gas Corporation- OH	Ohio Valley Gas Corporation		ОН
152	Ohio Valley Gas Inc- IN	•	Ohio Valley Gas Corporation	IN
153	Oklahoma Natural Gas Company- OK	. ,	ONE Gas, Inc.	OK
154	Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc NY		Consolidated Edison, Inc.	NY
155	Orwell Natural Gas Co OH		Gas Natural Inc.	OH
156	Orwell Natural Gas Co PA		Gas Natural Inc.	PA
157	Pacific Gas and Electric Company- CA		PG&E Corporation	CA
158	PECO Energy Company- PA		Exelon Corporation	PA
159	Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company- IL		WEC Energy Group, Inc.	IL
160	Peoples Gas System- FL	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Emera Incorporated	FL
161 162	Peoples Gas WV, LLC- WV Peoples Division- PA	·	SteelRiver Infrastructure Partners, LP SteelRiver Infrastructure Partners, LP	WV PA
	i copica Diviaioni r'A	Peoples Natural Gas Company LLC	Otoonsiver minastructure Faithers, LP	
163	Equitable Division- PA	Peoples Natural Gas Company LLC	SteelRiver Infrastructure Partners, LP	PA

Line No.		Company Name	Ultimate Parent Company Name	State
164	Peoples TWP LLC- PA	Peoples TWP LLC	SteelRiver Infrastructure Partners, LP	PA
165	Philadelphia Gas Works Co PA	Philadelphia Gas Works Co.	Philadelphia City of	PA
166	Piedmont Natural Gas Company, Inc NC	Piedmont Natural Gas Company, Inc.	Duke Energy Corporation	NC
167	Piedmont Natural Gas Company, Inc SC	Piedmont Natural Gas Company, Inc.	Duke Energy Corporation	SC
168	Nashville Gas Company- TN	Piedmont Natural Gas Company, Inc.	Duke Energy Corporation	TN
169	Pike County Light and Power Company- PA	Pike County Light and Power Company	Corning Natural Gas Holding Corporation	PA
170	Pike Natural Gas Co- OH	Pike Natural Gas Co		OH
171	Florida City Gas- FL	Pivotal Utility Holdings, Inc.	Southern Company	FL
172	Elizabethtown Gas Company- NJ	Pivotal Utility Holdings, Inc.	Southern Company	NJ
173	Elkton Gas- MD	Pivotal Utility Holdings, Inc.	Southern Company	MD
174	Public Gas Company, Inc KY	Public Gas Company, Inc.	Kentucky Frontier Gas, LLC	KY
175	Public Service Company of Colorado- CO	Public Service Company of Colorado	Xcel Energy Inc.	CO
176	Public Service Company of North Carolina, Incorpo	Public Service Company of North Carolina, Incorporated	SCANA Corporation	NC
177	Public Service Electric and Gas Company- NJ	Public Service Electric and Gas Company	Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated	NJ
178	Puget Sound Energy, Inc WA	Puget Sound Energy, Inc.	Puget Holdings LLC	WA
179	Questar Gas Company- ID	Questar Gas Company	Dominion Energy, Inc.	ID
180	Questar Gas Company- UT	Questar Gas Company	Dominion Energy, Inc.	UT
181	Questar Gas Company- WY	Questar Gas Company	Dominion Energy, Inc.	WY
182	Roanoke Gas Co VA	Roanoke Gas Company	RGC Resources, Inc.	VA
183	Roanoke Gas Company- VA	Roanoke Gas Company	RGC Resources, Inc.	VA
184	Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation- NY	Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation	Iberdrola, S.A.	NY
185	San Diego Gas & Electric Co CA	San Diego Gas & Electric Co.	Sempra Energy	CA
186	SEMCO Energy, Inc MI	SEMCO Energy, Inc.	AltaGas Ltd.	MI
187	Sierra Pacific Power Company- NV	Sierra Pacific Power Company	Berkshire Hathaway Inc.	NV
188	South Carolina Electric & Gas Co SC	South Carolina Electric & Gas Co.	SCANA Corporation	SC
189	South Jersey Gas Company- NJ	South Jersey Gas Company	South Jersey Industries, Inc.	NJ
190	Southern California Gas Company- CA	Southern California Gas Company	Sempra Energy	CA
191	Southern Connecticut Gas Company- CT	Southern Connecticut Gas Company	Iberdrola, S.A.	CT
192	Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company, Inc		Vectren Corporation	IN
193	Southwest Gas Corporation- AZ	Southwest Gas Corporation	Southwest Gas Holdings, Inc.	AZ
194	Southwest Gas Corporation- CA	Southwest Gas Corporation	Southwest Gas Holdings, Inc.	CA
195	Southwest Gas Corporation- NV	Southwest Gas Corporation	Southwest Gas Holdings, Inc.	NV
196	St. Joe Natural Gas Co, Inc FL	St. Joe Natural Gas Co, Inc.	Countries Cae Helange, me.	FL
197	St. Lawrence Gas Company, Inc NY	St. Lawrence Gas Company, Inc.	Enbridge Inc.	NY
198	Summit Natural Gas of Missouri, Inc MO	Summit Natural Gas of Missouri, Inc.	JPMorgan Chase & Co.	MO
199	Superior Water, Light and Power Company- WI	Superior Water, Light and Power Company	ALLETE, Inc.	WI
200	Sycamore Gas Company- IN	Sycamore Gas Company	INOH Gas Inc.	IN.
201	Texas Gas Service Company- TX	Texas Gas Service Company	ONE Gas, Inc.	TX
202	UGI Central Penn Gas, Inc MD	UGI Central Penn Gas, Inc.	UGI Corporation	MD
203	UGI Central Penn Gas, Inc PA	UGI Central Penn Gas, Inc.	UGI Corporation	PA
204	UGI Penn Natural Gas, Inc PA	UGI Penn Natural Gas, Inc.	UGI Corporation	PA
205	UGI Utilities, Inc PA	UGI Utilities. Inc.	UGI Corporation	PA
206	Union Electric Company- MO	Union Electric Company	Ameren Corporation	MO
207	UNS Gas, Inc AZ	UNS Gas, Inc.	Fortis Inc.	AZ
208	Valley Gas- PA	Valley Energy Inc.	C&T Enterprises, Inc.	PA
209	Waverly Gas Service- NY	Valley Energy Inc.	C&T Enterprises, Inc.	NY
210	Vectren Energy Delivery of Ohio, Inc OH		•	OH
210	Vermont Gas Systems, Inc VT	Vectren Energy Delivery of Ohio, Inc. Vermont Gas Systems, Inc.	Vectren Corporation Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec	VT
212	Virginia Natural Gas, Inc VA	Virginia Natural Gas, Inc.	Southern Company	VA
212				MD
	Washington Gas Light Company- MD	Washington Gas Light Company	WGL Holdings, Inc.	
214	Washington Gas Light Company- VA	Washington Gas Light Company	WGL Holdings, Inc.	VA
215	West Yellowstone Gas- MT	West Yellowstone Gas	Gas Natural Inc.	MT
216	Willmut Gas & Oil Company- MS	Willmut Gas & Oil Company	Spire Inc.	MS
217	Wisconsin Electric Power Company- WI	Wisconsin Electric Power Company	WEC Energy Group, Inc.	WI
218	Wisconsin Gas LLC- WI	Wisconsin Gas LLC	WEC Energy Group, Inc.	WI
219	Wisconsin Power and Light Company- WI	Wisconsin Power and Light Company	Alliant Energy Corporation	WI
220	Wisconsin Public Service Corporation- MI	Wisconsin Public Service Corporation	WEC Energy Group, Inc.	MI
221	Wisconsin Public Service Corporation- WI	Wisconsin Public Service Corporation	WEC Energy Group, Inc.	WI
222	Wyoming Gas Company- WY	Wyoming Gas Company		WY
223	Yankee Gas Services Company- CT	Yankee Gas Services Company	Eversource Energy	CT

Black & Veatch Management Consulting, LLC Review of Methodologies for Evaluating the Profitability of System Extension Projects Bibliography of Supporting Resources

Canadian Utilities

Enbridge Gas New Brunswick

New Brunswick Energy and Utility Board Decision in the Matter of an Application by Enbridge Gas New Brunswick Limited Partnership for approval to change its distribution rates and for approval of its 2015 Regulatory Financial Statements. Matter No. 330, dated November 30, 2016.

http://142.166.3.251/Documents/Decisions/NG/E/2016%2011%2030%20-%20Decision%20-%20Matter%20330.pdf

Review of 2013 Regulatory Financial Statements/2015 Rate Application, Schedule 4.1, Note 17, dated June 27, 2014.

https://naturalgasnb.com/files/regulatory_documents/Schedule_4.1 - 2013_Actuals.pdf

System Expansion Portfolio Test, undated

http://nbeub.ca/opt/Mfr/get_document.php?doc=EGNB3.08.xlsx&no=16789

New Brunswick Energy and Utility Board Decision in the Matter of a Review of Enbridge Gas New Brunswick Inc. Financial Results and Natural Gas Sales at December 31, 2009, dated May 16, 2011. http://142.166.3.251/Documents/Decisions/NG/E/2011%2005%2016%20EGNB%202009%20Financial 20Review%20Decision.pdf

New Brunswick Energy and Utility Board Decision in the Matter of an application by Enbridge Gas New Brunswick Limited Partnership regarding the approval of fixing of rates and tariffs pursuant to section 52.2 of the Gas Distribution Act, 1999 and In the Matter of a review of Enbridge Gas New Brunswick Limited Partnership 2011 Regulatory Financial Results, dated September 20, 2012.

http://nbeub.ca/opt/M/get_document.php?doc=EGNB.pdf&no=7149

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