

**NORMES DE FIABILITÉ DE LA NERC
(VERSION ANGLAISE)**

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Cyber Security — BES Cyber System Categorization
2. **Number:** CIP-002-5.1
3. **Purpose:** To identify and categorize BES Cyber Systems and their associated BES Cyber Assets for the application of cyber security requirements commensurate with the adverse impact that loss, compromise, or misuse of those BES Cyber Systems could have on the reliable operation of the BES. Identification and categorization of BES Cyber Systems support appropriate protection against compromises that could lead to misoperation or instability in the BES.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. **Functional Entities:** For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of functional entities will be collectively referred to as “Responsible Entities.” For requirements in this standard where a specific functional entity or subset of functional entities are the applicable entity or entities, the functional entity or entities are specified explicitly.
 - 4.1.1. **Balancing Authority**
 - 4.1.2. **Distribution Provider that owns** one or more of the following Facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the BES:
 - 4.1.2.1. Each underfrequency load shedding (UFLS) or undervoltage load shedding (UVLS) system that:
 - 4.1.2.1.1. is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and
 - 4.1.2.1.2. performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.
 - 4.1.2.2. Each Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme where the Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - 4.1.2.3. Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - 4.1.2.4. Each Cranking Path and group of Elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a Blackstart Resource up to and including the first interconnection point of the starting station service of the next generation unit(s) to be started.
 - 4.1.3. **Generator Operator**
 - 4.1.4. **Generator Owner**

4.1.5. Interchange Coordinator or Interchange Authority

4.1.6. Reliability Coordinator

4.1.7. Transmission Operator

4.1.8. Transmission Owner

4.2. Facilities: For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following Facilities, systems, and equipment owned by each Responsible Entity in 4.1 above are those to which these requirements are applicable. For requirements in this standard where a specific type of Facilities, system, or equipment or subset of Facilities, systems, and equipment are applicable, these are specified explicitly.

4.2.1. Distribution Provider: One or more of the following Facilities, systems and equipment owned by the Distribution Provider for the protection or restoration of the BES:

4.2.1.1. Each UFLS or UVLS System that:

4.2.1.1.1. is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and

4.2.1.1.2. performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.

4.2.1.2. Each Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme where the Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.

4.2.1.3. Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.

4.2.1.4. Each Cranking Path and group of Elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a Blackstart Resource up to and including the first interconnection point of the starting station service of the next generation unit(s) to be started.

4.2.2. Responsible Entities listed in 4.1 other than Distribution Providers:

All BES Facilities.

4.2.3. Exemptions: The following are exempt from Standard CIP-002-5.1:

4.2.3.1. Cyber Assets at Facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.

4.2.3.2. Cyber Assets associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete Electronic Security Perimeters.

4.2.3.3. The systems, structures, and components that are regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under a cyber security plan pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Section 73.54.

4.2.3.4. For Distribution Providers, the systems and equipment that are not included in section 4.2.1 above.

5. Effective Dates:

1. **24 Months Minimum** – CIP-002-5.1 shall become effective on the later of July 1, 2015, or the first calendar day of the ninth calendar quarter after the effective date of the order providing applicable regulatory approval.
2. In those jurisdictions where no regulatory approval is required CIP-002-5.1 shall become effective on the first day of the ninth calendar quarter following Board of Trustees' approval, or as otherwise made effective pursuant to the laws applicable to such ERO governmental authorities.

6. Background:


This standard provides “bright-line” criteria for applicable Responsible Entities to categorize their BES Cyber Systems based on the impact of their associated Facilities, systems, and equipment, which, if destroyed, degraded, misused, or otherwise rendered unavailable, would affect the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System. Several concepts provide the basis for the approach to the standard.

Throughout the standards, unless otherwise stated, bulleted items in the requirements are items that are linked with an “or,” and numbered items are items that are linked with an “and.”

Many references in the Applicability section and the criteria in Attachment 1 of CIP-002 use a threshold of 300 MW for UFLS and UVLS. This particular threshold of 300 MW for UVLS and UFLS was provided in Version 1 of the CIP Cyber Security Standards. The threshold remains at 300 MW since it is specifically addressing UVLS and UFLS, which are last ditch efforts to save the Bulk Electric System. A review of UFLS tolerances defined within regional reliability standards for UFLS program requirements to date indicates that the historical value of 300 MW represents an adequate and reasonable threshold value for allowable UFLS operational tolerances.

BES Cyber Systems

One of the fundamental differences between Versions 4 and 5 of the CIP Cyber Security Standards is the shift from identifying Critical Cyber Assets to identifying BES Cyber Systems. This change results from the drafting team’s review of the NIST Risk Management Framework and the use of an analogous term “information system” as the target for categorizing and applying security controls.



In transitioning from Version 4 to Version 5, a BES Cyber System can be viewed simply as a grouping of Critical Cyber Assets (as that term is used in Version 4). The CIP Cyber Security Standards use the “BES Cyber System” term primarily to provide a higher level for referencing the object of a requirement. For example, it becomes possible to apply requirements dealing with recovery and malware protection to a grouping rather than individual Cyber Assets, and it becomes clearer in the requirement that malware protection applies to the system as a whole and may not be necessary for every individual device to comply.

Another reason for using the term “BES Cyber System” is to provide a convenient level at which a Responsible Entity can organize their documented implementation of the requirements and compliance evidence. Responsible Entities can use the well-developed concept of a *security plan* for each BES Cyber System to document the programs, processes, and plans in place to comply with security requirements.

It is left up to the Responsible Entity to determine the level of granularity at which to identify a BES Cyber System within the qualifications in the definition of BES Cyber System. For example, the Responsible Entity might choose to view an entire plant control system as a single BES Cyber System, or it might choose to view certain components of the plant control system as distinct BES Cyber Systems. The Responsible Entity should take into consideration the operational environment and

scope of management when defining the BES Cyber System boundary in order to maximize efficiency in secure operations. Defining the boundary too tightly may result in redundant paperwork and authorizations, while defining the boundary too broadly could make the secure operation of the BES Cyber System difficult to monitor and assess.

Reliable Operation of the BES

The scope of the CIP Cyber Security Standards is restricted to BES Cyber Systems that would impact the reliable operation of the BES. In order to identify BES Cyber Systems, Responsible Entities determine whether the BES Cyber Systems perform or support any BES reliability function according to those reliability tasks identified for their reliability function and the corresponding functional entity's responsibilities as defined in its relationships with other functional entities in the NERC Functional Model. This ensures that the *initial* scope for consideration includes only those BES Cyber Systems and their associated BES Cyber Assets that perform or support the reliable operation of the BES. The definition of BES Cyber Asset provides the basis for this scoping.

Real-time Operations

One characteristic of the BES Cyber Asset is a real-time scoping characteristic. The time horizon that is significant for BES Cyber Systems and BES Cyber Assets subject to the application of these Version 5 CIP Cyber Security Standards is defined as that which is material to real-time operations for the reliable operation of the BES. To provide a better defined time horizon than "Real-time," BES Cyber Assets are those Cyber Assets that, if rendered unavailable, degraded, or misused, would adversely impact the reliable operation of the BES within 15 minutes of the activation or exercise of the compromise. This time window must not include in its consideration the activation of redundant BES Cyber Assets or BES Cyber Systems: from the cyber security standpoint, redundancy does not mitigate cyber security vulnerabilities.

Categorization Criteria

The criteria defined in Attachment 1 are used to categorize BES Cyber Systems into impact categories. Requirement 1 only requires the discrete identification of BES Cyber Systems for those in the high impact and medium impact categories. All BES Cyber Systems for Facilities not included in Attachment 1 – Impact Rating Criteria, Criteria 1.1 to 1.4 and Criteria 2.1 to 2.11 default to be low impact.

This general process of categorization of BES Cyber Systems based on impact on the reliable operation of the BES is consistent with risk management approaches for the purpose of application of cyber security requirements in the remainder of the Version 5 CIP Cyber Security Standards.

Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems, Physical Access Control Systems, and Protected Cyber Assets that are associated with BES Cyber Systems

BES Cyber Systems have associated Cyber Assets, which, if compromised, pose a threat to the BES Cyber System by virtue of: (a) their location within the Electronic Security Perimeter (Protected Cyber Assets), or (b) the security control function they perform (Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems and Physical Access Control Systems). These Cyber Assets include:

Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (“EACMS”) – Examples include: Electronic Access Points, Intermediate Systems, authentication servers (e.g., RADIUS servers, Active Directory servers, Certificate Authorities), security event monitoring systems, and intrusion detection systems.

Physical Access Control Systems (“PACS”)– Examples include: authentication servers, card systems, and badge control systems.

Protected Cyber Assets (“PCA”) – Examples may include, to the extent they are within the ESP: file servers, ftp servers, time servers, LAN switches, networked printers, digital fault recorders, and emission monitoring systems.

B. Requirements and Measures

- R1.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement a process that considers each of the following assets for purposes of parts 1.1 through 1.3: [*Violation Risk Factor: High*][*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]
- i.** Control Centers and backup Control Centers;
 - ii.** Transmission stations and substations;
 - iii.** Generation resources;
 - iv.** Systems and facilities critical to system restoration, including Blackstart Resources and Cranking Paths and initial switching requirements;
 - v.** Special Protection Systems that support the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System; and
 - vi.** For Distribution Providers, Protection Systems specified in Applicability section 4.2.1 above.
- 1.1.** Identify each of the high impact BES Cyber Systems according to Attachment 1, Section 1, if any, at each asset;
 - 1.2.** Identify each of the medium impact BES Cyber Systems according to Attachment 1, Section 2, if any, at each asset; and
 - 1.3.** Identify each asset that contains a low impact BES Cyber System according to Attachment 1, Section 3, if any (a discrete list of low impact BES Cyber Systems is not required).
- M1.** Acceptable evidence includes, but is not limited to, dated electronic or physical lists required by Requirement R1, and Parts 1.1 and 1.2.

R2. The Responsible Entity shall: [*Violation Risk Factor: Lower*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]

- 2.1** Review the identifications in Requirement R1 and its parts (and update them if there are changes identified) at least once every 15 calendar months, even if it has no identified items in Requirement R1, and
- 2.2** Have its CIP Senior Manager or delegate approve the identifications required by Requirement R1 at least once every 15 calendar months, even if it has no identified items in Requirement R1.

M2. Acceptable evidence includes, but is not limited to, electronic or physical dated records to demonstrate that the Responsible Entity has reviewed and updated, where necessary, the identifications required in Requirement R1 and its parts, and has had its CIP Senior Manager or delegate approve the identifications required in Requirement R1 and its parts at least once every 15 calendar months, even if it has none identified in Requirement R1 and its parts, as required by Requirement R2.

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process:

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority:

The Regional Entity shall serve as the Compliance Enforcement Authority (“CEA”) unless the applicable entity is owned, operated, or controlled by the Regional Entity. In such cases the ERO or a Regional Entity approved by FERC or other applicable governmental authority shall serve as the CEA.

1.2. Evidence Retention:

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the CEA may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Responsible Entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its CEA to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

- Each Responsible Entity shall retain evidence of each requirement in this standard for three calendar years.
- If a Responsible Entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.

- The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes:

- Compliance Audit
- Self-Certification
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Investigation
- Self-Reporting
- Complaint

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

- None

2. Table of Compliance Elements

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-002-5.1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1	Operations Planning	High	<p>For Responsible Entities with more than a total of 40 BES assets in Requirement R1, five percent or fewer BES assets have not been considered according to Requirement R1;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>For Responsible Entities with a total of 40 or fewer BES assets, 2 or fewer BES assets in Requirement R1, have not been considered according to Requirement R1;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>For Responsible Entities with more than a total of 100 high and medium impact BES Cyber</p>	<p>For Responsible Entities with more than a total of 40 BES assets in Requirement R1, more than five percent but less than or equal to 10 percent of BES assets have not been considered, according to Requirement R1;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>For Responsible Entities with a total of 40 or fewer BES assets, more than two, but fewer than or equal to four BES assets in Requirement R1, have not been considered according to Requirement R1;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>For Responsible</p>	<p>For Responsible Entities with more than a total of 40 BES assets in Requirement R1, more than 10 percent but less than or equal to 15 percent of BES assets have not been considered, according to Requirement R1;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>For Responsible Entities with a total of 40 or fewer BES assets, more than four, but fewer than or equal to six BES assets in Requirement R1, have not been considered according to Requirement R1;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>For Responsible</p>	<p>For Responsible Entities with more than a total of 40 BES assets in Requirement R1, more than 15 percent of BES assets have not been considered, according to Requirement R1;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>For Responsible Entities with a total of 40 or fewer BES assets, more than six BES assets in Requirement R1, have not been considered according to Requirement R1;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>For Responsible Entities with more than a total of 100 high and medium impact BES Cyber</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-002-5.1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>Systems, five percent or fewer of identified BES Cyber Systems have not been categorized or have been incorrectly categorized at a lower category;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>For Responsible Entities with a total of 100 or fewer high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems, five or fewer identified BES Cyber Systems have not been categorized or have been incorrectly categorized at a lower category.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>For Responsible Entities with more than a total of 100 high and medium impact BES Cyber</p>	<p>Entities with more than a total of 100 high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems, more than five percent but less than or equal to 10 percent of identified BES Cyber Systems have not been categorized or have been incorrectly categorized at a lower category;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>For Responsible Entities with a total of 100 or fewer high and medium impact and BES Cyber Systems, more than five but less than or equal to 10 identified BES Cyber Systems have not been categorized or have been incorrectly categorized at a lower</p>	<p>Entities with more than a total of 100 high or medium impact BES Cyber Systems, more than 10 percent but less than or equal to 15 percent of identified BES Cyber Systems have not been categorized or have been incorrectly categorized at a lower category;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>For Responsible Entities with a total of 100 or fewer high or medium impact and BES Cyber Assets, more than 10 but less than or equal to 15 identified BES Cyber Assets have not been categorized or have been incorrectly categorized at a lower</p>	<p>Systems, more than 15 percent of identified BES Cyber Systems have not been categorized or have been incorrectly categorized at a lower category;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>For Responsible Entities with a total of 100 or fewer high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems, more than 15 identified BES Cyber Systems have not been categorized or have been incorrectly categorized at a lower category.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>For Responsible Entities with more than a total of 100 high and medium impact BES Cyber</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-002-5.1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>Systems, five percent or fewer high or medium BES Cyber Systems have not been identified;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>For Responsible Entities with a total of 100 or fewer high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems, five or fewer high or medium BES Cyber Systems have not been identified.</p>	<p>category.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>For Responsible Entities with more than a total of 100 high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems, more than five percent but less than or equal to 10 percent high or medium BES Cyber Systems have not been identified;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>For Responsible Entities with a total of 100 or fewer high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems, more than five but less than or equal to 10 high or medium BES Cyber Systems have not been identified.</p>	<p>category.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>For Responsible Entities with more than a total of 100 high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems, more than 10 percent but less than or equal to 15 percent high or medium BES Cyber Systems have not been identified;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>For Responsible Entities with a total of 100 or fewer high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems, more than 10 but less than or equal to 15 high or medium BES Cyber Systems have not been identified.</p>	<p>Systems, more than 15 percent of high or medium impact BES Cyber Systems have not been identified;</p> <p>OR</p> <p>For Responsible Entities with a total of 100 or fewer high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems, more than 15 high or medium impact BES Cyber Systems have not been identified.</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-002-5.1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R2	Operations Planning	Lower	<p>The Responsible Entity did not complete its review and update for the identification required for R1 within 15 calendar months but less than or equal to 16 calendar months of the previous review. (R2.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not complete its approval of the identifications required by R1 by the CIP Senior Manager or delegate according to Requirement R2 within 15 calendar months but less than or equal to 16 calendar months of the previous approval. (R2.2)</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity did not complete its review and update for the identification required for R1 within 16 calendar months but less than or equal to 17 calendar months of the previous review. (R2.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to complete its approval of the identifications required by R1 by the CIP Senior Manager or delegate according to Requirement R2 within 16 calendar months but less than or equal to 17 calendar months of the previous approval. (R2.2)</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity did not complete its review and update for the identification required for R1 within 17 calendar months but less than or equal to 18 calendar months of the previous review. (R2.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to complete its approval of the identifications required by R1 by the CIP Senior Manager or delegate according to Requirement R2 within 17 calendar months but less than or equal to 18 calendar months of the previous approval. (R2.2)</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity did not complete its review and update for the identification required for R1 within 18 calendar months of the previous review. (R2.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to complete its approval of the identifications required by R1 by the CIP Senior Manager or delegate according to Requirement R2 within 18 calendar months of the previous approval. (R2.2)</p>

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. Associated Documents

None.

CIP-002-5.1 - Attachment 1

Impact Rating Criteria

The criteria defined in Attachment 1 do not constitute stand-alone compliance requirements, but are criteria characterizing the level of impact and are referenced by requirements.

1. High Impact Rating (H)

Each BES Cyber System used by and located at any of the following:

- 1.1. Each Control Center or backup Control Center used to perform the functional obligations of the Reliability Coordinator.
- 1.2. Each Control Center or backup Control Center used to perform the functional obligations of the Balancing Authority: 1) for generation equal to or greater than an aggregate of 3000 MW in a single Interconnection, or 2) for one or more of the assets that meet criterion 2.3, 2.6, or 2.9.
- 1.3. Each Control Center or backup Control Center used to perform the functional obligations of the Transmission Operator for one or more of the assets that meet criterion 2.2, 2.4, 2.5, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, or 2.10.
- 1.4. Each Control Center or backup Control Center used to perform the functional obligations of the Generator Operator for one or more of the assets that meet criterion 2.1, 2.3, 2.6, or 2.9.

2. Medium Impact Rating (M)

Each BES Cyber System, not included in Section 1 above, associated with any of the following:

- 2.1. Commissioned generation, by each group of generating units at a single plant location, with an aggregate highest rated net Real Power capability of the preceding 12 calendar months equal to or exceeding 1500 MW in a single Interconnection. For each group of generating units, the only BES Cyber Systems that meet this criterion are those shared BES Cyber Systems that could, within 15 minutes, adversely impact the reliable operation of any combination of units that in aggregate equal or exceed 1500 MW in a single Interconnection.
- 2.2. Each BES reactive resource or group of resources at a single location (excluding generation Facilities) with an aggregate maximum Reactive Power nameplate rating of 1000 MVAR or greater (excluding those at generation Facilities). The only BES Cyber Systems that meet this criterion are those shared BES Cyber Systems that could, within 15 minutes, adversely impact the reliable operation of any combination of resources that in aggregate equal or exceed 1000 MVAR.

- 2.3. Each generation Facility that its Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner designates, and informs the Generator Owner or Generator Operator, as necessary to avoid an Adverse Reliability Impact in the planning horizon of more than one year.
- 2.4. Transmission Facilities operated at 500 kV or higher. For the purpose of this criterion, the collector bus for a generation plant is not considered a Transmission Facility, but is part of the generation interconnection Facility.
- 2.5. Transmission Facilities that are operating between 200 kV and 499 kV at a single station or substation, where the station or substation is connected at 200 kV or higher voltages to three or more other Transmission stations or substations and has an "aggregate weighted value" exceeding 3000 according to the table below. The "aggregate weighted value" for a single station or substation is determined by summing the "weight value per line" shown in the table below for each incoming and each outgoing BES Transmission Line that is connected to another Transmission station or substation. For the purpose of this criterion, the collector bus for a generation plant is not considered a Transmission Facility, but is part of the generation interconnection Facility.

Voltage Value of a Line	Weight Value per Line
less than 200 kV (not applicable)	(not applicable)
200 kV to 299 kV	700
300 kV to 499 kV	1300
500 kV and above	0

- 2.6. Generation at a single plant location or Transmission Facilities at a single station or substation location that are identified by its Reliability Coordinator, Planning Coordinator, or Transmission Planner as critical to the derivation of Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (IROLs) and their associated contingencies.
- 2.7. Transmission Facilities identified as essential to meeting Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements.
- 2.8. Transmission Facilities, including generation interconnection Facilities, providing the generation interconnection required to connect generator output to the Transmission Systems that, if destroyed, degraded, misused, or otherwise rendered unavailable, would result in the loss of the generation Facilities identified by any Generator Owner as a result of its application of Attachment 1, criterion 2.1 or 2.3.
- 2.9. Each Special Protection System (SPS), Remedial Action Scheme (RAS), or automated switching System that operates BES Elements, that, if destroyed, degraded, misused or otherwise rendered unavailable, would cause one or more Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (IROLs) violations for failure to operate as designed or cause a reduction in one or more IROLs if destroyed, degraded, misused, or otherwise rendered unavailable.

- 2.10.** Each system or group of Elements that performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more implementing undervoltage load shedding (UVLS) or underfrequency load shedding (UFLS) under a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or regional reliability standard.
- 2.11.** Each Control Center or backup Control Center, not already included in High Impact Rating (H) above, used to perform the functional obligations of the Generator Operator for an aggregate highest rated net Real Power capability of the preceding 12 calendar months equal to or exceeding 1500 MW in a single Interconnection.
- 2.12.** Each Control Center or backup Control Center used to perform the functional obligations of the Transmission Operator not included in High Impact Rating (H), above.
- 2.13.** Each Control Center or backup Control Center, not already included in High Impact Rating (H) above, used to perform the functional obligations of the Balancing Authority for generation equal to or greater than an aggregate of 1500 MW in a single Interconnection.

3. Low Impact Rating (L)

BES Cyber Systems not included in Sections 1 or 2 above that are associated with any of the following assets and that meet the applicability qualifications in Section 4 - Applicability, part 4.2 – Facilities, of this standard:

- 3.1.** Control Centers and backup Control Centers.
- 3.2.** Transmission stations and substations.
- 3.3.** Generation resources.
- 3.4.** Systems and facilities critical to system restoration, including Blackstart Resources and Cranking Paths and initial switching requirements.
- 3.5.** Special Protection Systems that support the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System.
- 3.6.** For Distribution Providers, Protection Systems specified in Applicability section 4.2.1 above.

Guidelines and Technical Basis

Section 4 – Scope of Applicability of the CIP Cyber Security Standards

Section “4. Applicability” of the standards provides important information for Responsible Entities to determine the scope of the applicability of the CIP Cyber Security Requirements.

Section “4.1. Functional Entities” is a list of NERC functional entities to which the standard applies. If the entity is registered as one or more of the functional entities listed in section 4.1, then the NERC CIP Cyber Security Standards apply. Note that there is a qualification in section 4.1 that restricts the applicability in the case of Distribution Providers to only those that own certain types of systems and equipment listed in 4.2.

Section “4.2. Facilities” defines the scope of the Facilities, systems, and equipment owned by the Responsible Entity, as qualified in section 4.1, that is subject to the requirements of the standard. In addition to the set of BES Facilities, Control Centers, and other systems and equipment, the list includes the qualified set of systems and equipment owned by Distribution Providers. While the NERC Glossary term “Facilities” already includes the BES characteristic, the additional use of the term BES here is meant to reinforce the scope of applicability of these Facilities where it is used, especially in this applicability scoping section. This in effect sets the scope of Facilities, systems, and equipment that is subject to the standards. This section is especially significant in CIP-002-5.1 and represents the total scope of Facilities, systems, and equipment to which the criteria in Attachment 1 apply. This is important because it determines the balance of these Facilities, systems, and equipment that are Low Impact once those that qualify under the High and Medium Impact categories are filtered out.

For the purpose of identifying groups of Facilities, systems, and equipment, whether by location or otherwise, the Responsible Entity identifies assets as described in Requirement R1 of CIP-002-5.1. This is a process familiar to Responsible Entities that have to comply with versions 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the CIP standards for Critical Assets. As in versions 1, 2, 3, and 4, Responsible Entities may use substations, generation plants, and Control Centers at single site locations as identifiers of these groups of Facilities, systems, and equipment.

CIP-002-5.1

CIP-002-5.1 requires that applicable Responsible Entities categorize their BES Cyber Systems and associated BES Cyber Assets according to the criteria in Attachment 1. A BES Cyber Asset includes in its definition, “...that if rendered unavailable, degraded, or misused would, within 15 minutes adversely impact the reliable operation of the BES.”

The following provides guidance that a Responsible Entity may use to identify the BES Cyber Systems that would be in scope. The concept of BES reliability operating service is useful in providing Responsible Entities with the option of a defined process for scoping those BES Cyber

Systems that would be subject to CIP-002-5.1. The concept includes a number of named BES reliability operating services. These named services include:

- Dynamic Response to BES conditions
- Balancing Load and Generation
- Controlling Frequency (Real Power)
- Controlling Voltage (Reactive Power)
- Managing Constraints
- Monitoring & Control
- Restoration of BES
- Situational Awareness
- Inter-Entity Real-Time Coordination and Communication

Responsibility for the reliable operation of the BES is spread across all Entity Registrations. Each entity registration has its own special contribution to reliable operations and the following discussion helps identify which entity registration, in the context of those functional entities to which these CIP standards apply, performs which reliability operating service, as a process to identify BES Cyber Systems that would be in scope. The following provides guidance for Responsible Entities to determine applicable reliability operations services according to their Function Registration type.

Entity Registration	RC	BA	TOP	TO	DP	GOP	GO
Dynamic Response		X	X	X	X	X	X
Balancing Load & Generation	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Controlling Frequency		X				X	X
Controlling Voltage			X	X	X		X
Managing Constraints	X		X			X	
Monitoring and Control			X			X	
Restoration			X			X	
Situation Awareness	X	X	X			X	
Inter-Entity coordination	X	X	X	X		X	X

Dynamic Response

The Dynamic Response Operating Service includes those actions performed by BES Elements or subsystems which are automatically triggered to initiate a response to a BES condition. These actions are triggered by a single element or control device or a combination of these elements or devices in concert to perform an action or cause a condition in reaction to the triggering action or condition. The types of dynamic responses that may be considered as potentially having an impact on the BES are:

- Spinning reserves (contingency reserves)
 - Providing actual reserve generation when called upon (GO,GOP)
 - Monitoring that reserves are sufficient (BA)
- Governor Response
 - Control system used to actuate governor response (GO)
- Protection Systems (transmission & generation)
 - Lines, buses, transformers, generators (DP, TO, TOP, GO, GOP)
 - Zone protection for breaker failure (DP, TO, TOP)
 - Breaker protection (DP, TO, TOP)
 - Current, frequency, speed, phase (TO,TOP, GO,GOP)
- Special Protection Systems or Remedial Action Schemes
 - Sensors, relays, and breakers, possibly software (DP, TO, TOP)
- Under and Over Frequency relay protection (includes automatic load shedding)
 - Sensors, relays & breakers (DP)
- Under and Over Voltage relay protection (includes automatic load shedding)
 - Sensors, relays & breakers (DP)
- Power System Stabilizers (GO)

Balancing Load and Generation

The Balancing Load and Generation Operations Service includes activities, actions and conditions necessary for monitoring and controlling generation and load in the operations planning horizon and in real-time. Aspects of the Balancing Load and Generation function include, but are not limited to:

- Calculation of Area Control Error (ACE)
 - Field data sources (real time tie flows, frequency sources, time error, etc) (TO, TOP)
 - Software used to perform calculation (BA)
- Demand Response
 - Ability to identify load change need (BA)
 - Ability to implement load changes (TOP,DP)
- Manually Initiated Load shedding
 - Ability to identify load change need (BA)
 - Ability to implement load changes (TOP, DP)

- Non-spinning reserve (contingency reserve)
 - Know generation status, capability, ramp rate, start time (GO, BA)
 - Start units and provide energy (GOP)

Controlling Frequency (Real Power)

The Controlling Frequency Operations Service includes activities, actions and conditions which ensure, in real time, that frequency remains within bounds acceptable for the reliability or operability of the BES. Aspects of the Controlling Frequency function include, but are limited to:

- Generation Control (such as AGC)
 - ACE, current generator output, ramp rate, unit characteristics (BA, GOP, GO)
 - Software to calculate unit adjustments (BA)
 - Transmit adjustments to individual units (GOP)
 - Unit controls implementing adjustments (GOP)
- Regulation (regulating reserves)
 - Frequency source, schedule (BA)
 - Governor control system (GO)

Controlling Voltage (Reactive Power)

The Controlling Voltage Operations Service includes activities, actions and conditions which ensure, in real time, that voltage remains within bounds acceptable for the reliability or operability of the BES. Aspects of the Controlling Voltage function include, but are not limited to:

- Automatic Voltage Regulation (AVR)
 - Sensors, stator control system, feedback (GO)
- Capacitive resources
 - Status, control (manual or auto), feedback (TOP, TO,DP)
- Inductive resources (transformer tap changer, or inductors)
 - Status, control (manual or auto), feedback (TOP,TO,DP)
- Static VAR Compensators (SVC)
 - Status, computations, control (manual or auto), feedback (TOP, TO,DP)

Managing Constraints

Managing Constraints includes activities, actions and conditions that are necessary to ensure that elements of the BES operate within design limits and constraints established for the reliability and operability of the BES. Aspects of the Managing Constraints include, but are not limited to:

- Available Transfer Capability (ATC) (TOP)
- Interchange schedules (TOP, RC)
- Generation re-dispatch and unit commit (GOP)
- Identify and monitor SOL's & IROL's (TOP, RC)
- Identify and monitor Flow gates (TOP, RC)

Monitoring and Control

Monitoring and Control includes those activities, actions and conditions that provide monitoring and control of BES Elements. An example aspect of the Control and Operation function is:

- All methods of operating breakers and switches
 - SCADA (TOP, GOP)
 - Substation automation (TOP)

Restoration of BES

The Restoration of BES Operations Service includes activities, actions and conditions necessary to go from a shutdown condition to an operating condition delivering electric power without external assistance. Aspects of the Restoration of BES function include, but are not limited to:

- Restoration including planned cranking path
 - Through black start units (TOP, GOP)
 - Through tie lines (TOP, GOP)
- Off-site power for nuclear facilities. (TOP, TO, BA, RC, DP, GO, GOP)
- Coordination (TOP, TO, BA, RC, DP, GO, GOP)

Situational Awareness

The Situational Awareness function includes activities, actions and conditions established by policy, directive or standard operating procedure necessary to assess the current condition of the BES and anticipate effects of planned and unplanned changes to conditions. Aspects of the Situation Awareness function include:

- Monitoring and alerting (such as EMS alarms) (TOP, GOP, RC,BA)
- Change management (TOP,GOP,RC,BA)
- Current Day and Next Day planning (TOP)
- Contingency Analysis (RC)
- Frequency monitoring (BA, RC)

Inter-Entity Coordination

The Inter-Entity coordination and communication function includes activities, actions, and conditions established by policy, directive, or standard operating procedure necessary for the coordination and communication between Responsible Entities to ensure the reliability and operability of the BES. Aspects of the Inter-Entity Coordination and Communication function include:

- Scheduled interchange (BA,TOP,GOP,RC)
- Facility operational data and status (TO, TOP, GO, GOP, RC, BA)
- Operational directives (TOP, RC, BA)

Applicability to Distribution Providers

It is expected that only Distribution Providers that own or operate facilities that qualify in the Applicability section will be subject to these Version 5 Cyber Security Standards. Distribution Providers that do not own or operate any facility that qualifies are not subject to these standards. The qualifications are based on the requirements for registration as a Distribution Provider and on the requirements applicable to Distribution Providers in NERC Standard EOP-005.

Requirement R1:

Requirement R1 implements the methodology for the categorization of BES Cyber Systems according to their impact on the BES. Using the traditional risk assessment equation, it reduces the measure of the risk to an impact (consequence) assessment, assuming the vulnerability index of 1 (the Systems are assumed to be vulnerable) and a probability of threat of 1 (100 percent). The criteria in Attachment 1 provide a measure of the impact of the BES assets supported by these BES Cyber Systems.

Responsible Entities are required to identify and categorize those BES Cyber Systems that have high and medium impact. BES Cyber Systems for BES assets not specified in Attachment 1, Criteria 1.1 – 1.4 and Criteria 2.1 – 2.11 default to low impact.

Attachment 1

Overall Application

In the application of the criteria in Attachment 1, Responsible Entities should note that the approach used is based on the impact of the BES Cyber System as measured by the bright-line criteria defined in Attachment 1.

- When the drafting team uses the term “Facilities”, there is some latitude to Responsible Entities to determine included Facilities. The term Facility is defined in the NERC Glossary of Terms as “A set of electrical equipment that operates as a single Bulk Electric System Element (e.g., a line, a generator, a shunt compensator, transformer, etc.).” In most cases, the criteria refer to a group of Facilities in a given location that supports the reliable operation of the BES. For example, for Transmission assets, the substation may be designated as the group of Facilities. However, in a substation that includes equipment that supports BES operations along with equipment that only supports Distribution operations, the Responsible Entity may be better served to consider only the group of Facilities that supports BES operation. In that case, the Responsible Entity may designate the group of Facilities by location, with qualifications on the group of Facilities that supports reliable operation of the BES, as the Facilities that are subject to the criteria for categorization of BES Cyber Systems. Generation Facilities are separately discussed in the Generation section below. In CIP-002-5.1, these groups of Facilities, systems, and equipment are sometimes designated as BES assets. For example, an identified BES asset may be a named substation, generating plant, or Control Center. Responsible Entities have flexibility in how they group Facilities, systems, and equipment at a location.
- In certain cases, a BES Cyber System may be categorized by meeting multiple criteria. In such cases, the Responsible Entity may choose to document all criteria that result in the categorization. This will avoid inadvertent miscategorization when it no longer meets one of the criteria, but still meets another.
- It is recommended that each BES Cyber System should be listed by only one Responsible Entity. Where there is joint ownership, it is advisable that the owning Responsible Entities should formally agree on the designated Responsible Entity responsible for compliance with the standards.

High Impact Rating (H)

This category includes those BES Cyber Systems, used by and at Control Centers (and the associated data centers included in the definition of Control Centers), that perform the functional obligations of the Reliability Coordinator (RC), Balancing Authority (BA), Transmission Operator (TOP), or Generator Operator (GOP), as defined under the Tasks heading of the applicable Function and the Relationship with Other Entities heading of the functional entity in the NERC Functional Model, and as scoped by the qualification in Attachment 1, Criteria 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4. While those entities that have been registered as the above-named functional entities are specifically referenced, it must be noted that there may be agreements where some

of the functional obligations of a Transmission Operator may be delegated to a Transmission Owner (TO). In these cases, BES Cyber Systems at these TO Control Centers that perform these functional obligations would be subject to categorization as high impact. The criteria notably specifically emphasize functional obligations, not necessarily the RC, BA, TOP, or GOP facilities. One must note that the definition of Control Center specifically refers to reliability tasks for RCs, Bas, TOPs, and GOPs. A TO BES Cyber System in a TO facility that does not perform or does not have an agreement with a TOP to perform any of these functional tasks does not meet the definition of a Control Center. However, if that BES Cyber System operates any of the facilities that meet criteria in the Medium Impact category, that BES Cyber System would be categorized as a Medium Impact BES Cyber System.

The 3000 MW threshold defined in criterion 1.2 for BA Control Centers provides a sufficient differentiation of the threshold defined for Medium Impact BA Control Centers. An analysis of BA footprints shows that the majority of Bas with significant impact are covered under this criterion.

Additional thresholds as specified in the criteria apply for this category.

Medium Impact Rating (M)

Generation

The criteria in Attachment 1's medium impact category that generally apply to Generation Owner and Operator (GO/GOP) Registered Entities are criteria 2.1, 2.3, 2.6, 2.9, and 2.11. Criterion 2.13 for BA Control Centers is also included here.

- Criterion 2.1 designates as medium impact those BES Cyber Systems that impact generation with a net Real Power capability exceeding 1500 MW. The 1500 MW criterion is sourced partly from the Contingency Reserve requirements in NERC standard BAL-002, whose purpose is "to ensure the Balancing Authority is able to utilize its Contingency Reserve to balance resources and demand and return Interconnection frequency within defined limits following a Reportable Disturbance." In particular, it requires that "as a minimum, the Balancing Authority or Reserve Sharing Group shall carry at least enough Contingency Reserve to cover the most severe single contingency." The drafting team used 1500 MW as a number derived from the most significant Contingency Reserves operated in various Bas in all regions.

In the use of net Real Power capability, the drafting team sought to use a value that could be verified through existing requirements as proposed by NERC standard MOD-024 and current development efforts in that area.

By using 1500 MW as a bright-line, the intent of the drafting team was to ensure that BES Cyber Systems with common mode vulnerabilities that could result in the loss of 1500 MW or more of generation at a single plant for a unit or group of units are adequately protected.

The drafting team also used additional time and value parameters to ensure the bright-lines and the values used to measure against them were relatively stable over the review period. Hence, where multiple values of net Real Power capability could be used for the Facilities' qualification against these bright-lines, the highest value was used.

- In Criterion 2.3, the drafting team sought to ensure that BES Cyber Systems for those generation Facilities that have been designated by the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner as necessary to avoid BES Adverse Reliability Impacts in the planning horizon of one year or more are categorized as medium impact. In specifying a planning horizon of one year or more, the intent is to ensure that those are units that are identified as a result of a "long term" reliability planning, i.e that the plans are spanning an operating period of at least 12 months: it does not mean that the operating day for the unit is necessarily beyond one year, but that the period that is being planned for is more than 1 year: it is specifically intended to avoid designating generation that is required to be run to remediate short term emergency reliability issues. These Facilities may be designated as "Reliability Must Run," and this designation is distinct from those generation Facilities designated as "must run" for market stabilization purposes. Because the use of the term "must run" creates some confusion in many areas, the drafting team chose to avoid using this term and instead drafted the requirement in more generic reliability language. In particular, the focus on preventing an Adverse Reliability Impact dictates that these units are designated as must run for reliability purposes beyond the local area. Those units designated as must run for voltage support in the local area would not generally be given this designation. In cases where there is no designated Planning Coordinator, the Transmission Planner is included as the Registered Entity that performs this designation.

If it is determined through System studies that a unit must run in order to preserve the reliability of the BES, such as due to a Category C3 contingency as defined in TPL-003, then BES Cyber Systems for that unit are categorized as medium impact.

The TPL standards require that, where the studies and plans indicate additional actions, that these studies and plans be communicated by the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner in writing to the Regional Entity/RRO. Actions necessary for the implementation of these plans by affected parties (generation owners/operators and Reliability Coordinators or other necessary party) are usually formalized in the form of an agreement and/or contract.

- Criterion 2.6 includes BES Cyber Systems for those Generation Facilities that have been identified as critical to the derivation of IROLs and their associated contingencies, as specified by FAC-014-2, **Establish and Communicate System Operating Limits**, R5.1.1 and R5.1.3.

IROLs may be based on dynamic System phenomena such as instability or voltage collapse. Derivation of these IROLs and their associated contingencies often considers the effect of generation inertia and AVR response.

- Criterion 2.9 categorizes BES Cyber Systems for Special Protection Systems and Remedial Action Schemes as medium impact. Special Protection Systems and Remedial Action Schemes may be implemented to prevent disturbances that would result in exceeding IROLs if they do not provide the function required at the time it is required or if it operates outside of the parameters it was designed for. Generation Owners and Generator Operators which own BES Cyber Systems for such Systems and schemes designate them as medium impact.
- Criterion 2.11 categorizes as medium impact BES Cyber Systems used by and at Control Centers that perform the functional obligations of the Generator Operator for an aggregate generation of 1500 MW or higher in a single interconnection, and that have not already been included in Part 1.
- Criterion 2.13 categorizes as medium impact those BA Control Centers that “control” 1500 MW of generation or more in a single interconnection and that have not already been included in Part 1. The 1500 MW threshold is consistent with the impact level and rationale specified for Criterion 2.1.

Transmission

The SDT uses the phrases “Transmission Facilities at a single station or substation” and “Transmission stations or substations” to recognize the existence of both stations and substations. Many entities in industry consider a substation to be a location with physical borders (i.e. fence, wall, etc.) that contains at least an autotransformer. Locations also exist that do not contain autotransformers, and many entities in industry refer to those locations as stations (or switchyards). Therefore, the SDT chose to use both “station” and “substation” to refer to the locations where groups of Transmission Facilities exist.

- Criteria 2.2, 2.4 through 2.10, and 2.12 in Attachment 1 are the criteria that are applicable to Transmission Owners and Operators. In many of the criteria, the impact threshold is defined as the capability of the failure or compromise of a System to result in exceeding one or more Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (IROLs). Criterion 2.2 includes BES Cyber Systems for those Facilities in Transmission Systems that provide reactive resources to enhance and preserve the reliability of the BES. The nameplate value is used here because there is no NERC requirement to verify actual capability of these Facilities. The value of 1000 MVARs used in this criterion is a value deemed reasonable for the purpose of determining criticality.
- Criterion 2.4 includes BES Cyber Systems for any Transmission Facility at a substation operated at 500 kV or higher. While the drafting team felt that Facilities operated at 500 kV or higher did not require any further qualification for their role as components of the

backbone on the Interconnected BES, Facilities in the lower EHV range should have additional qualifying criteria for inclusion in the medium impact category.

It must be noted that if the collector bus for a generation plant (i.e. the plant is smaller in aggregate than the threshold set for generation in Criterion 2.1) is operated at 500kV, the collector bus should be considered a Generation Interconnection Facility, and not a Transmission Facility, according to the “Final Report from the Ad Hoc Group for Generation Requirements at the Transmission Interface.” This collector bus would not be a facility for a medium impact BES Cyber System because it does not significantly affect the 500kV Transmission grid; it only affects a plant which is below the generation threshold.

- Criterion 2.5 includes BES Cyber Systems for facilities at the lower end of BES Transmission with qualifications for inclusion if they are deemed highly likely to have significant impact on the BES. While the criterion has been specified as part of the rationale for requiring protection for significant impact on the BES, the drafting team included, in this criterion, additional qualifications that would ensure the required level of impact to the BES. The drafting team:
 - Excluded radial facilities that would only provide support for single generation facilities.
 - Specified interconnection to at least three transmission stations or substations to ensure that the level of impact would be appropriate.

The total aggregated weighted value of 3,000 was derived from weighted values related to three connected 345 kV lines and five connected 230 kV lines at a transmission station or substation. The total aggregated weighted value is used to account for the true impact to the BES, irrespective of line kV rating and mix of multiple kV rated lines.

Additionally, in NERC’s document “[Integrated Risk Assessment Approach – Refinement to Severity Risk Index](#)”, Attachment 1, the report used an average MVA line loading based on kV rating:

- 230 kV → 700 MVA
- 345 kV → 1,300 MVA
- 500 kV → 2,000 MVA
- 765 kV → 3,000 MVA

In the terms of applicable lines and connecting “other Transmission stations or substations” determinations, the following should be considered:

- For autotransformers in a station, Responsible Entities have flexibility in determining whether the groups of Facilities are considered a single substation or station location or multiple substations or stations. In most cases, Responsible Entities

would probably consider them as Facilities at a single substation or station unless geographically dispersed. In these cases of these transformers being within the “fence” of the substation or station, autotransformers may not count as separate connections to other stations. The use of common BES Cyber Systems may negate any rationale for any consideration otherwise. In the case of autotransformers that are geographically dispersed from a station location, the calculation would take into account the connections in and out of each station or substation location.

- Multiple-point (or multiple-tap) lines are considered to contribute a single weight value per line and affect the number of connections to other stations. Therefore, a single 230 kV multiple-point line between three Transmission stations or substations would contribute an aggregated weighted value of 700 and connect Transmission Facilities at a single station or substation to two other Transmission stations or substations.
- Multiple lines between two Transmission stations or substations are considered to contribute multiple weight values per line, but these multiple lines between the two stations only connect one station to one other station. Therefore, two 345 kV lines between two Transmission stations or substations would contribute an aggregated weighted value of 2600 and connect Transmission Facilities at a single station or substation to one other Transmission station or substation.

Criterion 2.5’s qualification for Transmission Facilities at a Transmission station or substation is based on 2 distinct conditions.

1. The first condition is that Transmission Facilities at a single station or substation where that station or substation connect, at voltage levels of 200 kV or higher to three (3) other stations or substations, to three other stations or substations. This qualification is meant to ensure that connections that operate at voltages of 500 kV or higher are included in the count of connections to other stations or substations as well.
2. The second qualification is that the aggregate value of all lines entering or leaving the station or substation must exceed 3000. This qualification does not include the consideration of lines operating at lower than 200 kV, or 500 kV or higher, the latter already qualifying as medium impact under criterion 2.4. : there is no value to be assigned to lines at voltages of less than 200 kV or 500 kV or higher in the table of values for the contribution to the aggregate value of 3000.

The Transmission Facilities at the station or substation must meet both qualifications to be considered as qualified under criterion 2.5.

- Criterion 2.6 include BES Cyber Systems for those Transmission Facilities that have been identified as critical to the derivation of IROLs and their associated contingencies, as

specified by FAC-014-2, **Establish and Communicate System Operating Limits**, R5.1.1 and R5.1.3.

- Criterion 2.7 is sourced from the NUC-001 NERC standard, Requirement R9.2.2, for the support of Nuclear Facilities. NUC-001 ensures that reliability of NPIR's are ensured through adequate coordination between the Nuclear Generator Owner/Operator and its Transmission provider "for the purpose of ensuring nuclear plant safe operation and shutdown." In particular, there are specific requirements to coordinate physical and cyber security protection of these interfaces.
- Criterion 2.8 designates as medium impact those BES Cyber Systems that impact Transmission Facilities necessary to directly support generation that meet the criteria in Criteria 2.1 (generation Facilities with output greater than 1500 MW) and 2.3 (generation Facilities generally designated as "must run" for wide area reliability in the planning horizon). The Responsible Entity can request a formal statement from the Generation owner as to the qualification of generation Facilities connected to their Transmission systems.
- Criterion 2.9 designates as medium impact those BES Cyber Systems for those Special Protection Systems (SPS), Remedial Action Schemes (RAS), or automated switching Systems installed to ensure BES operation within IROLs. The degradation, compromise or unavailability of these BES Cyber Systems would result in exceeding IROLs if they fail to operate as designed. By the definition of IROL, the loss or compromise of any of these have Wide Area impacts.
- Criterion 2.10 designates as medium impact those BES Cyber Systems for Systems or Elements that perform automatic Load shedding, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more. The SDT spent considerable time discussing the wording of Criterion 2.10, and chose the term "Each" to represent that the criterion applied to a discrete System or Facility. In the drafting of this criterion, the drafting team sought to include only those Systems that did not require human operator initiation, and targeted in particular those underfrequency load shedding (UFLS) Facilities and systems and undervoltage load shedding (UVLS) systems and Elements that would be subject to a regional Load shedding requirement to prevent Adverse Reliability Impact. These include automated UFLS systems or UVLS systems that are capable of Load shedding 300 MW or more. It should be noted that those qualifying systems which require a human operator to arm the system, but once armed, trigger automatically, are still to be considered as not requiring human operator initiation and should be designated as medium impact. The 300 MW threshold has been defined as the aggregate of the highest MW Load value, as defined by the applicable regional Load Shedding standards, for the preceding 12 months to account for seasonal fluctuations.

This particular threshold (300 MW) was provided in CIP, Version 1. The SDT believes that the threshold should be lower than the 1500MW generation requirement since it is specifically addressing UVLS and UFLS, which are last ditch efforts to save the Bulk Electric

System and hence requires a lower threshold. A review of UFLS tolerances defined within regional reliability standards for UFLS program requirements to date indicates that the historical value of 300 MW represents an adequate and reasonable threshold value for allowable UFLS operational tolerances.

In ERCOT, the Load acting as a Resource (“LaaR”) Demand Response Program is not part of the regional load shedding program, but an ancillary services market. In general, similar demand response programs that are not part of the NERC or regional reliability Load shedding programs, but are offered as components of an ancillary services market do not qualify under this criterion.

The language used in section 4 for UVLS and UFLS and in criterion 2.10 of Attachment 1 is designed to be consistent with requirements set in the PRC standards for UFLS and UVLS.

- Criterion 2.12 categorizes as medium impact those BES Cyber Systems used by and at Control Centers and associated data centers performing the functional obligations of a Transmission Operator and that have not already been categorized as high impact.
- Criterion 2.13 categorizes as Medium Impact those BA Control Centers that “control” 1500 MW of generation or more in a single Interconnection. The 1500 MW threshold is consistent with the impact level and rationale specified for Criterion 2.1.

Low Impact Rating (L)

BES Cyber Systems not categorized in high impact or medium impact default to low impact. Note that low impact BES Cyber Systems do not require discrete identification.

Restoration Facilities

- Several discussions on the CIP Version 5 standards suggest entities owning Blackstart Resources and Cranking Paths might elect to remove those services to avoid higher compliance costs. For example, one Reliability Coordinator reported a 25% reduction of Blackstart Resources as a result of the Version 1 language, and there could be more entities that make this choice under Version 5.

In response, the CIP Version 5 drafting team sought informal input from NERC’s Operating and Planning Committees. The committees indicate there has already been a reduction in Blackstart Resources because of increased CIP compliance costs, environmental rules, and other risks; continued inclusion within Version 5 at a category that would very significantly increase compliance costs can result in further reduction of a vulnerable pool.

The drafting team moved from the categorization of restoration assets such as Blackstart Resources and Cranking Paths as medium impact (as was the case in earlier drafts) to categorization of these assets as low impact as a result of these considerations. This will not relieve asset owners of all responsibilities, as would have been the case in CIP-002, Versions 1-4 (since only Cyber Assets with routable connectivity which are essential to

restoration assets are included in those versions). Under the low impact categorization, those assets will be protected in the areas of cyber security awareness, physical access control, and electronic access control, and they will have obligations regarding incident response. This represents a net gain to bulk power system reliability, however, since many of those assets do not meet criteria for inclusion under Versions 1-4.

Weighing the risks to overall BES reliability, the drafting team determined that this re-categorization represents the option that would be the least detrimental to restoration function and, thus, overall BES reliability. Removing Blackstart Resources and Cranking Paths from medium impact promotes overall reliability, as the likely alternative is fewer Blackstart Resources supporting timely restoration when needed.

BES Cyber Systems for generation resources that have been designated as Blackstart Resources in the Transmission Operator's restoration plan default to low impact. NERC Standard EOP-005-2 requires the Transmission Operator to have a Restoration Plan and to list its Blackstart Resources in its plan, as well as requirements to test these Resources. This criterion designates only those generation Blackstart Resources that have been designated as such in the Transmission Operator's restoration plan. The glossary term Blackstart Capability Plan has been retired.

Regarding concerns of communication to BES Asset Owners and Operators of their role in the Restoration Plan, Transmission Operators are required in NERC Standard EOP-005-2 to "provide the entities identified in its approved restoration plan with a description of any changes to their roles and specific tasks prior to the implementation date of the plan."


- BES Cyber Systems for Facilities and Elements comprising the Cranking Paths and meeting the initial switching requirements from the Blackstart Resource to the first Interconnection point of the generation unit(s) to be started, as identified in the Transmission Operator's restoration plan, default to the category of low impact: however, these systems are explicitly called out to ensure consideration for inclusion in the scope of the version 5 CIP standards. This requirement for inclusion in the scope is sourced from requirements in NERC standard EOP-005-2, which requires the Transmission Operator to include in its Restoration Plan the Cranking Paths and initial switching requirements from the Blackstart Resource and the unit(s) to be started.

Distribution Providers may note that they may have BES Cyber Systems that must be scoped in if they have Elements listed in the Transmission Operator's Restoration Plan that are components of the Cranking Path.

Use Case: CIP Process Flow

The following CIP use case process flow for a generator Operator/Owner was provided by a participant in the development of the Version 5 standards and is provided here as an example of a process used to identify and categorize BES Cyber Systems and BES Cyber Assets; review, develop, and implement strategies to mitigate overall risks; and apply applicable security controls.

Overview (Generation Facility)



* - Engineering revisions will need to be reviewed for cost justification, operational safety requirements, support requirements, and technical limitations.

Rationale:

During development of this standard, text boxes were embedded within the standard to explain the rationale for various parts of the standard. Upon BOT approval, the text from the rationale text boxes was moved to this section.

Rationale for R1:

BES Cyber Systems at each site location have varying impact on the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System. Attachment 1 provides a set of “bright-line” criteria that the Responsible Entity must use to identify these BES Cyber Systems in accordance with the impact on the BES. BES Cyber Systems must be identified and categorized according to their impact so that the appropriate measures can be applied, commensurate with their impact. These impact categories will be the basis for the application of appropriate requirements in CIP-003-CIP-011.

Rationale for R2:

The lists required by Requirement R1 are reviewed on a periodic basis to ensure that all BES Cyber Systems required to be categorized have been properly identified and categorized. The miscategorization or non-categorization of a BES Cyber System can lead to the application of inadequate or non-existent cyber security controls that can lead to compromise or misuse that can affect the real-time operation of the BES. The CIP Senior Manager’s approval ensures proper oversight of the process by the appropriate Responsible Entity personnel.

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	1/16/06	R3.2 — Change “Control Center” to “control center.”	3/24/06
2	9/30/09	Modifications to clarify the requirements and to bring the compliance elements into conformance with the latest guidelines for developing compliance elements of standards. Removal of reasonable business judgment. Replaced the RRO with the RE as a Responsible Entity. Rewording of Effective Date. Changed compliance monitor to Compliance Enforcement Authority.	
3	12/16/09	Updated version number from -2 to -3.	Update

Guidelines and Technical Basis

		Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees.	
3	3/31/10	Approved by FERC.	
4	12/30/10	Modified to add specific criteria for Critical Asset identification.	Update
4	1/24/11	Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Update
5	11/26/12	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Modified to coordinate with other CIP standards and to revise format to use RBS Template.
5.1	9/30/13	Replaced "Devices" with "Systems" in a definition in background section.	Errata
5.1	11/22/13	FERC Order issued approving CIP-002-5.1. (Order becomes effective on 2/3/14.)	

This appendix establishes specific provisions for the application of the standard in Québec. Provisions of the standard and of its appendix must be read together for the purposes of understanding and interpretation. Where the standard and appendix differ, the appendix shall prevail.

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Cyber Security — BES Cyber System Categorization
2. **Number:** CIP-002-5.1
3. **Purpose:** No specific provision
4. **Applicability:**

Functional Entities

No specific provision

Facilities

This standard only applies to the facilities of the Main Transmission System (RTP) and to the facilities specified for the Distribution Provider. In application of this standard, any reference to the terms "Bulk Electric System" or "BES" shall be replaced by the terms "Main Transmission System" or "RTP" respectively.

Additional Exemptions

The following are exempt from this standard:

- Generating facilities with a nameplate capacity of 300 MVA or less, unless the facility comprises one or more units that can be synchronized with neighboring systems.
- Step-up substations of generating facilities identified in the preceding point.

5. **Effective Date:**

5.1. Adoption of the standard by the Régie de l'énergie: Month xx 201x

5.2. Adoption of the appendix by the Régie de l'énergie: Month xx 201x

5.3. Effective date of the standard and its appendix in Québec: Month xx 201x

6. **Background:** No specific provision

B. Requirements and Measures

No specific provision

C. Compliance

1. **Compliance Monitoring Process**
 - 1.1. **Compliance Enforcement Authority**

The Régie de l'énergie is responsible, in Québec, for compliance enforcement with respect to the reliability standard and its appendix that it adopts.

1.2. Evidence Retention

No specific provision

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes

No specific provision

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

No specific provision

2. Table of Compliance Elements

No specific provision

D. Regional Variances

No specific provision

E. Interpretations

No specific provision

F. Associated Documents

No specific provision

CIP-002-5.1 — Attachment 1

No specific provision

Guidelines and Technical Basis

No specific provision

Rationale

No specific provision

Revision History

Revision	Adoption Date	Action	Change Tracking
0	Xx month 201x	New appendix	New

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Cyber Security — Security Management Controls
2. **Number:** CIP-003-5
3. **Purpose:** To specify consistent and sustainable security management controls that establish responsibility and accountability to protect BES Cyber Systems against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the BES.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. **Functional Entities:** For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of functional entities will be collectively referred to as “Responsible Entities.” For requirements in this standard where a specific functional entity or subset of functional entities are the applicable entity or entities, the functional entity or entities are specified explicitly.
 - 4.1.1 **Balancing Authority**
 - 4.1.2 **Distribution Provider** that owns one or more of the following Facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the BES:
 - 4.1.2.1 Each underfrequency Load shedding (UFLS) or undervoltage Load shedding (UVLS) system that:
 - 4.1.2.1.1 is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and
 - 4.1.2.1.2 performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.
 - 4.1.2.2 Each Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme where the Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - 4.1.2.3 Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - 4.1.2.4 Each Cranking Path and group of Elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a Blackstart Resource up to and including the first interconnection point of the starting station service of the next generation unit(s) to be started.
 - 4.1.3 **Generator Operator**
 - 4.1.4 **Generator Owner**
 - 4.1.5 **Interchange Coordinator or Interchange Authority**
 - 4.1.6 **Reliability Coordinator**

4.1.7 Transmission Operator

4.1.8 Transmission Owner

4.2. Facilities: For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following Facilities, systems, and equipment owned by each Responsible Entity in 4.1 above are those to which these requirements are applicable. For requirements in this standard where a specific type of Facilities, system, or equipment or subset of Facilities, systems, and equipment are applicable, these are specified explicitly.

4.2.1 Distribution Provider: One or more of the following Facilities, systems and equipment owned by the Distribution Provider for the protection or restoration of the BES:

4.2.1.1 Each UFLS or UVLS System that:

4.2.1.1.1 is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and

4.2.1.1.2 performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.

4.2.1.2 Each Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme where the Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.

4.2.1.3 Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.

4.2.1.4 Each Cranking Path and group of Elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a Blackstart Resource up to and including the first interconnection point of the starting station service of the next generation unit(s) to be started.

4.2.2 Responsible Entities listed in 4.1 other than Distribution Providers:

All BES Facilities.

4.2.3 Exemptions: The following are exempt from Standard CIP-003-5:

4.2.3.1 Cyber Assets at Facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.

4.2.3.2 Cyber Assets associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete Electronic Security Perimeters.

4.2.3.3 The systems, structures, and components that are regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under a cyber security plan pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Section 73.54.

4.2.3.4 For Distribution Providers, the systems and equipment that are not included in section 4.2.1 above.

5. Effective Dates:

1. **24 Months Minimum** – CIP-003-5, except for CIP-003-5, Requirement R2, shall become effective on the later of July 1, 2015, or the first calendar day of the ninth calendar quarter after the effective date of the order providing applicable regulatory approval. CIP-003-5, Requirement R2 shall become effective on the later of July 1, 2016, or the first calendar day of the 13th calendar quarter after the effective date of the order providing applicable regulatory approval.
2. In those jurisdictions where no regulatory approval is required, CIP-003-5, except for CIP-003-5, Requirement R2, shall become effective on the first day of the ninth calendar quarter following Board of Trustees' approval, and CIP-003-5, Requirement R2 shall become effective on the first day of the 13th calendar quarter following Board of Trustees' approval, or as otherwise made effective pursuant to the laws applicable to such ERO governmental authorities.

6. Background:

Standard CIP-003-5 exists as part of a suite of CIP Standards related to cyber security. CIP-002-5 requires the initial identification and categorization of BES Cyber Systems. CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1 require a minimum level of organizational, operational, and procedural controls to mitigate risk to BES Cyber Systems. This suite of CIP Standards is referred to as the *Version 5 CIP Cyber Security Standards*.

The SDT has incorporated within this standard a recognition that certain requirements should not focus on individual instances of failure as a sole basis for violating the standard. In particular, the SDT has incorporated an approach to empower and enable the industry to identify, assess, and correct deficiencies in the implementation of certain requirements. The intent is to change the basis of a violation in those requirements so that they are not focused on *whether* there is a deficiency, but on identifying, assessing, and correcting deficiencies. It is presented in those requirements by modifying "implement" as follows:

Each Responsible Entity shall implement, **in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies**, . . .

The term *documented processes* refers to a set of required instructions specific to the Responsible Entity and to achieve a specific outcome. This term does not imply any naming or approval structure beyond what is stated in the requirements. An entity should include as much as it believes necessary in their documented processes, but they must address the applicable requirements. The documented processes themselves are not required to include the ". . . identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, . . ." elements described in the preceding paragraph, as those aspects

are related to the manner of implementation of the documented processes and could be accomplished through other controls or compliance management activities.

The terms *program* and *plan* are sometimes used in place of *documented processes* where it makes sense and is commonly understood. For example, documented processes describing a response are typically referred to as *plans* (i.e., incident response plans and recovery plans). Likewise, a security plan can describe an approach involving multiple procedures to address a broad subject matter.

Similarly, the term *program* may refer to the organization's overall implementation of its policies, plans and procedures involving a subject matter. Examples in the standards include the personnel risk assessment program and the personnel training program. The full implementation of the CIP Cyber Security Standards could also be referred to as a program. However, the terms *program* and *plan* do not imply any additional requirements beyond what is stated in the standards.

Responsible Entities can implement common controls that meet requirements for multiple high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems. For example, a single training program could meet the requirements for training personnel across multiple BES Cyber Systems.

Measures provide examples of evidence to show documentation and implementation of the requirement. These measures serve to provide guidance to entities in acceptable records of compliance and should not be viewed as an all-inclusive list.

Throughout the standards, unless otherwise stated, bulleted items in the requirements and measures are items that are linked with an "or," and numbered items are items that are linked with an "and."

Many references in the Applicability section use a threshold of 300 MW for UFLS and UVLS. This particular threshold of 300 MW for UVLS and UFLS was provided in Version 1 of the CIP Cyber Security Standards. The threshold remains at 300 MW since it is specifically addressing UVLS and UFLS, which are last ditch efforts to save the Bulk Electric System. A review of UFLS tolerances defined within regional reliability standards for UFLS program requirements to date indicates that the historical value of 300 MW represents an adequate and reasonable threshold value for allowable UFLS operational tolerances.

B. Requirements and Measures

- R1.** Each Responsible Entity, for its high impact and medium impact BES Cyber Systems, shall review and obtain CIP Senior Manager approval at least once every 15 calendar months for one or more documented cyber security policies that collectively address the following topics: *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*
- 1.1** Personnel & training (CIP-004);
 - 1.2** Electronic Security Perimeters (CIP-005) including Interactive Remote Access;
 - 1.3** Physical security of BES Cyber Systems (CIP-006);
 - 1.4** System security management (CIP-007);
 - 1.5** Incident reporting and response planning (CIP-008);
 - 1.6** Recovery plans for BES Cyber Systems (CIP-009);
 - 1.7** Configuration change management and vulnerability assessments (CIP-010);
 - 1.8** Information protection (CIP-011); and
 - 1.9** Declaring and responding to CIP Exceptional Circumstances.
- M1.** Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, policy documents; revision history, records of review, or workflow evidence from a document management system that indicate review of each cyber security policy at least once every 15 calendar months; and documented approval by the CIP Senior Manager for each cyber security policy.
- R2.** Each Responsible Entity for its assets identified in CIP-002-5, Requirement R1, Part R1.3, shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented cyber security policies that collectively address the following topics, and review and obtain CIP Senior Manager approval for those policies at least once every 15 calendar months: *[Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*
- 2.1** Cyber security awareness;
 - 2.2** Physical security controls;
 - 2.3** Electronic access controls for external routable protocol connections and Dial-up Connectivity; and
 - 2.4** Incident response to a Cyber Security Incident.

An inventory, list, or discrete identification of low impact BES Cyber Systems or their BES Cyber Assets is not required.

- M2.** Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, one or more documented cyber security policies and evidence of processes, procedures, or plans that demonstrate the implementation of the required topics; revision history, records of review, or workflow evidence from a document management system that indicate review of each cyber security policy at least once every 15 calendar months; and documented approval by the CIP Senior Manager for each cyber security policy.

- R3.** Each Responsible Entity shall identify a CIP Senior Manager by name and document any change within 30 calendar days of the change. *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium]*
[Time Horizon: Operations Planning]

- M3.** An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a dated and approved document from a high level official designating the name of the individual identified as the CIP Senior Manager.

- R4.** The Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, a documented process to delegate authority, unless no delegations are used. Where allowed by the CIP Standards, the CIP Senior Manager may delegate authority for specific actions to a delegate or delegates. These delegations shall be documented, including the name or title of the delegate, the specific actions delegated, and the date of the delegation; approved by the CIP Senior Manager; and updated within 30 days of any change to the delegation. Delegation changes do not need to be reinstated with a change to the delegator. *[Violation Risk Factor: Lower]* *[Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*

- M4.** An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a dated document, approved by the CIP Senior Manager, listing individuals (by name or title) who are delegated the authority to approve or authorize specifically identified items.

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority:

The Regional Entity shall serve as the Compliance Enforcement Authority (“CEA”) unless the applicable entity is owned, operated, or controlled by the Regional Entity. In such cases the ERO or a Regional Entity approved by FERC or other applicable governmental authority shall serve as the CEA.

1.2. Evidence Retention:

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the CEA may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Responsible Entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its CEA to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

- Each Responsible Entity shall retain evidence of each requirement in this standard for three calendar years.
- If a Responsible Entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.
- The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes:

- Compliance Audit
- Self-Certification
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Investigation
- Self-Reporting
- Complaint

1.4. Additional Compliance Information:

- None

2. Table of Compliance Elements

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-003-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1	Operations Planning	Medium	<p>The Responsible Entity documented and implemented one or more cyber security policies for its high impact and medium impact BES Cyber Systems, but did not address one of the nine topics required by R1. (R1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not complete its review of the one or more documented cyber security policies for its high impact and medium impact BES Cyber Systems as required by R1 within 15 calendar months but did complete this review</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity documented and implemented one or more cyber security policies for its high impact and medium impact BES Cyber Systems, but did not address two of the nine topics required by R1. (R1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not complete its review of the one or more documented cyber security policies for its high impact and medium impact BES Cyber Systems as required by R1 within 16 calendar months but did complete this review</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity documented and implemented one or more cyber security policies for its high impact and medium impact BES Cyber Systems, but did not address three of the nine topics required by R1. (R1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not complete its review of the one or more documented cyber security policies for its high impact and medium impact BES Cyber Systems as required by R1 within 17 calendar months but did complete this review in less than or equal to 18 calendar months of the</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity documented and implemented one or more cyber security policies for its high impact and medium impact BES Cyber Systems, but did not address four or more of the nine topics required by R1. (R1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not have any documented cyber security policies for its high impact and medium impact BES Cyber Systems as required by R1. (R1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-003-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>in less than or equal to 16 calendar months of the previous review. (R1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not complete its approval of the one or more documented cyber security policies for its high impact and medium impact BES Cyber Systems as required by R1 by the CIP Senior Manager or delegate within 15 calendar months but did complete this approval in less than or equal to 16 calendar months of the previous approval. (R1)</p>	<p>in less than or equal to 17 calendar months of the previous review. (R1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not complete its approval of the one or more documented cyber security policies for its high impact and medium impact BES Cyber Systems as required by R1 by the CIP Senior Manager or delegate within 16 calendar months but did complete this approval in less than or equal to 17 calendar months of the previous approval. (R1)</p>	<p>previous review. (R1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not complete its approval of the one or more documented cyber security policies for its high impact and medium impact BES Cyber Systems as required by R1 by the CIP Senior Manager or delegate within 17 calendar months but did complete this approval in less than or equal to 18 calendar months of the previous approval. (R1)</p>	<p>Entity did not complete its review of the one or more documented cyber security policies as required by R1 within 18 calendar months of the previous review. (R1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not complete its approval of the one or more documented cyber security policies for its high impact and medium impact BES Cyber Systems as required by R1 by the CIP Senior Manager or delegate within 18 calendar months of the previous approval.</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-003-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						(R1)
R2	Operations Planning	Lower	<p>The Responsible Entity documented and implemented one or more cyber security policies for assets with a low impact rating that address only three of the topics as required by R2 and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (R2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity documented and implemented one or more cyber security policies for assets with a low impact rating that address only three of the topics as required by R2 but</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity documented and implemented one or more cyber security policies for assets with a low impact rating that address only two of the topics as required by R2 and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (R2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity documented and implemented one or more cyber security policies for assets with a low impact rating that address only two of the topics as required by R2 but</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity documented and implemented one or more cyber security policies for assets with a low impact rating that address only one of the topics as required by R2 and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (R2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity documented and implemented one or more cyber security policies for assets with a low impact rating that address only one of the topics as required by R2 but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity did not document or implement any cyber security policies for assets with a low impact rating that address the topics as required by R2. (R2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not complete its review of the one or more documented cyber security policies for assets with a low impact rating as required by R2 within 18 calendar months of the previous review. (R2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-003-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not complete its review of the one or more documented cyber security policies for assets with a low impact rating as required by R2 within 15 calendar months but did complete this review in less than or equal to 16 calendar months of the previous review. (R2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not complete its approval of the one or more documented</p>	<p>did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not complete its review of the one or more documented cyber security policies for assets with a low impact rating as required by R2 within 16 calendar months but did complete this review in less than or equal to 17 calendar months of the previous review. (R2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not complete its approval of the one or more</p>	<p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not complete its review of the one or more documented cyber security policies for assets with a low impact rating as required by R2 within 17 calendar months but did complete this review in less than or equal to 18 calendar months of the previous review. (R2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not complete its approval of the one or more documented cyber security policies for assets with a low impact rating as required by R2 by the CIP Senior Manager within 17 calendar months but did complete this approval</p>	<p>complete its approval of the one or more documented cyber security policies for assets with a low impact rating as required by R2 by the CIP Senior Manager within 18 calendar months of the previous approval. (R2)</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-003-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			cyber security policies for assets with a low impact rating as required by R2 by the CIP Senior Manager within 15 calendar months but did complete this approval in less than or equal to 16 calendar months of the previous approval. (R2)	documented cyber security policies for assets with a low impact rating as required by R2 by the CIP Senior Manager within 16 calendar months but did complete this approval in less than or equal to 17 calendar months of the previous approval. (R2)	in less than or equal to 18 calendar months of the previous approval. (R2)	
R3	Operations Planning	Medium	The Responsible Entity has identified by name a CIP Senior Manager, but did not document changes to the CIP Senior Manager within 30 calendar days but did document this change in less than 40 calendar days of the change. (R3)	The Responsible Entity has identified by name a CIP Senior Manager, but did not document changes to the CIP Senior Manager within 40 calendar days but did document this change in less than 50 calendar days of	The Responsible Entity has identified by name a CIP Senior Manager, but did not document changes to the CIP Senior Manager within 50 calendar days but did document this change in less than 60 calendar days of the change. (R3)	The Responsible Entity has not identified, by name, a CIP Senior Manager. OR The Responsible Entity has identified by name a CIP Senior Manager, but did not document changes to the CIP

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-003-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
				the change. (R3)		Senior Manager within 60 calendar days of the change. (R3)
R4	Operations Planning	Lower	The Responsible Entity has identified a delegate by name, title, date of delegation, and specific actions delegated, but did not document changes to the delegate within 30 calendar days but did document this change in less than 40 calendar days of the change. (R4)	The Responsible Entity has identified a delegate by name, title, date of delegation, and specific actions delegated, but did not document changes to the delegate within 40 calendar days but did document this change in less than 50 calendar days of the change. (R4)	The Responsible Entity has used delegated authority for actions where allowed by the CIP Standards, has a process to delegate actions from the CIP Senior Manager, and has Identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies.(R4) OR The Responsible Entity has used delegated authority for actions where allowed by the CIP Standards, has a process to delegate actions from the CIP Senior Manager, but did not identify, assess, or	The Responsible Entity has used delegated authority for actions where allowed by the CIP Standards, but does not have a process to delegate actions from the CIP Senior Manager. (R4) OR The Responsible Entity has identified a delegate by name, title, date of delegation, and specific actions delegated, but did not document changes to the delegate within 60 calendar days of the

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-003-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
					correct the deficiencies.(R4) OR The Responsible Entity has identified a delegate by name, title, date of delegation, and specific actions delegated, but did not document changes to the delegate within 50 calendar days but did document this change in less than 60 calendar days of the change. (R4)	change. (R4)

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. Associated Documents

None.

Guidelines and Technical Basis

Section 4 – Scope of Applicability of the CIP Cyber Security Standards

Section “4. Applicability” of the standards provides important information for Responsible Entities to determine the scope of the applicability of the CIP Cyber Security Requirements.

Section “4.1. Functional Entities” is a list of NERC functional entities to which the standard applies. If the entity is registered as one or more of the functional entities listed in Section 4.1, then the NERC CIP Cyber Security Standards apply. Note that there is a qualification in Section 4.1 that restricts the applicability in the case of Distribution Providers to only those that own certain types of systems and equipment listed in 4.2.

Section “4.2. Facilities” defines the scope of the Facilities, systems, and equipment owned by the Responsible Entity, as qualified in Section 4.1, that is subject to the requirements of the standard. In addition to the set of BES Facilities, Control Centers, and other systems and equipment, the list includes the set of systems and equipment owned by Distribution Providers. While the NERC Glossary term “Facilities” already includes the BES characteristic, the additional use of the term BES here is meant to reinforce the scope of applicability of these Facilities where it is used, especially in this applicability scoping section. This in effect sets the scope of Facilities, systems, and equipment that is subject to the standards.

Requirement R1:

The number of policies and their specific language are guided by a Responsible Entity's management structure and operating conditions. Policies might be included as part of a general information security program for the entire organization, or as components of specific programs. The cyber security policy must cover in sufficient detail the nine topical areas required by CIP-003-5, Requirement R1. The Responsible Entity has the flexibility to develop a single comprehensive cyber security policy covering these topics, or it may choose to develop a single high-level umbrella policy and provide additional policy detail in lower level documents in its documentation hierarchy. In the case of a high-level umbrella policy, the Responsible Entity would be expected to provide the high-level policy as well as the additional documentation in order to demonstrate compliance with CIP-003-5, Requirement R1. Implementation of the cyber security policy is not specifically included in CIP-003-5, Requirement R1 as it is envisioned that the implementation of this policy is evidenced through successful implementation of CIP-004 through CIP-011. However, Responsible Entities are encouraged not to limit the scope of their cyber security policies to only those requirements from CIP-004 through CIP-011, but rather to put together a holistic cyber security policy appropriate to its organization. The assessment through the Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program of policy items that extend beyond the scope of CIP-004 through CIP-011 should not be considered candidates for potential violations. The Responsible Entity should consider the following for each of the required topics in its cyber security policy:

1.1 Personnel & training (CIP-004)

- Organization position on acceptable background investigations
- Identification of possible disciplinary action for violating this policy
- Account management

1.2 Electronic Security Perimeters (CIP-005) including Interactive Remote Access

- Organization stance on use of wireless networks
- Identification of acceptable authentication methods
- Identification of trusted and untrusted resources
- Monitoring and logging of ingress and egress at Electronic Access Points
- Maintaining up-to-date anti-malware software before initiating Interactive Remote Access
- Maintaining up-to-date patch levels for operating systems and applications used to initiate Interactive Remote Access
- Disabling VPN “split-tunneling” or “dual-homed” workstations before initiating Interactive Remote Access
- For vendors, contractors, or consultants: include language in contracts that requires adherence to the Responsible Entity’s Interactive Remote Access controls

1.3 Physical security of BES Cyber Systems (CIP-006)

- Strategy for protecting Cyber Assets from unauthorized physical access
- Acceptable physical access control methods
- Monitoring and logging of physical ingress

1.4 System security management (CIP-007)

- Strategies for system hardening
- Acceptable methods of authentication and access control
- Password policies including length, complexity, enforcement, prevention of brute force attempts
- Monitoring and logging of BES Cyber Systems

1.5 Incident reporting and response planning (CIP-008)

- Recognition of Cyber Security Incidents
- Appropriate notifications upon discovery of an incident
- Obligations to report Cyber Security Incidents

1.6 Recovery plans for BES Cyber Systems (CIP-009)

- Availability of spare components

- Availability of system backups

1.7 Configuration change management and vulnerability assessments (CIP-010)

- Initiation of change requests
- Approval of changes
- Break-fix processes

1.8 Information protection (CIP-011)

- Information access control methods
- Notification of unauthorized information disclosure
- Information access on a need-to-know basis

1.9 Declaring and responding to CIP Exceptional Circumstances

- Processes to invoke special procedures in the event of a CIP Exceptional Circumstance
- Processes to allow for exceptions to policy that do not violate CIP requirements

The Standard Drafting Team (SDT) has removed requirements relating to exceptions to a Responsible Entity's security policies since it is a general management issue that is not within the scope of a reliability requirement. The SDT considers it to be an internal policy requirement and not a reliability requirement. However, the SDT encourages Responsible Entities to continue this practice as a component of its cyber security policy.

In this and all subsequent required approvals in the NERC CIP Standards, the Responsible Entity may elect to use hardcopy or electronic approvals to the extent that there is sufficient evidence to ensure the authenticity of the approving party.

Requirement R2:

As with Requirement R1, the number of policies and their specific language would be guided by a Responsible Entity's management structure and operating conditions. Policies might be included as part of a general information security program for the entire organization or as components of specific programs. The cyber security policy must cover in sufficient detail the four topical areas required by CIP-003-5, Requirement R2. The Responsible Entity has flexibility to develop a single comprehensive cyber security policy covering these topics, or it may choose to develop a single high-level umbrella policy and provide additional policy detail in lower level documents in its documentation hierarchy. In the case of a high-level umbrella policy, the Responsible Entity would be expected to provide the high-level policy as well as the additional documentation in order to demonstrate compliance with CIP-003-5, Requirement R2. The intent of the requirement is to outline a set of basic protections that all low impact BES Cyber Systems should receive without requiring a significant administrative and compliance overhead. The SDT intends that demonstration of this requirement can be reasonably accomplished through providing evidence of related processes, procedures, or plans. While the audit staff may choose to review an example low impact BES Cyber System, the SDT believes strongly that the current method (as of this writing) of reviewing a statistical sample of systems is not

necessary. The SDT also notes that in topic 2.3, the SDT uses the term “electronic access control” in the general sense, i.e., to control access, and not in the specific technical sense requiring authentication, authorization, and auditing.

Requirement R3:

The intent of CIP-003-5, Requirement R3 is effectively unchanged since prior versions of the standard. The specific description of the CIP Senior Manager has now been included as a defined term rather than clarified in the Standard itself to prevent any unnecessary cross-reference to this standard. It is expected that this CIP Senior Manager play a key role in ensuring proper strategic planning, executive/board-level awareness, and overall program governance.

Requirement R4:

As indicated in the rationale for CIP-003-5, Requirement R4, this requirement is intended to demonstrate a clear line of authority and ownership for security matters. The intent of the SDT was not to impose any particular organizational structure, but, rather, the Responsible Entity should have significant flexibility to adapt this requirement to their existing organizational structure. A Responsible Entity may satisfy this requirement through a single delegation document or through multiple delegation documents. The Responsible Entity can make use of the delegation of the delegation authority itself to increase the flexibility in how this applies to its organization. In such a case, delegations may exist in numerous documentation records as long as the collection of these documentation records provides a clear line of authority back to the CIP Senior Manager. In addition, the CIP Senior Manager could also choose not to delegate any authority and meet this requirement without such delegation documentation.

The Responsible Entity must keep its documentation of the CIP Senior Manager and any delegations up to date. This is to ensure that individuals do not assume any undocumented authority. However, delegations do not have to be re-instated if the individual who delegated the task changes roles or is replaced. For instance, assume that John Doe is named the CIP Senior Manager and he delegates a specific task to the Substation Maintenance Manager. If John Doe is replaced as the CIP Senior Manager, the CIP Senior Manager documentation must be updated within the specified timeframe, but the existing delegation to the Substation Maintenance Manager remains in effect as approved by the previous CIP Senior Manager, John Doe.

Rationale:

During development of this standard, text boxes were embedded within the standard to explain the rationale for various parts of the standard. Upon BOT approval, the text from the rationale text boxes was moved to this section.

Rationale for R1:

One or more security policies enable effective implementation of the standard's requirements. The purpose of policies is to provide a management and governance foundation for all requirements that apply to personnel who have authorized electronic access and/or authorized unescorted physical access to its BES Cyber Systems. The Responsible Entity can demonstrate through its policies that its management supports the accountability and responsibility necessary for effective implementation of the standard's requirements.

Annual review and approval of the cyber security policy ensures that the policy is kept up-to-date and periodically reaffirms management's commitment to the protection of its BES Cyber Systems.

Rationale for R2:

One or more security policies enable effective implementation of the standard's requirements. The purpose of policies is to provide a management and governance foundation for all requirements that apply to personnel who have authorized electronic access and/or authorized unescorted physical access to its BES Cyber Systems. The Responsible Entity can demonstrate through its policies that its management supports the accountability and responsibility necessary for effective implementation of the standard's requirements.

The language in Requirement R2, Part 2.3 “. . . for external routable protocol connections and Dial-up Connectivity . . .” was included to acknowledge the support given in FERC Order 761, paragraph 87, for electronic security perimeter protections “of some form” to be applied to all BES Cyber Systems, regardless of impact. Part 2.3 uses the phrase “external routable protocol connections” instead of the defined term “External Routable Connectivity,” because the latter term has very specific connotations relating to Electronic Security Perimeters and high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems. Using the glossary term “External Routable Connectivity” in the context of Requirement R2 would not be appropriate because Requirement R2 is limited in scope to low impact BES Cyber Systems.

Review and approval of the cyber security policy at least every 15 calendar months ensures that the policy is kept up-to-date and periodically reaffirms management's commitment to the protection of its BES Cyber Systems.

Rationale for R3:

The identification and documentation of the single CIP Senior Manager ensures that there is clear authority and ownership for the CIP program within an organization, as called for in Blackout Report Recommendation 43. The language that identifies CIP Senior Manager responsibilities is included in the *Glossary of Terms used in NERC Reliability Standards* so that it may be used across the body of CIP standards without an explicit cross-reference.

FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 296, requests consideration of whether the single senior manager should be a corporate officer or equivalent. As implicated through the defined term, the senior manager has “the overall authority and responsibility for leading and managing implementation of the requirements within this set of standards” which ensures that the senior manager is of sufficient position in the Responsible Entity to ensure that cyber security receives the prominence that is necessary. In addition, given the range of business models for responsible entities, from municipal, cooperative, federal agencies, investor owned utilities, privately owned utilities, and everything in between, the SDT believes that requiring the senior manager to be a “corporate officer or equivalent” would be extremely difficult to interpret and enforce on a consistent basis.

Rationale for R4:

The intent of the requirement is to ensure clear accountability within an organization for certain security matters. It also ensures that delegations are kept up-to-date and that individuals do not assume undocumented authority.

In FERC Order No. 706, Paragraphs 379 and 381, the Commission notes that Recommendation 43 of the 2003 Blackout Report calls for “clear lines of authority and ownership for security matters.” With this in mind, the Standard Drafting Team has sought to provide clarity in the requirement for delegations so that this line of authority is clear and apparent from the documented delegations.

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	1/16/06	R3.2 — Change “Control Center” to “control center.”	3/24/06
2	9/30/09	Modifications to clarify the requirements and to bring the compliance elements into conformance with the latest guidelines for developing compliance elements of standards. Removal of reasonable business judgment. Replaced the RRO with the RE as a responsible entity. Rewording of Effective Date. Changed compliance monitor to Compliance Enforcement Authority.	
3	12/16/09	Updated version number from -2 to -3 Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees.	
3	3/31/10	Approved by FERC.	
4	1/24/11	Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Update to conform to changes to CIP-002-4 (Project 2008-06)
5	11/26/12	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Modified to coordinate with other CIP standards and to revise format to use RBS Template.
5	11/22/13	FERC Order issued approving CIP-003-5.	
5	7/9/14	FERC Letter Order issued approving VRFs and VSLs revisions to certain CIP standards.	CIP-003-5 Requirements R1 and R2 eliminated redundant language in VSLs.

This appendix establishes specific provisions for the application of the standard in Québec. Provisions of the standard and of its appendix must be read together for the purposes of understanding and interpretation. Where the standard and appendix differ, the appendix shall prevail.

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Cyber Security — Security Management Controls
2. **Number:** CIP-003-5
3. **Purpose:** No specific provision
4. **Applicability:**

Functional Entities

No specific provision

Facilities

This standard only applies to the facilities of the Main Transmission System (RTP) and to the facilities specified for the Distribution Provider. In application of this standard, any reference to the terms "Bulk Electric System" or "BES" shall be replaced by the terms "Main Transmission System" or "RTP" respectively.

Additional Exemptions

The following are exempt from this standard:

- Generating facilities with a nameplate capacity of 300 MVA or less, unless the facility comprises one or more units that can be synchronized with neighboring systems.
- Step-up substations of generating facilities identified in the preceding point.

5. **Effective Date:**
 - 5.1. Adoption of the standard by the Régie de l'énergie: Month xx 201x
 - 5.2. Adoption of the appendix by the Régie de l'énergie: Month xx 201x
 - 5.3. Effective date of the standard and its appendix in Québec: Month xx 201x
6. **Background:** No specific provision

B. Requirements and Measures

No specific provision

C. Compliance

1. **Compliance Monitoring Process**
 - 1.1. **Compliance Enforcement Authority**

The Régie de l'énergie is responsible, in Québec, for compliance enforcement with respect to the reliability standard and its appendix that it adopts.

1.2. Evidence Retention

No specific provision

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes

No specific provision

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

No specific provision

2. Table of Compliance Elements

No specific provision

D. Regional Variances

No specific provision

E. Interpretations

No specific provision

F. Associated Documents

No specific provision

Guidelines and Technical Basis

No specific provision

Rationale

No specific provision

Revision History

Revision	Adoption Date	Action	Change Tracking
0	Xx month 201x	New appendix	New

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Cyber Security — Personnel & Training

2. **Number:** CIP-004-5.1

3. **Purpose:** To minimize the risk against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the BES from individuals accessing BES Cyber Systems by requiring an appropriate level of personnel risk assessment, training, and security awareness in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems.

4. Applicability:

4.1. Functional Entities: For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of functional entities will be collectively referred to as “Responsible Entities.” For requirements in this standard where a specific functional entity or subset of functional entities are the applicable entity or entities, the functional entity or entities are specified explicitly.

4.1.1. Balancing Authority

4.1.2. Distribution Provider that owns one or more of the following Facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the BES:

4.1.2.1. Each underfrequency Load shedding (UFLS) or undervoltage Load shedding (UVLS) system that:

4.1.2.1.1. is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and

4.1.2.1.2. performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.

4.1.2.2. Each Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme where the Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.

4.1.2.3. Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.

4.1.2.4. Each Cranking Path and group of Elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a Blackstart Resource up to and including the first interconnection point of the starting station service of the next generation unit(s) to be started.

4.1.3. Generator Operator

4.1.4. Generator Owner

4.1.5. Interchange Coordinator or Interchange Authority

4.1.6. Reliability Coordinator

4.1.7. Transmission Operator

4.1.8. Transmission Owner

4.2. Facilities: For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following Facilities, systems, and equipment owned by each Responsible Entity in 4.1 above are those to which these requirements are applicable. For requirements in this standard where a specific type of Facilities, system, or equipment or subset of Facilities, systems, and equipment are applicable, these are specified explicitly.

4.2.1. Distribution Provider: One or more of the following Facilities, systems and equipment owned by the Distribution Provider for the protection or restoration of the BES:

4.2.1.1. Each UFLS or UVLS System that:

4.2.1.1.1. is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and

4.2.1.1.2. performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.

4.2.1.2. Each Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme where the Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.

4.2.1.3. Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.

4.2.1.4. Each Cranking Path and group of Elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a Blackstart Resource up to and including the first interconnection point of the starting station service of the next generation unit(s) to be started.

4.2.2. Responsible Entities listed in 4.1 other than Distribution Providers:

All BES Facilities.

4.2.3. Exemptions: The following are exempt from Standard CIP-004-5.1:

4.2.3.1. Cyber Assets at Facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.

4.2.3.2. Cyber Assets associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete Electronic Security Perimeters.

4.2.3.3. The systems, structures, and components that are regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under a cyber security plan pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Section 73.54.

4.2.3.4. For Distribution Providers, the systems and equipment that are not included in section 4.2.1 above.

4.2.3.5. Responsible Entities that identify that they have no BES Cyber Systems categorized as high impact or medium impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.

5. Effective Dates:

1. **24 Months Minimum** – CIP-004-5.1 shall become effective on the later of July 1, 2015, or the first calendar day of the ninth calendar quarter after the effective date of the order providing applicable regulatory approval.
2. In those jurisdictions where no regulatory approval is required, CIP-004-5.1 shall become effective on the first day of the ninth calendar quarter following Board of Trustees' approval, or as otherwise made effective pursuant to the laws applicable to such ERO governmental authorities.

6. Background:

Standard CIP-004-5.1 exists as part of a suite of CIP Standards related to cyber security. CIP-002-5 requires the initial identification and categorization of BES Cyber Systems. CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1 and CIP-011-1 require a minimum level of organizational, operational and procedural controls to mitigate risk to BES Cyber Systems. This suite of CIP Standards is referred to as the *Version 5 CIP Cyber Security Standards*.

Most requirements open with, *"Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented [processes, plan, etc] that include the applicable items in [Table Reference]."* The referenced table requires the applicable items in the procedures for the requirement's common subject matter.

The SDT has incorporated within this standard a recognition that certain requirements should not focus on individual instances of failure as a sole basis for violating the standard. In particular, the SDT has incorporated an approach to empower and enable the industry to identify, assess, and correct deficiencies in the implementation of certain requirements. The intent is to change the basis of a violation in those requirements so that they are not focused on *whether* there is a deficiency, but on identifying, assessing, and correcting deficiencies. It is presented in those requirements by modifying "implement" as follows:

Each Responsible Entity shall implement, **in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, . . .**

The term *documented processes* refers to a set of required instructions specific to the Responsible Entity and to achieve a specific outcome. This term does not imply any particular naming or approval structure beyond what is stated in the requirements. An entity should include as much as it believes necessary in their documented processes, but they must address the applicable requirements in the table. The documented processes themselves are not required to include the ". . . identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, . . ." elements described in the preceding paragraph, as those aspects are related to the manner of

implementation of the documented processes and could be accomplished through other controls or compliance management activities.

The terms *program* and *plan* are sometimes used in place of *documented processes* where it makes sense and is commonly understood. For example, documented processes describing a response are typically referred to as *plans* (i.e., incident response plans and recovery plans). Likewise, a security plan can describe an approach involving multiple procedures to address a broad subject matter.

Similarly, the term *program* may refer to the organization’s overall implementation of its policies, plans and procedures involving a subject matter. Examples in the standards include the personnel risk assessment program and the personnel training program. The full implementation of the CIP Cyber Security Standards could also be referred to as a program. However, the terms *program* and *plan* do not imply any additional requirements beyond what is stated in the standards.

Responsible Entities can implement common controls that meet requirements for multiple high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems. For example, a single training program could meet the requirements for training personnel across multiple BES Cyber Systems.

Measures for the initial requirement are simply the documented processes themselves. Measures in the table rows provide examples of evidence to show documentation and implementation of applicable items in the documented processes. These measures serve to provide guidance to entities in acceptable records of compliance and should not be viewed as an all-inclusive list.

Throughout the standards, unless otherwise stated, bulleted items in the requirements and measures are items that are linked with an “or,” and numbered items are items that are linked with an “and.”

Many references in the Applicability section use a threshold of 300 MW for UFLS and UVLS. This particular threshold of 300 MW for UVLS and UFLS was provided in Version 1 of the CIP Cyber Security Standards. The threshold remains at 300 MW since it is specifically addressing UVLS and UFLS, which are last ditch efforts to save the Bulk Electric System. A review of UFLS tolerances defined within regional reliability standards for UFLS program requirements to date indicates that the historical value of 300 MW represents an adequate and reasonable threshold value for allowable UFLS operational tolerances.

“Applicable Systems” Columns in Tables:

Each table has an “Applicable Systems” column to further define the scope of systems to which a specific requirement row applies. The CSO706 SDT adapted this concept from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) Risk Management Framework as a way of applying requirements more appropriately based on impact and connectivity characteristics. The following conventions are used in the “Applicable Systems” column as described.

- **High Impact BES Cyber Systems** – Applies to BES Cyber Systems categorized as high impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.

- **Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems** – Applies to BES Cyber Systems categorized as medium impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.
- **Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity** – Only applies to medium impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity. This also excludes Cyber Assets in the BES Cyber System that cannot be directly accessed through External Routable Connectivity.
- **Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS)** – Applies to each Electronic Access Control or Monitoring System associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System. Examples may include, but are not limited to, firewalls, authentication servers, and log monitoring and alerting systems.
- **Physical Access Control Systems (PACS)** – Applies to each Physical Access Control System associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System with External Routable Connectivity.

B. Requirements and Measures

- R1.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-004-5.1 Table R1 – Security Awareness Program*. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]
- M1.** Evidence must include each of the applicable documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-004-5.1 Table R1 – Security Awareness Program* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-004-5.1 Table R1 – Security Awareness Program			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.1	High Impact BES Cyber Systems Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems	Security awareness that, at least once each calendar quarter, reinforces cyber security practices (which may include associated physical security practices) for the Responsible Entity’s personnel who have authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access to BES Cyber Systems.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation that the quarterly reinforcement has been provided. Examples of evidence of reinforcement may include, but are not limited to, dated copies of information used to reinforce security awareness, as well as evidence of distribution, such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • direct communications (for example, e-mails, memos, computer-based training); or • indirect communications (for example, posters, intranet, or brochures); or • management support and reinforcement (for example, presentations or meetings).

- R2.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, a cyber security training program(s) appropriate to individual roles, functions, or responsibilities that collectively includes each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-004-5.1 Table R2 – Cyber Security Training Program*. [*Violation Risk Factor: Lower*]
[*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]
- M2.** Evidence must include the training program that includes each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-004-5.1 Table R2 – Cyber Security Training Program* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation of the program(s).

CIP-004-5.1 Table R2 – Cyber Security Training Program			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.1	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS 	<p>Training content on:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2.1.1. Cyber security policies; 2.1.2. Physical access controls; 2.1.3. Electronic access controls; 2.1.4. The visitor control program; 2.1.5. Handling of BES Cyber System Information and its storage; 2.1.6. Identification of a Cyber Security Incident and initial notifications in accordance with the entity’s incident response plan; 2.1.7. Recovery plans for BES Cyber Systems; 2.1.8. Response to Cyber Security Incidents; and 2.1.9. Cyber security risks associated with a BES Cyber System’s electronic interconnectivity and interoperability with other Cyber Assets. 	<p>Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, training material such as power point presentations, instructor notes, student notes, handouts, or other training materials.</p>

CIP-004-5.1 Table R2 – Cyber Security Training Program			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.2	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS 	<p>Require completion of the training specified in Part 2.1 prior to granting authorized electronic access and authorized unescorted physical access to applicable Cyber Assets, except during CIP Exceptional Circumstances.</p>	<p>Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, training records and documentation of when CIP Exceptional Circumstances were invoked.</p>
2.3	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS 	<p>Require completion of the training specified in Part 2.1 at least once every 15 calendar months.</p>	<p>Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated individual training records.</p>

R3. Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented personnel risk assessment programs to attain and retain authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access to BES Cyber Systems that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-004-5.1 Table R3 – Personnel Risk Assessment Program*. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning].

M3. Evidence must include the documented personnel risk assessment programs that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-004-5.1 Table R3 – Personnel Risk Assessment Program* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation of the program(s).

CIP-004-5.1 Table R3 – Personnel Risk Assessment Program			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
3.1	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS 	Process to confirm identity.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation of the Responsible Entity’s process to confirm identity.

CIP-004-5.1 Table R3 – Personnel Risk Assessment Program			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
3.2	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS 	<p>Process to perform a seven year criminal history records check as part of each personnel risk assessment that includes:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3.2.1. current residence, regardless of duration; and 3.2.2. other locations where, during the seven years immediately prior to the date of the criminal history records check, the subject has resided for six consecutive months or more. <p>If it is not possible to perform a full seven year criminal history records check, conduct as much of the seven year criminal history records check as possible and document the reason the full seven year criminal history records check could not be performed.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation of the Responsible Entity’s process to perform a seven year criminal history records check.</p>

CIP-004-5.1 Table R3 – Personnel Risk Assessment Program			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
3.3	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS 	<p>Criteria or process to evaluate criminal history records checks for authorizing access.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation of the Responsible Entity’s process to evaluate criminal history records checks.</p>
3.4	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS 	<p>Criteria or process for verifying that personnel risk assessments performed for contractors or service vendors are conducted according to Parts 3.1 through 3.3.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation of the Responsible Entity’s criteria or process for verifying contractors or service vendors personnel risk assessments.</p>

CIP-004-5.1 Table R3 – Personnel Risk Assessment Program			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
3.5	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS 	<p>Process to ensure that individuals with authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access have had a personnel risk assessment completed according to Parts 3.1 to 3.4 within the last seven years.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation of the Responsible Entity’s process for ensuring that individuals with authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access have had a personnel risk assessment completed within the last seven years.</p>

- R4.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented access management programs that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-004-5.1 Table R4 – Access Management Program*. [*Violation Risk Factor: Medium*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning and Same Day Operations*].
- M4.** Evidence must include the documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-004-5.1 Table R4 – Access Management Program* and additional evidence to demonstrate that the access management program was implemented as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-004-5.1 Table R4 – Access Management Program			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
4.1	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS 	<p>Process to authorize based on need, as determined by the Responsible Entity, except for CIP Exceptional Circumstances:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4.1.1. Electronic access; 4.1.2. Unescorted physical access into a Physical Security Perimeter; and 4.1.3. Access to designated storage locations, whether physical or electronic, for BES Cyber System Information. 	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated documentation of the process to authorize electronic access, unescorted physical access in a Physical Security Perimeter, and access to designated storage locations, whether physical or electronic, for BES Cyber System Information.</p>

CIP-004-5.1 Table R4 – Access Management Program			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
4.2	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS 	<p>Verify at least once each calendar quarter that individuals with active electronic access or unescorted physical access have authorization records.</p>	<p>Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dated documentation of the verification between the system generated list of individuals who have been authorized for access (i.e., workflow database) and a system generated list of personnel who have access (i.e., user account listing), or • Dated documentation of the verification between a list of individuals who have been authorized for access (i.e., authorization forms) and a list of individuals provisioned for access (i.e., provisioning forms or shared account listing).

CIP-004-5.1 Table R4 – Access Management Program			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
4.3	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS 	<p>For electronic access, verify at least once every 15 calendar months that all user accounts, user account groups, or user role categories, and their specific, associated privileges are correct and are those that the Responsible Entity determines are necessary.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation of the review that includes all of the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A dated listing of all accounts/account groups or roles within the system; 2. A summary description of privileges associated with each group or role; 3. Accounts assigned to the group or role; and 4. Dated evidence showing verification of the privileges for the group are authorized and appropriate to the work function performed by people assigned to each account.

CIP-004-5.1 Table R4 – Access Management Program			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
4.4	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS 	<p>Verify at least once every 15 calendar months that access to the designated storage locations for BES Cyber System Information, whether physical or electronic, are correct and are those that the Responsible Entity determines are necessary for performing assigned work functions.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, the documentation of the review that includes all of the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A dated listing of authorizations for BES Cyber System information; 2. Any privileges associated with the authorizations; and 3. Dated evidence showing a verification of the authorizations and any privileges were confirmed correct and the minimum necessary for performing assigned work functions.

- R5.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented access revocation programs that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-004-5.1 Table R5 – Access Revocation*. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Same Day Operations and Operations Planning].
- M5.** Evidence must include each of the applicable documented programs that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-004-5.1 Table R5 – Access Revocation* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-004-5.1 Table R5 – Access Revocation			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
5.1	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS 	<p>A process to initiate removal of an individual’s ability for unescorted physical access and Interactive Remote Access upon a termination action, and complete the removals within 24 hours of the termination action (Removal of the ability for access may be different than deletion, disabling, revocation, or removal of all access rights).</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation of all of the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dated workflow or sign-off form verifying access removal associated with the termination action; and 2. Logs or other demonstration showing such persons no longer have access.

CIP-004-5.1 Table R5 – Access Revocation			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
5.2	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS 	<p>For reassignments or transfers, revoke the individual’s authorized electronic access to individual accounts and authorized unescorted physical access that the Responsible Entity determines are not necessary by the end of the next calendar day following the date that the Responsible Entity determines that the individual no longer requires retention of that access.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation of all of the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dated workflow or sign-off form showing a review of logical and physical access; and 2. Logs or other demonstration showing such persons no longer have access that the Responsible Entity determines is not necessary.

CIP-004-5.1 Table R5 – Access Revocation			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
5.3	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS 	<p>For termination actions, revoke the individual’s access to the designated storage locations for BES Cyber System Information, whether physical or electronic (unless already revoked according to Requirement R5.1), by the end of the next calendar day following the effective date of the termination action.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, workflow or sign-off form verifying access removal to designated physical areas or cyber systems containing BES Cyber System Information associated with the terminations and dated within the next calendar day of the termination action.</p>

CIP-004-5.1 Table R5 – Access Revocation			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
5.4	High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EACMS 	For termination actions, revoke the individual’s non-shared user accounts (unless already revoked according to Parts 5.1 or 5.3) within 30 calendar days of the effective date of the termination action.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, workflow or sign-off form showing access removal for any individual BES Cyber Assets and software applications as determined necessary to completing the revocation of access and dated within thirty calendar days of the termination actions.

CIP-004-5.1 Table R5 – Access Revocation			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
5.5	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EACMS 	<p>For termination actions, change passwords for shared account(s) known to the user within 30 calendar days of the termination action. For reassignments or transfers, change passwords for shared account(s) known to the user within 30 calendar days following the date that the Responsible Entity determines that the individual no longer requires retention of that access.</p> <p>If the Responsible Entity determines and documents that extenuating operating circumstances require a longer time period, change the password(s) within 10 calendar days following the end of the operating circumstances.</p>	<p>Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Workflow or sign-off form showing password reset within 30 calendar days of the termination; Workflow or sign-off form showing password reset within 30 calendar days of the reassignments or transfers; or Documentation of the extenuating operating circumstance and workflow or sign-off form showing password reset within 10 calendar days following the end of the operating circumstance.

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process:

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority:

The Regional Entity shall serve as the Compliance Enforcement Authority (“CEA”) unless the applicable entity is owned, operated, or controlled by the Regional Entity. In such cases the ERO or a Regional Entity approved by FERC or other applicable governmental authority shall serve as the CEA.

1.2. Evidence Retention:

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the CEA may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Responsible Entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its CEA to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

- Each Responsible Entity shall retain evidence of each requirement in this standard for three calendar years.
- If a Responsible Entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.
- The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes:

- Compliance Audit
- Self-Certification
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Investigation
- Self-Reporting
- Complaint

1.4. Additional Compliance Information:

- None

2. Table of Compliance Elements

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-004-5.1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1	Operations Planning	Lower	The Responsible Entity did not reinforce cyber security practices during a calendar quarter but did so less than 10 calendar days after the start of a subsequent calendar quarter. (1.1)	The Responsible Entity did not reinforce cyber security practices during a calendar quarter but did so between 10 and 30 calendar days after the start of a subsequent calendar quarter. (1.1)	The Responsible Entity did not reinforce cyber security practices during a calendar quarter but did so within the subsequent quarter but beyond 30 calendar days after the start of that calendar quarter. (1.1)	The Responsible Entity did not document or implement any security awareness process(es) to reinforce cyber security practices. (R1) OR The Responsible Entity did not reinforce cyber security practices and associated physical security practices for at least two consecutive calendar quarters. (1.1)
R2	Operations Planning	Lower	The Responsible Entity implemented a cyber security training program but failed to include one of the training	The Responsible Entity implemented a cyber security training program but failed to include two of the training content topics in Requirement Parts 2.1.1 through 2.1.9, and did not identify, assess and correct the	The Responsible Entity implemented a cyber security training program but failed to include three of the training content topics in Requirement Parts 2.1.1 through 2.1.9, and did not identify, assess and correct the	The Responsible Entity did not implement a cyber security training program appropriate to individual roles, functions, or responsibilities. (R2) OR The Responsible Entity

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-004-5.1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>content topics in Requirement Parts 2.1.1 through 2.1.9, and did not identify, assess and correct the deficiencies. (2.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity implemented a cyber security training program but failed to train one individual (with the exception of CIP Exceptional Circumstances) prior to their being granted authorized electronic and authorized</p>	<p>deficiencies. (2.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity implemented a cyber security training program but failed to train two individuals (with the exception of CIP Exceptional Circumstances) prior to their being granted authorized electronic and authorized unescorted physical access, and did not identify, assess and correct the deficiencies. (2.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity implemented a cyber security training program but failed to train two individuals with authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical</p>	<p>deficiencies. (2.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity implemented a cyber security training program but failed to train three individuals (with the exception of CIP Exceptional Circumstances) prior to their being granted authorized electronic and authorized unescorted physical access, and did not identify, assess and correct the deficiencies. (2.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity implemented a cyber security training program but failed to train three individuals with authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical</p>	<p>implemented a cyber security training program but failed to include four or more of the training content topics in Requirement Parts 2.1.1 through 2.1.9, and did not identify, assess and correct the deficiencies. (2.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity implemented a cyber security training program but failed to train four or more individuals (with the exception of CIP Exceptional Circumstances) prior to their being granted authorized electronic and authorized unescorted physical access, and did not identify, assess and correct the deficiencies.</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-004-5.1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>unescorted physical access, and did not identify, assess and correct the deficiencies. (2.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity implemented a cyber security training program but failed to train one individual with authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access within 15 calendar months of the previous training completion</p>	<p>access within 15 calendar months of the previous training completion date, and did not identify, assess and correct the deficiencies. (2.3)</p>	<p>access within 15 calendar months of the previous training completion date, and did not identify, assess and correct the deficiencies. (2.3)</p>	<p>(2.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity implemented a cyber security training program but failed to train four or more individuals with authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access within 15 calendar months of the previous training completion date, and did not identify, assess and correct the deficiencies. (2.3)</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-004-5.1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			date, and did not identify, assess and correct the deficiencies. (2.3)			
R3	Operations Planning	Medium	<p>The Responsible Entity has a program for conducting Personnel Risk Assessments (PRAs) for individuals, including contractors and service vendors, but did not conduct the PRA as a condition of granting authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity has a program for conducting Personnel Risk Assessments (PRAs) for individuals, including contractors and service vendors, but did not conduct the PRA as a condition of granting authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access for two individuals, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (R3)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did conduct Personnel Risk Assessments (PRAs) for individuals, including</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity has a program for conducting Personnel Risk Assessments (PRAs) for individuals, including contractors and service vendors, but did not conduct the PRA as a condition of granting authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access for three individuals, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (R3)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did conduct Personnel Risk Assessments (PRAs) for individuals, including</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity did not have all of the required elements as described by 3.1 through 3.4 included within documented program(s) for implementing Personnel Risk Assessments (PRAs), for individuals, including contractors and service vendors, for obtaining and retaining authorized cyber or authorized unescorted physical access. (R3)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has a program for conducting Personnel Risk Assessments (PRAs)</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-004-5.1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			for one individual, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (R3) OR The Responsible Entity did conduct Personnel Risk Assessments (PRAs) for individuals, including contractors and service vendors, with authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access but did not confirm identity for one	contractors and service vendors, with authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access but did not confirm identity for two individuals, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (3.1 & 3.4) OR The Responsible Entity has a process to perform seven-year criminal history record checks for individuals, including contractors and service vendors, with authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access but did not include the required checks described in 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 for two individuals, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies.	contractors and service vendors, with authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access but did not confirm identity for three individuals, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (3.1 & 3.4) OR The Responsible Entity has a process to perform seven-year criminal history record checks for individuals, including contractors and service vendors, with authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access but did not include the required checks described in 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 for three individuals, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies.	for individuals, including contractors and service vendors, but did not conduct the PRA as a condition of granting authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access for four or more individuals, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (R3) OR The Responsible Entity did conduct Personnel Risk Assessments (PRAs) for individuals, including contractors and service vendors, with authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access but did not confirm identity for four or more individuals, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (3.1 & 3.4)

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-004-5.1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			individual, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (3.1 & 3.4) OR The Responsible Entity has a process to perform seven-year criminal history record checks for individuals, including contractors and service vendors, with authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access but did not include the required	(3.2 & 3.4) OR The Responsible Entity did conduct Personnel Risk Assessments (PRAs) for individuals, including contractors and service vendors, with authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access but did not evaluate criminal history records check for access authorization for two individuals, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (3.3 & 3.4) OR The Responsible Entity did not conduct Personnel Risk Assessments (PRAs) for two individuals with authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access within 7	(3.2 & 3.4) OR The Responsible Entity did conduct Personnel Risk Assessments (PRAs) for individuals, including contractors and service vendors, with authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access but did not evaluate criminal history records check for access authorization for three individuals, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (3.3 & 3.4) OR The Responsible Entity did not conduct Personnel Risk Assessments (PRAs) for three individuals with authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access within 7	OR The Responsible Entity has a process to perform seven-year criminal history record checks for individuals, including contractors and service vendors, with authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access but did not include the required checks described in 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 for four or more individuals, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (3.2 & 3.4) OR The Responsible Entity did conduct Personnel Risk Assessments (PRAs) for individuals, including contractors and service vendors, with authorized electronic or

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-004-5.1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>checks described in 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 for one individual, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (3.2 & 3.4)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not conduct Personnel Risk Assessments (PRAs) for individuals, including contractors and service vendors, with authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access</p>	<p>calendar years of the previous PRA completion date, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (3.5)</p>	<p>calendar years of the previous PRA completion date, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (3.5)</p>	<p>authorized unescorted physical access but did not evaluate criminal history records check for access authorization for four or more individuals, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (3.3 & 3.4)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not conduct Personnel Risk Assessments (PRAs) for four or more individuals with authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access within 7 calendar years of the previous PRA completion date and has identified deficiencies, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (3.5)</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-004-5.1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			but did not evaluate criminal history records check for access authorization for one individual, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (3.3 & 3.4) OR The Responsible Entity did not conduct Personnel Risk Assessments (PRAs) for one individual with authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access within 7			

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-004-5.1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			calendar years of the previous PRA completion date, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (3.5)			
R4	Operations Planning and Same Day Operations	Medium	The Responsible Entity did not verify that individuals with active electronic or active unescorted physical access have authorization records during a calendar quarter but did so less than 10 calendar days after the start	The Responsible Entity did not verify that individuals with active electronic or active unescorted physical access have authorization records during a calendar quarter but did so between 10 and 20 calendar days after the start of a subsequent calendar quarter, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (4.2) OR	The Responsible Entity did not verify that individuals with active electronic or active unescorted physical access have authorization records during a calendar quarter but did so between 20 and 30 calendar days after the start of a subsequent calendar quarter, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (4.2) OR	The Responsible Entity did not implement any documented program(s) for access management. (R4) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented program(s) for access management that includes a process to authorize electronic access, unescorted physical access, or access to the designated storage locations where

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-004-5.1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>of a subsequent calendar quarter, and did not identify, assess and correct the deficiencies. (4.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has implemented processes to verify that user accounts, user account groups, or user role categories, and their specific, associated privileges are correct and necessary within 15</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity has implemented processes to verify that user accounts, user account groups, or user role categories, and their specific, associated privileges are correct and necessary within 15 calendar months of the previous verification but for more than 5% but less than (or equal to) 10% of its BES Cyber Systems, privileges were incorrect or unnecessary, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (4.3)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has implemented processes to verify that access to the designated storage locations for BES Cyber System</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity has implemented processes to verify that user accounts, user account groups, or user role categories, and their specific, associated privileges are correct and necessary within 15 calendar months of the previous verification but for more than 10% but less than (or equal to) 15% of its BES Cyber Systems, privileges were incorrect or unnecessary, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (4.3)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has implemented processes to verify that access to the designated storage locations for BES Cyber System</p>	<p>BES Cyber System Information is located, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (4.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not verify that individuals with active electronic or active unescorted physical access have authorization records for at least two consecutive calendar quarters, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (4.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has implemented processes to verify that user accounts, user account groups, or user role categories, and their specific, associated</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-004-5.1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>calendar months of the previous verification but for 5% or less of its BES Cyber Systems, privileges were incorrect or unnecessary, and did not identify, assess and correct the deficiencies. (4.3)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has implemented processes to verify that access to the designated storage locations for BES Cyber System</p>	<p>Information is correct and necessary within 15 calendar months of the previous verification but for more than 5% but less than (or equal to) 10% of its BES Cyber System Information storage locations, privileges were incorrect or unnecessary, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (4.4)</p>	<p>Information is correct and necessary within 15 calendar months of the previous verification but for more than 10% but less than (or equal to) 15% of its BES Cyber System Information storage locations, privileges were incorrect or unnecessary, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (4.4)</p>	<p>privileges are correct and necessary within 15 calendar months of the previous verification but for more than 15% of its BES Cyber Systems, privileges were incorrect or unnecessary, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (4.3)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has implemented processes to verify that access to the designated storage locations for BES Cyber System Information is correct and necessary within 15 calendar months of the previous verification but for more than 15% of its BES Cyber System Information storage locations, privileges</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-004-5.1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			Information is correct and necessary within 15 calendar months of the previous verification but for 5% or less of its BES Cyber System Information storage locations, privileges were incorrect or unnecessary, and did not identify, assess and correct the deficiencies. (4.4)			were incorrect or unnecessary, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (4.4)
R5	Same Day Operations and Operations Planning	Medium	The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more process(es) to	The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more process(es) to remove the ability for unescorted physical access and Interactive	The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more process(es) to remove the ability for unescorted physical access and Interactive	The Responsible Entity has not implemented any documented program(s) for access revocation for electronic access, unescorted

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-004-5.1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			revoke the individual’s access to the designated storage locations for BES Cyber System Information but, for one individual, did not do so by the end of the next calendar day following the effective date and time of the termination action, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (5.3) OR The Responsible	Remote Access upon a termination action or complete the removal within 24 hours of the termination action but did not initiate those removals for one individual, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (5.1) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more process(es) to determine that an individual no longer requires retention of access following reassignments or transfers but, for one individual, did not revoke the authorized electronic access to individual accounts and authorized unescorted	Remote Access upon a termination action or complete the removal within 24 hours of the termination action but did not initiate those removals for two individuals, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (5.1) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more process(es) to determine that an individual no longer requires retention of access following reassignments or transfers but, for two individuals, did not revoke the authorized electronic access to individual accounts and authorized unescorted	physical access, or BES Cyber System Information storage locations. (R5) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more process(es) to remove the ability for unescorted physical access and Interactive Remote Access upon a termination action or complete the removal within 24 hours of the termination action but did not initiate those removals for three or more individuals, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (5.1) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more process(es) to

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-004-5.1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>Entity has implemented one or more process(es) to revoke the individual’s user accounts upon termination action but did not do so for within 30 calendar days of the date of termination action for one or more individuals, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (5.4)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has implemented</p>	<p>physical access by the end of the next calendar day following the predetermined date, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (5.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more process(es) to revoke the individual’s access to the designated storage locations for BES Cyber System Information but, for two individuals, did not do so by the end of the next calendar day following the effective date and time of the termination action, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (5.3)</p>	<p>physical access by the end of the next calendar day following the predetermined date, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (5.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more process(es) to revoke the individual’s access to the designated storage locations for BES Cyber System Information but, for three or more individuals, did not do so by the end of the next calendar day following the effective date and time of the termination action, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (5.3)</p>	<p>determine that an individual no longer requires retention of access following reassignments or transfers but, for three or more individuals, did not revoke the authorized electronic access to individual accounts and authorized unescorted physical access by the end of the next calendar day following the predetermined date, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (5.2)</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-004-5.1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			one or more process(es) to change passwords for shared accounts known to the user upon termination action, reassignment, or transfer, but did not do so for within 30 calendar days of the date of termination action, reassignment, or transfer for one or more individuals, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (5.5) OR			

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-004-5.1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more process(es) to determine and document extenuating operating circumstances following a termination action, reassignment, or transfer, but did not change one or more passwords for shared accounts known to the user within 10 calendar days following the end of the extenuating operating</p>			

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-004-5.1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			circumstances, and did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (5.5)			

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. Associated Documents

None.

Guidelines and Technical Basis

Section 4 – Scope of Applicability of the CIP Cyber Security Standards

Section “4. Applicability” of the standards provides important information for Responsible Entities to determine the scope of the applicability of the CIP Cyber Security Requirements.

Section “4.1. Functional Entities” is a list of NERC functional entities to which the standard applies. If the entity is registered as one or more of the functional entities listed in Section 4.1, then the NERC CIP Cyber Security Standards apply. Note that there is a qualification in Section 4.1 that restricts the applicability in the case of Distribution Providers to only those that own certain types of systems and equipment listed in 4.2. Furthermore,

Section “4.2. Facilities” defines the scope of the Facilities, systems, and equipment owned by the Responsible Entity, as qualified in Section 4.1, that is subject to the requirements of the standard. As specified in the exemption section 4.2.3.5, this standard does not apply to Responsible Entities that do not have High Impact or Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems under CIP-002-5’s categorization. In addition to the set of BES Facilities, Control Centers, and other systems and equipment, the list includes the set of systems and equipment owned by Distribution Providers. While the NERC Glossary term “Facilities” already includes the BES characteristic, the additional use of the term BES here is meant to reinforce the scope of applicability of these Facilities where it is used, especially in this applicability scoping section. This in effect sets the scope of Facilities, systems, and equipment that is subject to the standards.

Requirement R1:

The security awareness program is intended to be an informational program, not a formal training program. It should reinforce security practices to ensure that personnel maintain awareness of best practices for both physical and electronic security to protect its BES Cyber Systems. The Responsible Entity is not required to provide records that show that each individual received or understood the information, but they must maintain documentation of the program materials utilized in the form of posters, memos, and/or presentations.

Examples of possible mechanisms and evidence, when dated, which can be used are:

- Direct communications (e.g., emails, memos, computer based training, etc.);
- Indirect communications (e.g., posters, intranet, brochures, etc.);
- Management support and reinforcement (e.g., presentations, meetings, etc.).

Requirement R2:

Training shall cover the policies, access controls, and procedures as developed for the BES Cyber Systems and include, at a minimum, the required items appropriate to personnel roles and responsibilities from Table R2. The Responsible Entity has the flexibility to define the training program and it may consist of multiple modules and multiple delivery mechanisms, but a single training program for all individuals needing to be trained is acceptable. The training can focus on functions, roles or responsibilities at the discretion of the Responsible Entity.

One new element in the training content is intended to encompass networking hardware and software and other issues of electronic interconnectivity supporting the operation and control of BES Cyber Systems as per FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 434. This is not intended to provide technical training to individuals supporting networking hardware and software, but educating system users of the cyber security risks associated with the interconnectedness of these systems. The users, based on their function, role or responsibility, should have a basic understanding of which systems can be accessed from other systems and how the actions they take can affect cyber security.

Each Responsible Entity shall ensure all personnel who are granted authorized electronic access and/or authorized unescorted physical access to its BES Cyber Systems, including contractors and service vendors, complete cyber security training prior to their being granted authorized access, except for CIP Exceptional Circumstances. To retain the authorized accesses, individuals must complete the training at least one every 15 months.

Requirement R3:

Each Responsible Entity shall ensure a personnel risk assessment is performed for all personnel who are granted authorized electronic access and/or authorized unescorted physical access to its BES Cyber Systems, including contractors and service vendors, prior to their being granted authorized access, except for program specified exceptional circumstances that are approved by the single senior management official or their delegate and impact the reliability of the BES or emergency response. Identity should be confirmed in accordance with federal, state, provincial, and local laws, and subject to existing collective bargaining unit agreements. Identity only needs to be confirmed prior to initially granting access and only requires periodic confirmation according to the entity's process during the tenure of employment, which may or may not be the same as the initial verification action.

A seven year criminal history check should be performed for those locations where the individual has resided for at least six consecutive months. This check should also be performed in accordance with federal, state, provincial, and local laws, and subject to existing collective bargaining unit agreements. When it is not possible to perform a full seven year criminal history check, documentation must be made of what criminal history check was performed, and the reasons a full seven-year check could not be performed. Examples of this could include


individuals under the age of 25 where a juvenile criminal history may be protected by law, individuals who may have resided in locations from where it is not possible to obtain a criminal history records check, violates the law or is not allowed under the existing collective bargaining agreement. The Responsible Entity should consider the absence of information for the full seven years when assessing the risk of granting access during the process to evaluate the criminal history check. There needs to be a personnel risk assessment that has been completed within the last seven years for each individual with access. A new criminal history records check must be performed as part of the new PRA. Individuals who have been granted access under a previous version of these standards need a new PRA within seven years of the date of their last PRA. The clarifications around the seven year criminal history check in this version do not require a new PRA be performed by the implementation date.

Requirement R4:

Authorization for electronic and unescorted physical access and access to BES Cyber System Information must be on the basis of necessity in the individual performing a work function. Documentation showing the authorization should have some justification of the business need included. To ensure proper segregation of duties, access authorization and provisioning should not be performed by the same person where possible.

This requirement specifies both quarterly reviews and reviews at least once every 15 calendar months. Quarterly reviews are to perform a validation that only authorized users have been granted access to BES Cyber Systems. This is achieved by comparing individuals actually provisioned to a BES Cyber System against records of individuals authorized to the BES Cyber System. The focus of this requirement is on the integrity of provisioning access rather than individual accounts on all BES Cyber Assets. The list of provisioned individuals can be an automatically generated account listing. However, in a BES Cyber System with several account databases, the list of provisioned individuals may come from other records such as provisioning workflow or a user account database where provisioning typically initiates.

The privilege review at least once every 15 calendar months is more detailed to ensure an individual’s associated privileges are the minimum necessary to perform their work function (i.e., least privilege). Entities can more efficiently perform this review by implementing role-based access. This involves determining the specific roles on the system (e.g., system operator, technician, report viewer, administrator, etc.) then grouping access privileges to the role and assigning users to the role. Role-based access does not assume any specific software and can be implemented by defining specific provisioning processes for each role where access group



assignments cannot be performed. Role-based access permissions eliminate the need to perform the privilege review on individual accounts. An example timeline of all the reviews in Requirement R4 is included below.

Separation of duties should be considered when performing the reviews in Requirement R4. The person reviewing should be different than the person provisioning access.

If the results of quarterly or at least once every 15 calendar months account reviews indicate an administrative or clerical error in which access was not actually provisioned, then the SDT intends that this error should not be considered a violation of this requirement.

For BES Cyber Systems that do not have user accounts defined, the controls listed in Requirement R4 are not applicable. However, the Responsible Entity should document such configurations.

Requirement R5:

The requirement to revoke access at the time of the termination action includes procedures showing revocation of access concurrent with the termination action. This requirement recognizes that the timing of the termination action may vary depending on the circumstance. Some common scenarios and possible processes on when the termination action occurs are provided in the following table. These scenarios are not an exhaustive list of all scenarios, but are representative of several routine business practices.

Scenario	Possible Process
Immediate involuntary termination	Human resources or corporate security escorts the individual off site and the supervisor or human resources personnel notify the appropriate personnel to begin the revocation process.
Scheduled involuntary termination	Human resources personnel are notified of the termination and work with appropriate personnel to schedule the revocation of access at the time of termination.
Voluntary termination	Human resources personnel are notified of the termination and work with appropriate personnel to schedule the revocation of access at the time of termination.
Retirement where the last working day is several weeks prior to the termination date	Human resources personnel coordinate with manager to determine the final date access is no longer needed and schedule the revocation of access on the determined day.
Death	Human resources personnel are notified of the death and work with appropriate personnel to begin the revocation process.

Revocation of electronic access should be understood to mean a process with the end result that electronic access to BES Cyber Systems is no longer possible using credentials assigned to or known by the individual(s) whose access privileges are being revoked. Steps taken to accomplish this outcome may include deletion or deactivation of accounts used by the individual(s), but no specific actions are prescribed. Entities should consider the ramifications of deleting an account may include incomplete event log entries due to an unrecognized account or system services using the account to log on.

The initial revocation required in Requirement R5.1 includes unescorted physical access and Interactive Remote Access. These two actions should prevent any further access by the individual after termination. If an individual still has local access accounts (i.e., accounts on the Cyber Asset itself) on BES Cyber Assets, then the Responsible Entity has 30 days to complete the revocation process for those accounts. However, nothing prevents a Responsible Entity from performing all of the access revocation at the time of termination.

For transferred or reassigned individuals, a review of access privileges should be performed. This review could entail a simple listing of all authorizations for an individual and working with the respective managers to determine which access will still be needed in the new position. For instances in which the individual still needs to retain access as part of a transitory period, the entity should schedule a time to review these access privileges or include the privileges in the quarterly account review or annual privilege review.

Revocation of access to shared accounts is called out separately to prevent the situation where passwords on substation and generation devices are constantly changed due to staff turnover.

Requirement 5.5 specified that passwords for shared account are to be changed within 30 calendar days of the termination action or when the Responsible Entity determines an individual no longer requires access to the account as a result of a reassignment or transfer. The 30 days applies under normal operating conditions. However, circumstances may occur where this is not possible. Some systems may require an outage or reboot of the system in order to complete the password change. In periods of extreme heat or cold, many Responsible Entities may prohibit system outages and reboots in order to maintain reliability of the BES. When these circumstances occur, the Responsible Entity must document these circumstances and prepare to change the password within 10 calendar days following the end of the operating circumstances. Records of activities must be retained to show that the Responsible Entity followed the plan they created.

Rationale:

During the development of this standard, references to prior versions of the CIP standards and rationale for the requirements and their parts were embedded within the standard. Upon BOT approval, that information was moved to this section.

Rationale for R1:

Ensures that Responsible Entities with personnel who have authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access to BES Cyber Assets take action so that those personnel with such authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access maintain awareness of the Responsible Entity's security practices.

Summary of Changes: Reformatted into table structure.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.1) CIP-004-4, R1

Change Rationale: (Part 1.1)

Changed to remove the need to ensure or prove everyone with authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access "received" ongoing reinforcement – to state that security awareness has been reinforced.

Moved example mechanisms to guidance.

Rationale for R2:

To ensure that the Responsible Entity's training program for personnel who need authorized electronic access and/or authorized unescorted physical access to BES Cyber Systems covers the proper policies, access controls, and procedures to protect BES Cyber Systems and are trained before access is authorized.

Based on their role, some personnel may not require training on all topics.

Summary of Changes:

1. Addition of specific role training for:

- The visitor control program
- Electronic interconnectivity supporting the operation and control of BES Cyber Systems
- Storage media as part of the handling of BES Cyber Systems information

2. Change references from Critical Cyber Assets to BES Cyber Systems.

Reference to prior version: (Part 2.1) CIP004-4, R2.2.1

Change Rationale: (Part 2.1)

Removed "proper use of Critical Cyber Assets" concept from previous versions to focus the requirement on cyber security issues, not the business function. The previous version was

focused more on the business or functional use of the BES Cyber System and is outside the scope of cyber security. Personnel who will administer the visitor control process or serve as escorts for visitors need training on the program. Core training on the handling of BES Cyber System (not Critical Cyber Assets) Information, with the addition of storage; FERC Order No. 706, paragraph 413 and paragraphs 632-634, 688, 732-734; DHS 2.4.16. Core training on the identification and reporting of a Cyber Security Incident; FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 413; Related to CIP-008-5 & DHS Incident Reporting requirements for those with roles in incident reporting. Core training on the action plans and procedures to recover or re-establish BES Cyber Systems for personnel having a role in the recovery; FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 413. Core training programs are intended to encompass networking hardware and software and other issues of electronic interconnectivity supporting the operation and control of BES Cyber Systems; FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 434.

Reference to prior version: (Part 2.2) CIP004-4, R2.1

Change Rationale: (Part 2.2)

Addition of exceptional circumstances parameters as directed in FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 431 is detailed in CIP-003-5.

Reference to prior version: (Part 2.3) CIP004-4, R2.3

Change Rationale: (Part 2.3)

Updated to replace “annually” with “once every 15 calendar months.”

Rationale for R3:

To ensure that individuals who need authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access to BES Cyber Systems have been assessed for risk. Whether initial access or maintaining access, those with access must have had a personnel risk assessment completed within the last 7 years.

Summary of Changes: Specify that the seven year criminal history check covers all locations where the individual has resided for six consecutive months or more, including current residence regardless of duration.

Reference to prior version: (Part 3.1) CIP004-4, R3.1

Change Rationale: (Part 3.1)

Addressed interpretation request in guidance. Specified that process for identity confirmation is required. The implementation plan clarifies that a documented identity verification conducted under an earlier version of the CIP standards is sufficient.

Reference to prior version: (Part 3.2) CIP004-4, R3.1

Change Rationale: (Part 3.2)

Specify that the seven year criminal history check covers all locations where the individual has resided for six months or more, including current residence regardless of duration. Added

additional wording based on interpretation request. Provision is made for when a full seven-year check cannot be performed.

Reference to prior version: (Part 3.3) New

Change Rationale: (Part 3.3)

There should be documented criteria or a process used to evaluate criminal history records checks for authorizing access.

Reference to prior version: (Part 3.4) CIP-004-4, R3.3

Change Rationale: (Part 3.4)

Separated into its own table item.

Reference to prior version: (Part 3.5) CIP-004-3, R3, R3.3

Change Rationale: (Part 3.5)

Whether for initial access or maintaining access, establishes that those with access must have had PRA completed within 7 years. This covers both initial and renewal. The implementation plan specifies that initial performance of this requirement is 7 years after the last personnel risk assessment that was performed pursuant to a previous version of the CIP Cyber Security Standards for a personnel risk assessment. CIP-004-3, R3, R3.3

Rationale for R4:

To ensure that individuals with access to BES Cyber Systems and the physical and electronic locations where BES Cyber System Information is stored by the Responsible Entity have been properly authorized for such access. "Authorization" should be considered to be a grant of permission by a person or persons empowered by the Responsible Entity to perform such grants and included in the delegations referenced in CIP-003-5. "Provisioning" should be considered the actions to provide access to an individual.

Access is physical, logical, and remote permissions granted to Cyber Assets composing the BES Cyber System or allowing access to the BES Cyber System. When granting, reviewing, or revoking access, the Responsible Entity must address the Cyber Asset specifically as well as the systems used to enable such access (i.e., physical access control system, remote access system, directory services).

CIP Exceptional Circumstances are defined in a Responsible Entity's policy from CIP-003-5 and allow an exception to the requirement for authorization to BES Cyber Systems and BES Cyber System Information.

Quarterly reviews in Part 4.5 are to perform a validation that only authorized users have been granted access to BES Cyber Systems. This is achieved by comparing individuals actually provisioned to a BES Cyber System against records of individuals authorized to access the BES Cyber System. The focus of this requirement is on the integrity of provisioning access rather than individual accounts on all BES Cyber Assets. The list of provisioned individuals can be an automatically generated account listing. However, in a BES Cyber System with several account

databases, the list of provisioned individuals may come from other records such as provisioning workflow or a user account database where provisioning typically initiates.

If the results of quarterly or annual account reviews indicate an administrative or clerical error in which access was not actually provisioned, then the SDT intends that the error should not be considered a violation of this requirement.

For BES Cyber Systems that do not have user accounts defined, the controls listed in Requirement R4 are not applicable. However, the Responsible Entity should document such configurations.

Summary of Changes: The primary change was in pulling the access management requirements from CIP-003-4, CIP-004-4, and CIP-007-4 into a single requirement. The requirements from Version 4 remain largely unchanged except to clarify some terminology. The purpose for combining these requirements is to remove the perceived redundancy in authorization and review. The requirement in CIP-004-4 R4 to maintain a list of authorized personnel has been removed because the list represents only one form of evidence to demonstrate compliance that only authorized persons have access.

Reference to prior version: (Part 4.1) CIP 003-4, R5.1 and R5.2; CIP-006-4, R1.5 and R4; CIP-007-4, R5.1 and R5.1.1

Change Rationale: (Part 4.1)

Combined requirements from CIP-003-4, CIP-007-4, and CIP-006-4 to make the authorization process clear and consistent. *CIP-003-4, CIP-004-4, CIP-006-4, and CIP-007-4 all reference authorization of access in some form, and CIP-003-4 and CIP-007-4 require authorization on a “need to know” basis or with respect to work functions performed. These were consolidated to ensure consistency in the requirement language.*

Reference to prior version: (Part 4.2) CIP 004-4, R4.1

Change Rationale: (Part 4.2)

Feedback among team members, observers, and regional CIP auditors indicates there has been confusion in implementation around what the term “review” entailed in CIP-004-4, Requirement R4.1. This requirement clarifies the review should occur between the provisioned access and authorized access.

Reference to prior version: (Part 4.3) CIP 007-4, R5.1.3

Change Rationale: (Part 4.3)

Moved requirements to ensure consistency and eliminate the cross-referencing of requirements. Clarified what was necessary in performing verification by stating the objective was to confirm that access privileges are correct and the minimum necessary.

Reference to prior version: (Part 4.4) CIP-003-4, R5.1.2

Change Rationale: (Part 4.4)

Moved requirement to ensure consistency among access reviews. Clarified precise meaning of annual. Clarified what was necessary in performing a verification by stating the objective was to

confirm access privileges are correct and the minimum necessary for performing assigned work functions.

Rationale for R5:

The timely revocation of electronic access to BES Cyber Systems is an essential element of an access management regime. When an individual no longer requires access to a BES Cyber System to perform his or her assigned functions, that access should be revoked. This is of particular importance in situations where a change of assignment or employment is involuntary, as there is a risk the individual(s) involved will react in a hostile or destructive manner.

In considering how to address directives in FERC Order No. 706 directing “immediate” revocation of access for involuntary separation, the SDT chose not to specify hourly time parameters in the requirement (e.g., revoking access within 1 hour). The point in time at which an organization terminates a person cannot generally be determined down to the hour. However, most organizations have formal termination processes, and the timeliest revocation of access occurs in concurrence with the initial processes of termination.

Access is physical, logical, and remote permissions granted to Cyber Assets composing the BES Cyber System or allowing access to the BES Cyber System. When granting, reviewing, or revoking access, the Responsible Entity must address the Cyber Asset specifically as well as the systems used to enable such access (e.g., physical access control system, remote access system, directory services).

Summary of Changes: FERC Order No. 706, Paragraphs 460 and 461, state the following: “The Commission adopts the CIP NOPR proposal to direct the ERO to develop modifications to CIP-004-1 to require immediate revocation of access privileges when an employee, contractor or vendor no longer performs a function that requires physical or electronic access to a Critical Cyber Asset for any reason (including disciplinary action, transfer, retirement, or termination).

As a general matter, the Commission believes that revoking access when an employee no longer needs it, either because of a change in job or the end of employment, must be immediate.”

Reference to prior version: (Part 5.1) CIP 004-4, R4.2

Change Rationale: (Part 5.1)

*The FERC Order No. 706, Paragraphs 460 and 461, directs modifications to the Standards to **require immediate revocation** for any person no longer needing access. To address this directive, this requirement specifies revocation concurrent with the termination instead of within 24 hours.*

Reference to prior version: (Part 5.2) CIP-004-4, R4.2

Change Rationale: (Part 5.2)

FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 460 and 461, direct modifications to the Standards to require immediate revocation for any person no longer needing access, including transferred employees. In reviewing how to modify this requirement, the SDT determined the date a person no longer needs access after a transfer was problematic because the need may change over time. As a result, the SDT adapted this requirement from NIST 800-53 Version 3 to review access authorizations on the date of the transfer. The SDT felt this was a more effective control in accomplishing the objective to prevent a person from accumulating unnecessary authorizations through transfers.

Reference to prior version: (Part 5.3) New

Change Rationale: (Part 5.3)

FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 386, directs modifications to the standards to require prompt revocation of access to protected information. To address this directive, Responsible Entities are required to revoke access to areas designated for BES Cyber System Information. This could include records closets, substation control houses, records management systems, file shares or other physical and logical areas under the Responsible Entity's control.

Reference to prior version: (Part 5.4) New

Change Rationale: (Part 5.4)

FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 460 and 461, direct modifications to the Standards to require immediate revocation for any person no longer needing access. In order to meet the immediate timeframe, Responsible Entities will likely have initial revocation procedures to prevent remote and physical access to the BES Cyber System. Some cases may take more time to coordinate access revocation on individual Cyber Assets and applications without affecting reliability. This requirement provides the additional time to review and complete the revocation process. Although the initial actions already prevent further access, this step provides additional assurance in the access revocation process.

Reference to prior version: (Part 5.5) CIP-007-4, R5.2.3

Change Rationale: (Part 5.5)

To provide clarification of expected actions in managing the passwords.

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	1/16/06	R3.2 — Change “Control Center” to “control center.”	3/24/06
2	9/30/09	Modifications to clarify the requirements and to bring the compliance elements into conformance with the latest guidelines for developing compliance elements of standards. Removal of reasonable business judgment. Replaced the RRO with the RE as a responsible entity. Rewording of Effective Date. Changed compliance monitor to Compliance Enforcement Authority.	
3	12/16/09	Updated version number from -2 to -3 Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees.	
3	3/31/10	Approved by FERC.	
4	12/30/10	Modified to add specific criteria for Critical Asset identification.	Update
4	1/24/11	Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Update
5	11/26/12	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Modified to coordinate with other CIP standards and to revise format to use RBS Template.
5.1	9/30/13	Modified two VSLs in R4.	Errata
5.1	11/22/13	FERC Order issued approving CIP-004-5.1.	
5.1	7/9/14	FERC Letter Order issued approving VRFs and VSLs revisions to certain CIP standards.	CIP-004-5.1 Requirement R4 changed from Lower to

Guidelines and Technical Basis

			Medium, and revised the VSL assignment for Requirement R4 to a percentage-based gradation.
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This appendix establishes specific provisions for the application of the standard in Québec. Provisions of the standard and of its appendix must be read together for the purposes of understanding and interpretation. Where the standard and appendix differ, the appendix shall prevail.

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Cyber Security — Personnel & Training
2. **Number:** CIP-004-5.1
3. **Purpose:** No specific provision
4. **Applicability:**

Functional Entities

No specific provision

Facilities

This standard only applies to the facilities of the Main Transmission System (RTP) and to the facilities specified for the Distribution Provider. In application of this standard, any reference to the terms "Bulk Electric System" or "BES" shall be replaced by the terms "Main Transmission System" or "RTP" respectively.

Additional Exemptions

The following are exempt from this standard:

- Generating facilities with a nameplate capacity of 300 MVA or less, unless the facility comprises one or more units that can be synchronized with neighboring systems.
- Step-up substations of generating facilities identified in the preceding point.

5. **Effective Date:**

5.1. Adoption of the standard by the Régie de l'énergie: Month xx 201x

5.2. Adoption of the appendix by the Régie de l'énergie: Month xx 201x

5.3. Effective date of the standard and its appendix in Québec: Month xx 201x

6. **Background:** No specific provision

B. Requirements and Measures

No specific provision

C. Compliance

1. **Compliance Monitoring Process**
 - 1.1. **Compliance Enforcement Authority**

The Régie de l'énergie is responsible, in Québec, for compliance enforcement with respect to the reliability standard and its appendix that it adopts.

1.2. Evidence Retention

No specific provision

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes

No specific provision

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

No specific provision

2. Table of Compliance Elements

No specific provision

D. Regional Variances

No specific provision

E. Interpretations

No specific provision

F. Associated Documents

No specific provision

Guidelines and Technical Basis

No specific provision

Rationale

No specific provision

Revision History

Revision	Adoption Date	Action	Change Tracking
0	Xx month 201x	New appendix	New

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Cyber Security — Electronic Security Perimeter(s)
2. **Number:** CIP-005-5
3. **Purpose:** To manage electronic access to BES Cyber Systems by specifying a controlled Electronic Security Perimeter in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the BES.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. **Functional Entities:** For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of functional entities will be collectively referred to as “Responsible Entities.” For requirements in this standard where a specific functional entity or subset of functional entities are the applicable entity or entities, the functional entity or entities are specified explicitly.
 - 4.1.1 **Balancing Authority**
 - 4.1.2 **Distribution Provider** that owns one or more of the following Facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the BES:
 - 4.1.2.1 Each underfrequency Load shedding (UFLS) or undervoltage Load shedding (UVLS) system that:
 - 4.1.2.1.1 is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and
 - 4.1.2.1.2 performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.
 - 4.1.2.2 Each Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme where the Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - 4.1.2.3 Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - 4.1.2.4 Each Cranking Path and group of Elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a Blackstart Resource up to and including the first interconnection point of the starting station service of the next generation unit(s) to be started.
 - 4.1.3 **Generator Operator**
 - 4.1.4 **Generator Owner**
 - 4.1.5 **Interchange Coordinator or Interchange Authority**
 - 4.1.6 **Reliability Coordinator**
 - 4.1.7 **Transmission Operator**

4.1.8 Transmission Owner

4.2. Facilities: For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following Facilities, systems, and equipment owned by each Responsible Entity in 4.1 above are those to which these requirements are applicable. For requirements in this standard where a specific type of Facilities, system, or equipment or subset of Facilities, systems, and equipment are applicable, these are specified explicitly.

4.2.1 Distribution Provider: One or more of the following Facilities, systems and equipment owned by the Distribution Provider for the protection or restoration of the BES:

4.2.1.1 Each UFLS or UVLS System that:

4.2.1.1.1 is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and

4.2.1.1.2 performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.

4.2.1.2 Each Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme where the Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.

4.2.1.3 Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.

4.2.1.4 Each Cranking Path and group of Elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a Blackstart Resource up to and including the first interconnection point of the starting station service of the next generation unit(s) to be started.

4.2.2 Responsible Entities listed in 4.1 other than Distribution Providers:

All BES Facilities.

4.2.3 Exemptions: The following are exempt from Standard CIP-005-5:

4.2.3.1 Cyber Assets at Facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.

4.2.3.2 Cyber Assets associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete Electronic Security Perimeters.

4.2.3.3 The systems, structures, and components that are regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under a cyber security plan pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Section 73.54.

4.2.3.4 For Distribution Providers, the systems and equipment that are not included in section 4.2.1 above.

4.2.3.5 Responsible Entities that identify that they have no BES Cyber Systems categorized as high impact or medium impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.

5. Effective Dates:

1. **24 Months Minimum** – CIP-005-5 shall become effective on the later of July 1, 2015, or the first calendar day of the ninth calendar quarter after the effective date of the order providing applicable regulatory approval.
2. In those jurisdictions where no regulatory approval is required, CIP-005-5 shall become effective on the first day of the ninth calendar quarter following Board of Trustees' approval, or as otherwise made effective pursuant to the laws applicable to such ERO governmental authorities.

6. Background:

Standard CIP-005-5 exists as part of a suite of CIP Standards related to cyber security. CIP-002-5 requires the initial identification and categorization of BES Cyber Systems. CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1 require a minimum level of organizational, operational and procedural controls to mitigate risk to BES Cyber Systems. This suite of CIP Standards is referred to as the *Version 5 CIP Cyber Security Standards*.

Most requirements open with, "*Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented [processes, plan, etc] that include the applicable items in [Table Reference].*" The referenced table requires the applicable items in the procedures for the requirement's common subject matter.

The term *documented processes* refers to a set of required instructions specific to the Responsible Entity and to achieve a specific outcome. This term does not imply any particular naming or approval structure beyond what is stated in the requirements. An entity should include as much as it believes necessary in their documented processes, but they must address the applicable requirements in the table.

The terms *program* and *plan* are sometimes used in place of *documented processes* where it makes sense and is commonly understood. For example, documented processes describing a response are typically referred to as *plans* (i.e., incident response plans and recovery plans). Likewise, a security plan can describe an approach involving multiple procedures to address a broad subject matter.

Similarly, the term *program* may refer to the organization's overall implementation of its policies, plans and procedures involving a subject matter. Examples in the standards include the personnel risk assessment program and the personnel training program. The full implementation of the CIP Cyber Security Standards could also be referred to as a program. However, the terms *program* and *plan* do not imply any additional requirements beyond what is stated in the standards.

Responsible Entities can implement common controls that meet requirements for multiple high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems. For example, a single training

program could meet the requirements for training personnel across multiple BES Cyber Systems.

Measures for the initial requirement are simply the documented processes themselves. Measures in the table rows provide examples of evidence to show documentation and implementation of applicable items in the documented processes. These measures serve to provide guidance to entities in acceptable records of compliance and should not be viewed as an all-inclusive list.

Throughout the standards, unless otherwise stated, bulleted items in the requirements and measures are items that are linked with an “or,” and numbered items are items that are linked with an “and.”

Many references in the Applicability section use a threshold of 300 MW for UFLS and UVLS. This particular threshold of 300 MW for UVLS and UFLS was provided in Version 1 of the CIP Cyber Security Standards. The threshold remains at 300 MW since it is specifically addressing UVLS and UFLS, which are last ditch efforts to save the Bulk Electric System. A review of UFLS tolerances defined within regional reliability standards for UFLS program requirements to date indicates that the historical value of 300 MW represents an adequate and reasonable threshold value for allowable UFLS operational tolerances.

“Applicable Systems” Columns in Tables:

Each table has an “Applicable Systems” column to further define the scope of systems to which a specific requirement row applies. The CSO706 SDT adapted this concept from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) Risk Management Framework as a way of applying requirements more appropriately based on impact and connectivity characteristics. The following conventions are used in the “Applicable Systems” column as described.

- **High Impact BES Cyber Systems** – Applies to BES Cyber Systems categorized as high impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.
- **High Impact BES Cyber Systems with Dial-up Connectivity** – Only applies to high impact BES Cyber Systems with Dial-up Connectivity.
- **High Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity** – Only applies to high impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity. This also excludes Cyber Assets in the BES Cyber System that cannot be directly accessed through External Routable Connectivity.
- **Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems** – Applies to each BES Cyber Systems categorized as medium impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.
- **Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at Control Centers** – Only applies to medium impact BES Cyber Systems located at a Control Center.

- **Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with Dial-up Connectivity** – Only applies to medium impact BES Cyber Systems with Dial-up Connectivity.
- **Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity** – Only applies to medium impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity. This also excludes Cyber Assets in the BES Cyber System that cannot be directly accessed through External Routable Connectivity.
- **Protected Cyber Assets (PCA)** – Applies to each Protected Cyber Asset associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System.
- **Electronic Access Points (EAP)** – Applies at Electronic Access Points associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System.

B. Requirements and Measures

- R1.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-005-5 Table R1 – Electronic Security Perimeter*. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning and Same Day Operations].
- M1.** Evidence must include each of the applicable documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-005-5 Table R1 – Electronic Security Perimeter* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-005-5 Table R1 – Electronic Security Perimeter			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.1	High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCA Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCA 	All applicable Cyber Assets connected to a network via a routable protocol shall reside within a defined ESP.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a list of all ESPs with all uniquely identifiable applicable Cyber Assets connected via a routable protocol within each ESP.

CIP-005-5 Table R1 – Electronic Security Perimeter			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.2	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCA 	All External Routable Connectivity must be through an identified Electronic Access Point (EAP).	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, network diagrams showing all external routable communication paths and the identified EAPs.

CIP-005-5 Table R1 – Electronic Security Perimeter			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.3	<p>Electronic Access Points for High Impact BES Cyber Systems</p> <p>Electronic Access Points for Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems</p>	<p>Require inbound and outbound access permissions, including the reason for granting access, and deny all other access by default.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a list of rules (firewall, access control lists, etc.) that demonstrate that only permitted access is allowed and that each access rule has a documented reason.</p>
1.4	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems with Dial-up Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with Dial-up Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCA 	<p>Where technically feasible, perform authentication when establishing Dial-up Connectivity with applicable Cyber Assets.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a documented process that describes how the Responsible Entity is providing authenticated access through each dial-up connection.</p>

CIP-005-5 Table R1 – Electronic Security Perimeter			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.5	Electronic Access Points for High Impact BES Cyber Systems Electronic Access Points for Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at Control Centers	Have one or more methods for detecting known or suspected malicious communications for both inbound and outbound communications.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation that malicious communications detection methods (e.g. intrusion detection system, application layer firewall, etc.) are implemented.

- R2.** Each Responsible Entity allowing Interactive Remote Access to BES Cyber Systems shall implement one or more documented processes that collectively include the applicable requirement parts, where technically feasible, in *CIP-005-5 Table R2 – Interactive Remote Access Management*. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning and Same Day Operations].
- M2.** Evidence must include the documented processes that collectively address each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-005-5 Table R2 – Interactive Remote Access Management* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-005-5 Table R2 – Interactive Remote Access Management			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.1	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCA 	<p>Utilize an Intermediate System such that the Cyber Asset initiating Interactive Remote Access does not directly access an applicable Cyber Asset.</p>	<p>Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, network diagrams or architecture documents.</p>
2.2	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCA 	<p>For all Interactive Remote Access sessions, utilize encryption that terminates at an Intermediate System.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, architecture documents detailing where encryption initiates and terminates.</p>

CIP-005-5 Table R2 – Interactive Remote Access Management			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.3	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCA 	<p>Require multi-factor authentication for all Interactive Remote Access sessions.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, architecture documents detailing the authentication factors used.</p> <p>Examples of authenticators may include, but are not limited to,</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Something the individual knows such as passwords or PINs. This does not include User ID; • Something the individual has such as tokens, digital certificates, or smart cards; or • Something the individual is such as fingerprints, iris scans, or other biometric characteristics.

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process:

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority:

The Regional Entity shall serve as the Compliance Enforcement Authority (“CEA”) unless the applicable entity is owned, operated, or controlled by the Regional Entity. In such cases the ERO or a Regional Entity approved by FERC or other applicable governmental authority shall serve as the CEA.

1.2. Evidence Retention:

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the CEA may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Responsible Entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its CEA to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

- Each Responsible Entity shall retain evidence of each requirement in this standard for three calendar years.
- If a Responsible Entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.
- The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes:

- Compliance Audit
- Self-Certification
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Investigation
- Self-Reporting
- Complaint

1.4. Additional Compliance Information:

- None

2. Table of Compliance Elements

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-005-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1	Operations Planning and Same Day Operations	Medium			<p>The Responsible Entity did not have a method for detecting malicious communications for both inbound and outbound communications. (1.5)</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity did not document one or more processes for CIP-005-5 Table R1 – Electronic Security Perimeter. (R1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not have all applicable Cyber Assets connected to a network via a routable protocol within a defined Electronic Security Perimeter (ESP). (1.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>External Routable Connectivity through the ESP was not through an identified EAP. (1.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not require inbound and</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-005-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						outbound access permissions and deny all other access by default. (1.3) OR The Responsible Entity did not perform authentication when establishing dial-up connectivity with the applicable Cyber Assets, where technically feasible. (1.4)
R2	Operations Planning and Same Day Operations	Medium	The Responsible Entity does not have documented processes for one or more of the applicable items for Requirement Parts 2.1 through 2.3.	The Responsible Entity did not implement processes for one of the applicable items for Requirement Parts 2.1 through 2.3.	The Responsible Entity did not implement processes for two of the applicable items for Requirement Parts 2.1 through 2.3.	The Responsible Entity did not implement processes for three of the applicable items for Requirement Parts 2.1 through 2.3.

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. Associated Documents

None.

Guidelines and Technical Basis

Section 4 – Scope of Applicability of the CIP Cyber Security Standards

Section “4. Applicability” of the standards provides important information for Responsible Entities to determine the scope of the applicability of the CIP Cyber Security Requirements.

Section “4.1. Functional Entities” is a list of NERC functional entities to which the standard applies. If the entity is registered as one or more of the functional entities listed in Section 4.1, then the NERC CIP Cyber Security Standards apply. Note that there is a qualification in Section 4.1 that restricts the applicability in the case of Distribution Providers to only those that own certain types of systems and equipment listed in 4.2. Furthermore,

Section “4.2. Facilities” defines the scope of the Facilities, systems, and equipment owned by the Responsible Entity, as qualified in Section 4.1, that is subject to the requirements of the standard. As specified in the exemption section 4.2.3.5, this standard does not apply to Responsible Entities that do not have High Impact or Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems under CIP-002-5’s categorization. In addition to the set of BES Facilities, Control Centers, and other systems and equipment, the list includes the set of systems and equipment owned by Distribution Providers. While the NERC Glossary term “Facilities” already includes the BES characteristic, the additional use of the term BES here is meant to reinforce the scope of applicability of these Facilities where it is used, especially in this applicability scoping section. This in effect sets the scope of Facilities, systems, and equipment that is subject to the standards.

Requirement R1:

CIP-005-5, Requirement R1 requires segmenting of BES Cyber Systems from other systems of differing trust levels by requiring controlled Electronic Access Points between the different trust zones. Electronic Security Perimeters are also used as a primary defense layer for some BES Cyber Systems that may not inherently have sufficient cyber security functionality, such as devices that lack authentication capability.

All applicable BES Cyber Systems that are connected to a network via a routable protocol must have a defined Electronic Security Perimeter (ESP). Even standalone networks that have no external connectivity to other networks must have a defined ESP. The ESP defines a zone of protection around the BES Cyber System, and it also provides clarity for entities to determine what systems or Cyber Assets are in scope and what requirements they must meet. The ESP is used in:

- Defining the scope of ‘Associated Protected Cyber Assets’ that must also meet certain CIP requirements.
- Defining the boundary in which all of the Cyber Assets must meet the requirements of the highest impact BES Cyber System that is in the zone (the ‘high water mark’).

The CIP Cyber Security Standards do not require network segmentation of BES Cyber Systems by impact classification. Many different impact classifications can be mixed within an ESP. However, all of the Cyber Assets and BES Cyber Systems within the ESP must be protected at the level of the highest impact BES Cyber System present in the ESP (i.e., the “high water mark”) where the term “Protected Cyber Assets” is used. The CIP Cyber Security Standards accomplish the “high water mark” by associating all other Cyber Assets within the ESP, even other BES Cyber Systems of lesser impact, as “Protected Cyber Assets” of the highest impact system in the ESP.

For example, if an ESP contains both a high impact BES Cyber System and a low impact BES Cyber System, each Cyber Asset of the low impact BES Cyber System is an “Associated Protected Cyber Asset” of the high impact BES Cyber System and must meet all requirements with that designation in the applicability columns of the requirement tables.

If there is routable connectivity across the ESP into any Cyber Asset, then an Electronic Access Point (EAP) must control traffic into and out of the ESP. Responsible Entities should know what traffic needs to cross an EAP and document those reasons to ensure the EAPs limit the traffic to only those known communication needs. These include, but are not limited to, communications needed for normal operations, emergency operations, support, maintenance, and troubleshooting.

The EAP should control both inbound and outbound traffic. The standard added outbound traffic control, as it is a prime indicator of compromise and a first level of defense against zero day vulnerability-based attacks. If Cyber Assets within the ESP become compromised and attempt to communicate to unknown hosts outside the ESP (usually ‘command and control’ hosts on the Internet, or compromised ‘jump hosts’ within the Responsible Entity’s other networks acting as intermediaries), the EAPs should function as a first level of defense in stopping the exploit. This does not limit the Responsible Entity from controlling outbound traffic at the level of granularity that it deems appropriate, and large ranges of internal addresses may be allowed. The SDT’s intent is that the Responsible Entity knows what other Cyber Assets or ranges of addresses a BES Cyber System needs to communicate with and limits the communications to that known range. For example, most BES Cyber Systems within a Responsible Entity should not have the ability to communicate through an EAP to any network address in the world, but should probably be at least limited to the address space of the

Responsible Entity, and preferably to individual subnet ranges or individual hosts within the Responsible Entity's address space. The SDT's intent is not for Responsible Entities to document the inner workings of stateful firewalls, where connections initiated in one direction are allowed a return path. The intent is to know and document what systems can talk to what other systems or ranges of systems on the other side of the EAP, such that rogue connections can be detected and blocked.

This requirement applies only to communications for which access lists and 'deny by default' type requirements can be universally applied, which today are those that employ routable protocols. Direct serial, non-routable connections are not included as there is no perimeter or firewall type security that should be universally mandated across all entities and all serial communication situations. There is no firewall or perimeter capability for an RS232 cable run between two Cyber Assets. Without a clear 'perimeter type' security control that can be applied in practically every circumstance, such a requirement would mostly generate technical feasibility exceptions ("TFEs") rather than increased security.

As for dial-up connectivity, the Standard Drafting Team's intent of this requirement is to prevent situations where only a phone number can establish direct connectivity to the BES Cyber Asset. If a dial-up modem is implemented in such a way that it simply answers the phone and connects the line to the BES Cyber Asset with no authentication of the calling party, it is a vulnerability to the BES Cyber System. The requirement calls for some form of authentication of the calling party before completing the connection to the BES Cyber System. Some examples of acceptable methods include dial-back modems, modems that must be remotely enabled or powered up, and modems that are only powered on by onsite personnel when needed along with policy that states they are disabled after use. If the dial-up connectivity is used for Interactive Remote Access, then Requirement R2 also applies.

The standard adds a requirement to detect malicious communications for Control Centers. This is in response to FERC Order No. 706, Paragraphs 496-503, where ESPs are required to have two distinct security measures such that the BES Cyber Systems do not lose all perimeter protection if one measure fails or is misconfigured. The Order makes clear that this is not simply redundancy of firewalls, thus the SDT has decided to add the security measure of malicious traffic inspection as a requirement for these ESPs. Technologies meeting this requirement include Intrusion Detection or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS) or other forms of deep packet inspection. These technologies go beyond source/destination/port rule sets and thus provide another distinct security measure at the ESP.

Requirement R2:

See Secure Remote Access Reference Document (see remote access alert).

Rationale:

During the development of this standard, references to prior versions of the CIP standards and rationale for the requirements and their parts were embedded within the standard. Upon BOT approval, that information was moved to this section.

Rationale for R1:

The Electronic Security Perimeter (“ESP”) serves to control traffic at the external electronic boundary of the BES Cyber System. It provides a first layer of defense for network based attacks as it limits reconnaissance of targets, restricts and prohibits traffic to a specified rule set, and assists in containing any successful attacks.

Summary of Changes: CIP-005, Requirement R1 has taken more of a focus on the discrete Electronic Access Points, rather than the logical “perimeter.”

CIP-005 (V1 through V4), Requirement R1.2 has been deleted from V5. This requirement was definitional in nature and used to bring dial-up modems using non-routable protocols into the scope of CIP-005. The non-routable protocol exclusion no longer exists as a blanket CIP-002 filter for applicability in V5, therefore there is no need for this requirement.

CIP-005 (V1 through V4), Requirement R1.1 and R1.3 were also definitional in nature and have been deleted from V5 as separate requirements but the concepts were integrated into the definitions of ESP and Electronic Access Point (“EAP”).

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.1) CIP-005-4, R1

Change Rationale: (Part 1.1)

Explicitly clarifies that BES Cyber Assets connected via routable protocol must be in an Electronic Security Perimeter.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.2) CIP-005-4, R1

Change Rationale: (Part 1.2)

Changed to refer to the defined term Electronic Access Point and BES Cyber System.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.3) CIP-005-4, R2.1

Change Rationale: (Part 1.3)

Changed to refer to the defined term Electronic Access Point and to focus on the entity knowing and having a reason for what it allows through the EAP in both inbound and outbound directions.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.4) CIP-005-4, R2.3

Change Rationale: (Part 1.4)

Added clarification that dial-up connectivity should perform authentication so that the BES Cyber System is not directly accessible with a phone number only.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.5) CIP-005-4, R1

Change Rationale: (Part 1.5)

Per FERC Order No. 706, Paragraphs 496-503, ESPs need two distinct security measures such that the Cyber Assets do not lose all perimeter protection if one measure fails or is misconfigured. The Order makes clear this is not simple redundancy of firewalls, thus the SDT has decided to add the security measure of malicious traffic inspection as a requirement for these ESPs.

Rationale for R2:

Registered Entities use Interactive Remote Access to access Cyber Assets to support and maintain control systems networks. Discovery and announcement of vulnerabilities for remote access methods and technologies, that were previously thought secure and in use by a number of electric sector entities, necessitate changes to industry security control standards. Currently, no requirements are in effect for management of secure remote access to Cyber Assets to be afforded the NERC CIP protective measures. Inadequate safeguards for remote access can allow unauthorized access to the organization's network, with potentially serious consequences. Additional information is provided in **Guidance for Secure Interactive Remote Access** published by NERC in July 2011.

Remote access control procedures must provide adequate safeguards through robust identification, authentication and encryption techniques. Remote access to the organization's network and resources will only be permitted providing that authorized users are authenticated, data is encrypted across the network, and privileges are restricted.

The Intermediate System serves as a proxy for the remote user. Rather than allowing all the protocols the user might need to access Cyber Assets inside the Electronic Security Perimeter to traverse from the Electronic Security Perimeter to the remote computer, only the protocol required for remotely controlling the jump host is required. This allows the firewall rules to be much more restrictive than if the remote computer was allowed to connect to Cyber Assets within the Electronic Security Perimeter directly. The use of an Intermediate System also protects the Cyber Asset from vulnerabilities on the remote computer.

The use of multi-factor authentication provides an added layer of security. Passwords can be guessed, stolen, hijacked, found, or given away. They are subject to automated attacks including brute force attacks, in which possible passwords are tried until the password is found, or dictionary attacks, where words and word combinations are tested as possible passwords. But if a password or PIN must be supplied along with a one-time password supplied by a token, a fingerprint, or some other factor, the password is of no value unless the other factor(s) used for authentication are acquired along with it.

Encryption is used to protect the data that is sent between the remote computer and the Intermediate System. Data encryption is important for anyone who wants or needs secure data transfer. Encryption is needed when there is a risk of unauthorized interception of transmissions on the communications link. This is especially important when using the Internet as the communication means.

Summary of Changes: This is a new requirement to continue the efforts of the Urgent Action team for Project 2010-15: Expedited Revisions to CIP-005-3.

Reference to prior version: (Part 2.1) New

Change Rationale: (Part 2.1)

This is a new requirement to continue the efforts of the Urgent Action team for Project 2010-15: Expedited Revisions to CIP-005-3.

Reference to prior version: (Part 2.2) CIP-007-5, R3.1

Change Rationale: (Part 2.2)

This is a new requirement to continue the efforts of the Urgent Action team for Project 2010-15: Expedited Revisions to CIP-005-3. The purpose of this part is to protect the confidentiality and integrity of each Interactive Remote Access session.

Reference to prior version: (Part 2.3) CIP-007-5, R3.2

Change Rationale: (Part 2.3)

This is a new requirement to continue the efforts of the Urgent Action team for Project 2010-15: Expedited Revisions to CIP-005-3. The multi-factor authentication methods are also the same as those identified in the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12), issued August 12, 2007.

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	1/16/06	R3.2 — Change “Control Center” to “control center.”	3/24/06
2	9/30/09	Modifications to clarify the requirements and to bring the compliance elements into conformance with the latest guidelines for developing compliance elements of standards. Removal of reasonable business judgment. Replaced the RRO with the RE as a responsible entity. Rewording of Effective Date. Changed compliance monitor to Compliance Enforcement Authority.	
3	12/16/09	Updated version number from -2 to -3 Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees.	
3	3/31/10	Approved by FERC.	
4	12/30/10	Modified to add specific criteria for Critical Asset identification.	Update
4	1/24/11	Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Update
5	11/26/12	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Modified to coordinate with other CIP standards and to revise format to use RBS Template.
5	11/22/13	FERC Order issued approving CIP-005-5. (Order becomes effective on 2/3/14.)	

This appendix establishes specific provisions for the application of the standard in Québec. Provisions of the standard and of its appendix must be read together for the purposes of understanding and interpretation. Where the standard and appendix differ, the appendix shall prevail.

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Cyber Security — Electronic Security Perimeter(s)
2. **Number:** CIP-005-5
3. **Purpose:** No specific provision
4. **Applicability:**

Functional Entities

No specific provision

Facilities

This standard only applies to the facilities of the Main Transmission System (RTP) and to the facilities specified for the Distribution Provider. In application of this standard, any reference to the terms "Bulk Electric System" or "BES" shall be replaced by the terms "Main Transmission System" or "RTP" respectively.

Additional Exemptions

The following are exempt from this standard:

- Generating facilities with a nameplate capacity of 300 MVA or less, unless the facility comprises one or more units that can be synchronized with neighboring systems.
- Step-up substations of generating facilities identified in the preceding point.

5. **Effective Date:**
 - 5.1. Adoption of the standard by the Régie de l'énergie: Month xx 201x
 - 5.2. Adoption of the appendix by the Régie de l'énergie: Month xx 201x
 - 5.3. Effective date of the standard and its appendix in Québec: Month xx 201x
6. **Background:** No specific provision

B. Requirements and Measures

No specific provision

C. Compliance

1. **Compliance Monitoring Process**
 - 1.1. **Compliance Enforcement Authority**

The Régie de l'énergie is responsible, in Québec, for compliance enforcement with respect to the reliability standard and its appendix that it adopts.

1.2. Evidence Retention

No specific provision

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes

No specific provision

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

No specific provision

2. Table of Compliance Elements

No specific provision

D. Regional Variances

No specific provision

E. Interpretations

No specific provision

F. Associated Documents

No specific provision

Guidelines and Technical Basis

No specific provision

Rationale

No specific provision

Revision History

Revision	Adoption Date	Action	Change Tracking
0	Xx month 201x	New appendix	New

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Cyber Security — Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems
2. **Number:** CIP-006-5
3. **Purpose:** To manage physical access to BES Cyber Systems by specifying a physical security plan in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the BES.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. **Functional Entities:** For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of functional entities will be collectively referred to as “Responsible Entities.” For requirements in this standard where a specific functional entity or subset of functional entities are the applicable entity or entities, the functional entity or entities are specified explicitly.
 - 4.1.1 **Balancing Authority**
 - 4.1.2 **Distribution Provider** that owns one or more of the following Facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the BES:
 - 4.1.2.1 Each underfrequency Load shedding (UFLS) or undervoltage Load shedding (UVLS) system that:
 - 4.1.2.1.1 is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and
 - 4.1.2.1.2 performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.
 - 4.1.2.2 Each Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme where the Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - 4.1.2.3 Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - 4.1.2.4 Each Cranking Path and group of Elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a Blackstart Resource up to and including the first interconnection point of the starting station service of the next generation unit(s) to be started.
 - 4.1.3 **Generator Operator**
 - 4.1.4 **Generator Owner**
 - 4.1.5 **Interchange Coordinator or Interchange Authority**
 - 4.1.6 **Reliability Coordinator**

4.1.7 Transmission Operator

4.1.8 Transmission Owner

4.2. Facilities: For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following Facilities, systems, and equipment owned by each Responsible Entity in 4.1 above are those to which these requirements are applicable. For requirements in this standard where a specific type of Facilities, system, or equipment or subset of Facilities, systems, and equipment are applicable, these are specified explicitly.

4.2.1 Distribution Provider: One or more of the following Facilities, systems and equipment owned by the Distribution Provider for the protection or restoration of the BES:

4.2.1.1 Each UFLS or UVLS System that:

4.2.1.1.1 is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and

4.2.1.1.2 performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.

4.2.1.2 Each Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme where the Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.

4.2.1.3 Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.

4.2.1.4 Each Cranking Path and group of Elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a Blackstart Resource up to and including the first interconnection point of the starting station service of the next generation unit(s) to be started.

4.2.2 Responsible Entities listed in 4.1 other than Distribution Providers:

All BES Facilities.

4.2.3 Exemptions: The following are exempt from Standard CIP-006-5:

4.2.3.1 Cyber Assets at Facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.

4.2.3.2 Cyber Assets associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete Electronic Security Perimeters.

4.2.3.3 The systems, structures, and components that are regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under a cyber security plan pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Section 73.54.

4.2.3.4 For Distribution Providers, the systems and equipment that are not included in section 4.2.1 above.

4.2.3.5 Responsible Entities that identify that they have no BES Cyber Systems categorized as high impact or medium impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.

5. Effective Dates:

1. **24 Months Minimum** – CIP-006-5 shall become effective on the later of July 1, 2015, or the first calendar day of the ninth calendar quarter after the effective date of the order providing applicable regulatory approval.
2. In those jurisdictions where no regulatory approval is required, CIP-006-5 shall become effective on the first day of the ninth calendar quarter following Board of Trustees’ approval, or as otherwise made effective pursuant to the laws applicable to such ERO governmental authorities.

6. Background:

Standard CIP-006-5 exists as part of a suite of CIP Standards related to cyber security. CIP-002-5 requires the initial identification and categorization of BES Cyber Systems. CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1 require a minimum level of organizational, operational and procedural controls to mitigate risk to BES Cyber Systems. This suite of CIP Standards is referred to as the *Version 5 CIP Cyber Security Standards*.

Most requirements open with, “*Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented [processes, plan, etc] that include the applicable items in [Table Reference].*” The referenced table requires the applicable items in the procedures for the requirement’s common subject matter.

The SDT has incorporated within this standard a recognition that certain requirements should not focus on individual instances of failure as a sole basis for violating the standard. In particular, the SDT has incorporated an approach to empower and enable the industry to identify, assess, and correct deficiencies in the implementation of certain requirements. The intent is to change the basis of a violation in those requirements so that they are not focused on *whether* there is a deficiency, but on identifying, assessing, and correcting deficiencies. It is presented in those requirements by modifying “implement” as follows:

Each Responsible Entity shall implement, **in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, . . .**

The term *documented processes* refers to a set of required instructions specific to the Responsible Entity and to achieve a specific outcome. This term does not imply any particular naming or approval structure beyond what is stated in the requirements. An entity should include as much as it believes necessary in their documented processes, but they must address the applicable requirements in the table. The

documented processes themselves are not required to include the “. . . identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, . . .” elements described in the preceding paragraph, as those aspects are related to the manner of implementation of the documented processes and could be accomplished through other controls or compliance management activities.

The terms *program* and *plan* are sometimes used in place of *documented processes* where it makes sense and is commonly understood. For example, documented processes describing a response are typically referred to as *plans* (i.e., incident response plans and recovery plans). Likewise, a security plan can describe an approach involving multiple procedures to address a broad subject matter.

Similarly, the term *program* may refer to the organization’s overall implementation of its policies, plans and procedures involving a subject matter. Examples in the standards include the personnel risk assessment program and the personnel training program. The full implementation of the CIP Cyber Security Standards could also be referred to as a program. However, the terms *program* and *plan* do not imply any additional requirements beyond what is stated in the standards.

Responsible Entities can implement common controls that meet requirements for multiple high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems. For example, a single training program could meet the requirements for training personnel across multiple BES Cyber Systems.

Measures for the initial requirement are simply the documented processes themselves. Measures in the table rows provide examples of evidence to show documentation and implementation of applicable items in the documented processes. These measures serve to provide guidance to entities in acceptable records of compliance and should not be viewed as an all-inclusive list.

Throughout the standards, unless otherwise stated, bulleted items in the requirements and measures are items that are linked with an “or,” and numbered items are items that are linked with an “and.”

Many references in the Applicability section use a threshold of 300 MW for UFLS and UVLS. This particular threshold of 300 MW for UVLS and UFLS was provided in Version 1 of the CIP Cyber Security Standards. The threshold remains at 300 MW since it is specifically addressing UVLS and UFLS, which are last ditch efforts to save the Bulk Electric System. A review of UFLS tolerances defined within regional reliability standards for UFLS program requirements to date indicates that the historical value of 300 MW represents an adequate and reasonable threshold value for allowable UFLS operational tolerances.

“Applicable Systems” Columns in Tables:

Each table has an “Applicable Systems” column to further define the scope of systems to which a specific requirement row applies. The CSO706 SDT adapted this concept from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) Risk Management

Framework as a way of applying requirements more appropriately based on impact and connectivity characteristics. The following conventions are used in the “Applicable Systems” column as described.

- **High Impact BES Cyber Systems** – Applies to BES Cyber Systems categorized as high impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.
- **Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems** – Applies to BES Cyber Systems categorized as medium impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.
- **Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems without External Routable Connectivity** – Only applies to medium impact BES Cyber Systems without External Routable Connectivity.
- **Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity** – Only applies to medium impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity. This also excludes Cyber Assets in the BES Cyber System that cannot be directly accessed through External Routable Connectivity.
- **Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS)** – Applies to each Electronic Access Control or Monitoring System associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System. Examples may include, but are not limited to, firewalls, authentication servers, and log monitoring and alerting systems.
- **Physical Access Control Systems (PACS)** – Applies to each Physical Access Control System associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System.
- **Protected Cyber Assets (PCA)** – Applies to each Protected Cyber Asset associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System.
- **Locally mounted hardware or devices at the Physical Security Perimeter** – Applies to the locally mounted hardware or devices (e.g. such as motion sensors, electronic lock control mechanisms, and badge readers) at a Physical Security Perimeter associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System with External Routable Connectivity, and that does not contain or store access control information or independently perform access authentication. These hardware and devices are excluded in the definition of Physical Access Control Systems.

B. Requirements and Measures

- R1.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented physical security plans that collectively include all of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-006-5 Table R1 – Physical Security Plan*. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning and Same Day Operations].
- M1.** Evidence must include each of the documented physical security plans that collectively include all of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-006-5 Table R1 – Physical Security Plan* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation of the plan or plans as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-006-5 Table R1 – Physical Security Plan			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.1	<p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems without External Routable Connectivity</p> <p>Physical Access Control Systems (PACS) associated with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High Impact BES Cyber Systems, or • Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity 	Define operational or procedural controls to restrict physical access.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation that operational or procedural controls exist.

CIP-006-5 Table R1 – Physical Security Plan			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.2	<p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PCA 	<p>Utilize at least one physical access control to allow unescorted physical access into each applicable Physical Security Perimeter to only those individuals who have authorized unescorted physical access.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, language in the physical security plan that describes each Physical Security Perimeter and how unescorted physical access is controlled by one or more different methods and proof that unescorted physical access is restricted to only authorized individuals, such as a list of authorized individuals accompanied by access logs.</p>

CIP-006-5 Table R1 – Physical Security Plan			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.3	High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PCA 	Where technically feasible, utilize two or more different physical access controls (this does not require two completely independent physical access control systems) to collectively allow unescorted physical access into Physical Security Perimeters to only those individuals who have authorized unescorted physical access.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, language in the physical security plan that describes the Physical Security Perimeters and how unescorted physical access is controlled by two or more different methods and proof that unescorted physical access is restricted to only authorized individuals, such as a list of authorized individuals accompanied by access logs.

CIP-006-5 Table R1– Physical Security Plan			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.4	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PCA 	<p>Monitor for unauthorized access through a physical access point into a Physical Security Perimeter.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation of controls that monitor for unauthorized access through a physical access point into a Physical Security Perimeter.</p>

CIP-006-5 Table R1– Physical Security Plan			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.5	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PCA 	<p>Issue an alarm or alert in response to detected unauthorized access through a physical access point into a Physical Security Perimeter to the personnel identified in the BES Cyber Security Incident response plan within 15 minutes of detection.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, language in the physical security plan that describes the issuance of an alarm or alert in response to unauthorized access through a physical access control into a Physical Security Perimeter and additional evidence that the alarm or alert was issued and communicated as identified in the BES Cyber Security Incident Response Plan, such as manual or electronic alarm or alert logs, cell phone or pager logs, or other evidence that documents that the alarm or alert was generated and communicated.</p>
1.6	<p>Physical Access Control Systems (PACS) associated with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High Impact BES Cyber Systems, or • Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity 	<p>Monitor each Physical Access Control System for unauthorized physical access to a Physical Access Control System.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation of controls that monitor for unauthorized physical access to a PACS.</p>

CIP-006-5 Table R1– Physical Security Plan			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.7	Physical Access Control Systems (PACS) associated with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High Impact BES Cyber Systems, or • Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity 	Issue an alarm or alert in response to detected unauthorized physical access to a Physical Access Control System to the personnel identified in the BES Cyber Security Incident response plan within 15 minutes of the detection.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, language in the physical security plan that describes the issuance of an alarm or alert in response to unauthorized physical access to Physical Access Control Systems and additional evidence that the alarm or alerts was issued and communicated as identified in the BES Cyber Security Incident Response Plan, such as alarm or alert logs, cell phone or pager logs, or other evidence that the alarm or alert was generated and communicated.

CIP-006-5 Table R1 – Physical Security Plan			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.8	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PCA 	<p>Log (through automated means or by personnel who control entry) entry of each individual with authorized unescorted physical access into each Physical Security Perimeter, with information to identify the individual and date and time of entry.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, language in the physical security plan that describes logging and recording of physical entry into each Physical Security Perimeter and additional evidence to demonstrate that this logging has been implemented, such as logs of physical access into Physical Security Perimeters that show the individual and the date and time of entry into Physical Security Perimeter.</p>

CIP-006-5 Table R1 – Physical Security Plan			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.9	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PCA 	<p>Retain physical access logs of entry of individuals with authorized unescorted physical access into each Physical Security Perimeter for at least ninety calendar days.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated documentation such as logs of physical access into Physical Security Perimeters that show the date and time of entry into Physical Security Perimeter.</p>

R2. Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented visitor control programs that include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-006-5 Table R2 – Visitor Control Program*. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Same Day Operations.]

M2. Evidence must include one or more documented visitor control programs that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-006-5 Table R2 – Visitor Control Program* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-006-5 Table R2 – Visitor Control Program			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.1	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PCA 	<p>Require continuous escorted access of visitors (individuals who are provided access but are not authorized for unescorted physical access) within each Physical Security Perimeter, except during CIP Exceptional Circumstances.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, language in a visitor control program that requires continuous escorted access of visitors within Physical Security Perimeters and additional evidence to demonstrate that the process was implemented, such as visitor logs.</p>

CIP-006-5 Table R2 – Visitor Control Program			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.2	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PCA 	<p>Require manual or automated logging of visitor entry into and exit from the Physical Security Perimeter that includes date and time of the initial entry and last exit, the visitor’s name, and the name of an individual point of contact responsible for the visitor, except during CIP Exceptional Circumstances.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, language in a visitor control program that requires continuous escorted access of visitors within Physical Security Perimeters and additional evidence to demonstrate that the process was implemented, such as dated visitor logs that include the required information.</p>
2.3	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PCA 	<p>Retain visitor logs for at least ninety calendar days.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation showing logs have been retained for at least ninety calendar days.</p>

- R3.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented Physical Access Control System maintenance and testing programs that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-006-5 Table R3 – Maintenance and Testing Program*. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning].
- M3.** Evidence must include each of the documented Physical Access Control System maintenance and testing programs that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-006-5 Table R3 – Maintenance and Testing Program* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-006-5 Table R3 – Physical Access Control System Maintenance and Testing Program			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirement	Measures
3.1	<p>Physical Access Control Systems (PACS) associated with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High Impact BES Cyber Systems, or • Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity <p>Locally mounted hardware or devices at the Physical Security Perimeter associated with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High Impact BES Cyber Systems, or • Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity 	<p>Maintenance and testing of each Physical Access Control System and locally mounted hardware or devices at the Physical Security Perimeter at least once every 24 calendar months to ensure they function properly.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a maintenance and testing program that provides for testing each Physical Access Control System and locally mounted hardware or devices associated with each applicable Physical Security Perimeter at least once every 24 calendar months and additional evidence to demonstrate that this testing was done, such as dated maintenance records, or other documentation showing testing and maintenance has been performed on each applicable device or system at least once every 24 calendar months.</p>

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process:

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority:

The Regional Entity shall serve as the Compliance Enforcement Authority (“CEA”) unless the applicable entity is owned, operated, or controlled by the Regional Entity. In such cases the ERO or a Regional Entity approved by FERC or other applicable governmental authority shall serve as the CEA.

1.2. Evidence Retention:

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the CEA may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Responsible Entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its CEA to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

- Each Responsible Entity shall retain evidence of each requirement in this standard for three calendar years.
- If a Responsible Entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.
- The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes:

- Compliance Audit
- Self-Certification
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Investigation
- Self-Reporting
- Complaint

1.4. Additional Compliance Information:

- None

2. Table of Compliance Elements

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-006-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1	Long Term Planning Same-Day Operations	Medium	<p>The Responsible Entity has a process to log authorized physical entry into any Physical Security Perimeter with sufficient information to identify the individual and date and time of entry and identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (1.8)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has a</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity has a process to alert for unauthorized physical access to Physical Access Control Systems and identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (1.7)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has a process to alert for unauthorized physical access to Physical Access Control Systems but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (1.7)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has a process to communicate alerts within 15 minutes to identified personnel and</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity has a process to alert for detected unauthorized access through a physical access point into a Physical security Perimeter and identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (1.5)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has a process to alert for detected unauthorized access through a physical access point into a Physical security Perimeter but did not identify, assess, or correct deficiencies. (1.5)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity did not document or implement operational or procedural controls to restrict physical access. (1.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity documented and implemented operational or procedural controls to restrict physical access and identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (1.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity documented and implemented operational or procedural controls to restrict physical access but did not identify,</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-006-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			process to log authorized physical entry into any Physical Security Perimeter with sufficient information to identify the individual and date and time of entry but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (1.8) OR The Responsible Entity has a process to retain physical access logs for 90 calendar days and identified	identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (1.7) OR The Responsible Entity has a process to communicate alerts within 15 minutes to identified personnel but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (1.7)	has a process to communicate alerts within 15 minutes to identified personnel and identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (1.5) OR The Responsible Entity has a process to communicate alerts within 15 minutes to identified personnel but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (1.5) OR The Responsible Entity has a process to monitor for unauthorized physical access to a Physical Access Control Systems and identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the	assess, or correct the deficiencies. (1.1) OR The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented physical access controls, but at least one control does not exist to restrict access to Applicable Systems. (1.2) OR The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented physical access controls, restricts access to Applicable Systems using at least one control, and identified deficiencies, but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (1.2) OR The Responsible Entity has documented and

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-006-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (1.9) OR The Responsible Entity has a process to retain physical access logs for 90 calendar days but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (1.9)		deficiencies. (1.6) OR The Responsible Entity has a process to monitor for unauthorized physical access to a Physical Access Control Systems but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (1.6)	implemented physical access controls, restricts access to Applicable Systems using at least one control, but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (1.2) OR The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented physical access controls, but at least two different controls do not exist to restrict access to Applicable Systems. (1.3) OR The Responsible Entity documented and implemented operational or procedural controls, restricts access to Applicable Systems using at least two

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-006-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						<p>different controls, and identified deficiencies, but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (1.3)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity documented and implemented operational or procedural controls, restricts access to Applicable Systems using at least two different controls, but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (1.3)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity does not have a process to monitor for unauthorized access through a physical access point into a Physical Security</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-006-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						Perimeter. (1.4) OR The Responsible Entity has a process to monitor for unauthorized access through a physical access point into a Physical Security Perimeter and identified deficiencies, but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (1.4) OR The Responsible Entity has a process to monitor for unauthorized access through a physical access point into a Physical Security Perimeter, but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (1.4) OR

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-006-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						<p>The Responsible Entity does not have a process to alert for detected unauthorized access through a physical access point into a Physical security Perimeter or to communicate such alerts within 15 minutes to identified personnel. (1.5)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity does not have a process to monitor each Physical Access Control System for unauthorized physical access to a Physical Access Control Systems. (1.6)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity does not have a process to alert for unauthorized physical access to Physical</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-006-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						<p>Access Control Systems or to communicate such alerts within 15 minutes to identified personnel (1.7)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity does not have a process to log authorized physical entry into each Physical Security Perimeter with sufficient information to identify the individual and date and time of entry. (1.8)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity does not have a process to retain physical access logs for 90 calendar days. (1.9)</p>
R2	Same-Day Operations	Medium	N/A	The Responsible Entity included a visitor control program that requires logging of each	The Responsible Entity included a visitor control program that requires continuous	The Responsible Entity has failed to include or implement a visitor control program that

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-006-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
				<p>of the initial entry and last exit dates and times of the visitor, the visitor’s name, and the point of contact and identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (2.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity included a visitor control program that requires logging of the initial entry and last exit dates and times of the visitor, the visitor’s name, and the point of contact and but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (2.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity included a visitor control program to retain visitor logs for at</p>	<p>escorted access of visitors within any Physical Security Perimeter, and identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct deficiencies. (2.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity included a visitor control program that requires continuous escorted access of visitors within any Physical Security Perimeter but did not identify, assess, or correct deficiencies. (2.1)</p>	<p>requires continuous escorted access of visitors within any Physical Security Perimeter. (2.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has failed to include or implement a visitor control program that requires logging of the initial entry and last exit dates and times of the visitor, the visitor’s name, and the point of contact. (2.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to include or implement a visitor control program to retain visitor logs for at least ninety days. (2.3)</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-006-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
				least ninety days and identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (2.3) OR The Responsible Entity included a visitor control program to retain visitor logs for at least ninety days but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (2.3)		
R3	Long Term Planning	Medium	The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented a maintenance and testing program for Physical Access Control Systems and locally	The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented a maintenance and testing program for Physical Access Control Systems and locally mounted hardware or devices at the Physical Security Perimeter, but did not complete required testing within 25 calendar months but	The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented a maintenance and testing program for Physical Access Control Systems and locally mounted hardware or devices at the Physical Security Perimeter, but did not complete required testing within 26 calendar months but	The Responsible Entity has not documented and implemented a maintenance and testing program for Physical Access Control Systems and locally mounted hardware or devices at the Physical Security Perimeter. (3.1) OR The Responsible Entity

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-006-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			mounted hardware or devices at the Physical Security Perimeter, but did not complete required testing within 24 calendar months but did complete required testing within 25 calendar months. (3.1)	did complete required testing within 26 calendar months. (3.1)	did complete required testing within 27 calendar months. (3.1)	has documented and implemented a maintenance and testing program for Physical Access Control Systems and locally mounted hardware or devices at the Physical Security Perimeter, but did not complete required testing within 27 calendar months. (3.1)

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. Associated Documents

None.

Guidelines and Technical Basis

Section 4 – Scope of Applicability of the CIP Cyber Security Standards

Section “4. Applicability” of the standards provides important information for Responsible Entities to determine the scope of the applicability of the CIP Cyber Security Requirements.

Section “4.1. Functional Entities” is a list of NERC functional entities to which the standard applies. If the entity is registered as one or more of the functional entities listed in Section 4.1, then the NERC CIP Cyber Security Standards apply. Note that there is a qualification in Section 4.1 that restricts the applicability in the case of Distribution Providers to only those that own certain types of systems and equipment listed in 4.2. Furthermore,

Section “4.2. Facilities” defines the scope of the Facilities, systems, and equipment owned by the Responsible Entity, as qualified in Section 4.1, that is subject to the requirements of the standard. As specified in the exemption section 4.2.3.5, this standard does not apply to Responsible Entities that do not have High Impact or Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems under CIP-002-5’s categorization. In addition to the set of BES Facilities, Control Centers, and other systems and equipment, the list includes the set of systems and equipment owned by Distribution Providers. While the NERC Glossary term “Facilities” already includes the BES characteristic, the additional use of the term BES here is meant to reinforce the scope of applicability of these Facilities where it is used, especially in this applicability scoping section. This in effect sets the scope of Facilities, systems, and equipment that is subject to the standards.

General:

While the focus is shifted from the definition and management of a completely enclosed “six-wall” boundary, it is expected in many instances this will remain a primary mechanism for controlling, alerting, and logging access to BES Cyber Systems. Taken together, these controls will effectively constitute the physical security plan to manage physical access to BES Cyber Systems.

Requirement R1:

Methods of physical access control include:

- Card Key: A means of electronic access where the access rights of the card holder are predefined in a computer database. Access rights may differ from one perimeter to another.
- Special Locks: These include, but are not limited to, locks with “restricted key” systems, magnetic locks that can be operated remotely, and “man-trap” systems.
- Security Personnel: Personnel responsible for controlling physical access who may reside on-site or at a monitoring station.

- Other Authentication Devices: Biometric, keypad, token, or other equivalent devices that control physical access into the Physical Security Perimeter.

Methods to monitor physical access include:

- Alarm Systems: Systems that alarm to indicate interior motion or when a door, gate, or window has been opened without authorization. These alarms must provide for notification within 15 minutes to individuals responsible for response.
- Human Observation of Access Points: Monitoring of physical access points by security personnel who are also controlling physical access.

Methods to log physical access include:

- Computerized Logging: Electronic logs produced by the Responsible Entity's selected access control and alerting method.
- Video Recording: Electronic capture of video images of sufficient quality to determine identity.
- Manual Logging: A log book or sign-in sheet, or other record of physical access maintained by security or other personnel authorized to control and monitor physical access.

The FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 572, directive discussed utilizing two or more different and complementary physical access controls to provide defense in depth. It does not require two or more Physical Security Perimeters, nor does it exclude the use of layered perimeters. Use of two-factor authentication would be acceptable at the same entry points for a non-layered single perimeter. For example, a sole perimeter's controls could include either a combination of card key and pin code (something you know and something you have), or a card key and biometric scanner (something you have and something you are), or a physical key in combination with a guard-monitored remote camera and door release, where the "guard" has adequate information to authenticate the person they are observing or talking to prior to permitting access (something you have and something you are). The two-factor authentication could be implemented using a single Physical Access Control System but more than one authentication method must be utilized. For physically layered protection, a locked gate in combination with a locked control-building could be acceptable, provided no single authenticator (e.g., key or card key) would provide access through both.

Entities may choose for certain PACS to reside in a PSP controlling access to applicable BES Cyber Systems. For these PACS, there is no additional obligation to comply with Requirement Parts 1.1, 1.7 and 1.8 beyond what is already required for the PSP.

Requirement R2:

The logging of visitors should capture each visit of the individual and does not need to capture each entry or exit during that visit. This is meant to allow a visitor to temporarily exit the Physical Security Perimeter to obtain something they left in their vehicle or outside the area without requiring a new log entry for each and every entry during the visit.

The SDT also determined that a point of contact should be documented who can provide additional details about the visit if questions arise in the future. The point of contact could be the escort, but there is no need to document everyone that acted as an escort for the visitor.

Requirement R3:

This includes the testing of locally mounted hardware or devices used in controlling, alerting or logging access to the Physical Security Perimeter. This includes motion sensors, electronic lock control mechanisms, and badge readers which are not deemed to be part of the Physical Access Control System but are required for the protection of the BES Cyber Systems.

Rationale:

During the development of this standard, references to prior versions of the CIP standards and rationale for the requirements and their parts were embedded within the standard. Upon BOT approval, that information was moved to this section.

Rationale for R1:

Each Responsible Entity shall ensure that physical access to all BES Cyber Systems is restricted and appropriately managed. *Entities may choose for certain PACS to reside in a PSP controlling access to applicable BES Cyber Systems. For these PACS, there is no additional obligation to comply with Requirement Parts 1.1, 1.7 and 1.8 beyond what is already required for the PSP.*

Summary of Changes: The entire content of CIP-006-5 is intended to constitute a physical security program. This represents a change from previous versions, since there was no specific requirement to have a physical security program in previous versions of the standards, only requirements for physical security plans.

Added details to address FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 572, directives for physical security defense in depth.

Additional guidance on physical security defense in depth provided to address the directive in FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 575.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.1) *CIP-006-4c, R2.1 for Physical Access Control Systems New Requirement for Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems not having External Routable Connectivity*

Change Rationale: (Part 1.1)

To allow for programmatic protection controls as a baseline (which also includes how the entity plans to protect Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems that do not have External Routable Connectivity not otherwise covered under Part 1.2, and it does not require a detailed list of individuals with access). Physical Access Control Systems do not themselves need to be protected at the same level as required in Parts 1.2 through 1.5.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.2) CIP006-4c, R3 & R4

Change Rationale: (Part 1.2)

This requirement has been made more general to allow for alternate measures of restricting physical access. Specific examples of methods a Responsible Entity can take to restricting access to BES Cyber Systems has been moved to the Guidelines and Technical Basis section.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.3) CIP006-4c, R3 & R4

Change Rationale: (Part 1.3)

The specific examples that specify methods a Responsible Entity can take to restricting access to BES Cyber Systems has been moved to the Guidelines and Technical Basis section. This requirement has been made more general to allow for alternate measures of controlling physical access.

Added to address FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 572, related directives for physical security defense in depth.

FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 575, directives addressed by providing the examples in the guidance document of physical security defense in depth via multi-factor authentication or layered Physical Security Perimeter(s).

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.4) CIP006-4c, R5

Change Rationale: (Part 1.4)

Examples of monitoring methods have been moved to the Guidelines and Technical Basis section.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.5) CIP006-4c, R5

Change Rationale: (Part 1.5)

Examples of monitoring methods have been moved to the Guidelines and Technical Basis section.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.6) CIP006-4c, R5

Change Rationale: (Part 1.6)

Addresses the prior CIP-006-4c, Requirement R5 requirement for Physical Access Control Systems.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.7) CIP006-4c, R5

Change Rationale: (Part 1.7)

Addresses the prior CIP-006-4c, Requirement R5 requirement for Physical Access Control Systems.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.8) CIP-006-4c, R6

Change Rationale: (Part 1.8)

CIP-006-4c, Requirement R6 was specific to the logging of access at identified access points. This requirement more generally requires logging of authorized physical access into the Physical Security Perimeter.

Examples of logging methods have been moved to the Guidelines and Technical Basis section.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.9) CIP-006-4c, R7

Change Rationale: (Part 1.9)

No change.

Rationale for R2:

To control when personnel without authorized unescorted physical access can be in any Physical Security Perimeters protecting BES Cyber Systems or Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems, as applicable in Table R2.

Summary of Changes: Reformatted into table structure. Originally added in Version 3 per FERC Order issued September 30, 2009.

Reference to prior version: (Part 2.1) CIP-006-4c, R1.6.2

Change Rationale: (Part 2.1)

Added the ability to not do this during CIP Exceptional Circumstances.

Reference to prior version: (Part 2.2) CIP-006-4c R1.6.1

Change Rationale: (Part 2.2)

Added the ability to not do this during CIP Exceptional Circumstances, addressed multi-entry scenarios of the same person in a day (log first entry and last exit), and name of the person who is responsible or sponsor for the visitor. There is no requirement to document the escort or handoffs between escorts.

Reference to prior version: (Part 2.3) CIP-006-4c, R7

Change Rationale: (Part 2.3)

No change

Rationale for R3:

To ensure all Physical Access Control Systems and devices continue to function properly.

Summary of Changes: Reformatted into table structure.

Added details to address FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 581, directives to test more frequently than every three years.

Reference to prior version: (Part 3.1) CIP-006-4c, R8.1 and R8.2

Change Rationale: (Part 3.1)

Added details to address FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 581 directives to test more frequently than every three years. The SDT determined that annual testing was too often and agreed on two years.

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	1/16/06	R3.2 — Change “Control Center” to “control center.”	3/24/06
2	9/30/09	Modifications to clarify the requirements and to bring the compliance elements into conformance with the latest guidelines for developing compliance elements of standards. Removal of reasonable business judgment. Replaced the RRO with the RE as a responsible entity. Rewording of Effective Date. Changed compliance monitor to Compliance Enforcement Authority.	
3	12/16/09	Updated Version Number from -2 to -3 In Requirement 1.6, deleted the sentence pertaining to removing component or system from service in order to perform testing, in response to FERC order issued September 30, 2009.	
3	12/16/09	Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees.	
3	3/31/10	Approved by FERC.	
4	1/24/11	Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees.	
5	11/26/12	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Modified to coordinate with other CIP standards and to revise format to use RBS Template.

Guidelines and Technical Basis

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
5	11/22/13	FERC Order issued approving CIP-006-5.	
5	7/9/14	FERC Letter Order issued approving VRFs and VSLs revisions to certain CIP standards.	CIP-006-5 Requirement R3 changed from Lower to Medium.

This appendix establishes specific provisions for the application of the standard in Québec. Provisions of the standard and of its appendix must be read together for the purposes of understanding and interpretation. Where the standard and appendix differ, the appendix shall prevail.

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Cyber Security — Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems
2. **Number:** CIP-006-5
3. **Purpose:** No specific provision
4. **Applicability:**

Functional Entities

No specific provision

Facilities

This standard only applies to the facilities of the Main Transmission System (RTP) and to the facilities specified for the Distribution Provider. In application of this standard, any reference to the terms "Bulk Electric System" or "BES" shall be replaced by the terms "Main Transmission System" or "RTP" respectively.

Additional Exemptions

The following are exempt from this standard:

- Generating facilities with a nameplate capacity of 300 MVA or less, unless the facility comprises one or more units that can be synchronized with neighboring systems.
- Step-up substations of generating facilities identified in the preceding point.

5. **Effective Date:**

5.1. Adoption of the standard by the Régie de l'énergie: Month xx, 201x

5.2. Adoption of the appendix by the Régie de l'énergie: Month xx, 201x

5.3. Effective date of the standard and its appendix in Québec: Month xx, 201x

6. **Background:** No specific provision

B. Requirements and Measures

No specific provision

C. Compliance

1. **Compliance Monitoring Process**
 - 1.1. **Compliance Enforcement Authority**

The Régie de l'énergie is responsible, in Québec, for compliance enforcement with respect to the reliability standard and its appendix that it adopts.

1.2. Evidence Retention

No specific provision

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes

No specific provision

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

No specific provision

2. Table of Compliance Elements

No specific provision

D. Regional Variances

No specific provision

E. Interpretations

No specific provision

F. Associated Documents

No specific provision

Guidelines and Technical Basis

No specific provision

Rationale

No specific provision

Revision History

Revision	Adoption Date	Action	Change Tracking
0	Xx month 201x	New appendix	New

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Cyber Security — System Security Management
2. **Number:** CIP-007-5
3. **Purpose:** To manage system security by specifying select technical, operational, and procedural requirements in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the BES.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. **Functional Entities:** For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of functional entities will be collectively referred to as “Responsible Entities.” For requirements in this standard where a specific functional entity or subset of functional entities are the applicable entity or entities, the functional entity or entities are specified explicitly.
 - 4.1.1 **Balancing Authority**
 - 4.1.2 **Distribution Provider** that owns one or more of the following Facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the BES:
 - 4.1.2.1 Each underfrequency Load shedding (UFLS) or undervoltage Load shedding (UVLS) system that:
 - 4.1.2.1.1 is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and
 - 4.1.2.1.2 performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.
 - 4.1.2.2 Each Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme where the Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - 4.1.2.3 Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - 4.1.2.4 Each Cranking Path and group of Elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a Blackstart Resource up to and including the first interconnection point of the starting station service of the next generation unit(s) to be started.
 - 4.1.3 **Generator Operator**
 - 4.1.4 **Generator Owner**
 - 4.1.5 **Interchange Coordinator or Interchange Authority**
 - 4.1.6 **Reliability Coordinator**

4.1.7 Transmission Operator

4.1.8 Transmission Owner

4.2. Facilities: For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following Facilities, systems, and equipment owned by each Responsible Entity in 4.1 above are those to which these requirements are applicable. For requirements in this standard where a specific type of Facilities, system, or equipment or subset of Facilities, systems, and equipment are applicable, these are specified explicitly.

4.2.1 Distribution Provider: One or more of the following Facilities, systems and equipment owned by the Distribution Provider for the protection or restoration of the BES:

4.2.1.1 Each UFLS or UVLS System that:

4.2.1.1.1 is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and

4.2.1.1.2 performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.

4.2.1.2 Each Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme where the Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.

4.2.1.3 Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.

4.2.1.4 Each Cranking Path and group of Elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a Blackstart Resource up to and including the first interconnection point of the starting station service of the next generation unit(s) to be started.

4.2.2 Responsible Entities listed in 4.1 other than Distribution Providers:

All BES Facilities.

4.2.3 Exemptions: The following are exempt from Standard CIP-007-5:

4.2.3.1 Cyber Assets at Facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.

4.2.3.2 Cyber Assets associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete Electronic Security Perimeters.

4.2.3.3 The systems, structures, and components that are regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under a cyber security plan pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Section 73.54.

4.2.3.4 For Distribution Providers, the systems and equipment that are not included in section 4.2.1 above.

4.2.3.5 Responsible Entities that identify that they have no BES Cyber Systems categorized as high impact or medium impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.

5. Effective Dates:

1. **24 Months Minimum** – CIP-007-5 shall become effective on the later of July 1, 2015, or the first calendar day of the ninth calendar quarter after the effective date of the order providing applicable regulatory approval.
2. In those jurisdictions where no regulatory approval is required, CIP-007-5 shall become effective on the first day of the ninth calendar quarter following Board of Trustees' approval, or as otherwise made effective pursuant to the laws applicable to such ERO governmental authorities.

6. Background:

Standard CIP-007-5 exists as part of a suite of CIP Standards related to cyber security. CIP-002-5 requires the initial identification and categorization of BES Cyber Systems. CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1 require a minimum level of organizational, operational and procedural controls to mitigate risk to BES Cyber Systems. This suite of CIP Standards is referred to as the *Version 5 CIP Cyber Security Standards*.

Most requirements open with, “*Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented [processes, plan, etc] that include the applicable items in [Table Reference].*” The referenced table requires the applicable items in the procedures for the requirement’s common subject matter.

The SDT has incorporated within this standard a recognition that certain requirements should not focus on individual instances of failure as a sole basis for violating the standard. In particular, the SDT has incorporated an approach to empower and enable the industry to identify, assess, and correct deficiencies in the implementation of certain requirements. The intent is to change the basis of a violation in those requirements so that they are not focused on *whether* there is a deficiency, but on identifying, assessing, and correcting deficiencies. It is presented in those requirements by modifying “implement” as follows:

Each Responsible Entity shall implement, **in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, . . .**

The term *documented processes* refers to a set of required instructions specific to the Responsible Entity and to achieve a specific outcome. This term does not imply any particular naming or approval structure beyond what is stated in the requirements. An entity should include as much as it believes necessary in their documented processes, but they must address the applicable requirements in the table. The

documented processes themselves are not required to include the “. . . identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, . . .” elements described in the preceding paragraph, as those aspects are related to the manner of implementation of the documented processes and could be accomplished through other controls or compliance management activities.

The terms *program* and *plan* are sometimes used in place of *documented processes* where it makes sense and is commonly understood. For example, documented processes describing a response are typically referred to as *plans* (i.e., incident response plans and recovery plans). Likewise, a security plan can describe an approach involving multiple procedures to address a broad subject matter.

Similarly, the term *program* may refer to the organization’s overall implementation of its policies, plans and procedures involving a subject matter. Examples in the standards include the personnel risk assessment program and the personnel training program. The full implementation of the CIP Cyber Security Standards could also be referred to as a program. However, the terms *program* and *plan* do not imply any additional requirements beyond what is stated in the standards.

Responsible Entities can implement common controls that meet requirements for multiple high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems. For example, a single training program could meet the requirements for training personnel across multiple BES Cyber Systems.

Measures for the initial requirement are simply the documented processes themselves. Measures in the table rows provide examples of evidence to show documentation and implementation of applicable items in the documented processes. These measures serve to provide guidance to entities in acceptable records of compliance and should not be viewed as an all-inclusive list.

Throughout the standards, unless otherwise stated, bulleted items in the requirements and measures are items that are linked with an “or,” and numbered items are items that are linked with an “and.”

Many references in the Applicability section use a threshold of 300 MW for UFLS and UVLS. This particular threshold of 300 MW for UVLS and UFLS was provided in Version 1 of the CIP Cyber Security Standards. The threshold remains at 300 MW since it is specifically addressing UVLS and UFLS, which are last ditch efforts to save the Bulk Electric System. A review of UFLS tolerances defined within regional reliability standards for UFLS program requirements to date indicates that the historical value of 300 MW represents an adequate and reasonable threshold value for allowable UFLS operational tolerances.

“Applicable Systems” Columns in Tables:

Each table has an “Applicable Systems” column to further define the scope of systems to which a specific requirement row applies. The CSO706 SDT adapted this concept from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) Risk Management

Framework as a way of applying requirements more appropriately based on impact and connectivity characteristics. The following conventions are used in the “Applicable Systems” column as described.

- **High Impact BES Cyber Systems** – Applies to BES Cyber Systems categorized as high impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.
- **Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems** – Applies to BES Cyber Systems categorized as medium impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.
- **Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at Control Centers** – Only applies to medium impact BES Cyber Systems located at a Control Center.
- **Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity** – Only applies to medium impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity. This also excludes Cyber Assets in the BES Cyber System that cannot be directly accessed through External Routable Connectivity.
- **Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS)** – Applies to each Electronic Access Control or Monitoring System associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System in the applicability column. Examples may include, but are not limited to, firewalls, authentication servers, and log monitoring and alerting systems.
- **Physical Access Control Systems (PACS)** – Applies to each Physical Access Control System associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System.
- **Protected Cyber Assets (PCA)** – Applies to each Protected Cyber Asset associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System.

B. Requirements and Measures

- R1.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-007-5 Table R1 – Ports and Services*. [*Violation Risk Factor: Medium*] [*Time Horizon: Same Day Operations.*]
- M1.** Evidence must include the documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-007-5 Table R1 – Ports and Services* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-007-5 Table R1– Ports and Services			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.1	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	<p>Where technically feasible, enable only logical network accessible ports that have been determined to be needed by the Responsible Entity, including port ranges or services where needed to handle dynamic ports. If a device has no provision for disabling or restricting logical ports on the device then those ports that are open are deemed needed.</p>	<p>Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Documentation of the need for all enabled ports on all applicable Cyber Assets and Electronic Access Points, individually or by group. • Listings of the listening ports on the Cyber Assets, individually or by group, from either the device configuration files, command output (such as netstat), or network scans of open ports; or • Configuration files of host-based firewalls or other device level mechanisms that only allow needed ports and deny all others.
1.2	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems</p> <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at Control Centers</p>	<p>Protect against the use of unnecessary physical input/output ports used for network connectivity, console commands, or removable media.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation showing types of protection of physical input/output ports, either logically through system configuration or physically using a port lock or signage.</p>

- R2.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-007-5 Table R2 – Security Patch Management*. [*Violation Risk Factor: Medium*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*].
- M2.** Evidence must include each of the applicable documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-007-5 Table R2 – Security Patch Management* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-007-5 Table R2 – Security Patch Management			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.1	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	<p>A patch management process for tracking, evaluating, and installing cyber security patches for applicable Cyber Assets. The tracking portion shall include the identification of a source or sources that the Responsible Entity tracks for the release of cyber security patches for applicable Cyber Assets that are updateable and for which a patching source exists.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation of a patch management process and documentation or lists of sources that are monitored, whether on an individual BES Cyber System or Cyber Asset basis.</p>

CIP-007-5 Table R2 – Security Patch Management			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.2	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	<p>At least once every 35 calendar days, evaluate security patches for applicability that have been released since the last evaluation from the source or sources identified in Part 2.1.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, an evaluation conducted by, referenced by, or on behalf of a Responsible Entity of security-related patches released by the documented sources at least once every 35 calendar days.</p>

CIP-007-5 Table R2 – Security Patch Management			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.3	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	<p>For applicable patches identified in Part 2.2, within 35 calendar days of the evaluation completion, take one of the following actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Apply the applicable patches; or • Create a dated mitigation plan; or • Revise an existing mitigation plan. <p>Mitigation plans shall include the Responsible Entity’s planned actions to mitigate the vulnerabilities addressed by each security patch and a timeframe to complete these mitigations.</p>	<p>Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Records of the installation of the patch (e.g., exports from automated patch management tools that provide installation date, verification of BES Cyber System Component software revision, or registry exports that show software has been installed); or • A dated plan showing when and how the vulnerability will be addressed, to include documentation of the actions to be taken by the Responsible Entity to mitigate the vulnerabilities addressed by the security patch and a timeframe for the completion of these mitigations.

CIP-007-5 Table R2 – Security Patch Management			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.4	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	<p>For each mitigation plan created or revised in Part 2.3, implement the plan within the timeframe specified in the plan, unless a revision to the plan or an extension to the timeframe specified in Part 2.3 is approved by the CIP Senior Manager or delegate.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, records of implementation of mitigations.</p>

- R3.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-007-5 Table R3 – Malicious Code Prevention*. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Same Day Operations].
- M3.** Evidence must include each of the documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-007-5 Table R3 – Malicious Code Prevention* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-007-5 Table R3 – Malicious Code Prevention			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
3.1	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	<p>Deploy method(s) to deter, detect, or prevent malicious code.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, records of the Responsible Entity’s performance of these processes (e.g., through traditional antivirus, system hardening, policies, etc.).</p>

CIP-007-5 Table R3 – Malicious Code Prevention			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
3.2	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	Mitigate the threat of detected malicious code.	<p>Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Records of response processes for malicious code detection • Records of the performance of these processes when malicious code is detected.
3.3	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	For those methods identified in Part 3.1 that use signatures or patterns, have a process for the update of the signatures or patterns. The process must address testing and installing the signatures or patterns.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation showing the process used for the update of signatures or patterns.

- R4.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-007-5 Table R4 – Security Event Monitoring*. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Same Day Operations and Operations Assessment.]
- M4.** Evidence must include each of the documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-007-5 Table R4 – Security Event Monitoring* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-007-5 Table R4 – Security Event Monitoring			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
4.1	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	<p>Log events at the BES Cyber System level (per BES Cyber System capability) or at the Cyber Asset level (per Cyber Asset capability) for identification of, and after-the-fact investigations of, Cyber Security Incidents that includes, as a minimum, each of the following types of events:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4.1.1. Detected successful login attempts; 4.1.2. Detected failed access attempts and failed login attempts; 4.1.3. Detected malicious code. 	<p>Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, a paper or system generated listing of event types for which the BES Cyber System is capable of detecting and, for generated events, is configured to log. This listing must include the required types of events.</p>

CIP-007-5 Table R4 – Security Event Monitoring			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
4.2	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	<p>Generate alerts for security events that the Responsible Entity determines necessitates an alert, that includes, as a minimum, each of the following types of events (per Cyber Asset or BES Cyber System capability):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4.2.1. Detected malicious code from Part 4.1; and 4.2.2. Detected failure of Part 4.1 event logging. 	<p>Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, paper or system-generated listing of security events that the Responsible Entity determined necessitate alerts, including paper or system generated list showing how alerts are configured.</p>

CIP-007-5 Table R4 – Security Event Monitoring			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
4.3	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at Control Centers and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	<p>Where technically feasible, retain applicable event logs identified in Part 4.1 for at least the last 90 consecutive calendar days except under CIP Exceptional Circumstances.</p>	<p>Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, documentation of the event log retention process and paper or system generated reports showing log retention configuration set at 90 days or greater.</p>
4.4	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PCA 	<p>Review a summarization or sampling of logged events as determined by the Responsible Entity at intervals no greater than 15 calendar days to identify undetected Cyber Security Incidents.</p>	<p>Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, documentation describing the review, any findings from the review (if any), and dated documentation showing the review occurred.</p>

- R5.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-007-5 Table R5 – System Access Controls*. [*Violation Risk Factor: Medium*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*].
- M5.** Evidence must include each of the applicable documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-007-5 Table 5 – System Access Controls* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-007-5 Table R5 – System Access Control			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
5.1	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at Control Centers and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	<p>Have a method(s) to enforce authentication of interactive user access, where technically feasible.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation describing how access is authenticated.</p>

CIP-007-5 Table R5 – System Access Control			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
5.2	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	<p>Identify and inventory all known enabled default or other generic account types, either by system, by groups of systems, by location, or by system type(s).</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a listing of accounts by account types showing the enabled or generic account types in use for the BES Cyber System.</p>

CIP-007-5 Table R5 – System Access Control			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
5.3	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	Identify individuals who have authorized access to shared accounts.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, listing of shared accounts and the individuals who have authorized access to each shared account.

CIP-007-5 Table R5 – System Access Control			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
5.4	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	Change known default passwords, per Cyber Asset capability	<p>Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Records of a procedure that passwords are changed when new devices are in production; or • Documentation in system manuals or other vendor documents showing default vendor passwords were generated pseudo-randomly and are thereby unique to the device.

CIP-007-5 Table R5 – System Access Control			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
5.5	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	<p>For password-only authentication for interactive user access, either technically or procedurally enforce the following password parameters:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5.5.1. Password length that is, at least, the lesser of eight characters or the maximum length supported by the Cyber Asset; and 5.5.2. Minimum password complexity that is the lesser of three or more different types of characters (e.g., uppercase alphabetic, lowercase alphabetic, numeric, non-alphanumeric) or the maximum complexity supported by the Cyber Asset. 	<p>Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • System-generated reports or screen-shots of the system-enforced password parameters, including length and complexity; or • Attestations that include a reference to the documented procedures that were followed.

CIP-007-5 Table R5 – System Access Control			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
5.6	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	<p>Where technically feasible, for password-only authentication for interactive user access, either technically or procedurally enforce password changes or an obligation to change the password at least once every 15 calendar months.</p>	<p>Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • System-generated reports or screen-shots of the system-enforced periodicity of changing passwords; or • Attestations that include a reference to the documented procedures that were followed.

CIP-007-5 Table R5 – System Access Control			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
5.7	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at Control Centers and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	<p>Where technically feasible, either:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limit the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts; or • Generate alerts after a threshold of unsuccessful authentication attempts. 	<p>Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Documentation of the account-lockout parameters; or • Rules in the alerting configuration showing how the system notified individuals after a determined number of unsuccessful login attempts.

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process:

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority:

The Regional Entity shall serve as the Compliance Enforcement Authority (“CEA”) unless the applicable entity is owned, operated, or controlled by the Regional Entity. In such cases the ERO or a Regional Entity approved by FERC or other applicable governmental authority shall serve as the CEA.

1.2. Evidence Retention:

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the CEA may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Responsible Entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its CEA to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

- Each Responsible Entity shall retain evidence of each requirement in this standard for three calendar years.
- If a Responsible Entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.
- The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes:

- Compliance Audit
- Self-Certification
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Investigation
- Self-Reporting
- Complaint

1.4. Additional Compliance Information:

- None

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. Associated Documents

None.

2. Table of Compliance Elements

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-007-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1	Same Day Operations	Medium	N/A	<p>The Responsible Entity has implemented and documented processes for Ports and Services but had no methods to protect against unnecessary physical input/output ports used for network connectivity, console commands, or removable media and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (1.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has implemented and</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity has implemented and documented processes for determining necessary Ports and Services but, where technically feasible, had one or more unneeded logical network accessible ports enabled and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (1.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has implemented and documented processes for determining</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity has implemented and documented processes for determining necessary Ports and Services but, where technically feasible, had one or more unneeded logical network accessible ports enabled and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (R1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not implement or document one or more process(es) that included the applicable items in CIP-007-5 Table R1 and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (R1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not implement or document one or more process(es) that included the applicable items in CIP-007-5 Table R1 but did not identify, assess, or correct</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-007-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
				documented processes for Ports and Services but had no methods to protect against unnecessary physical input/output ports used for network connectivity, console commands, or removable media but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (1.2)	necessary Ports and Services but, where technically feasible, had one or more unneeded logical network accessible ports enabled but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (1.1)	the deficiencies. (R1)
R2	Operations Planning	Medium	The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented one or more process(es) to evaluate uninstalled released security patches for applicability but did not evaluate the	The Responsible Entity has documented or implemented one or more process(es) for patch management but did not include any processes, including the identification of	The Responsible Entity has documented or implemented one or more process(es) for patch management but did not include any processes for installing cyber security patches for	The Responsible Entity did not implement or document one or more process(es) that included the applicable items in CIP-007-5 Table R2 and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-007-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			security patches for applicability within 35 calendar days but less than 50 calendar days of the last evaluation for the source or sources identified and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (2.2) OR The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented one or more process(es) to evaluate uninstalled released security patches for applicability but did not evaluate the security patches for applicability within	sources, for tracking or evaluating cyber security patches for applicable Cyber Assets and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (2.1) OR The Responsible Entity has documented or implemented one or more process(es) for patch management but did not include any processes, including the identification of sources, for tracking, or evaluating cyber security patches for applicable Cyber Assets but did not	applicable Cyber Assets and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (2.1) OR The Responsible Entity has documented or implemented one or more process(es) for patch management but did not include any processes for installing cyber security patches for applicable Cyber Assets but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (2.1) OR	the deficiencies. (R2) OR The Responsible Entity did not implement or document one or more process(es) that included the applicable items in CIP-007-5 Table R2 but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (R2) OR The Responsible Entity has documented or implemented one or more process(es) for patch management but did not include any processes for tracking, evaluating,

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-007-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>35 calendar days but less than 50 calendar days of the last evaluation for the source or sources identified but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (2.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has one or more documented process(es) for evaluating cyber security patches but, in order to mitigate the vulnerabilities exposed by applicable security patches, did not apply the applicable patches, create a dated mitigation plan, or revise an</p>	<p>identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (2.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented one or more process(es) to evaluate uninstalled released security patches for applicability but did not evaluate the security patches for applicability within 50 calendar days but less than 65 calendar days of the last evaluation for the source or sources identified and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented one or more process(es) to evaluate uninstalled released security patches for applicability but did not evaluate the security patches for applicability within 65 calendar days of the last evaluation for the source or sources identified and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (2.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented one or</p>	<p>or installing cyber security patches for applicable Cyber Assets and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (2.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has documented or implemented one or more process(es) for patch management but did not include any processes for tracking, evaluating, or installing cyber security patches for applicable Cyber Assets but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (2.1)</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-007-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>existing mitigation plan within 35 calendar days but less than 50 calendar days of the evaluation completion and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (2.3)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has one or more documented process(es) for evaluating cyber security patches but, in order to mitigate the vulnerabilities exposed by applicable security patches, did not apply the applicable patches, create a</p>	<p>the deficiencies. (2.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented one or more process(es) to evaluate uninstalled released security patches for applicability but did not evaluate the security patches for applicability within 50 calendar days but less than 65 calendar days of the last evaluation for the source or sources identified but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (2.2)</p>	<p>more process(es) to evaluate uninstalled released security patches for applicability but did not evaluate the security patches for applicability within 65 calendar days of the last evaluation for the days source or sources identified but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (2.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has one or more documented process(es) for evaluating cyber security patches but, in order to mitigate the vulnerabilities exposed by</p>	<p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity documented a mitigation plan for an applicable cyber security patch and documented a revision or extension to the timeframe but did not obtain approval by the CIP Senior Manager or delegate and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (2.4)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity documented a mitigation plan for an applicable cyber security patch and documented a</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-007-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			dated mitigation plan, or revise an existing mitigation plan within 35 calendar days but less than 50 calendar days of the evaluation completion but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (2.3)	OR The Responsible Entity has one or more documented process(es) for evaluating cyber security patches but, in order to mitigate the vulnerabilities exposed by applicable security patches, did not apply the applicable patches, create a dated mitigation plan, or revise an existing mitigation plan within 50 calendar days but less than 65 calendar days of the evaluation completion and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct	applicable security patches, did not apply the applicable patches, create a dated mitigation plan, or revise an existing mitigation plan within 65 calendar days of the evaluation completion and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (2.3) OR The Responsible Entity has one or more documented process(es) for evaluating cyber security patches but, in order to mitigate the vulnerabilities exposed by	revision or extension to the timeframe but did not obtain approval by the CIP Senior Manager or delegate but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (2.4) OR The Responsible Entity documented a mitigation plan for an applicable cyber security patch but did not implement the plan as created or revised within the timeframe specified in the plan and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (2.4)

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-007-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
				the deficiencies. (2.3) OR The Responsible Entity has one or more documented process(es) for evaluating cyber security patches but, in order to mitigate the vulnerabilities exposed by applicable security patches, did not apply the applicable patches, create a dated mitigation plan, or revise an existing mitigation plan within 50 calendar days but less than 65 calendar days of the evaluation completion but did not identify, assess,	applicable security patches, did not apply the applicable patches, create a dated mitigation plan, or revise an existing mitigation plan within 65 calendar days of the evaluation completion but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (2.3)	OR The Responsible Entity documented a mitigation plan for an applicable cyber security patch but did not implement the plan as created or revised within the timeframe specified in the plan but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (2.4)

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-007-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
				or correct the deficiencies. (2.3)		
R3	Same Day Operations	Medium		<p>The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es), but, where signatures or patterns are used, the Responsible Entity did not address testing the signatures or patterns and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (3.3)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es), but,</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es) for malicious code prevention but did not mitigate the threat of detected malicious code and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (3.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es) for malicious code prevention but did not mitigate the threat of detected</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity did not implement or document one or more process(es) that included the applicable items in CIP-007-5 Table R3 and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (R3)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not implement or document one or more process(es) that included the applicable items in CIP-007-5 Table R3 and did not identify,</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-007-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
				where signatures or patterns are used, the Responsible Entity did not address testing the signatures or patterns and did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (3.3)	malicious code and did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (3.2) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es) for malicious code prevention, but where signatures or patterns are used, the Responsible Entity did not update malicious code protections and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (3.3) OR	assess, or correct the deficiencies. (R3) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es) for malicious code prevention but did not deploy method(s) to deter, detect, or prevent malicious code and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (3.1) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-007-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
					The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es) for malicious code prevention, but where signatures or patterns are used, the Responsible Entity did not update malicious code protections and did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (3.3)	process(es) for malicious code prevention but did not deploy method(s) to deter, detect, or prevent malicious code and did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (3.1)
R4	Same Day Operations and Operations Assessment	Medium	The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented one or more process(es) to identify undetected Cyber Security Incidents by reviewing an entity-	The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented one or more process(es) to identify undetected Cyber Security Incidents by reviewing an entity-	The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented one or more process(es) to generate alerts for necessary security events (as determined by the	The Responsible Entity did not implement or document one or more process(es) that included the applicable items in CIP-007-5 Table R4 and has identified

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-007-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>determined summarization or sampling of logged events at least every 15 calendar days but missed an interval and completed the review within 22 calendar days of the prior review and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (4.4)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented one or more process(es) to identify undetected Cyber Security Incidents by reviewing an entity-determined</p>	<p>determined summarization or sampling of logged events at least every 15 calendar days but missed an interval and completed the review within 30 calendar days of the prior review and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (4.4)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented one or more process(es) to identify undetected Cyber Security Incidents by reviewing an entity-determined</p>	<p>responsible entity) for the Applicable Systems (per device or system capability) but did not generate alerts for all of the required types of events described in 4.2.1 through 4.2.2 and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (4.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented one or more process(es) to generate alerts for necessary security events (as determined by the responsible entity) for the Applicable</p>	<p>deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (R4)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not implement or document one or more process(es) that included the applicable items in CIP-007-5 Table R4 and did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (R4)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented one or more process(es) to log events for the Applicable Systems</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-007-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>summarization or sampling of logged events at least every 15 calendar days but missed an interval and completed the review within 22 calendar days of the prior review but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (4.4)</p>	<p>summarization or sampling of logged events at least every 15 calendar days but missed an interval and completed the review within 30 calendar days of the prior review but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (4.4)</p>	<p>Systems (per device or system capability) but did not generate alerts for all of the required types of events described in 4.2.1 through 4.2.2 and did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (4.2) OR The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented one or more process(es) to log applicable events identified in 4.1 (where technically feasible and except during CIP Exceptional Circumstances) but did not retain applicable event</p>	<p>(per device or system capability) but did not detect and log all of the required types of events described in 4.1.1 through 4.1.3 and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (4.1) OR The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented one or more process(es) to log events for the Applicable Systems (per device or system capability) but did not detect and log all of the required types of events described in</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-007-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
					logs for at least the last 90 consecutive days and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (4.3) OR The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented one or more process(es) to log applicable events identified in 4.1 (where technically feasible and except during CIP Exceptional Circumstances) but did not retain applicable event logs for at least the last 90 consecutive days and did not	4.1.1 through 4.1.3 and did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (4.1)

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-007-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
					identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (4.3) OR The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented one or more process(es) to identify undetected Cyber Security Incidents by reviewing an entity-determined summarization or sampling of logged events at least every 15 calendar days but missed two or more intervals and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (4.4)	

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-007-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
					OR The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented one or more process(es) to identify undetected Cyber Security Incidents by reviewing an entity-determined summarization or sampling of logged events at least every 15 calendar days but missed two or more intervals and did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (4.4)	
R5	Operations Planning	Medium	The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es) for password-only	The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es) for password-only	The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es) for System Access	The Responsible Entity did not implement or document one or more process(es) that included the

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-007-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>authentication for interactive user access but did not technically or procedurally enforce password changes or an obligation to change the password within 15 calendar months but less than or equal to 16 calendar months of the last password change and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (5.6)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es) for password-only</p>	<p>authentication for interactive user access but did not technically or procedurally enforce password changes or an obligation to change the password within 16 calendar months but less than or equal to 17 calendar months of the last password change and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (5.6)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es) for password-only</p>	<p>Controls but, did not include the identification or inventory of all known enabled default or other generic account types, either by system, by groups of systems, by location, or by system type(s) and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (5.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es) for System Access Controls but, did not include the identification or</p>	<p>applicable items in <i>CIP-007-5 Table R5</i> and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (R5)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not implement or document one or more process(es) that included the applicable items in <i>CIP-007-5 Table R5</i> and did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (R5)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-007-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			authentication for interactive user access but did not technically or procedurally enforce password changes or an obligation to change the password within 15 calendar months but less than or equal to 16 calendar months of the last password change and did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (5.6)	authentication for interactive user access but did not technically or procedurally enforce password changes or an obligation to change the password within 16 calendar months but less than or equal to 17 calendar months of the last password change and did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (5.6)	inventory of all known enabled default or other generic account types, either by system, by groups of systems, by location, or by system type(s) and did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (5.2) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es) for System Access Controls but, did not include the identification of the individuals with authorized access to shared accounts and has identified	process(es) for System Access Controls but, where technically feasible, does not have a method(s) to enforce authentication of interactive user access and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (5.1) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es) for System Access Controls but, where technically feasible, does not have a method(s) to

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-007-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
					deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (5.3) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es) for System Access Controls but, did not include the identification of the individuals with authorized access to shared accounts and did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (5.3) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented one or	enforce authentication of interactive user access and did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (5.1) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es) for System Access Controls but did not, per device capability, change known default passwords and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (5.4) OR

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-007-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
					<p>more documented process(es) for password-only authentication for interactive user access that did not technically or procedurally enforce one of the two password parameters as described in 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (5.5)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es) for password-only authentication for</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es) for System Access Controls but did not, per device capability, change known default passwords but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (5.4)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es) for password-only authentication for interactive user access but the Responsible Entity did not technically</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-007-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
					interactive user access that did not technically or procedurally enforce one of the two password parameters as described in 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 and did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (5.5) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es) for password-only authentication for interactive user access but did not technically or procedurally enforce password changes or an obligation to	or procedurally enforce all of the password parameters described in 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (5.5) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es) for password-only authentication for interactive user access but the Responsible Entity did not technically or procedurally enforce all of the password

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-007-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
					change the password within 17 calendar months but less than or equal to 18 calendar months of the last password change and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (5.6) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es) for password-only authentication for interactive user access but did not technically or procedurally enforce password changes or an obligation to	parameters described in 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 and did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (5.5) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es) for password-only authentication for interactive user access but did not technically or procedurally enforce password changes or an obligation to change the password within 18 calendar months of the last password change and has identified

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-007-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
					change the password within 17 calendar months but less than or equal to 18 calendar months of the last password change and did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (5.6)	deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (5.6) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es) for password-only authentication for interactive user access but did not technically or procedurally enforce password changes or an obligation to change the password within 18 calendar months of the last password change and did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (5.6)

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-007-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						OR The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es) for System Access Control but, where technically feasible, did not either limit the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts or generate alerts after a threshold of unsuccessful authentication attempts and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (5.7) OR

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-007-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented process(es) for System Access Control but, where technically feasible, did not either limit the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts or generate alerts after a threshold of unsuccessful authentication attempts and did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (5.7)

Guidelines and Technical Basis

Section 4 – Scope of Applicability of the CIP Cyber Security Standards

Section “4. Applicability” of the standards provides important information for Responsible Entities to determine the scope of the applicability of the CIP Cyber Security Requirements.

Section “4.1. Functional Entities” is a list of NERC functional entities to which the standard applies. If the entity is registered as one or more of the functional entities listed in Section 4.1, then the NERC CIP Cyber Security Standards apply. Note that there is a qualification in Section 4.1 that restricts the applicability in the case of Distribution Providers to only those that own certain types of systems and equipment listed in 4.2. Furthermore,

Section “4.2. Facilities” defines the scope of the Facilities, systems, and equipment owned by the Responsible Entity, as qualified in Section 4.1, that is subject to the requirements of the standard. As specified in the exemption section 4.2.3.5, this standard does not apply to Responsible Entities that do not have High Impact or Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems under CIP-002-5’s categorization. In addition to the set of BES Facilities, Control Centers, and other systems and equipment, the list includes the set of systems and equipment owned by Distribution Providers. While the NERC Glossary term “Facilities” already includes the BES characteristic, the additional use of the term BES here is meant to reinforce the scope of applicability of these Facilities where it is used, especially in this applicability scoping section. This in effect sets the scope of Facilities, systems, and equipment that is subject to the standards.

Requirement R1:

Requirement R1 exists to reduce the attack surface of Cyber Assets by requiring entities to disable known unnecessary ports. The SDT intends for the entity to know what network accessible (“listening”) ports and associated services are accessible on their assets and systems, whether they are needed for that Cyber Asset’s function, and disable or restrict access to all other ports.

1.1. This requirement is most often accomplished by disabling the corresponding service or program that is listening on the port or configuration settings within the Cyber Asset. It can also be accomplished through using host-based firewalls, TCP_Wrappers, or other means on the Cyber Asset to restrict access. Note that the requirement is applicable at the Cyber Asset level. The Cyber Assets are those which comprise the applicable BES Cyber Systems and their associated Cyber Assets. This control is another layer in the defense against network-based attacks, therefore the SDT intends that the control be on the device itself, or positioned inline in a non-bypassable manner. Blocking ports at the ESP border does not substitute for this device level requirement. If a device has no provision for disabling or restricting logical ports on the device (example - purpose built devices that run from firmware with no port configuration available) then those ports that are open are deemed ‘needed.’

1.2. Examples of physical I/O ports include network, serial and USB ports external to the device casing. BES Cyber Systems should exist within a Physical Security Perimeter in which

case the physical I/O ports have protection from unauthorized access, but it may still be possible for accidental use such as connecting a modem, connecting a network cable that bridges networks, or inserting a USB drive. Ports used for 'console commands' primarily means serial ports on Cyber Assets that provide an administrative interface.

The protection of these ports can be accomplished in several ways including, but not limited to:

- Disabling all unneeded physical ports within the Cyber Asset's configuration
- Prominent signage, tamper tape, or other means of conveying that the ports should not be used without proper authorization
- Physical port obstruction through removable locks

This is a 'defense in depth' type control and it is acknowledged that there are other layers of control (the PSP for one) that prevent unauthorized personnel from gaining physical access to these ports. Even with physical access, it has been pointed out there are other ways to circumvent the control. This control, with its inclusion of means such as signage, is not meant to be a preventative control against intruders. Signage is indeed a directive control, not a preventative one. However, with a defense-in-depth posture, different layers and types of controls are required throughout the standard with this providing another layer for depth in Control Center environments. Once physical access has been achieved through the other preventative and detective measures by authorized personnel, a directive control that outlines proper behavior as a last line of defense are appropriate in these highest risk areas. In essence, signage would be used to remind authorized users to "think before you plug anything into one of these systems" which is the intent. This control is not designed primarily for intruders, but for example the authorized employee who intends to plug his possibly infected smartphone into an operator console USB port to charge the battery.

Requirement R2:

The SDT's intent of Requirement R2 is to require entities to know, track, and mitigate the known software vulnerabilities associated with their BES Cyber Assets. It is not strictly an "install every security patch" requirement; the main intention is to "be aware of in a timely manner and manage all known vulnerabilities" requirement.

Patch management is required for BES Cyber Systems that are accessible remotely as well as standalone systems. Stand alone systems are vulnerable to intentional or unintentional introduction of malicious code. A sound defense-in-depth security strategy employs additional measures such as physical security, malware prevention software, and software patch management to reduce the introduction of malicious code or the exploit of known vulnerabilities.

One or multiple processes could be utilized. An overall assessment process may exist in a top tier document with lower tier documents establishing the more detailed process followed for individual systems. Lower tier documents could be used to cover BES Cyber System nuances that may occur at the system level.

2.1. The Responsible Entity is to have a patch management program that covers tracking, evaluating, and installing cyber security patches. The requirement applies to patches only,

which are fixes released to handle a specific vulnerability in a hardware or software product. The requirement covers only patches that involve cyber security fixes and does not cover patches that are purely functionality related with no cyber security impact. Tracking involves processes for notification of the availability of new cyber security patches for the Cyber Assets. Documenting the patch source in the tracking portion of the process is required to determine when the assessment timeframe clock starts. This requirement handles the situation where security patches can come from an original source (such as an operating system vendor), but must be approved or certified by another source (such as a control system vendor) before they can be assessed and applied in order to not jeopardize the availability or integrity of the control system. The source can take many forms. The National Vulnerability Database, Operating System vendors, or Control System vendors could all be sources to monitor for release of security related patches, hotfixes, and/or updates. A patch source is not required for Cyber Assets that have no updateable software or firmware (there is no user accessible way to update the internal software or firmware executing on the Cyber Asset), or those Cyber Assets that have no existing source of patches such as vendors that no longer exist. The identification of these sources is intended to be performed once unless software is changed or added to the Cyber Asset's baseline.

2.2. Responsible Entities are to perform an assessment of security related patches within 35 days of release from their monitored source. An assessment should consist of determination of the applicability of each patch to the entity's specific environment and systems. Applicability determination is based primarily on whether the patch applies to a specific software or hardware component that the entity does have installed in an applicable Cyber Asset. A patch that applies to a service or component that is not installed in the entity's environment is not applicable. If the patch is determined to be non-applicable, that is documented with the reasons why and the entity is compliant. If the patch is applicable, the assessment can include a determination of the risk involved, how the vulnerability can be remediated, the urgency and timeframe of the remediation, and the steps the entity has previously taken or will take. Considerable care must be taken in applying security related patches, hotfixes, and/or updates or applying compensating measures to BES Cyber System or BES Cyber Assets that are no longer supported by vendors. It is possible security patches, hotfixes, and updates may reduce the reliability of the system, and entities should take this into account when determining the type of mitigation to apply. The Responsible Entities can use the information provided in the Department of Homeland Security "Quarterly Report on Cyber Vulnerabilities of Potential Risk to Control Systems" as a source. The DHS document "Recommended Practice for Patch Management of Control Systems" provides guidance on an evaluative process. It uses severity levels determined using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System Version 2. Determination that a security related patch, hotfix, and/or update poses too great a risk to install on a system or is not applicable due to the system configuration should not require a TFE.

When documenting the remediation plan measures it may not be necessary to document them on a one to one basis. The remediation plan measures may be cumulative. A measure to address a software vulnerability may involve disabling a particular service. That same service may be exploited through other software vulnerabilities. Therefore disabling the single service has addressed multiple patched vulnerabilities.

2.3. The requirement handles the situations where it is more of a reliability risk to patch a running system than the vulnerability presents. In all cases, the entity either installs the patch or documents (either through the creation of a new or update of an existing mitigation plan) what they are going to do to mitigate the vulnerability and when they are going to do so. There are times when it is in the best interest of reliability to not install a patch, and the entity can document what they have done to mitigate the vulnerability. For those security related patches that are determined to be applicable, the Responsible Entity must within 35 days either install the patch, create a dated mitigation plan which will outline the actions to be taken or those that have already been taken by the Responsible Entity to mitigate the vulnerabilities addressed by the security patch, or revise an existing mitigation plan. Timeframes do not have to be designated as a particular calendar day but can have event designations such as “at next scheduled outage of at least two days duration.” “Mitigation plans” in the standard refers to internal documents and are not to be confused with plans that are submitted to Regional Entities in response to violations.

2.4. The entity has been notified of, has assessed, and has developed a plan to remediate the known risk and that plan must be implemented. Remediation plans that only include steps that have been previously taken are considered implemented upon completion of the documentation. Remediation plans that have steps to be taken to remediate the vulnerability must be implemented by the timeframe the entity documented in their plan. There is no maximum timeframe in this requirement as patching and other system changes carries its own risk to the availability and integrity of the systems and may require waiting until a planned outage. In periods of high demand or threatening weather, changes to systems may be curtailed or denied due to the risk to reliability.

Requirement R3:

3.1. Due to the wide range of equipment comprising the BES Cyber Systems and the wide variety of vulnerability and capability of that equipment to malware as well as the constantly evolving threat and resultant tools and controls, it is not practical within the standard to prescribe how malware is to be addressed on each Cyber Asset. Rather, the Responsible Entity determines on a BES Cyber System basis which Cyber Assets have susceptibility to malware intrusions and documents their plans and processes for addressing those risks and provides evidence that they follow those plans and processes. There are numerous options available including traditional antivirus solutions for common operating systems, white-listing solutions, network isolation techniques, portable storage media policies, Intrusion Detection/Prevention (IDS/IPS) solutions, etc. If an entity has numerous BES Cyber Systems or Cyber Assets that are of identical architecture, they may provide one process that describes how all the like Cyber Assets are covered. If a specific Cyber Asset has no updateable software and its executing code cannot be altered, then that Cyber Asset is considered to have its own internal method of deterring malicious code.

3.2. When malicious code is detected on a Cyber Asset within the applicability of this requirement, the threat posed by that code must be mitigated. In situations where traditional antivirus products are used, they may be configured to automatically remove or quarantine the malicious code. In white-listing situations, the white-listing tool itself can mitigate the threat as

it will not allow the code to execute, however steps should still be taken to remove the malicious code from the Cyber Asset. In some instances, it may be in the best interest of reliability to not immediately remove or quarantine the malicious code, such as when availability of the system may be jeopardized by removal while operating and a rebuild of the system needs to be scheduled. In that case, monitoring may be increased and steps taken to insure the malicious code cannot communicate with other systems. In some instances the entity may be working with law enforcement or other governmental entities to closely monitor the code and track the perpetrator(s). For these reasons, there is no maximum timeframe or method prescribed for the removal of the malicious code, but the requirement is to mitigate the threat posed by the now identified malicious code.

3.3. In instances where malware detection technologies depend on signatures or patterns of known attacks, the effectiveness of these tools against evolving threats is tied to the ability to keep these signatures and patterns updated in a timely manner. The entity is to have a documented process that includes the testing and installation of signature or pattern updates. In a BES Cyber System, there may be some Cyber Assets that would benefit from the more timely installation of the updates where availability of that Cyber Asset would not jeopardize the availability of the BES Cyber System's ability to perform its function. For example, some HMI workstations where portable media is utilized may benefit from having the very latest updates at all times with minimal testing. Other Cyber Assets should have any updates thoroughly tested before implementation where the result of a 'false positive' could harm the availability of the BES Cyber System. The testing should not negatively impact the reliability of the BES. The testing should be focused on the update itself and if it will have an adverse impact on the BES Cyber System. Testing in no way implies that the entity is testing to ensure that malware is indeed detected by introducing malware into the environment. It is strictly focused on ensuring that the update does not negatively impact the BES Cyber System before those updates are placed into production.

Requirement R4:

Refer to NIST 800-92 and 800-137 for additional guidance in security event monitoring.

4.1. In a complex computing environment and faced with dynamic threats and vulnerabilities, it is not practical within the standard to enumerate all security-related events necessary to support the activities for alerting and incident response. Rather, the Responsible Entity determines which computer generated events are necessary to log, provide alerts and monitor for their particular BES Cyber System environment.

Specific security events already required in Version 4 of the CIP Standards carry forward in this version. This includes access attempts at the Electronic Access Points, if any have been identified for a BES Cyber Systems. Examples of access attempts include: (i) blocked network access attempts, (ii) successful and unsuccessful remote user access attempts, (iii) blocked network access attempts from a remote VPN, and (iv) successful network access attempts or network flow information.

User access and activity events include those events generated by Cyber Assets within the Electronic Security Perimeter that have access control capability. These types of events include:

(i) successful and unsuccessful authentication, (ii) account management, (iii) object access, and (iv) processes started and stopped.

It is not the intent of the SDT that if a device cannot log a particular event that a TFE must be generated. The SDT's intent is that if any of the items in the bulleted list (for example, user logouts) can be logged by the device then the entity must log that item. If the device does not have the capability of logging that event, the entity remains compliant.

4.2. Real-time alerting allows the cyber system to automatically communicate events of significance to designated responders. This involves configuration of a communication mechanism and log analysis rules. Alerts can be configured in the form of an email, text message, or system display and alarming. The log analysis rules can exist as part of the operating system, specific application or a centralized security event monitoring system. On one end, a real-time alert could consist of a set point on an RTU for a login failure, and on the other end, a security event monitoring system could provide multiple alerting communications options triggered on any number of complex log correlation rules.

The events triggering a real-time alert may change from day to day as system administrators and incident responders better understand the types of events that might be indications of a cyber-security incident. Configuration of alerts also must balance the need for responders to know an event occurred with the potential inundation of insignificant alerts. The following list includes examples of events a Responsible Entity should consider in configuring real-time alerts:

- Detected known or potential malware or malicious activity
- Failure of security event logging mechanisms
- Login failures for critical accounts
- Interactive login of system accounts
- Enabling of accounts
- Newly provisioned accounts
- System administration or change tasks by an unauthorized user
- Authentication attempts on certain accounts during non-business hours
- Unauthorized configuration changes
- Insertion of removable media in violation of a policy

4.3 Logs that are created under Part 4.1 are to be retained on the applicable Cyber Assets or BES Cyber Systems for at least 90 days. This is different than the evidence retention period called for in the CIP standards used to prove historical compliance. For such audit purposes, the entity should maintain evidence that shows that 90 days were kept historically. One example would be records of disposition of event logs beyond 90 days up to the evidence retention period.

4.4. Reviewing logs at least every 15 days (approximately every two weeks) can consist of analyzing a summarization or sampling of logged events. NIST SP800-92 provides a lot of guidance in periodic log analysis. If a centralized security event monitoring system is used, log analysis can be performed top-down starting with a review of trends from summary reports.

The log review can also be an extension of the exercise in identifying those events needing real-time alerts by analyzing events that are not fully understood or could possibly inundate the real-time alerting.

Requirement R5:

Account types referenced in this guidance typically include:

- **Shared user account:** An account used by multiple users for normal business functions by employees or contractors. Usually on a device that does not support Individual User Accounts.
- **Individual user account:** An account used by a single user.
- **Administrative account:** An account with elevated privileges for performing administrative or other specialized functions. These can be individual or shared accounts.
- **System account:** Accounts used to run services on a system (web, DNS, mail etc). No users have access to these accounts.
- **Application account:** A specific system account, with rights granted at the application level often used for access into a Database.
- **Guest account:** An individual user account not typically used for normal business functions by employees or contractors and not associated with a specific user. May or may not be shared by multiple users.
- **Remote access account:** An individual user account only used for obtaining Interactive Remote Access to the BES Cyber System.
- **Generic account:** A group account set up by the operating system or application to perform specific operations. This differs from a shared user account in that individual users do not receive authorization for access to this account type.

5.1 Reference the Requirement's rationale.

5.2 Where possible, default and other generic accounts provided by a vendor should be removed, renamed, or disabled prior to production use of the Cyber Asset or BES Cyber System. If this is not possible, the passwords must be changed from the default provided by the vendor. Default and other generic accounts remaining enabled must be documented. For common configurations, this documentation can be performed at a BES Cyber System or more general level.

5.3 Entities may choose to identify individuals with access to shared accounts through the access authorization and provisioning process, in which case the individual authorization records suffice to meet this Requirement Part. Alternatively, entities may choose to maintain a separate listing for shared accounts. Either form of evidence achieves the end result of maintaining control of shared accounts.

5.4. Default passwords can be commonly published in vendor documentation that is readily available to all customers using that type of equipment and possibly published online.

The requirement option to have unique password addresses cases where the Cyber Asset generates or has assigned pseudo-random default passwords at the time of production or installation. In these cases, the default password does not have to change because the system or manufacturer created it specific to the Cyber Asset.

5.5. Interactive user access does not include read-only information access in which the configuration of the Cyber Asset cannot change (e.g. front panel displays, web-based reports, etc.). For devices that cannot technically or for operational reasons perform authentication, an entity may demonstrate all interactive user access paths, both remote and local, are configured for authentication. Physical security suffices for local access configuration if the physical security can record who is in the Physical Security Perimeter and at what time.

Technical or procedural enforcement of password parameters are required where passwords are the only credential used to authenticate individuals. Technical enforcement of the password parameters means a Cyber Asset verifies an individually selected password meets the required parameters before allowing the account to authenticate with the selected password. Technical enforcement should be used in most cases when the authenticating Cyber Asset supports enforcing password parameters. Likewise, procedural enforcement means requiring the password parameters through procedures. Individuals choosing the passwords have the obligation of ensuring the password meets the required parameters.

Password complexity refers to the policy set by a Cyber Asset to require passwords to have one or more of the following types of characters: (1) lowercase alphabetic, (2) uppercase alphabetic, (3) numeric, and (4) non-alphanumeric or “special” characters (e.g. #, \$, @, &), in various combinations.

5.6 Technical or procedural enforcement of password change obligations are required where passwords are the only credential used to authenticate individuals. Technical enforcement of password change obligations means the Cyber Asset requires a password change after a specified timeframe prior to allowing access. In this case, the password is not required to change by the specified time as long as the Cyber Asset enforces the password change after the next successful authentication of the account. Procedural enforcement means manually changing passwords used for interactive user access after a specified timeframe.

5.7 Configuring an account lockout policy or alerting after a certain number of failed authentication attempts serves to prevent unauthorized access through an online password guessing attack. The threshold of failed authentication attempts should be set high enough to avoid false-positives from authorized users failing to authenticate. It should also be set low enough to account for online password attacks occurring over an extended period of time. This threshold may be tailored to the operating environment over time to avoid unnecessary account lockouts.

Entities should take caution when configuring account lockout to avoid locking out accounts necessary for the BES Cyber System to perform a BES reliability task. In such cases, entities should configure authentication failure alerting.

Rationale:

During the development of this standard, references to prior versions of the CIP standards and rationale for the requirements and their parts were embedded within the standard. Upon BOT approval, that information was moved to this section.

Rationale for R1:

The requirement is intended to minimize the attack surface of BES Cyber Systems through disabling or limiting access to unnecessary network accessible logical ports and services and physical I/O ports.

Summary of Changes: Changed the ‘needed for normal or emergency operations’ to those ports that are needed. Physical I/O ports were added in response to a FERC order. The unneeded physical ports in Control Centers (which are the highest risk, most impactful areas) should be protected as well.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.1) CIP-007-4, R2.1 and R2.2

Change Rationale: (Part 1.1)

The requirement focuses on the entity knowing and only allowing those ports that are necessary. The additional classification of ‘normal or emergency’ added no value and has been removed.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.2) New

Change Rationale: (Part 1.2)

On March 18, 2010, FERC issued an order to approve NERC’s interpretation of Requirement R2 of CIP-007-2. In this order, FERC agreed the term “ports” in “ports and services” refers to logical communication (e.g. TCP/IP) ports, but they also encouraged the drafting team to address unused physical ports.

Rationale for R2:

Security patch management is a proactive way of monitoring and addressing known security vulnerabilities in software before those vulnerabilities can be exploited in a malicious manner to gain control of or render a BES Cyber Asset or BES Cyber System inoperable.

The remediation plan can be updated as necessary to maintain the reliability of the BES, including an explanation of any rescheduling of the remediation actions.

Summary of Changes: The existing wordings of CIP-007, Requirements R3, R3.1, and R3.2, were separated into individual line items to provide more granularity. The documentation of a source(s) to monitor for release of security related patches, hot fixes, and/or updates for BES Cyber System or BES Cyber Assets was added to provide context as to when the “release” date was. The current wording stated “document the assessment of security patches and security

upgrades for applicability within thirty calendar days of availability of the patches or upgrades” and there has been confusion as to what constitutes the availability date. Due to issues that may occur regarding Control System vendor license and service agreements, flexibility must be given to Responsible Entities to define what sources are being monitored for BES Cyber Assets.

Reference to prior version: (Part 2.1) CIP-007, R3

Change Rationale: (Part 2.1)

The requirement is brought forward from previous CIP versions with the addition of defining the source(s) that a Responsible Entity monitors for the release of security related patches. Documenting the source is used to determine when the assessment timeframe clock starts. This requirement also handles the situation where security patches can come from an original source (such as an operating system vendor), but must be approved or certified by another source (such as a control system vendor) before they can be assessed and applied in order to not jeopardize the availability or integrity of the control system.

Reference to prior version: (Part 2.2) CIP-007, R3.1

Change Rationale: (Part 2.2)

Similar to the current wording but added “from the source or sources identified in 2.1” to clarify the 35-day time frame.

Reference to prior version: (Part 2.3) CIP-007, R3.2

Change Rationale: (Part 2.3)

The requirement has been changed to handle the situations where it is more of a reliability risk to patch a running system than the vulnerability presents. In all cases, the entity documents (either through the creation of a new or update of an existing mitigation plan) what they are going to do to mitigate the vulnerability and when they are going to do so. The mitigation plan may, and in many cases will, consist of installing the patch. However, there are times when it is in the best interest of reliability to not install a patch, and the entity can document what they have done to mitigate the vulnerability.

Reference to prior version: (Part 2.4) CIP-007, R3.2

Change Rationale: (Part 2.4)

Similar to the current wording but added that the plan must be implemented within the timeframe specified in the plan, or in a revised plan as approved by the CIP Senior Manager or delegate.

Rationale for R3:

Malicious code prevention has the purpose of limiting and detecting the addition of malicious code onto the applicable Cyber Assets of a BES Cyber System. Malicious code (viruses, worms, botnets, targeted code such as Stuxnet, etc.) may compromise the availability or integrity of the BES Cyber System.

Summary of Changes: In prior versions, this requirement has arguably been the single greatest generator of TFEs as it prescribed a particular technology to be used on every CCA regardless of

that asset's susceptibility or capability to use that technology. As the scope of Cyber Assets in scope of these standards expands to more field assets, this issue will grow exponentially. The drafting team is taking the approach of making this requirement a competency based requirement where the entity must document how the malware risk is handled for each BES Cyber System, but it does not prescribe a particular technical method nor does it prescribe that it must be used on every Cyber Asset. The BES Cyber System is the object of protection.

Beginning in Paragraphs 619-622 of FERC Order No. 706, and in particular Paragraph 621, FERC agrees that the standard "does not need to prescribe a single method...However, how a responsible entity does this should be detailed in its cyber security policy so that it can be audited for compliance..."

In Paragraph 622, FERC directs that the requirement be modified to include safeguards against personnel introducing, either maliciously or unintentionally, viruses or malicious software through remote access, electronic media, or other means. The drafting team believes that addressing this issue holistically at the BES Cyber System level and regardless of technology, along with the enhanced change management requirements, meets this directive.

Reference to prior version: (Part 3.1) CIP-007-4, R4; CIP-007-4, R4.1

Change Rationale: (Part 3.1)

See the Summary of Changes. FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 621, states the standards development process should decide to what degree to protect BES Cyber Systems from personnel introducing malicious software.

Reference to prior version: (Part 3.2) CIP-007-4, R4; CIP-007-4, R4.1

Change Rationale: (Part 3.2)

See the Summary of Changes.

Reference to prior version: (Part 3.3) CIP-007-4, R4; CIP-007-4, R4.2

Change Rationale: (Part 3.3)

Requirement essentially unchanged from previous versions; updated to refer to previous parts of the requirement table.

Rationale for R4:

Rationale for R4: Security event monitoring has the purpose of detecting unauthorized access, reconnaissance and other malicious activity on BES Cyber Systems, and comprises of the activities involved with the collection, processing, alerting and retention of security-related computer logs. These logs can provide both (1) the detection of an incident and (2) useful evidence in the investigation of an incident. The retention of security-related logs is intended to support post-event data analysis.

Audit processing failures are not penalized in this requirement. Instead, the requirement specifies processes which must be in place to monitor for and notify personnel of audit processing failures.

Summary of Changes: Beginning in Paragraph 525 and also Paragraph 628 of the FERC Order No. 706, the Commission directs a manual review of security event logs on a more periodic basis. This requirement combines CIP-005-4, R5 and CIP-007-4, R6 and addresses both directives from a system-wide perspective. The primary feedback received on this requirement from the informal comment period was the vagueness of terms “security event” and “monitor.”

The term “security event” or “events related to cyber security” is problematic because it does not apply consistently across all platforms and applications. To resolve this term, the requirement takes an approach similar to NIST 800-53 and requires the entity to define the security events relevant to the System. There are a few events explicitly listed that if a Cyber Asset or BES Cyber System can log, then it must log.

In addition, this requirement sets up parameters for the monitoring and reviewing of processes. It is rarely feasible or productive to look at every security log on the system. Paragraph 629 of the FERC Order No. 706 acknowledges this reality when directing a manual log review. As a result, this requirement allows the manual review to consist of a sampling or summarization of security events occurring since the last review.

Reference to prior version: (Part 4.1) CIP-005-4, R3; CIP-007-4, R5, R5.1.2, R6.1, and R6.3

Change Rationale: (Part 4.1)

This requirement is derived from NIST 800-53 version 3 AU-2, which requires organizations to determine system events to audit for incident response purposes. The industry expressed confusion in the term “system events related to cyber security” from informal comments received on CIP-011. Access logs from the ESP as required in CIP-005-4 Requirement R3 and user access and activity logs as required in CIP-007-5 Requirement R5 are also included here.

Reference to prior version: (Part 4.2) CIP-005-4, R3.2; CIP-007-4, R6.2

Change Rationale: (Part 4.2)

This requirement is derived from alerting requirements in CIP-005-4, Requirement R3.2 and CIP-007-4, Requirement R6.2 in addition to NIST 800-53 version 3 AU-6. Previous CIP Standards required alerting on unauthorized access attempts and detected Cyber Security Incidents, which can be vast and difficult to determine from day to day. Changes to this requirement allow the entity to determine events that necessitate a response.

Reference to prior version: (Part 4.3) CIP-005-4, R3.2; CIP-007-4, R6.4

Change Rationale: (Part 4.3)

No substantive change.

Reference to prior version: (Part 4.4) CIP-005-4, R3.2; CIP-007-4, R6.5

Change Rationale: (Part 4.4)

Beginning in Paragraph 525 and also 628 of the FERC Order No. 706, the Commission directs a manual review of security event logs on a more periodic basis and suggests a weekly review. The Order acknowledges it is rarely feasible to review all system logs. Indeed, log review is a dynamic process that should improve over time and with additional threat information.

Changes to this requirement allow for an approximately biweekly summary or sampling review of logs.

Rationale for R5:

To help ensure that no authorized individual can gain electronic access to a BES Cyber System until the individual has been authenticated, i.e., until the individual's logon credentials have been validated. Requirement R5 also seeks to reduce the risk that static passwords, where used as authenticators, may be compromised.

Requirement Part 5.1 ensures the BES Cyber System or Cyber Asset authenticates individuals that can modify configuration information. This requirement addresses the configuration of authentication. The authorization of individuals is addressed elsewhere in the CIP Cyber Security Standards. Interactive user access does not include read-only information access in which the configuration of the Cyber Asset cannot change (e.g. front panel displays, web-based reports, etc.). For devices that cannot technically or for operational reasons perform authentication, an entity may demonstrate all interactive user access paths, both remote and local, are configured for authentication. Physical security suffices for local access configuration if the physical security can record who is in the Physical Security Perimeter and at what time.

Requirement Part 5.2 addresses default and other generic account types. Identifying the use of default or generic account types that could introduce vulnerabilities has the benefit ensuring entities understand the possible risk these accounts pose to the BES Cyber System. The Requirement Part avoids prescribing an action to address these accounts because the most effective solution is situation specific, and in some cases, removing or disabling the account could have reliability consequences.

Requirement Part 5.3 addresses identification of individuals with access to shared accounts. This Requirement Part has the objective of mitigating the risk of unauthorized access through shared accounts. This differs from other CIP Cyber Security Standards Requirements to authorize access. An entity can authorize access and still not know who has access to a shared account. Failure to identify individuals with access to shared accounts would make it difficult to revoke access when it is no longer needed. The term "authorized" is used in the requirement to make clear that individuals storing, losing, or inappropriately sharing a password is not a violation of this requirement.

Requirement 5.4 addresses default passwords. Changing default passwords closes an easily exploitable vulnerability in many systems and applications. Pseudo-randomly system generated passwords are not considered default passwords.

For password-based user authentication, using strong passwords and changing them periodically helps mitigate the risk of successful password cracking attacks and the risk of accidental password disclosure to unauthorized individuals. In these requirements, the drafting team considered multiple approaches to ensuring this requirement was both effective and flexible enough to allow Responsible Entities to make good security decisions. One of the approaches considered involved requiring minimum password entropy, but the calculation for

true information entropy is more highly complex and makes several assumptions in the passwords users choose. Users can pick poor passwords well below the calculated minimum entropy.

The drafting team also chose to not require technical feasibility exceptions for devices that cannot meet the length and complexity requirements in password parameters. The objective of this requirement is to apply a measurable password policy to deter password cracking attempts, and replacing devices to achieve a specified password policy does not meet this objective. At the same time, this requirement has been strengthened to require account lockout or alerting for failed login attempts, which in many instances better meets the requirement objective.

The requirement to change passwords exists to address password cracking attempts if an encrypted password were somehow attained and also to refresh passwords which may have been accidentally disclosed over time. The requirement permits the entity to specify the periodicity of change to accomplish this objective. Specifically, the drafting team felt determining the appropriate periodicity based on a number of factors is more effective than specifying the period for every BES Cyber System in the Standard. In general, passwords for user authentication should be changed at least annually. The periodicity may increase in some cases. For example, application passwords that are long and pseudo-randomly generated could have a very long periodicity. Also, passwords used only as a weak form of application authentication, such as accessing the configuration of a relay may only need to be changed as part of regularly scheduled maintenance.

The Cyber Asset should automatically enforce the password policy for individual user accounts. However, for shared accounts in which no mechanism exists to enforce password policies, the Responsible Entity can enforce the password policy procedurally and through internal assessment and audit.

Requirement Part 5.7 assists in preventing online password attacks by limiting the number of guesses an attacker can make. This requirement allows either limiting the number of failed authentication attempts or alerting after a defined number of failed authentication attempts. Entities should take caution in choosing to limit the number of failed authentication attempts for all accounts because this would allow the possibility for a denial of service attack on the BES Cyber System.

Summary of Changes (From R5):

CIP-007-4, Requirement R5.3 requires the use of passwords and specifies a specific policy of six characters or more with a combination of alpha-numeric and special characters. The level of detail in these requirements can restrict more effective security measures. For example, many have interpreted the password for tokens or biometrics must satisfy this policy and in some cases prevents the use of this stronger authentication. Also, longer passwords may preclude the use of strict complexity requirements. The password requirements have been changed to allow the entity to specify the most effective password parameters based on the impact of the BES Cyber System, the way passwords are used, and the significance of passwords in restricting access to the system. The SDT believes these changes strengthen the authentication

mechanism by requiring entities to look at the most effective use of passwords in their environment. Otherwise, prescribing a strict password policy has the potential to limit the effectiveness of security mechanisms and preclude better mechanisms in the future.

Reference to prior version: (Part 5.1) CIP-007-4, R5

Change Rationale: (Part 5.1)

The requirement to enforce authentication for all user access is included here. The requirement to establish, implement, and document controls is included in this introductory requirement. The requirement to have technical and procedural controls was removed because technical controls suffice when procedural documentation is already required. The phrase “that minimize the risk of unauthorized access” was removed and more appropriately captured in the rationale statement.

Reference to prior version: (Part 5.2) CIP-007-4, R5.2 and R5.2.1

Change Rationale: (Part 5.2)

CIP-007-4 requires entities to minimize and manage the scope and acceptable use of account privileges. The requirement to minimize account privileges has been removed because the implementation of such a policy is difficult to measure at best.

Reference to prior version: (Part 5.3) CIP-007-4, R5.2.2

Change Rationale: (Part 5.3)

No significant changes. Added “authorized” access to make clear that individuals storing, losing or inappropriately sharing a password is not a violation of this requirement.

Reference to prior version: (Part 5.4) CIP-007-4, R5.2.1

Change Rationale: (Part 5.4)

The requirement for the “removal, disabling or renaming of such accounts where possible” has been removed and incorporated into guidance for acceptable use of account types. This was removed because those actions are not appropriate on all account types. Added the option of having unique default passwords to permit cases where a system may have generated a default password or a hard-coded uniquely generated default password was manufactured with the BES Cyber System.

Reference to prior version: (Part 5.5) CIP-007-4, R5.3

Change Rationale: (Part 5.5)

CIP-007-4, Requirement R5.3 requires the use of passwords and specifies a specific policy of six characters or more with a combination of alpha-numeric and special characters. The level of detail in these requirements can restrict more effective security measures. The password requirements have been changed to permit the maximum allowed by the device in cases where the password parameters could otherwise not achieve a stricter policy. This change still achieves the requirement objective to minimize the risk of unauthorized disclosure of password

credentials while recognizing password parameters alone do not achieve this. The drafting team felt allowing the Responsible Entity the flexibility of applying the strictest password policy allowed by a device outweighed the need to track a relatively minimally effective control through the TFE process.

Reference to prior version: (Part 5.6) CIP-007-4, R5.3.3

Change Rationale: (Part 5.6)

**This was originally Requirement R5.5.3, but moved to add “external routable connectivity” to medium impact in response to comments. This requirement is limited in scope because the risk to performing an online password attack is lessened by its lack of external routable connectivity. Frequently changing passwords at field assets can entail significant effort with minimal risk reduction.*

Reference to prior version: (Part 5.7) New Requirement

Change Rationale: (Part 5.7)

Minimizing the number of unsuccessful login attempts significantly reduces the risk of live password cracking attempts. This is a more effective control in live password attacks than password parameters.

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	1/16/06	R3.2 — Change “Control Center” to “control center.”	3/24/06
2	9/30/09	Modifications to clarify the requirements and to bring the compliance elements into conformance with the latest guidelines for developing compliance elements of standards. Removal of reasonable business judgment. Replaced the RRO with the RE as a responsible entity. Rewording of Effective Date. Changed compliance monitor to Compliance Enforcement Authority.	
3	12/16/09	Updated version number from -2 to -3 Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees.	

Guidelines and Technical Basis

3	3/31/10	Approved by FERC.	
4	12/30/10	Modified to add specific criteria for Critical Asset identification.	Update
4	1/24/11	Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Update
5	11/26/12	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Modified to coordinate with other CIP standards and to revise format to use RBS Template.
5	11/22/13	FERC Order issued approving CIP-007-5. (Order becomes effective on 2/3/14.)	

This appendix establishes specific provisions for the application of the standard in Québec. Provisions of the standard and of its appendix must be read together for the purposes of understanding and interpretation. Where the standard and appendix differ, the appendix shall prevail.

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Cyber Security — System Security Management
2. **Number:** CIP-007-5
3. **Purpose:** No specific provision
4. **Applicability:**

Functional Entities

No specific provision

Facilities

This standard only applies to the facilities of the Main Transmission System (RTP) and to the facilities specified for the Distribution Provider. In application of this standard, any reference to the terms "Bulk Electric System" or "BES" shall be replaced by the terms "Main Transmission System" or "RTP" respectively.

Additional Exemptions

The following are exempt from this standard:

- Generating facilities with a nameplate capacity of 300 MVA or less, unless the facility comprises one or more units that can be synchronized with neighboring systems.
- Step-up substations of generating facilities identified in the preceding point.

5. **Effective Date:**

5.1. Adoption of the standard by the Régie de l'énergie: Month xx, 201x

5.2. Adoption of the appendix by the Régie de l'énergie: Month xx, 201x

5.3. Effective date of the standard and its appendix in Québec: Month xx, 201x

6. **Background:** No specific provision

B. Requirements and Measures

No specific provision

C. Compliance

1. **Compliance Monitoring Process**
 - 1.1. **Compliance Enforcement Authority**

The Régie de l'énergie is responsible, in Québec, for compliance enforcement with respect to the reliability standard and its appendix that it adopts.

1.2. Evidence Retention

No specific provision

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes

No specific provision

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

No specific provision

2. Table of Compliance Elements

No specific provision

D. Regional Variances

No specific provision

E. Interpretations

No specific provision

F. Associated Documents

No specific provision

Guidelines and Technical Basis

No specific provision

Rationale

No specific provision

Revision History

Revision	Adoption Date	Action	Change Tracking
0	Xx month 201x	New appendix	New

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Cyber Security — Incident Reporting and Response Planning
2. **Number:** CIP-008-5
3. **Purpose:** To mitigate the risk to the reliable operation of the BES as the result of a Cyber Security Incident by specifying incident response requirements.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. **Functional Entities:** For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of functional entities will be collectively referred to as “Responsible Entities.” For requirements in this standard where a specific functional entity or subset of functional entities are the applicable entity or entities, the functional entity or entities are specified explicitly.
 - 4.1.1 **Balancing Authority**
 - 4.1.2 **Distribution Provider** that owns one or more of the following Facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the BES:
 - 4.1.2.1 Each underfrequency Load shedding (UFLS) or undervoltage Load shedding (UVLS) system that:
 - 4.1.2.1.1 is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and
 - 4.1.2.1.2 performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.
 - 4.1.2.2 Each Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme where the Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - 4.1.2.3 Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - 4.1.2.4 Each Cranking Path and group of Elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a Blackstart Resource up to and including the first interconnection point of the starting station service of the next generation unit(s) to be started.
 - 4.1.3 **Generator Operator**
 - 4.1.4 **Generator Owner**
 - 4.1.5 **Interchange Coordinator or Interchange Authority**
 - 4.1.6 **Reliability Coordinator**
 - 4.1.7 **Transmission Operator**

4.1.8 Transmission Owner

4.2. Facilities: For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following Facilities, systems, and equipment owned by each Responsible Entity in 4.1 above are those to which these requirements are applicable. For requirements in this standard where a specific type of Facilities, system, or equipment or subset of Facilities, systems, and equipment are applicable, these are specified explicitly.

4.2.1 Distribution Provider: One or more of the following Facilities, systems and equipment owned by the Distribution Provider for the protection or restoration of the BES:

4.2.1.1 Each UFLS or UVLS System that:

4.2.1.1.1 is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and

4.2.1.1.2 performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.

4.2.1.2 Each Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme where the Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.

4.2.1.3 Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.

4.2.1.4 Each Cranking Path and group of Elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a Blackstart Resource up to and including the first interconnection point of the starting station service of the next generation unit(s) to be started.

4.2.2 Responsible Entities listed in 4.1 other than Distribution Providers:

All BES Facilities.

4.2.3 Exemptions: The following are exempt from Standard CIP-008-5:

4.2.3.1 Cyber Assets at Facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.

4.2.3.2 Cyber Assets associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete Electronic Security Perimeters.

4.2.3.3 The systems, structures, and components that are regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under a cyber security plan pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Section 73.54.

4.2.3.4 For Distribution Providers, the systems and equipment that are not included in section 4.2.1 above.

4.2.3.5 Responsible Entities that identify that they have no BES Cyber Systems categorized as high impact or medium impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.

5. Effective Dates:

1. **24 Months Minimum** – CIP-008-5 shall become effective on the later of July 1, 2015, or the first calendar day of the ninth calendar quarter after the effective date of the order providing applicable regulatory approval.
2. In those jurisdictions where no regulatory approval is required, CIP-008-5 shall become effective on the first day of the ninth calendar quarter following Board of Trustees' approval, or as otherwise made effective pursuant to the laws applicable to such ERO governmental authorities.

6. Background:

Standard CIP-008-5 exists as part of a suite of CIP Standards related to cyber security. CIP-002-5 requires the initial identification and categorization of BES Cyber Systems. CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1 require a minimum level of organizational, operational, and procedural controls to mitigate risk to BES Cyber Systems. This suite of CIP Standards is referred to as the *Version 5 CIP Cyber Security Standards*.

Most requirements open with, “*Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented [processes, plan, etc] that include the applicable items in [Table Reference].*” The referenced table requires the applicable items in the procedures for the requirement’s common subject matter.

The term *documented processes* refers to a set of required instructions specific to the Responsible Entity and to achieve a specific outcome. This term does not imply any particular naming or approval structure beyond what is stated in the requirements. An entity should include as much as it believes necessary in their documented processes, but they must address the applicable requirements in the table.

The terms *program* and *plan* are sometimes used in place of *documented processes* where it makes sense and is commonly understood. For example, documented processes describing a response are typically referred to as *plans* (i.e., incident response plans and recovery plans). Likewise, a security plan can describe an approach involving multiple procedures to address a broad subject matter.

Similarly, the term *program* may refer to the organization’s overall implementation of its policies, plans and procedures involving a subject matter. Examples in the standards include the personnel risk assessment program and the personnel training program. The full implementation of the CIP Cyber Security Standards could also be referred to as a program. However, the terms *program* and *plan* do not imply any additional requirements beyond what is stated in the standards.

Responsible Entities can implement common controls that meet requirements for multiple high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems. For example, a single training

program could meet the requirements for training personnel across multiple BES Cyber Systems.

Measures for the initial requirement are simply the documented processes themselves. Measures in the table rows provide examples of evidence to show documentation and implementation of applicable items in the documented processes. These measures serve to provide guidance to entities in acceptable records of compliance and should not be viewed as an all-inclusive list.

Throughout the standards, unless otherwise stated, bulleted items in the requirements and measures are items that are linked with an “or,” and numbered items are items that are linked with an “and.”

Many references in the Applicability section use a threshold of 300 MW for UFLS and UVLS. This particular threshold of 300 MW for UVLS and UFLS was provided in Version 1 of the CIP Cyber Security Standards. The threshold remains at 300 MW since it is specifically addressing UVLS and UFLS, which are last ditch efforts to save the Bulk Electric System. A review of UFLS tolerances defined within regional reliability standards for UFLS program requirements to date indicates that the historical value of 300 MW represents an adequate and reasonable threshold value for allowable UFLS operational tolerances.

“Applicable Systems” Columns in Tables:

Each table has an “Applicable Systems” column to further define the scope of systems to which a specific requirement row applies. The CSO706 SDT adapted this concept from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) Risk Management Framework as a way of applying requirements more appropriately based on impact and connectivity characteristics. The following conventions are used in the “Applicable Systems” column as described.

- **High Impact BES Cyber Systems** – Applies to BES Cyber Systems categorized as high impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.
- **Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems** – Applies to BES Cyber Systems categorized as medium impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.

B. Requirements and Measures

- R1.** Each Responsible Entity shall document one or more Cyber Security Incident response plan(s) that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-008-5 Table R1 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Specifications*. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning].
- M1.** Evidence must include each of the documented plan(s) that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-008-5 Table R1 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Specifications*.

CIP-008-5 Table R1 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Specifications			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.1	High Impact BES Cyber Systems Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems	One or more processes to identify, classify, and respond to Cyber Security Incidents.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated documentation of Cyber Security Incident response plan(s) that include the process to identify, classify, and respond to Cyber Security Incidents.
1.2	High Impact BES Cyber Systems Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems	One or more processes to determine if an identified Cyber Security Incident is a Reportable Cyber Security Incident and notify the Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ES-ISAC), unless prohibited by law. Initial notification to the ES-ISAC, which may be only a preliminary notice, shall not exceed one hour from the determination of a Reportable Cyber Security Incident.	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated documentation of Cyber Security Incident response plan(s) that provide guidance or thresholds for determining which Cyber Security Incidents are also Reportable Cyber Security Incidents and documentation of initial notices to the Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ES-ISAC).

CIP-008-5 Table R1 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Specifications			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.3	High Impact BES Cyber Systems Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems	The roles and responsibilities of Cyber Security Incident response groups or individuals.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated Cyber Security Incident response process(es) or procedure(s) that define roles and responsibilities (e.g., monitoring, reporting, initiating, documenting, etc.) of Cyber Security Incident response groups or individuals.
1.4	High Impact BES Cyber Systems Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems	Incident handling procedures for Cyber Security Incidents.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated Cyber Security Incident response process(es) or procedure(s) that address incident handling (e.g., containment, eradication, recovery/incident resolution).

- R2.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement each of its documented Cyber Security Incident response plans to collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-008-5 Table R2 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Implementation and Testing*. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning and Real-Time Operations].
- M2.** Evidence must include, but is not limited to, documentation that collectively demonstrates implementation of each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-008-5 Table R2 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Implementation and Testing*.

CIP-008-5 Table R2 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Implementation and Testing			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.1	High Impact BES Cyber Systems Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems	Test each Cyber Security Incident response plan(s) at least once every 15 calendar months: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • By responding to an actual Reportable Cyber Security Incident; • With a paper drill or tabletop exercise of a Reportable Cyber Security Incident; or • With an operational exercise of a Reportable Cyber Security Incident. 	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated evidence of a lessons-learned report that includes a summary of the test or a compilation of notes, logs, and communication resulting from the test. Types of exercises may include discussion or operations based exercises.

CIP-008-5 Table R2 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Implementation and Testing			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.2	High Impact BES Cyber Systems Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems	Use the Cyber Security Incident response plan(s) under Requirement R1 when responding to a Reportable Cyber Security Incident or performing an exercise of a Reportable Cyber Security Incident. Document deviations from the plan(s) taken during the response to the incident or exercise.	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, incident reports, logs, and notes that were kept during the incident response process, and follow-up documentation that describes deviations taken from the plan during the incident or exercise.
2.3	High Impact BES Cyber Systems Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems	Retain records related to Reportable Cyber Security Incidents.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated documentation, such as security logs, police reports, emails, response forms or checklists, forensic analysis results, restoration records, and post-incident review notes related to Reportable Cyber Security Incidents.

- R3.** Each Responsible Entity shall maintain each of its Cyber Security Incident response plans according to each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-008-5 Table R3 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Review, Update, and Communication*. *[Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Operations Assessment]*.
- M3.** Evidence must include, but is not limited to, documentation that collectively demonstrates maintenance of each Cyber Security Incident response plan according to the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-008-5 Table R3 – Cyber Security Incident*.

CIP-008-5 Table R3 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Review, Update, and Communication			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
3.1	High Impact BES Cyber Systems Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems	<p>No later than 90 calendar days after completion of a Cyber Security Incident response plan(s) test or actual Reportable Cyber Security Incident response:</p> <p>3.1.1. Document any lessons learned or document the absence of any lessons learned;</p> <p>3.1.2. Update the Cyber Security Incident response plan based on any documented lessons learned associated with the plan; and</p> <p>3.1.3. Notify each person or group with a defined role in the Cyber Security Incident response plan of the updates to the Cyber Security Incident response plan based on any documented lessons learned.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, all of the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dated documentation of post incident(s) review meeting notes or follow-up report showing lessons learned associated with the Cyber Security Incident response plan(s) test or actual Reportable Cyber Security Incident response or dated documentation stating there were no lessons learned; 2. Dated and revised Cyber Security Incident response plan showing any changes based on the lessons learned; and 3. Evidence of plan update distribution including, but not limited to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emails; • USPS or other mail service; • Electronic distribution system; or • Training sign-in sheets.

CIP-008-5 Table R3 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Review, Update, and Communication			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
3.2	High Impact BES Cyber Systems Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems	<p>No later than 60 calendar days after a change to the roles or responsibilities, Cyber Security Incident response groups or individuals, or technology that the Responsible Entity determines would impact the ability to execute the plan:</p> <p>3.2.1. Update the Cyber Security Incident response plan(s); and</p> <p>3.2.2. Notify each person or group with a defined role in the Cyber Security Incident response plan of the updates.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dated and revised Cyber Security Incident response plan with changes to the roles or responsibilities, responders or technology; and 2. Evidence of plan update distribution including, but not limited to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emails; • USPS or other mail service; • Electronic distribution system; or • Training sign-in sheets.

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process:

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority:

The Regional Entity shall serve as the Compliance Enforcement Authority (“CEA”) unless the applicable entity is owned, operated, or controlled by the Regional Entity. In such cases the ERO or a Regional Entity approved by FERC or other applicable governmental authority shall serve as the CEA.

1.2. Evidence Retention:

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the CEA may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Responsible Entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its CEA to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

- Each Responsible Entity shall retain evidence of each requirement in this standard for three calendar years.
- If a Responsible Entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.
- The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes:

- Compliance Audit
- Self-Certification
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Investigation
- Self-Reporting
- Complaint

1.4. Additional Compliance Information:

- None

2. Table of Compliance Elements

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-008-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1	Long Term Planning	Lower	N/A	N/A	<p>The Responsible Entity has developed the Cyber Security Incident response plan(s), but the plan does not include the roles and responsibilities of Cyber Security Incident response groups or individuals. (1.3)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has developed the Cyber Security Incident response plan(s), but the plan does not include incident handling procedures for Cyber Security Incidents. (1.4)</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity has not developed a Cyber Security Incident response plan with one or more processes to identify, classify, and respond to Cyber Security Incidents. (1.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has developed a Cyber Security Incident response plan, but the plan does not include one or more processes to identify Reportable Cyber Security Incidents. (1.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has developed a Cyber Security Incident response plan, but did</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-008-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						not provide at least preliminary notification to ES-ISAC within one hour from identification of a Reportable Cyber Security Incident. (1.2)
R2	Operations Planning Real-time Operations	Lower	The Responsible Entity has not tested the Cyber Security Incident response plan(s) within 15 calendar months, not exceeding 16 calendar months between tests of the plan. (2.1)	The Responsible Entity has not tested the Cyber Security Incident response plan(s) within 16 calendar months, not exceeding 17 calendar months between tests of the plan. (2.1)	The Responsible Entity has not tested the Cyber Security Incident response plan(s) within 17 calendar months, not exceeding 18 calendar months between tests of the plan. (2.1) OR The Responsible Entity did not document deviations, if any, from the plan during a test or when a Reportable Cyber Security Incident occurs. (2.2)	The Responsible Entity has not tested the Cyber Security Incident response plan(s) within 18 calendar months between tests of the plan. (2.1) OR The Responsible Entity did not retain relevant records related to Reportable Cyber Security Incidents. (2.3)
R3	Operations Assessment	Lower	The Responsible Entity has not notified each person or group with	The Responsible Entity has not updated the	The Responsible Entity has neither	The Responsible Entity has neither

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-008-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>a defined role in the Cyber Security Incident response plan of updates to the Cyber Security Incident response plan within greater than 90 but less than 120 calendar days of a test or actual incident response to a Reportable Cyber Security Incident. (3.1.3)</p>	<p>Cyber Security Incident response plan based on any documented lessons learned within 90 and less than 120 calendar days of a test or actual incident response to a Reportable Cyber Security Incident. (3.1.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has not notified each person or group with a defined role in the Cyber Security Incident response plan of updates to the Cyber Security Incident response plan within 120 calendar days of a test or actual incident response to a Reportable Cyber Security Incident. (3.1.3)</p> <p>OR</p>	<p>documented lessons learned nor documented the absence of any lessons learned within 90 and less than 120 calendar days of a test or actual incident response to a Reportable Cyber Security Incident. (3.1.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has not updated the Cyber Security Incident response plan based on any documented lessons learned within 120 calendar days of a test or actual incident response to a Reportable Cyber Security Incident. (3.1.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has not updated the</p>	<p>documented lessons learned nor documented the absence of any lessons learned within 120 calendar days of a test or actual incident response to a Reportable Cyber Security Incident. (3.1.1)</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-008-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
				<p>The Responsible Entity has not updated the Cyber Security Incident response plan(s) or notified each person or group with a defined role within 60 and less than 90 calendar days of any of the following changes that the responsible entity determines would impact the ability to execute the plan: (3.2)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Roles or responsibilities, or • Cyber Security Incident response groups or individuals, or • Technology changes. 	<p>Cyber Security Incident response plan(s) or notified each person or group with a defined role within 90 calendar days of any of the following changes that the responsible entity determines would impact the ability to execute the plan: (3.2)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Roles or responsibilities, or • Cyber Security Incident response groups or individuals, or • Technology changes. 	

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. Associated Documents

None.

Guidelines and Technical Basis

Section 4 – Scope of Applicability of the CIP Cyber Security Standards

Section “4. Applicability” of the standards provides important information for Responsible Entities to determine the scope of the applicability of the CIP Cyber Security Requirements.

Section “4.1. Functional Entities” is a list of NERC functional entities to which the standard applies. If the entity is registered as one or more of the functional entities listed in Section 4.1, then the NERC CIP Cyber Security Standards apply. Note that there is a qualification in Section 4.1 that restricts the applicability in the case of Distribution Providers to only those that own certain types of systems and equipment listed in 4.2. Furthermore,

Section “4.2. Facilities” defines the scope of the Facilities, systems, and equipment owned by the Responsible Entity, as qualified in Section 4.1, that is subject to the requirements of the standard. As specified in the exemption section 4.2.3.5, this standard does not apply to Responsible Entities that do not have High Impact or Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems under CIP-002-5’s categorization. In addition to the set of BES Facilities, Control Centers, and other systems and equipment, the list includes the set of systems and equipment owned by Distribution Providers. While the NERC Glossary term “Facilities” already includes the BES characteristic, the additional use of the term BES here is meant to reinforce the scope of applicability of these Facilities where it is used, especially in this applicability scoping section. This in effect sets the scope of Facilities, systems, and equipment that is subject to the standards.

Requirement R1:

The following guidelines are available to assist in addressing the required components of a Cyber Security Incident response plan:

- Department of Homeland Security, Control Systems Security Program, *Developing an Industrial Control Systems Cyber Security Incident Response Capability*, 2009, online at http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/practices/documents/final-RP_ics_cybersecurity_incident_response_100609.pdf
- National Institute of Standards and Technology, *Computer Security Incident Handling Guide*, Special Publication 800-61 revision 1, March 2008, online at <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-61-rev1/SP800-61rev1.pdf>

For Part 1.2, a Reportable Cyber Security Incident is a Cyber Security Incident that has compromised or disrupted one or more reliability tasks of a functional entity. It is helpful to distinguish Reportable Cyber Security Incidents as one resulting in a necessary response action. A response action can fall into one of two categories: Necessary or elective. The distinguishing characteristic is whether or not action was taken in response to an event. Precautionary measures that are not in response to any persistent damage or effects may be designated as elective. All other response actions to avoid any persistent damage or adverse effects, which include the activation of redundant systems, should be designated as necessary.

The reporting obligations for Reportable Cyber Security Incidents require at least a preliminary notice to the ES-ISAC within one hour after determining that a Cyber Security Incident is reportable (not within one hour of the Cyber Security Incident, an important distinction). This addition is in response to the directive addressing this issue in FERC Order No. 706, paragraphs 673 and 676, to report within one hour (at least preliminarily). This standard does not require a complete report within an hour of determining that a Cyber Security Incident is reportable, but at least preliminary notice, which may be a phone call, an email, or sending a Web-based notice. The standard does not require a specific timeframe for completing the full report.

Requirement R2:

Requirement R2 ensures entities periodically test the Cyber Security Incident response plan. This includes the requirement in Part 2.2 to ensure the plan is actually used when testing. The testing requirements are specifically for *Reportable Cyber Security Incidents*.

Entities may use an actual response to a *Reportable Cyber Security Incident* as a substitute for exercising the plan annually. Otherwise, entities must exercise the plan with a paper drill, tabletop exercise, or full operational exercise. For more specific types of exercises, refer to the FEMA Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). It lists the following four types of discussion-based exercises: seminar, workshop, tabletop, and games. In particular, it defines that, “A tabletop exercise involves key personnel discussing simulated scenarios in an informal setting. Table top exercises (TTX) can be used to assess plans, policies, and procedures.”

The HSEEP lists the following three types of operations-based exercises: Drill, functional exercise, and full-scale exercise. It defines that, “[A] full-scale exercise is a multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional, multi-discipline exercise involving functional (e.g., joint field office, Emergency operation centers, etc.) and ‘boots on the ground’ response (e.g., firefighters decontaminating mock victims).”

In addition to the requirements to implement the response plan, Part 2.3 specifies entities must retain relevant records for *Reportable Cyber Security Incidents*. There are several examples of specific types of evidence listed in the measure. Entities should refer to their handling procedures to determine the types of evidence to retain and how to transport and store the evidence. For further information in retaining incident records, refer to the NIST Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response (SP800-86). The NIST guideline includes a section (Section 3.1.2) on acquiring data when performing forensics.

Requirement R3:

This requirement ensures entities maintain Cyber Security Incident response plans. There are two requirement parts that trigger plan updates: (1) lessons learned from Part 3.1 and (2) organizational or technology changes from Part 3.2.

The documentation of lessons learned from Part 3.1 is associated with each Reportable Cyber Security Incident and involves the activities as illustrated in Figure 1, below. The deadline to document lessons learned starts after the completion of the incident in recognition that complex incidents on complex systems can take a few days or weeks to complete response

activities. The process of conducting lessons learned can involve the response team discussing the incident to determine gaps or areas of improvement within the plan. Any documented deviations from the plan from Part 2.2 can serve as input to the lessons learned. It is possible to have a *Reportable Cyber Security Incident* without any documented lessons learned. In such cases, the entity must retain documentation of the absence of any lessons learned associated with the *Reportable Cyber Security Incident*.




Figure 1: CIP-008-5 R3 Timeline for Reportable Cyber Security Incidents

The activities necessary to complete the lessons learned include updating the plan and distributing those updates. Entities should consider meeting with all of the individuals involved in the incident and documenting the lessons learned as soon after the incident as possible. This allows more time for making effective updates to the plan, obtaining any necessary approvals, and distributing those updates to the incident response team.

The plan change requirement in Part 3.2 is associated with organization and technology changes referenced in the plan and involves the activities illustrated in Figure 2, below. Organizational changes include changes to the roles and responsibilities people have in the plan or changes to the response groups or individuals. This may include changes to the names or contact information listed in the plan. Technology changes affecting the plan may include referenced information sources, communication systems or ticketing systems.




Figure 2: Timeline for Plan Changes in 3.2

Rationale:

During the development of this standard, references to prior versions of the CIP standards and rationale for the requirements and their parts were embedded within the standard. Upon BOT approval, that information was moved to this section.

Rationale for R1:

The implementation of an effective Cyber Security Incident response plan mitigates the risk to the reliable operation of the BES caused as the result of a Cyber Security Incident and provides feedback to Responsible Entities for improving the security controls applying to BES Cyber Systems. Preventative activities can lower the number of incidents, but not all incidents can be prevented. A preplanned incident response capability is therefore necessary for rapidly detecting incidents, minimizing loss and destruction, mitigating the weaknesses that were exploited, and restoring computing services. An enterprise or single incident response plan for all BES Cyber Systems may be used to meet the Requirement. An organization may have a common plan for multiple registered entities it owns.

Summary of Changes: Wording changes have been incorporated based primarily on industry feedback to more specifically describe required actions.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.1) CIP-008, R1.1

Change Description and Justification: (Part 1.1)

“Characterize” has been changed to “identify” for clarity. “Response actions” has been changed to “respond to” for clarity.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.2) CIP-008, R1.1

Change Description and Justification: (Part 1.2)

Addresses the reporting requirements from previous versions of CIP-008. This requirement part only obligates entities to have a process for determining Reportable Cyber Security Incidents. Also addresses the directive in FERC Order No. 706, paragraphs 673 and 676 to report within one hour (at least preliminarily).

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.3) CIP-008, R1.2

Change Description and Justification: (Part 1.3)

Replaced incident response teams with incident response “groups or individuals” to avoid the interpretation that roles and responsibilities sections must reference specific teams.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.4) CIP-008, R1.2

Change Description and Justification: (Part 1.4)

Conforming change to reference new defined term Cyber Security Incidents.

Rationale for R2:

The implementation of an effective Cyber Security Incident response plan mitigates the risk to the reliable operation of the BES caused as the result of a Cyber Security Incident and provides feedback to Responsible Entities for improving the security controls applying to BES Cyber Systems. This requirement ensures implementation of the response plans. Requirement Part 2.3 ensures the retention of incident documentation for post event analysis.

This requirement obligates entities to follow the Cyber Security Incident response plan when an incident occurs or when testing, but does not restrict entities from taking needed deviations from the plan. It ensures the plan represents the actual response and does not exist for documentation only. If a plan is written at a high enough level, then every action during the response should not be subject to scrutiny. The plan will likely allow for the appropriate variance in tactical decisions made by incident responders. Deviations from the plan can be documented during the incident response or afterward as part of the review.

Summary of Changes: Added testing requirements to verify the Responsible Entity’s response plan’s effectiveness and consistent application in responding to a Cyber Security Incident(s) impacting a BES Cyber System.

Reference to prior version: (Part 2.1) CIP-008, R1.6

Change Description and Justification: (Part 2.1)

Minor wording changes; essentially unchanged.

Reference to prior version: (Part 2.2) CIP-008, R1.6

Change Description and Justification: (Part 2.2)

Allows deviation from plan(s) during actual events or testing if deviations are recorded for review.

Reference to prior version: (Part 2.3) CIP-008, R2

Change Description and Justification: (Part 2.3)

Removed references to the retention period because the Standard addresses data retention in the Compliance Section.

Rationale for R3:

Conduct sufficient reviews, updates and communications to verify the Responsible Entity’s response plan’s effectiveness and consistent application in responding to a Cyber Security Incident(s) impacting a BES Cyber System. A separate plan is not required for those requirement parts of the table applicable to High or Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems. If an entity has a single Cyber Security Incident response plan and High or Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems, then the additional requirements would apply to the single plan.

Summary of Changes: Changes here address the FERC Order 706, Paragraph 686, which includes a directive to perform after-action review for tests or actual incidents and update the

plan based on lessons learned. Additional changes include specification of what it means to review the plan and specification of changes that would require an update to the plan.

Reference to prior version: (Part 3.1) CIP-008, R1.5

Change Description and Justification: (Part 3.1)

Addresses FERC Order 706, Paragraph 686 to document test or actual incidents and lessons learned.

Reference to prior version: (Part 3.2) CIP-008, R1.4

Change Description and Justification: (Part 3.2)

Specifies the activities required to maintain the plan. The previous version required entities to update the plan in response to any changes. The modifications make clear the changes that would require an update.

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	1/16/06	R3.2 — Change “Control Center” to “control center.”	3/24/06
2	9/30/09	Modifications to clarify the requirements and to bring the compliance elements into conformance with the latest guidelines for developing compliance elements of standards. Removal of reasonable business judgment. Replaced the RRO with the RE as a Responsible Entity. Rewording of Effective Date. Changed compliance monitor to Compliance Enforcement Authority.	
3		Updated version number from -2 to -3 In Requirement 1.6, deleted the sentence pertaining to removing component or system from service in order to perform testing, in response to FERC order issued September 30, 2009.	
3	12/16/09	Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Update
3	3/31/10	Approved by FERC.	

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4	12/30/10	Modified to add specific criteria for Critical Asset identification.	Update
4	1/24/11	Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Update
5	11/26/12	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Modified to coordinate with other CIP standards and to revise format to use RBS Template.
5	11/22/13	FERC Order issued approving CIP-008-5.	
5	7/9/14	FERC Letter Order issued approving VRFs and VSLs revisions to certain CIP standards.	CIP-008-5 Requirement R2, VSL table under Severe, changed from 19 to 18 calendar months.

This appendix establishes specific provisions for the application of the standard in Québec. Provisions of the standard and of its appendix must be read together for the purposes of understanding and interpretation. Where the standard and appendix differ, the appendix shall prevail.

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Cyber Security — Incident Reporting and Response Planning
2. **Number:** CIP-008-5
3. **Purpose:** No specific provision
4. **Applicability:**

Functional Entities

No specific provision

Facilities

This standard only applies to the facilities of the Main Transmission System (RTP) and to the facilities specified for the Distribution Provider. In application of this standard, any reference to the terms "Bulk Electric System" or "BES" shall be replaced by the terms "Main Transmission System" or "RTP" respectively.

Additional Exemptions

The following are exempt from this standard:

- Generating facilities with a nameplate capacity of 300 MVA or less, unless the facility comprises one or more units that can be synchronized with neighboring systems.
- Step-up substations of generating facilities identified in the preceding point.

5. **Effective Date:**

5.1. Adoption of the standard by the Régie de l'énergie: Month xx 201x

5.2. Adoption of the appendix by the Régie de l'énergie: Month xx 201x

5.3. Effective date of the standard and its appendix in Québec: Month xx 201x

6. **Background:** No specific provision

B. Requirements and Measures

No specific provision

C. Compliance

1. **Compliance Monitoring Process**
 - 1.1. **Compliance Enforcement Authority**

The Régie de l'énergie is responsible, in Québec, for compliance enforcement with respect to the reliability standard and its appendix that it adopts.

1.2. Evidence Retention

No specific provision

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes

No specific provision

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

No specific provision

2. Table of Compliance Elements

No specific provision

D. Regional Variances

No specific provision

E. Interpretations

No specific provision

F. Associated Documents

No specific provision

Guidelines and Technical Basis

No specific provision

Rationale

No specific provision

Revision History

Revision	Adoption Date	Action	Change Tracking
0	Xx month 201x	New appendix	New

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Cyber Security — Recovery Plans for BES Cyber Systems
2. **Number:** CIP-009-5
3. **Purpose:** To recover reliability functions performed by BES Cyber Systems by specifying recovery plan requirements in support of the continued stability, operability, and reliability of the BES.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. **Functional Entities:** For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of functional entities will be collectively referred to as “Responsible Entities.” For requirements in this standard where a specific functional entity or subset of functional entities are the applicable entity or entities, the functional entity or entities are specified explicitly.
 - 4.1.1 **Balancing Authority**
 - 4.1.2 **Distribution Provider** that owns one or more of the following Facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the BES:
 - 4.1.2.1 Each underfrequency Load shedding (UFLS) or undervoltage Load shedding (UVLS) system that:
 - 4.1.2.1.1 is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and
 - 4.1.2.1.2 performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.
 - 4.1.2.2 Each Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme where the Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - 4.1.2.3 Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - 4.1.2.4 Each Cranking Path and group of Elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a Blackstart Resource up to and including the first interconnection point of the starting station service of the next generation unit(s) to be started.
 - 4.1.3 **Generator Operator**
 - 4.1.4 **Generator Owner**
 - 4.1.5 **Interchange Coordinator or Interchange Authority**
 - 4.1.6 **Reliability Coordinator**

4.1.7 Transmission Operator

4.1.8 Transmission Owner

4.2. Facilities: For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following Facilities, systems, and equipment owned by each Responsible Entity in 4.1 above are those to which these requirements are applicable. For requirements in this standard where a specific type of Facilities, system, or equipment or subset of Facilities, systems, and equipment are applicable, these are specified explicitly.

4.2.1 Distribution Provider: One or more of the following Facilities, systems and equipment owned by the Distribution Provider for the protection or restoration of the BES:

4.2.1.1 Each UFLS or UVLS System that:

4.2.1.1.1 is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and

4.2.1.1.2 performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.

4.2.1.2 Each Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme where the Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.

4.2.1.3 Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.

4.2.1.4 Each Cranking Path and group of Elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a Blackstart Resource up to and including the first interconnection point of the starting station service of the next generation unit(s) to be started.

4.2.2 Responsible Entities listed in 4.1 other than Distribution Providers:

All BES Facilities.

4.2.3 Exemptions: The following are exempt from Standard CIP-009-5:

4.2.3.1 Cyber Assets at Facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.

4.2.3.2 Cyber Assets associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete Electronic Security Perimeters.

4.2.3.3 The systems, structures, and components that are regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under a cyber security plan pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Section 73.54.

4.2.3.4 For Distribution Providers, the systems and equipment that are not included in section 4.2.1 above.

4.2.3.5 Responsible Entities that identify that they have no BES Cyber Systems categorized as high impact or medium impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.

5. Effective Dates:

1. **24 Months Minimum** – CIP-009-5 shall become effective on the later of July 1, 2015, or the first calendar day of the ninth calendar quarter after the effective date of the order providing applicable regulatory approval.
2. In those jurisdictions where no regulatory approval is required, CIP-009-5 shall become effective on the first day of the ninth calendar quarter following Board of Trustees' approval, or as otherwise made effective pursuant to the laws applicable to such ERO governmental authorities.

6. Background:

Standard CIP-009-5 exists as part of a suite of CIP Standards related to cyber security. CIP-002-5 requires the initial identification and categorization of BES Cyber Systems. CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1 require a minimum level of organizational, operational, and procedural controls to mitigate risk to BES Cyber Systems. This suite of CIP Standards is referred to as the *Version 5 CIP Cyber Security Standards*.

Most requirements open with, “*Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented [processes, plan, etc] that include the applicable items in [Table Reference].*” The referenced table requires the applicable items in the procedures for the requirement’s common subject matter.

The SDT has incorporated within this standard a recognition that certain requirements should not focus on individual instances of failure as a sole basis for violating the standard. In particular, the SDT has incorporated an approach to empower and enable the industry to identify, assess, and correct deficiencies in the implementation of certain requirements. The intent is to change the basis of a violation in those requirements so that they are not focused on *whether* there is a deficiency, but on identifying, assessing, and correcting deficiencies. It is presented in those requirements by modifying “implement” as follows:

Each Responsible Entity shall implement, **in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, . . .**

The term *documented processes* refers to a set of required instructions specific to the Responsible Entity and to achieve a specific outcome. This term does not imply any particular naming or approval structure beyond what is stated in the requirements. An entity should include as much as it believes necessary in their documented processes, but they must address the applicable requirements in the table. The

documented processes themselves are not required to include the “. . . identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, . . .” elements described in the preceding paragraph, as those aspects are related to the manner of implementation of the documented processes and could be accomplished through other controls or compliance management activities.

The terms *program* and *plan* are sometimes used in place of *documented processes* where it makes sense and is commonly understood. For example, documented processes describing a response are typically referred to as *plans* (i.e., incident response plans and recovery plans). Likewise, a security plan can describe an approach involving multiple procedures to address a broad subject matter.

Similarly, the term *program* may refer to the organization’s overall implementation of its policies, plans and procedures involving a subject matter. Examples in the standards include the personnel risk assessment program and the personnel training program. The full implementation of the CIP Cyber Security Standards could also be referred to as a program. However, the terms *program* and *plan* do not imply any additional requirements beyond what is stated in the standards.

Responsible Entities can implement common controls that meet requirements for multiple high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems. For example, a single training program could meet the requirements for training personnel across multiple BES Cyber Systems.

Measures for the initial requirement are simply the documented processes themselves. Measures in the table rows provide examples of evidence to show documentation and implementation of applicable items in the documented processes. These measures serve to provide guidance to entities in acceptable records of compliance and should not be viewed as an all-inclusive list.

Throughout the standards, unless otherwise stated, bulleted items in the requirements and measures are items that are linked with an “or,” and numbered items are items that are linked with an “and.”

Many references in the Applicability section use a threshold of 300 MW for UFLS and UVLS. This particular threshold of 300 MW for UVLS and UFLS was provided in Version 1 of the CIP Cyber Security Standards. The threshold remains at 300 MW since it is specifically addressing UVLS and UFLS, which are last ditch efforts to save the Bulk Electric System. A review of UFLS tolerances defined within regional reliability standards for UFLS program requirements to date indicates that the historical value of 300 MW represents an adequate and reasonable threshold value for allowable UFLS operational tolerances.

“Applicable Systems” Columns in Tables:

Each table has an “Applicable Systems” column to further define the scope of systems to which a specific requirement row applies. The CSO706 SDT adapted this concept from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) Risk Management Framework as a way of applying requirements more appropriately based on impact and connectivity characteristics. The following conventions are used in the “Applicable Systems” column as described.

- **High Impact BES Cyber Systems** – Applies to BES Cyber Systems categorized as high impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.
- **Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems** – Applies to BES Cyber Systems categorized as medium impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.
- **Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at Control Centers** – Only applies to BES Cyber Systems located at a Control Center and categorized as medium impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.
- **Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS)** – Applies to each Electronic Access Control or Monitoring System associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System. Examples include, but are not limited to firewalls, authentication servers, and log monitoring and alerting systems.
- **Physical Access Control Systems (PACS)** – Applies to each Physical Access Control System associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System with External Routable Connectivity.

B. Requirements and Measures

- R1.** Each Responsible Entity shall have one or more documented recovery plans that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-009-5 Table R1 – Recovery Plan Specifications*. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning].
- M1.** Evidence must include the documented recovery plan(s) that collectively include the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-009-5 Table R1 – Recovery Plan Specifications*.

CIP-009-5 Table R1 – Recovery Plan Specifications			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.1	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS 	Conditions for activation of the recovery plan(s).	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, one or more plans that include language identifying conditions for activation of the recovery plan(s).
1.2	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS 	Roles and responsibilities of responders.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, one or more recovery plans that include language identifying the roles and responsibilities of responders.

CIP-009-5 Table R1 – Recovery Plan Specifications			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.3	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS 	<p>One or more processes for the backup and storage of information required to recover BES Cyber System functionality.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation of specific processes for the backup and storage of information required to recover BES Cyber System functionality.</p>

CIP-009-5 Table R1 – Recovery Plan Specifications			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.4	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at Control Centers and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS 	<p>One or more processes to verify the successful completion of the backup processes in Part 1.3 and to address any backup failures.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, logs, workflow or other documentation confirming that the backup process completed successfully and backup failures, if any, were addressed.</p>
1.5	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS 	<p>One or more processes to preserve data, per Cyber Asset capability, for determining the cause of a Cyber Security Incident that triggers activation of the recovery plan(s). Data preservation should not impede or restrict recovery.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, procedures to preserve data, such as preserving a corrupted drive or making a data mirror of the system before proceeding with recovery.</p>

- R2.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, its documented recovery plan(s) to collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-009-5 Table R2 – Recovery Plan Implementation and Testing*. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning and Real-time Operations.]
- M2.** Evidence must include, but is not limited to, documentation that collectively demonstrates implementation of each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-009-5 Table R2 – Recovery Plan Implementation and Testing*.

CIP-009-5 Table R2 – Recovery Plan Implementation and Testing			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.1	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at Control Centers and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS 	<p>Test each of the recovery plans referenced in Requirement R1 at least once every 15 calendar months:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • By recovering from an actual incident; • With a paper drill or tabletop exercise; or • With an operational exercise. 	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated evidence of a test (by recovering from an actual incident, with a paper drill or tabletop exercise, or with an operational exercise) of the recovery plan at least once every 15 calendar months. For the paper drill or full operational exercise, evidence may include meeting notices, minutes, or other records of exercise findings.</p>

CIP-009-5 Table R2 – Recovery Plan Implementation and Testing			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.2	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at Control Centers and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS 	<p>Test a representative sample of information used to recover BES Cyber System functionality at least once every 15 calendar months to ensure that the information is useable and is compatible with current configurations.</p> <p>An actual recovery that incorporates the information used to recover BES Cyber System functionality substitutes for this test.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, operational logs or test results with criteria for testing the usability (e.g. sample tape load, browsing tape contents) and compatibility with current system configurations (e.g. manual or automated comparison checkpoints between backup media contents and current configuration).</p>
2.3	High Impact BES Cyber Systems	<p>Test each of the recovery plans referenced in Requirement R1 at least once every 36 calendar months through an operational exercise of the recovery plans in an environment representative of the production environment.</p> <p>An actual recovery response may substitute for an operational exercise.</p>	<p>Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated documentation of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An operational exercise at least once every 36 calendar months between exercises, that demonstrates recovery in a representative environment; or • An actual recovery response that occurred within the 36 calendar month timeframe that exercised the recovery plans.

- R3.** Each Responsible Entity shall maintain each of its recovery plans in accordance with each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-009-5 Table R3 – Recovery Plan Review, Update and Communication*. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Operations Assessment].
- M3.** Acceptable evidence includes, but is not limited to, each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-009-5 Table R3 – Recovery Plan Review, Update and Communication*.

CIP-009-5 Table R3 – Recovery Plan Review, Update and Communication			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
3.1	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at Control Centers and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS 	<p>No later than 90 calendar days after completion of a recovery plan test or actual recovery:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3.1.1. Document any lessons learned associated with a recovery plan test or actual recovery or document the absence of any lessons learned; 3.1.2. Update the recovery plan based on any documented lessons learned associated with the plan; and 3.1.3. Notify each person or group with a defined role in the recovery plan of the updates to the recovery plan based on any documented lessons learned. 	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, all of the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dated documentation of identified deficiencies or lessons learned for each recovery plan test or actual incident recovery or dated documentation stating there were no lessons learned; 2. Dated and revised recovery plan showing any changes based on the lessons learned; and 3. Evidence of plan update distribution including, but not limited to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emails; • USPS or other mail service; • Electronic distribution system; or • Training sign-in sheets.

CIP-009-5 Table R3 – Recovery Plan Review, Update and Communication			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
3.2	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at Control Centers and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS 	<p>No later than 60 calendar days after a change to the roles or responsibilities, responders, or technology that the Responsible Entity determines would impact the ability to execute the recovery plan:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3.2.1. Update the recovery plan; and 3.2.2. Notify each person or group with a defined role in the recovery plan of the updates. 	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, all of the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dated and revised recovery plan with changes to the roles or responsibilities, responders, or technology; and 2. Evidence of plan update distribution including, but not limited to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emails; • USPS or other mail service; • Electronic distribution system; or • Training sign-in sheets.

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process:

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority:

The Regional Entity shall serve as the Compliance Enforcement Authority (“CEA”) unless the applicable entity is owned, operated, or controlled by the Regional Entity. In such cases the ERO or a Regional Entity approved by FERC or other applicable governmental authority shall serve as the CEA.

1.2. Evidence Retention:

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the CEA may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Responsible Entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its CEA to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

- Each Responsible Entity shall retain evidence of each requirement in this standard for three calendar years.
- If a Responsible Entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.
- The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes:

- Compliance Audit
- Self-Certification
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Investigation
- Self-Reporting
- Complaint

1.4. Additional Compliance Information:

- None

2. Table of Compliance Elements

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-009-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1	Long-term Planning	Medium	N/A	The Responsible Entity has developed recovery plan(s), but the plan(s) do not address one of the requirements included in Parts 1.2 through 1.5.	The Responsible Entity has developed recovery plan(s), but the plan(s) do not address two of the requirements included in Parts 1.2 through 1.5.	The Responsible Entity has not created recovery plan(s) for BES Cyber Systems. OR The Responsible Entity has created recovery plan(s) for BES Cyber Systems, but the plan(s) does not address the conditions for activation in Part 1.1. OR The Responsible Entity has created recovery plan(s) for BES Cyber Systems, but the plan(s) does not address three or more of the requirements in Parts 1.2 through 1.5.
R2	Operations	Lower	The Responsible	The Responsible	The Responsible	The Responsible

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-009-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
	<p>Planning</p> <p>Real-time Operations</p>		<p>Entity has not tested the recovery plan(s) according to R2 Part 2.1 within 15 calendar months, not exceeding 16 calendar months between tests of the plan, and when tested, any deficiencies were identified, assessed, and corrected. (2.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has not tested a representative sample of the information used in the recovery of BES Cyber System functionality according to R2 Part 2.2 within 15 calendar months, not exceeding 16 calendar months between tests, and when tested, any</p>	<p>Entity has not tested the recovery plan(s) within 16 calendar months, not exceeding 17 calendar months between tests of the plan, and when tested, any deficiencies were identified, assessed, and corrected. (2.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has not tested a representative sample of the information used in the recovery of BES Cyber System functionality according to R2 Part 2.2 within 16 calendar months, not exceeding 17 calendar months between tests, and when tested, any deficiencies were</p>	<p>Entity has not tested the recovery plan(s) according to R2 Part 2.1 within 17 calendar months, not exceeding 18 calendar months between tests of the plan, and when tested, any deficiencies were identified, assessed, and corrected. (2.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has not tested a representative sample of the information used in the recovery of BES Cyber System functionality according to R2 Part 2.2 within 17 calendar months, not exceeding 18 calendar months between tests, and when tested, any deficiencies were</p>	<p>Entity has not tested the recovery plan(s) according to R2 Part 2.1 within 18 calendar months between tests of the plan. (2.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has tested the recovery plan(s) according to R2 Part 2.1 and identified deficiencies, but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (2.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has tested the recovery plan(s) according to R2 Part 2.1 but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (2.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-009-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			deficiencies were identified, assessed, and corrected. (2.2) OR The Responsible Entity has not tested the recovery plan according to R2 Part 2.3 within 36 calendar months, not exceeding 37 calendar months between tests, and when tested, any deficiencies were identified, assessed, and corrected. (2.3)	identified, assessed, and corrected. (2.2) OR The Responsible Entity has not tested the recovery plan according to R2 Part 2.3 within 37 calendar months, not exceeding 38 calendar months between tests, and when tested, any deficiencies were identified, assessed, and corrected. (2.3)	identified, assessed, and corrected. (2.2) OR The Responsible Entity has not tested the recovery plan according to R2 Part 2.3 within 38 calendar months, not exceeding 39 calendar months between tests, and when tested, any deficiencies were identified, assessed, and corrected. (2.3)	Entity has not tested a representative sample of the information used in the recovery of BES Cyber System functionality according to R2 Part 2.2 within 18 calendar months between tests. (2.2) OR The Responsible Entity has tested a representative sample of the information used in the recovery of BES Cyber System functionality according to R2 Part 2.2 and identified deficiencies, but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (2.2) OR The Responsible Entity has tested a

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-009-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						<p>representative sample of the information used in the recovery of BES Cyber System functionality according to R2 Part 2.2 but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (2.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has not tested the recovery plan(s) according to R2 Part 2.3 within 39 calendar months between tests of the plan. (2.3)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has tested the recovery plan(s) according to R2 Part 2.3 and identified deficiencies, but did not assess or correct</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-009-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						the deficiencies. (2.3) OR The Responsible Entity has tested the recovery plan(s) according to R2 Part 2.3 but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (2.3)
R3	Operations Assessment	Lower	The Responsible Entity has not notified each person or group with a defined role in the recovery plan(s) of updates within 90 and less than 120 calendar days of the update being completed. (3.1.3)	The Responsible Entity has not updated the recovery plan(s) based on any documented lessons learned within 90 and less than 120 calendar days of each recovery plan test or actual recovery. (3.1.2) OR The Responsible Entity has not notified each person or group with a defined role in the recovery plan(s) of updates within 120	The Responsible Entity has neither documented lessons learned nor documented the absence of any lessons learned within 90 and less than 120 calendar days of each recovery plan test or actual recovery. (3.1.1) OR The Responsible Entity has not updated the recovery plan(s) based on any	The Responsible Entity has neither documented lessons learned nor documented the absence of any lessons learned within 120 calendar days of each recovery plan test or actual recovery. (3.1.1)

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-009-5)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
				calendar days of the update being completed. (3.1.3) OR The Responsible Entity has not updated the recovery plan(s) or notified each person or group with a defined role within 60 and less than 90 calendar days of any of the following changes that the responsible entity determines would impact the ability to execute the plan: (3.2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Roles or responsibilities, or • Responders, or • Technology changes. 	documented lessons learned within 120 calendar days of each recovery plan test or actual recovery. (3.1.2) OR The Responsible Entity has not updated the recovery plan(s) or notified each person or group with a defined role within 90 calendar days of any of the following changes that the responsible entity determines would impact the ability to execute the plan: (3.2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Roles or responsibilities, or • Responders, or • Technology changes. 	

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. Associated Documents

None.

Guidelines and Technical Basis

Section 4 – Scope of Applicability of the CIP Cyber Security Standards

Section “4. Applicability” of the standards provides important information for Responsible Entities to determine the scope of the applicability of the CIP Cyber Security Requirements.

Section “4.1. Functional Entities” is a list of NERC functional entities to which the standard applies. If the entity is registered as one or more of the functional entities listed in Section 4.1, then the NERC CIP Cyber Security Standards apply. Note that there is a qualification in Section 4.1 that restricts the applicability in the case of Distribution Providers to only those that own certain types of systems and equipment listed in 4.2. Furthermore,

Section “4.2. Facilities” defines the scope of the Facilities, systems, and equipment owned by the Responsible Entity, as qualified in Section 4.1, that is subject to the requirements of the standard. As specified in the exemption section 4.2.3.5, this standard does not apply to Responsible Entities that do not have High Impact or Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems under CIP-002-5’s categorization. In addition to the set of BES Facilities, Control Centers, and other systems and equipment, the list includes the set of systems and equipment owned by Distribution Providers. While the NERC Glossary term “Facilities” already includes the BES characteristic, the additional use of the term BES here is meant to reinforce the scope of applicability of these Facilities where it is used, especially in this applicability scoping section. This in effect sets the scope of Facilities, systems, and equipment that is subject to the standards.

Requirement R1:

The following guidelines are available to assist in addressing the required components of a recovery plan:

- NERC, Security Guideline for the Electricity Sector: Continuity of Business Processes and Operations Operational Functions, September 2011, online at <http://www.nerc.com/docs/cip/sgwg/Continuity%20of%20Business%20and%20Operational%20Functions%20FINAL%20102511.pdf>
- National Institute of Standards and Technology, Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems, Special Publication 800-34 revision 1, May 2010, online at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-34-rev1/sp800-34-rev1_errata-Nov11-2010.pdf

The term recovery plan is used throughout this Standard to refer to a documented set of instructions and resources needed to recover reliability functions performed by BES Cyber Systems. The recovery plan may exist as part of a larger business continuity or disaster recovery plan, but the term does not imply any additional obligations associated with those disciplines outside of the Requirements.

A documented recovery plan may not be necessary for each applicable BES Cyber System. For example, the short-term recovery plan for a BES Cyber System in a specific substation may be

managed on a daily basis by advanced power system applications such as state estimation, contingency and remedial action, and outage scheduling. One recovery plan for BES Cyber Systems should suffice for several similar facilities such as those found in substations or power plants' facilities.

For Part 1.1, the conditions for activation of the recovery plan should consider viable threats to the BES Cyber System such as natural disasters, computing equipment failures, computing environment failures, and Cyber Security Incidents. A business impact analysis for the BES Cyber System may be useful in determining these conditions.

For Part 1.2, entities should identify the individuals required for responding to a recovery operation of the applicable BES Cyber System.

For Part 1.3, entities should consider the following types of information to recover BES Cyber System functionality:

1. Installation files and media;
2. Current backup tapes and any additional documented configuration settings;
3. Documented build or restoration procedures; and
4. Cross site replication storage.

For Part 1.4, the processes to verify the successful completion of backup processes should include checking for: (1) usability of backup media, (2) logs or inspection showing that information from current, production system could be read, and (3) logs or inspection showing that information was written to the backup media. Test restorations are not required for this Requirement Part. The following backup scenarios provide examples of effective processes to verify successful completion and detect any backup failures:

- Periodic (e.g. daily or weekly) backup process – Review generated logs or job status reports and set up notifications for backup failures.
- Non-periodic backup process– If a single backup is provided during the commissioning of the system, then only the initial and periodic (every 15 months) testing must be done. Additional testing should be done as necessary and can be a part of the configuration change management program.
- Data mirroring – Configure alerts on the failure of data transfer for an amount of time specified by the entity (e.g. 15 minutes) in which the information on the mirrored disk may no longer be useful for recovery.
- Manual configuration information – Inspect the information used for recovery prior to storing initially and periodically (every 15 months). Additional inspection should be done as necessary and can be a part of the configuration change management program.

The plan must also include processes to address backup failures. These processes should specify the response to failure notifications or other forms of identification.

For Part 1.5, the recovery plan must include considerations for preservation of data to determine the cause of a Cyber Security Incident. Because it is not always possible to initially

know if a Cyber Security Incident caused the recovery activation, the data preservation procedures should be followed until such point a Cyber Security Incident can be ruled out. CIP-008 addresses the retention of data associated with a Cyber Security Incident.

Requirement R2:

A Responsible Entity must exercise each BES Cyber System recovery plan every 15 months. However, this does not necessarily mean that the entity must test each plan individually. BES Cyber Systems that are numerous and distributed, such as those found at substations, may not require an individual recovery plan and the associated redundant facilities since reengineering and reconstruction may be the generic response to a severe event. Conversely, there is typically one control center per bulk transmission service area that requires a redundant or backup facility. Because of these differences, the recovery plans associated with control centers differ a great deal from those associated with power plants and substations.

A recovery plan test does not necessarily cover all aspects of a recovery plan and failure scenarios, but the test should be sufficient to ensure the plan is up to date and at least one restoration process of the applicable cyber systems is covered.

Entities may use an actual recovery as a substitute for exercising the plan every 15 months. Otherwise, entities must exercise the plan with a paper drill, tabletop exercise, or operational exercise. For more specific types of exercises, refer to the FEMA Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). It lists the following four types of discussion-based exercises: seminar, workshop, tabletop, and games. In particular, it defines that, "A tabletop exercise involves key personnel discussing simulated scenarios in an informal setting. [Table top exercises (TTX)] can be used to assess plans, policies, and procedures."

The HSEEP lists the following three types of operations-based exercises: Drill, functional exercise, and full-scale exercise. It defines that, "[A] full-scale exercise is a multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional, multi-discipline exercise involving functional (e.g., joint field office, Emergency operation centers, etc.) and 'boots on the ground' response (e.g., firefighters decontaminating mock victims)."

For Part 2.2, entities should refer to the backup and storage of information required to recover BES Cyber System functionality in Requirement Part 1.3. This provides additional assurance that the information will actually recover the BES Cyber System as necessary. For most complex computing equipment, a full test of the information is not feasible. Entities should determine the representative sample of information that provides assurance in the processes for Requirement Part 1.3. The test must include steps for ensuring the information is useable and current. For backup media, this can include testing a representative sample to make sure the information can be loaded, and checking the content to make sure the information reflects the current configuration of the applicable Cyber Assets.

Requirement R3:

This requirement ensures entities maintain recovery plans. There are two requirement parts that trigger plan updates: (1) lessons learned and (2) organizational or technology changes.

The documentation of lessons learned is associated with each recovery activation, and it involves the activities as illustrated in Figure 1, below. The deadline to document lessons learned starts after the completion of the recovery operation in recognition that complex recovery activities can take a few days or weeks to complete. The process of conducting lessons learned can involve the recovery team discussing the incident to determine gaps or areas of improvement within the plan. It is possible to have a recovery activation without any documented lessons learned. In such cases, the entity must retain documentation of the absence of any lessons learned associated with the recovery activation.




Figure 1: CIP-009-5 R3 Timeline

The activities necessary to complete the lessons learned include updating the plan and distributing those updates. Entities should consider meeting with all of the individuals involved in the recovery and documenting the lessons learned as soon after the recovery activation as possible. This allows more time for making effective updates to the plan, obtaining any necessary approvals, and distributing those updates to the recovery team.

The plan change requirement is associated with organization and technology changes referenced in the plan and involves the activities illustrated in Figure 2, below. Organizational changes include changes to the roles and responsibilities people have in the plan or changes to the response groups or individuals. This may include changes to the names or contact information listed in the plan. Technology changes affecting the plan may include referenced information sources, communication systems, or ticketing systems.




Figure 2: Timeline for Plan Changes in 3.2

When notifying individuals of response plan changes, entities should keep in mind that recovery plans may be considered BES Cyber System Information, and they should take the appropriate measures to prevent unauthorized disclosure of recovery plan information. For example, the recovery plan itself, or other sensitive information about the recovery plan, should be redacted from Email or other unencrypted transmission.

Rationale:

During the development of this standard, references to prior versions of the CIP standards and rationale for the requirements and their parts were embedded within the standard. Upon BOT approval, that information was moved to this section.

Rationale for R1:

Preventative activities can lower the number of incidents, but not all incidents can be prevented. A preplanned recovery capability is, therefore, necessary for rapidly recovering from incidents, minimizing loss and destruction, mitigating the weaknesses that were exploited, and restoring computing services so that planned and consistent recovery action to restore BES Cyber System functionality occurs.

Summary of Changes: Added provisions to protect data that would be useful in the investigation of an event that results in the need for a Cyber System recovery plan to be utilized.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.1) CIP-009, R1.1

Change Description and Justification: (Part 1.1)

Minor wording changes; essentially unchanged.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.2) CIP-009, R1.2

Change Description and Justification: (Part 1.2)

Minor wording changes; essentially unchanged.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.3) CIP-009, R4

Change Description and Justification: (Part 1.3)

Addresses FERC Order Paragraph 739 and 748. The modified wording was abstracted from Paragraph 744.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.4) New Requirement

Change Description and Justification: (Part 1.4)

Addresses FERC Order Section 739 and 748.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.5) New Requirement

Change Description and Justification: (Part 1.5)

Added requirement to address FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 706.

Rationale for R2:

The implementation of an effective recovery plan mitigates the risk to the reliable operation of the BES by reducing the time to recover from various hazards affecting BES Cyber Systems. This requirement ensures continued implementation of the response plans.

Requirement Part 2.2 provides further assurance in the information (e.g. backup tapes, mirrored hot-sites, etc.) necessary to recover BES Cyber Systems. A full test is not feasible in most instances due to the amount of recovery information, and the Responsible Entity must determine a sampling that provides assurance in the usability of the information.

Summary of Changes. Added operational testing for recovery of BES Cyber Systems.

Reference to prior version: (Part 2.1) CIP-009, R2

Change Description and Justification: (Part 2.1)

Minor wording change; essentially unchanged.

Reference to prior version: (Part 2.2) CIP-009, R5

Change Description and Justification: (Part 2.2)

Specifies what to test and makes clear the test can be a representative sampling. These changes, along with Requirement Part 1.4 address the FERC Order No. 706, Paragraphs 739 and 748 related to testing of backups by providing high confidence the information will actually recover the system as necessary.

Reference to prior version: (Part 2.3) CIP-009, R2

Change Description and Justification: (Part 2.3)

Addresses FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 725 to add the requirement that the recovery plan test be a full operational test once every 3 years.

Rationale for R3:

To improve the effectiveness of BES Cyber System recovery plan(s) following a test, and to ensure the maintenance and distribution of the recovery plan(s). Responsible Entities achieve this by (i) performing a lessons learned review in 3.1 and (ii) revising the plan in 3.2 based on specific changes in the organization or technology that would impact plan execution. In both instances when the plan needs to change, the Responsible Entity updates and distributes the plan.

Summary of Changes: Makes clear when to perform lessons learned review of the plan and specifies the timeframe for updating the recovery plan.

Reference to prior version: (Part 3.1) CIP-009, R1 and R3

Change Description and Justification: (Part 3.1)

Added the timeframes for performing lessons learned and completing the plan updates. This requirement combines all three activities in one place. Where previous versions specified 30 calendar days for performing lessons learned, followed by additional time for updating recovery plans and notification, this requirement combines those activities into a single timeframe.

Reference to prior version: (Part 3.2) New Requirement

Change Description and Justification: (Part 3.2)

Specifies the activities required to maintain the plan. The previous version required entities to update the plan in response to any changes. The modifications make clear the specific changes that would require an update.

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	1/16/06	R3.2 — Change “Control Center” to “control center”	3/24/06
2	9/30/09	Modifications to clarify the requirements and to bring the compliance elements into conformance with the latest guidelines for developing compliance elements of standards. Removal of reasonable business judgment. Replaced the RRO with the RE as a Responsible Entity. Rewording of Effective Date. Changed compliance monitor to Compliance Enforcement Authority.	

Guidelines and Technical Basis

3		Updated version number from -2 to -3 In Requirement 1.6, deleted the sentence pertaining to removing component or system from service in order to perform testing, in response to FERC order issued September 30, 2009.	
3	12/16/09	Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Update
3	3/31/10	Approved by FERC.	
4	12/30/10	Modified to add specific criteria for Critical Asset identification.	Update
4	1/24/11	Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees.	
5	11/26/12	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Modified to coordinate with other CIP standards and to revise format to use RBS Template.
5	11/22/13	FERC Order issued approving CIP-009-5.	
5	7/9/14	FERC Letter Order issued approving VRFs and VSLs revisions to certain CIP standards.	Revised timeframes contained in VSLs from 90-210 days to 90-120 days.

This appendix establishes specific provisions for the application of the standard in Québec. Provisions of the standard and of its appendix must be read together for the purposes of understanding and interpretation. Where the standard and appendix differ, the appendix shall prevail.

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Cyber Security — Recovery Plans for BES Cyber Systems
2. **Number:** CIP-009-5
3. **Purpose:** No specific provision
4. **Applicability:**

Functional Entities

No specific provision

Facilities

This standard only applies to the facilities of the Main Transmission System (RTP) and to the facilities specified for the Distribution Provider. In application of this standard, any reference to the terms "Bulk Electric System" or "BES" shall be replaced by the terms "Main Transmission System" or "RTP" respectively.

Additional Exemptions

The following are exempt from this standard:

- Generating facilities with a nameplate capacity of 300 MVA or less, unless the facility comprises one or more units that can be synchronized with neighboring systems.
- Step-up substations of generating facilities identified in the preceding point.

5. **Effective Date:**

5.1. Adoption of the standard by the Régie de l'énergie: Month xx, 201x

5.2. Adoption of the appendix by the Régie de l'énergie: Month xx, 201x

5.3. Effective date of the standard and its appendix in Québec: Month xx, 201x

6. **Background:** No specific provision

B. Requirements and Measures

No specific provision

C. Compliance

1. **Compliance Monitoring Process**
 - 1.1. **Compliance Enforcement Authority**

The Régie de l'énergie is responsible, in Québec, for compliance enforcement with respect to the reliability standard and its appendix that it adopts.

1.2. Evidence Retention

No specific provision

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes

No specific provision

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

No specific provision

2. Table of Compliance Elements

No specific provision

D. Regional Variances

No specific provision

E. Interpretations

No specific provision

F. Associated Documents

No specific provision

Guidelines and Technical Basis

No specific provision

Rationale

No specific provision

Revision History

Revision	Adoption Date	Action	Change Tracking
0	Xx month 201x	New appendix	New

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Cyber Security — Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments
2. **Number:** CIP-010-1
3. **Purpose:** To prevent and detect unauthorized changes to BES Cyber Systems by specifying configuration change management and vulnerability assessment requirements in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems from compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the BES.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. **Functional Entities:** For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of functional entities will be collectively referred to as “Responsible Entities.” For requirements in this standard where a specific functional entity or subset of functional entities are the applicable entity or entities, the functional entity or entities are specified explicitly.
 - 4.1.1 **Balancing Authority**
 - 4.1.2 **Distribution Provider** that owns one or more of the following Facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the BES:
 - 4.1.2.1 Each underfrequency Load shedding (UFLS) or undervoltage Load shedding (UVLS) system that:
 - 4.1.2.1.1 is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and
 - 4.1.2.1.2 performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.
 - 4.1.2.2 Each Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme where the Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - 4.1.2.3 Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - 4.1.2.4 Each Cranking Path and group of Elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a Blackstart Resource up to and including the first interconnection point of the starting station service of the next generation unit(s) to be started.
 - 4.1.3 **Generator Operator**
 - 4.1.4 **Generator Owner**
 - 4.1.5 **Interchange Coordinator or Interchange Authority**

4.1.6 Reliability Coordinator

4.1.7 Transmission Operator

4.1.8 Transmission Owner

4.2. Facilities: For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following Facilities, systems, and equipment owned by each Responsible Entity in 4.1 above are those to which these requirements are applicable. For requirements in this standard where a specific type of Facilities, system, or equipment or subset of Facilities, systems, and equipment are applicable, these are specified explicitly.

4.2.1 Distribution Provider: One or more of the following Facilities, systems and equipment owned by the Distribution Provider for the protection or restoration of the BES:

4.2.1.1 Each UFLS or UVLS System that:

4.2.1.1.1 is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and

4.2.1.1.2 performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.

4.2.1.2 Each Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme where the Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.

4.2.1.3 Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.

4.2.1.4 Each Cranking Path and group of Elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a Blackstart Resource up to and including the first interconnection point of the starting station service of the next generation unit(s) to be started.

4.2.2 Responsible Entities listed in 4.1 other than Distribution Providers:

All BES Facilities.

4.2.3 Exemptions: The following are exempt from Standard CIP-010-1:

4.2.3.1 Cyber Assets at Facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.

4.2.3.2 Cyber Assets associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete Electronic Security Perimeters.

4.2.3.3 The systems, structures, and components that are regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under a cyber security plan pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Section 73.54.

4.2.3.4 For Distribution Providers, the systems and equipment that are not included in section 4.2.1 above.

4.2.3.5 Responsible Entities that identify that they have no BES Cyber Systems categorized as high impact or medium impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.

5. Effective Dates:

1. **24 Months Minimum** – CIP-010-1 shall become effective on the later of July 1, 2015, or the first calendar day of the ninth calendar quarter after the effective date of the order providing applicable regulatory approval.
2. In those jurisdictions where no regulatory approval is required, CIP-010-1 shall become effective on the first day of the ninth calendar quarter following Board of Trustees' approval, or as otherwise made effective pursuant to the laws applicable to such ERO governmental authorities.

6. Background:

Standard CIP-010-1 exists as part of a suite of CIP Standards related to cyber security. CIP-002-5 requires the initial identification and categorization of BES Cyber Systems. CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1 require a minimum level of organizational, operational and procedural controls to mitigate risk to BES Cyber Systems. This suite of CIP Standards is referred to as the *Version 5 CIP Cyber Security Standards*.

Most requirements open with, “*Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented [processes, plan, etc] that include the applicable items in [Table Reference].*” The referenced table requires the applicable items in the procedures for the requirement’s common subject matter.

The SDT has incorporated within this standard a recognition that certain requirements should not focus on individual instances of failure as a sole basis for violating the standard. In particular, the SDT has incorporated an approach to empower and enable the industry to identify, assess, and correct deficiencies in the implementation of certain requirements. The intent is to change the basis of a violation in those requirements so that they are not focused on *whether* there is a deficiency, but on identifying, assessing, and correcting deficiencies. It is presented in those requirements by modifying “implement” as follows:

Each Responsible Entity shall implement, **in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies**, . . .

The term *documented processes* refers to a set of required instructions specific to the Responsible Entity and to achieve a specific outcome. This term does not imply any particular naming or approval structure beyond what is stated in the requirements. An entity should include as much as it believes necessary in their documented processes, but they must address the applicable requirements in the table. The

documented processes themselves are not required to include the “. . . identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, . . .” elements described in the preceding paragraph, as those aspects are related to the manner of implementation of the documented processes and could be accomplished through other controls or compliance management activities.

The terms *program* and *plan* are sometimes used in place of *documented processes* where it makes sense and is commonly understood. For example, documented processes describing a response are typically referred to as *plans* (i.e., incident response plans and recovery plans). Likewise, a security plan can describe an approach involving multiple procedures to address a broad subject matter.

Similarly, the term *program* may refer to the organization’s overall implementation of its policies, plans and procedures involving a subject matter. Examples in the standards include the personnel risk assessment program and the personnel training program. The full implementation of the CIP Cyber Security Standards could also be referred to as a program. However, the terms *program* and *plan* do not imply any additional requirements beyond what is stated in the standards.

Responsible Entities can implement common controls that meet requirements for multiple high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems. For example, a single training program could meet the requirements for training personnel across multiple BES Cyber Systems.

Measures for the initial requirement are simply the documented processes themselves. Measures in the table rows provide examples of evidence to show documentation and implementation of applicable items in the documented processes. These measures serve to provide guidance to entities in acceptable records of compliance and should not be viewed as an all-inclusive list.

Throughout the standards, unless otherwise stated, bulleted items in the requirements and measures are items that are linked with an “or,” and numbered items are items that are linked with an “and.”

Many references in the Applicability section use a threshold of 300 MW for UFLS and UVLS. This particular threshold of 300 MW for UVLS and UFLS was provided in Version 1 of the CIP Cyber Security Standards. The threshold remains at 300 MW since it is specifically addressing UVLS and UFLS, which are last ditch efforts to save the Bulk Electric System. A review of UFLS tolerances defined within regional reliability standards for UFLS program requirements to date indicates that the historical value of 300 MW represents an adequate and reasonable threshold value for allowable UFLS operational tolerances.

“Applicable Systems” Columns in Tables:

Each table has an “Applicable Systems” column to further define the scope of systems to which a specific requirement row applies. The CSO706 SDT adapted this concept from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) Risk Management Framework as a way of applying requirements more appropriately

based on impact and connectivity characteristics. The following conventions are used in the applicability column as described.

- **High Impact BES Cyber Systems** – Applies to BES Cyber Systems categorized as high impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.
- **Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems** – Applies to BES Cyber Systems categorized as medium impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.
- **Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS)**– Applies to each Electronic Access Control or Monitoring System associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System. Examples may include, but are not limited to, firewalls, authentication servers, and log monitoring and alerting systems.
- **Physical Access Control Systems (PACS)**– Applies to each Physical Access Control System associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System with External Routable Connectivity.
- **Protected Cyber Assets (PCA)** – Applies to each Protected Cyber Asset associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System

B. Requirements and Measures

R1. Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-010-1 Table R1 – Configuration Change Management*. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning].

M1. Evidence must include each of the applicable documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-010-1 Table R1 – Configuration Change Management* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-010-1 Table R1 – Configuration Change Management			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.1	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	<p>Develop a baseline configuration, individually or by group, which shall include the following items:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.1.1. Operating system(s) (including version) or firmware where no independent operating system exists; 1.1.2. Any commercially available or open-source application software (including version) intentionally installed; 1.1.3. Any custom software installed; 1.1.4. Any logical network accessible ports; and 1.1.5. Any security patches applied. 	<p>Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A spreadsheet identifying the required items of the baseline configuration for each Cyber Asset, individually or by group; or • A record in an asset management system that identifies the required items of the baseline configuration for each Cyber Asset, individually or by group.

CIP-010-1 Table R1 – Configuration Change Management			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.2	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	<p>Authorize and document changes that deviate from the existing baseline configuration.</p>	<p>Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A change request record and associated electronic authorization (performed by the individual or group with the authority to authorize the change) in a change management system for each change; or • Documentation that the change was performed in accordance with the requirement.

CIP-010-1 Table R1 – Configuration Change Management			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.3	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	<p>For a change that deviates from the existing baseline configuration, update the baseline configuration as necessary within 30 calendar days of completing the change.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, updated baseline documentation with a date that is within 30 calendar days of the date of the completion of the change.</p>
1.4	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	<p>For a change that deviates from the existing baseline configuration:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.4.1. Prior to the change, determine required cyber security controls in CIP-005 and CIP-007 that could be impacted by the change; 1.4.2. Following the change, verify that required cyber security controls determined in 1.4.1 are not adversely affected; and 1.4.3. Document the results of the verification. 	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a list of cyber security controls verified or tested along with the dated test results.</p>

CIP-010-1 Table R1 – Configuration Change Management			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.5	High Impact BES Cyber Systems	<p>Where technically feasible, for each change that deviates from the existing baseline configuration:</p> <p>1.5.1. Prior to implementing any change in the production environment, test the changes in a test environment or test the changes in a production environment where the test is performed in a manner that minimizes adverse effects, that models the baseline configuration to ensure that required cyber security controls in CIP-005 and CIP-007 are not adversely affected; and</p> <p>1.5.2. Document the results of the testing and, if a test environment was used, the differences between the test environment and the production environment, including a description of the measures used to account for any differences in operation between the test and production environments.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a list of cyber security controls tested along with successful test results and a list of differences between the production and test environments with descriptions of how any differences were accounted for, including of the date of the test.</p>

- R2.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-010-1 Table R2 – Configuration Monitoring*. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning].
- M2.** Evidence must include each of the applicable documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-010-1 Table R2 – Configuration Monitoring* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-010-1 Table R2 – Configuration Monitoring			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.1	High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PCA 	Monitor at least once every 35 calendar days for changes to the baseline configuration (as described in Requirement R1, Part 1.1). Document and investigate detected unauthorized changes.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, logs from a system that is monitoring the configuration along with records of investigation for any unauthorized changes that were detected.

- R3.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-010-1 Table R3– Vulnerability Assessments*. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning and Operations Planning]
- M3.** Evidence must include each of the applicable documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-010-1 Table R3 – Vulnerability Assessments* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-010-1 Table R3 – Vulnerability Assessments			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
3.1	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	<p>At least once every 15 calendar months, conduct a paper or active vulnerability assessment.</p>	<p>Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A document listing the date of the assessment (performed at least once every 15 calendar months), the controls assessed for each BES Cyber System along with the method of assessment,; or • A document listing the date of the assessment and the output of any tools used to perform the assessment.

CIP-010-1 Table R3 – Vulnerability Assessments			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
3.2	High Impact BES Cyber Systems	<p>Where technically feasible, at least once every 36 calendar months:</p> <p>3.2.1 Perform an active vulnerability assessment in a test environment, or perform an active vulnerability assessment in a production environment where the test is performed in a manner that minimizes adverse effects, that models the baseline configuration of the BES Cyber System in a production environment; and</p> <p>3.2.2 Document the results of the testing and, if a test environment was used, the differences between the test environment and the production environment, including a description of the measures used to account for any differences in operation between the test and production environments.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a document listing the date of the assessment (performed at least once every 36 calendar months), the output of the tools used to perform the assessment, and a list of differences between the production and test environments with descriptions of how any differences were accounted for in conducting the assessment.</p>

CIP-010-1 Table R3 – Vulnerability Assessments			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
3.3	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PCA 	<p>Prior to adding a new applicable Cyber Asset to a production environment, perform an active vulnerability assessment of the new Cyber Asset, except for CIP Exceptional Circumstances and like replacements of the same type of Cyber Asset with a baseline configuration that models an existing baseline configuration of the previous or other existing Cyber Asset.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a document listing the date of the assessment (performed prior to the commissioning of the new Cyber Asset) and the output of any tools used to perform the assessment.</p>
3.4	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	<p>Document the results of the assessments conducted according to Parts 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 and the action plan to remediate or mitigate vulnerabilities identified in the assessments including the planned date of completing the action plan and the execution status of any remediation or mitigation action items.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a document listing the results or the review or assessment, a list of action items, documented proposed dates of completion for the action plan, and records of the status of the action items (such as minutes of a status meeting, updates in a work order system, or a spreadsheet tracking the action items).</p>

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process:

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority:

The Regional Entity shall serve as the Compliance Enforcement Authority (“CEA”) unless the applicable entity is owned, operated, or controlled by the Regional Entity. In such cases the ERO or a Regional Entity approved by FERC or other applicable governmental authority shall serve as the CEA.

1.2. Evidence Retention:

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the CEA may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Responsible Entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its CEA to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

- Each Responsible Entity shall retain evidence of each requirement in this standard for three calendar years.
- If a Responsible Entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.
- The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes:

- Compliance Audit
- Self-Certification
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Investigation
- Self-Reporting
- Complaint

1.4. Additional Compliance Information:

- None

2. Table of Compliance Elements

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-010-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1	Operations Planning	Medium	<p>The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented a configuration change management process(es) that includes only four of the required baseline items listed in 1.1.1 through 1.1.5. (1.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented a configuration change management process(es) that includes all of the required baseline</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented a configuration change management process(es) that includes only three of the required baseline items listed in 1.1.1 through 1.1.5. (1.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented a configuration change management process(es) that includes four of the required baseline items listed in 1.1.1 through 1.1.5 and</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented a configuration change management process(es) that includes only two of the required baseline items listed in 1.1.1 through 1.1.5. (1.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented a configuration change management process(es) that includes three of the required baseline items listed in 1.1.1 through 1.1.5 and identified</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity has not documented or implemented any configuration change management process(es). (R1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented a configuration change management process(es) that includes only one of the required baseline items listed in 1.1.1 through 1.1.5. (1.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has documented and</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-010-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>items listed in 1.1.1 through 1.1.5 and identified deficiencies but did not assess and correct the deficiencies. (1.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented a configuration change management process(es) that includes all of the required baseline items listed in 1.1.1 through 1.1.5 but did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (1.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible</p>	<p>identified deficiencies but did not assess and correct the deficiencies. (1.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented a configuration change management process(es) that includes four of the required baseline items listed in 1.1.1 through 1.1.5 but did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (1.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has a process(es) to determine required</p>	<p>deficiencies but did not assess and correct the deficiencies. (1.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented a configuration change management process(es) that includes three of the required baseline items listed in 1.1.1 through 1.1.5 but did not identify, assess, and correct the deficiencies. (1.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has a process(es) that requires authorization and documentation for</p>	<p>implemented a configuration change management process(es) that includes two or fewer of the required baseline items listed in 1.1.1 through 1.1.5 and identified deficiencies but did not assess and correct the deficiencies. (1.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented a configuration change management process(es) that includes two or fewer of the required baseline items listed in 1.1.1 through 1.1.5 but did not identify, assess, and correct</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-010-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>Entity has a process(es) to perform steps in 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 for a change(s) that deviates from the existing baseline configuration and identified deficiencies in the verification documentation but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (1.4.3)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has a process(es) to perform steps in 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 for a change(s) that deviates from the existing baseline configuration but did not identify, assess, or correct</p>	<p>security controls in CIP-005 and CIP-007 that could be impacted by a change(s) that deviates from the existing baseline configuration and identified deficiencies in the determination of affected security controls, but did not assess, or correct the deficiencies. (1.4.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has a process(es) to determine required security controls in CIP-005 and CIP-007 that could be impacted by a change(s) that deviates from the existing baseline</p>	<p>changes that deviate from the existing baseline configuration and identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (1.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has a process(es) that requires authorization and documentation for changes that deviate from the existing baseline configuration but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (1.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has a process(es) to update</p>	<p>the deficiencies. (1.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity does not have a process(es) that requires authorization and documentation of changes that deviate from the existing baseline configuration. (1.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity does not have a process(es) to update baseline configurations within 30 calendar days of completing a change(s) that deviates from the existing baseline configuration.(1.3)</p> <p>OR</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-010-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>the deficiencies in the verification documentation. (1.4.3)</p>	<p>configuration but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies in the determination of affected security controls. (1.4.1)</p>	<p>baseline configurations within 30 calendar days of completing a change(s) that deviates from the existing baseline configuration and identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (1.3)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has a process(es) to update baseline configurations within 30 calendar days of completing a change(s) that deviates from the existing baseline configuration but did not identify, assess, or correct the</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity does not have a process(es) to determine required security controls in CIP-005 and CIP-007 that could be impacted by a change(s) that deviates from the existing baseline configuration. (1.4.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has a process(es) to determine required security controls in CIP-005 and CIP-007 that could be impacted by a change(s) that deviates from the existing baseline configuration but did not verify and document that the</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-010-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
					deficiencies. (1.3) OR The Responsible Entity has a process(es) to verify that required security controls in CIP-005 and CIP-007 are not adversely affected by a change(s) that deviates from the existing baseline configuration and identified deficiencies in required controls, but did not assess, or correct the deficiencies. (1.4.2) OR The Responsible Entity has a process(es) to verify that required security controls in	required controls were not adversely affected following the change. (1.4.2 & 1.4.3) OR The Responsible Entity does not have a process for testing changes in an environment that models the baseline configuration prior to implementing a change that deviates from baseline configuration. (1.5.1) OR The Responsible Entity does not have a process to document the test results and, if using a test environment, document the differences between

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-010-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
					<p>CIP-005 and CIP-007 are not adversely affected by a change(s) that deviates from the existing baseline configuration but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies in the required controls. (1.4.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has a process for testing changes in an environment that models the baseline configuration prior to implementing a change that deviates from baseline configuration, and identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies.</p>	the test and production environments. (1.5.2)

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-010-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
					(1.5.1) OR The Responsible Entity has a process for testing changes in an environment that models the baseline configuration prior to implementing a change that deviates from baseline configuration but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (1.5.1) OR The Responsible Entity has a process to document the test results and, if using a test environment, document the differences between the test and production environments and	

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-010-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
					identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (1.5.2) OR The Responsible Entity has a process to document the test results and, if using a test environment, document the differences between the test and production environments, but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (1.5.2)	
R2	Operations Planning	Medium	N/A	N/A	N/A	The Responsible Entity has not documented or implemented a process(es) to monitor for, investigate, and

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-010-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						<p>document detected unauthorized changes to the baseline at least once every 35 calendar days. (2.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented a process(es) to monitor for, investigate, and document detected unauthorized changes to the baseline at least once every 35 calendar days and identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (2.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has documented and</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-010-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						implemented a process(es) to monitor for, investigate, and document detected unauthorized changes to the baseline at least once every 35 calendar days but did not identify, assess, or correct the deficiencies. (2.1)
R3	Long-term Planning and Operations Planning	Medium	The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented vulnerability assessment processes for each of its applicable BES Cyber Systems, but has performed a vulnerability assessment more than 15 months, but less than 18	The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented vulnerability assessment processes for each of its applicable BES Cyber Systems, but has performed a vulnerability assessment more than 18 months, but less than 21, months since the last	The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented vulnerability assessment processes for each of its applicable BES Cyber Systems, but has performed a vulnerability assessment more than 21 months, but less than 24 months, since the last	The Responsible Entity has not implemented any vulnerability assessment processes for one of its applicable BES Cyber Systems. (R3) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented vulnerability

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-010-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			<p>months, since the last assessment on one of its applicable BES Cyber Systems. (3.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented active vulnerability assessment processes for Applicable Systems, but has performed an active vulnerability assessment more than 36 months, but less than 39 months, since the last active assessment on one of its applicable BES Cyber Systems.</p>	<p>assessment on one of its applicable BES Cyber Systems. (3.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented active vulnerability assessment processes for Applicable Systems, but has performed an active vulnerability assessment more than 39 months, but less than 42 months, since the last active assessment on one of its applicable BES Cyber Systems. (3.2)</p>	<p>assessment on one of its applicable BES Cyber Systems. (3.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented active vulnerability assessment processes for Applicable Systems, but has performed an active vulnerability assessment more than 42 months, but less than 45 months, since the last active assessment on one of its applicable BES Cyber Systems. (3.2)</p>	<p>assessment processes for each of its applicable BES Cyber Systems, but has performed a vulnerability assessment more than 24 months since the last assessment on one of its applicable BES Cyber Systems. (3.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented active vulnerability assessment processes for Applicable Systems, but has performed an active vulnerability assessment more than 45 months since the last active assessment on one of</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-010-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			(3.2)			its applicable BES Cyber Systems.(3.2) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented and documented one or more vulnerability assessment processes for each of its applicable BES Cyber Systems, but did not perform the active vulnerability assessment in a manner that models an existing baseline configuration of its applicable BES Cyber Systems. (3.3) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented vulnerability

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-010-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
						assessment processes for each of its applicable BES Cyber Systems, but has not documented the results of the vulnerability assessments, the action plans to remediate or mitigate vulnerabilities identified in the assessments, the planned date of completion of the action plan, and the execution status of the mitigation plans. (3.4)

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. Associated Documents

None.

Guidelines and Technical Basis

Section 4 – Scope of Applicability of the CIP Cyber Security Standards

Section “4. Applicability” of the standards provides important information for Responsible Entities to determine the scope of the applicability of the CIP Cyber Security Requirements.

Section “4.1. Functional Entities” is a list of NERC functional entities to which the standard applies. If the entity is registered as one or more of the functional entities listed in Section 4.1, then the NERC CIP Cyber Security Standards apply. Note that there is a qualification in Section 4.1 that restricts the applicability in the case of Distribution Providers to only those that own certain types of systems and equipment listed in 4.2. Furthermore,

Section “4.2. Facilities” defines the scope of the Facilities, systems, and equipment owned by the Responsible Entity, as qualified in Section 4.1, that is subject to the requirements of the standard. As specified in the exemption section 4.2.3.5, this standard does not apply to Responsible Entities that do not have High Impact or Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems under CIP-002-5’s categorization. In addition to the set of BES Facilities, Control Centers, and other systems and equipment, the list includes the set of systems and equipment owned by Distribution Providers. While the NERC Glossary term “Facilities” already includes the BES characteristic, the additional use of the term BES here is meant to reinforce the scope of applicability of these Facilities where it is used, especially in this applicability scoping section. This in effect sets the scope of Facilities, systems, and equipment that is subject to the standards.

Requirement R1:

Baseline Configuration

The concept of establishing a Cyber Asset’s baseline configuration is meant to provide clarity on requirement language found in previous CIP standard versions. Modification of any item within an applicable Cyber Asset’s baseline configuration provides the triggering mechanism for when entities must apply change management processes.

Baseline configurations in CIP-010 consist of five different items: Operating system/firmware, commercially available software or open-source application software, custom software, logical network accessible port identification, and security patches. Operating system information identifies the software and version that is in use on the Cyber Asset. In cases where an independent operating system does not exist (such as for a protective relay), then firmware information should be identified. Commercially available or open-source application software identifies applications that were intentionally installed on the cyber asset. The use of the term “intentional” was meant to ensure that only software applications that were determined to be necessary for Cyber Asset use should be included in the baseline configuration. The SDT does not intend for notepad, calculator, DLL, device drivers, or other applications included in an operating system package as commercially available or open-source application software to be

included. Custom software installed may include scripts developed for local entity functions or other custom software developed for a specific task or function for the entity's use. If additional software was intentionally installed and is not commercially available or open-source, then this software could be considered custom software. If a specific device needs to communicate with another device outside the network, communications need to be limited to only the devices that need to communicate per the requirement in CIP-007-5. Those ports which are accessible need to be included in the baseline. Security patches applied would include all historical and current patches that have been applied on the cyber asset. While CIP-007-5 R2.1 requires entities to track, evaluate, and install security patches, CIP-010 R1.1.5 requires entities to list all applied historical and current patches.

Further guidance can be understood with the following example that details the baseline configuration for a serial-only microprocessor relay:

Asset #051028 at Substation Alpha

- R1.1.1 – Firmware: [MANUFACTURER]-[MODEL]-XYZ-1234567890-ABC
- R1.1.2 – Not Applicable
- R1.1.3 – Not Applicable
- R1.1.4 – Not Applicable
- R1.1.5 – Patch 12345, Patch 67890, Patch 34567, Patch 437823

Also, for a typical IT system, the baseline configuration could reference an IT standard that includes configuration details. An entity would be expected to provide that IT standard as part of their compliance evidence.

Cyber Security Controls

The use of cyber security controls refers specifically to controls referenced and applied according to CIP-005 and CIP-007. The concept presented in the relevant requirement sub-parts in CIP-010 R1 is that an entity is to identify/verify controls from CIP-005 and CIP-007 that could be impacted for a change that deviates from the existing baseline configuration. The SDT does not intend for Responsible Entities to identify/verify all controls located within CIP-005 and CIP-007 for each change. The Responsible Entity is only to identify/verify those control(s) that could be affected by the baseline configuration change. For example, changes that affect logical network ports would only involve CIP-007 R1 (Ports and Services), while changes that affect security patches would only involve CIP-007 R2 (Security Patch Management). The SDT chose not to identify the specific requirements from CIP-005 and CIP-007 in CIP-010 language as the intent of the related requirements is to be able to identify/verify any of the controls in those standards that are affected as a result of a change to the baseline configuration. The SDT believes it possible that all requirements from CIP-005 and CIP-007 may be identified for a

major change to the baseline configuration, and therefore, CIP-005 and CIP-007 was cited at the standard-level versus the requirement-level.

Test Environment

The Control Center test environment (or production environment where the test is performed in a manner that minimizes adverse effects) should model the baseline configuration, but may have a different set of components. For instance, an entity may have a BES Cyber System that runs a database on one component and a web server on another component. The test environment may have the same operating system, security patches, network accessible ports, and software, but have both the database and web server running on a single component instead of multiple components.

Additionally, the Responsible Entity should note that wherever a test environment (or production environment where the test is performed in a manner that minimizes adverse effects) is mentioned, the requirement is to “model” the baseline configuration and not duplicate it exactly. This language was chosen deliberately in order to allow for individual elements of a BES Cyber System at a Control Center to be modeled that may not otherwise be able to be replicated or duplicated exactly; such as, but not limited to, a legacy map-board controller or the numerous data communication links from the field or to other Control Centers (such as by ICCP).

Requirement R2:

The SDT’s intent of R2 is to require automated monitoring of the BES Cyber System. However, the SDT understands that there may be some Cyber Assets where automated monitoring may not be possible (such as a GPS time clock). For that reason, automated technical monitoring was not explicitly required, and a Responsible Entity may choose to accomplish this requirement through manual procedural controls.

Requirement R3:

The Responsible Entity should note that the requirement provides a distinction between paper and active vulnerability assessments. The justification for this distinction is well-documented in FERC Order No. 706 and its associated Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. In developing their vulnerability assessment processes, Responsible Entities are strongly encouraged to include at least the following elements, several of which are referenced in CIP-005 and CIP-007:

Paper Vulnerability Assessment:

1. Network Discovery - A review of network connectivity to identify all Electronic Access Points to the Electronic Security Perimeter.
2. Network Port and Service Identification - A review to verify that all enabled ports and services have an appropriate business justification.

3. Vulnerability Review - A review of security rule-sets and configurations including controls for default accounts, passwords, and network management community strings.
4. Wireless Review - Identification of common types of wireless networks (such as 802.11a/b/g/n) and a review of their controls if they are in any way used for BES Cyber System communications.

Active Vulnerability Assessment:

1. Network Discovery - Use of active discovery tools to discover active devices and identify communication paths in order to verify that the discovered network architecture matches the documented architecture.
2. Network Port and Service Identification – Use of active discovery tools (such as Nmap) to discover open ports and services.
3. Vulnerability Scanning – Use of a vulnerability scanning tool to identify network accessible ports and services along with the identification of known vulnerabilities associated with services running on those ports.
4. Wireless Scanning – Use of a wireless scanning tool to discover wireless signals and networks in the physical perimeter of a BES Cyber System. Serves to identify unauthorized wireless devices within the range of the wireless scanning tool.

In addition, Responsible Entities are strongly encouraged to review NIST SP800-115 for additional guidance on how to conduct a vulnerability assessment.

Rationale:

During the development of this standard, references to prior versions of the CIP standards and rationale for the requirements and their parts were embedded within the standard. Upon BOT approval, that information was moved to this section.

Rationale for R1:

The configuration change management processes are intended to prevent unauthorized modifications to BES Cyber Systems.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.1) New Requirement

Change Rationale: (Part 1.1)

The baseline configuration requirement was incorporated from the DHS Catalog for Control Systems Security. The baseline requirement is also intended to clarify precisely when a change management process must be invoked and which elements of the configuration must be examined.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.2) CIP-007-3, R9; CIP-003-3, R6

Change Rationale: (Part 1.2)

The SDT added requirement to explicitly authorize changes. This requirement was previously implied by CIP-003-3, Requirement R6.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.3) CIP-007-3, R9; CIP-005-3, R5

Change Rationale: (Part 1.3)

Document maintenance requirement due to a BES Cyber System change is equivalent to the requirements in the previous versions of the standard.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.4) CIP-007-3, R1

Change Rationale: (Part 1.4)

The SDT attempted to provide clarity on when testing must occur and removed requirement for specific test procedures because it is implicit in the performance of the requirement.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.5) CIP-007-3, R1

Change Rationale: (Part 1.5)

This requirement provides clarity on when testing must occur and requires additional testing to ensure that accidental consequences of planned changes are appropriately managed.

This change addresses FERC Order No. 706, Paragraphs 397, 609, 610, and 611.

Rationale for R2:

The configuration monitoring processes are intended to detect unauthorized modifications to BES Cyber Systems.

Reference to prior version: (Part 2.1) New Requirement

Change Rationale: (Part 2.1)

The monitoring of the configuration of the BES Cyber System provides an express acknowledgement of the need to consider malicious actions along with intentional changes.

This requirement was added after review of the DHS Catalog of Control System Security and to address FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 397.

Thirty-five Calendar days allows for a “once-a-month” frequency with slight flexibility to account for months with 31 days or for beginning or endings of months on weekends.

Rationale for R3:

The vulnerability assessment processes are intended to act as a component in an overall program to periodically ensure the proper implementation of cyber security controls as well as to continually improve the security posture of BES Cyber Systems.

The vulnerability assessment performed for this requirement may be a component of deficiency identification, assessment, and correction.

Reference to prior version: (Part 3.1) CIP-005-4, R4; CIP-007-4, R8

Change Rationale: (Part 3.1)

As suggested in FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 644, the details for what should be included in the assessment are left to guidance.

Reference to prior version: (Part 3.2) New Requirement

Change Rationale: (Part 3.2)

FERC Order No. 706, Paragraphs 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, and 547.

As suggested in FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 644, the details for what should be included in the assessment are left to guidance.

Reference to prior version: (Part 3.3) New Requirement

Change Rationale: (Part 3.3)

FERC Order No. 706, Paragraphs 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, and 547.

Reference to prior version: (Part 3.4) CIP-005-3, R4.5; CIP-007-3, R8.4

Change Rationale: (Part 3.4)

Added a requirement for an entity planned date of completion as per the directive in FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 643.

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	11/26/12	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Developed to define the configuration change management and vulnerability assessment requirements in coordination with other CIP standards and to address the balance of the FERC directives in its Order 706.
1	11/22/13	FERC Order issued approving CIP-010-1. (Order becomes effective on 2/3/14.)	

This appendix establishes specific provisions for the application of the standard in Québec. Provisions of the standard and of its appendix must be read together for the purposes of understanding and interpretation. Where the standard and appendix differ, the appendix shall prevail.

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Cyber Security — Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments
2. **Number:** CIP-010-1
3. **Purpose:** No specific provision
4. **Applicability:**

Functional Entities

No specific provision

Facilities

This standard only applies to the facilities of the Main Transmission System (RTP) and to the facilities specified for the Distribution Provider. In application of this standard, any reference to the terms "Bulk Electric System" or "BES" shall be replaced by the terms "Main Transmission System" or "RTP" respectively.

Additional Exemptions

The following are exempt from this standard:

- Generating facilities with a nameplate capacity of 300 MVA or less, unless the facility comprises one or more units that can be synchronized with neighboring systems.
- Step-up substations of generating facilities identified in the preceding point.

5. **Effective Date:**

5.1. Adoption of the standard by the Régie de l'énergie: Month xx 201x

5.2. Adoption of the appendix by the Régie de l'énergie: Month xx 201x

5.3. Effective date of the standard and its appendix in Québec: Month xx 201x

6. **Background:** No specific provision

B. Requirements and Measures

No specific provision

C. Compliance

1. **Compliance Monitoring Process**

Appendix QC-CIP-010-1

Provisions specific to the standard CIP-010-1 applicable in Québec

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

The Régie de l'énergie is responsible, in Québec, for compliance enforcement with respect to the reliability standard and its appendix that it adopts.

1.2. Evidence Retention

No specific provision

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes

No specific provision

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

No specific provision

2. Table of Compliance Elements

No specific provision

D. Regional Variances

No specific provision

E. Interpretations

No specific provision

F. Associated Documents

No specific provision

Guidelines and Technical Basis

No specific provision

Rationale

No specific provision

Revision History

Revision	Adoption Date	Action	Change Tracking
0	Xx month 201x	New appendix	New

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Cyber Security — Information Protection
2. **Number:** CIP-011-1
3. **Purpose:** To prevent unauthorized access to BES Cyber System Information by specifying information protection requirements in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the BES.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. **Functional Entities:** For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of functional entities will be collectively referred to as “Responsible Entities.” For requirements in this standard where a specific functional entity or subset of functional entities are the applicable entity or entities, the functional entity or entities are specified explicitly.
 - 4.1.1 **Balancing Authority**
 - 4.1.2 **Distribution Provider** that owns one or more of the following Facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the BES:
 - 4.1.2.1 Each underfrequency Load shedding (UFLS) or undervoltage Load shedding (UVLS) system that:
 - 4.1.2.1.1 is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and
 - 4.1.2.1.2 performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.
 - 4.1.2.2 Each Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme where the Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - 4.1.2.3 Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - 4.1.2.4 Each Cranking Path and group of Elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a Blackstart Resource up to and including the first interconnection point of the starting station service of the next generation unit(s) to be started.
 - 4.1.3 **Generator Operator**
 - 4.1.4 **Generator Owner**
 - 4.1.5 **Interchange Coordinator or Interchange Authority**
 - 4.1.6 **Reliability Coordinator**

4.1.7 Transmission Operator

4.1.8 Transmission Owner

4.2. Facilities: For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following Facilities, systems, and equipment owned by each Responsible Entity in 4.1 above are those to which these requirements are applicable. For requirements in this standard where a specific type of Facilities, system, or equipment or subset of Facilities, systems, and equipment are applicable, these are specified explicitly.

4.2.1 Distribution Provider: One or more of the following Facilities, systems and equipment owned by the Distribution Provider for the protection or restoration of the BES:

4.2.1.1 Each UFLS or UVLS System that:

4.2.1.1.1 is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and

4.2.1.1.2 performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.

4.2.1.2 Each Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme where the Special Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.

4.2.1.3 Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.

4.2.1.4 Each Cranking Path and group of Elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a Blackstart Resource up to and including the first interconnection point of the starting station service of the next generation unit(s) to be started.

4.2.2 Responsible Entities listed in 4.1 other than Distribution Providers:

All BES Facilities.

4.2.3 Exemptions: The following are exempt from Standard CIP-011-1:

4.2.3.1 Cyber Assets at Facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.

4.2.3.2 Cyber Assets associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete Electronic Security Perimeters.

4.2.3.3 The systems, structures, and components that are regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under a cyber security plan pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Section 73.54.

4.2.3.4 For Distribution Providers, the systems and equipment that are not included in section 4.2.1 above.

4.2.3.5 Responsible Entities that identify that they have no BES Cyber Systems categorized as high impact or medium impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.

5. Effective Dates:

1. **24 Months Minimum** – CIP-011-1 shall become effective on the later of July 1, 2015, or the first calendar day of the ninth calendar quarter after the effective date of the order providing applicable regulatory approval.

2. In those jurisdictions where no regulatory approval is required, CIP-011-1 shall become effective on the first day of the ninth calendar quarter following Board of Trustees' approval, or as otherwise made effective pursuant to the laws applicable to such ERO governmental authorities.

6. Background:

Standard CIP-011-1 exists as part of a suite of CIP Standards related to cyber security. CIP-002-5 requires the initial identification and categorization of BES Cyber Systems. CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1 require a minimum level of organizational, operational, and procedural controls to mitigate risk to BES Cyber Systems. This suite of CIP Standards is referred to as the *Version 5 CIP Cyber Security Standards*.

Most requirements open with, "*Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented [processes, plan, etc] that include the applicable items in [Table Reference].*" The referenced table requires the applicable items in the procedures for the requirement's common subject matter.

The SDT has incorporated within this standard a recognition that certain requirements should not focus on individual instances of failure as a sole basis for violating the standard. In particular, the SDT has incorporated an approach to empower and enable the industry to identify, assess, and correct deficiencies in the implementation of certain requirements. The intent is to change the basis of a violation in those requirements so that they are not focused on *whether* there is a deficiency, but on identifying, assessing, and correcting deficiencies. It is presented in those requirements by modifying "implement" as follows:

Each Responsible Entity shall implement, **in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, . . .**

The term *documented processes* refers to a set of required instructions specific to the Responsible Entity and to achieve a specific outcome. This term does not imply any particular naming or approval structure beyond what is stated in the requirements. An entity should include as much as it believes necessary in their documented

processes, but they must address the applicable requirements in the table. The documented processes themselves are not required to include the “. . . identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, . . .” elements described in the preceding paragraph, as those aspects are related to the manner of implementation of the documented processes and could be accomplished through other controls or compliance management activities.

The terms *program* and *plan* are sometimes used in place of *documented processes* where it makes sense and is commonly understood. For example, documented processes describing a response are typically referred to as *plans* (i.e., incident response plans and recovery plans). Likewise, a security plan can describe an approach involving multiple procedures to address a broad subject matter.

Similarly, the term *program* may refer to the organization’s overall implementation of its policies, plans and procedures involving a subject matter. Examples in the standards include the personnel risk assessment program and the personnel training program. The full implementation of the CIP Cyber Security Standards could also be referred to as a program. However, the terms *program* and *plan* do not imply any additional requirements beyond what is stated in the standards.

Responsible Entities can implement common controls that meet requirements for multiple high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems. For example, a single training program could meet the requirements for training personnel across multiple BES Cyber Systems.

Measures for the initial requirement are simply the documented processes themselves. Measures in the table rows provide examples of evidence to show documentation and implementation of applicable items in the documented processes. These measures serve to provide guidance to entities in acceptable records of compliance and should not be viewed as an all-inclusive list.

Throughout the standards, unless otherwise stated, bulleted items in the requirements and measures are items that are linked with an “or,” and numbered items are items that are linked with an “and.”

Many references in the Applicability section use a threshold of 300 MW for UFLS and UVLS. This particular threshold of 300 MW for UVLS and UFLS was provided in Version 1 of the CIP Cyber Security Standards. The threshold remains at 300 MW since it is specifically addressing UVLS and UFLS, which are last ditch efforts to save the Bulk Electric System. A review of UFLS tolerances defined within regional reliability standards for UFLS program requirements to date indicates that the historical value of 300 MW represents an adequate and reasonable threshold value for allowable UFLS operational tolerances.

“Applicable Systems” Columns in Tables:

Each table has an “Applicable Systems” column to further define the scope of systems to which a specific requirement row applies. The CSO706 SDT adapted this concept from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) Risk Management

Framework as a way of applying requirements more appropriately based on impact and connectivity characteristics. The following conventions are used in the “Applicable Systems” column as described.

- **High Impact BES Cyber Systems** – Applies to BES Cyber Systems categorized as high impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.
- **Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems** – Applies to BES Cyber Systems categorized as medium impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.
- **Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS)** – Applies to each Electronic Access Control or Monitoring System associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System. Examples may include, but are not limited to, firewalls, authentication servers, and log monitoring and alerting systems.
- **Physical Access Control Systems (PACS)** – Applies to each Physical Access Control System associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System with External Routable Connectivity.
- **Protected Cyber Assets (PCA)**– Applies to each Protected Cyber Asset associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System

B. Requirements and Measures

- R1.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented information protection program(s) that collectively includes each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-011-1 Table R1 – Information Protection*. [*Violation Risk Factor: Medium*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*].
- M1.** Evidence for the information protection program must include the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-011-1 Table R1 – Information Protection* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-011-1 Table R1 – Information Protection			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.1	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS 	<p>Method(s) to identify information that meets the definition of BES Cyber System Information.</p>	<p>Examples of acceptable evidence include, but are not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Documented method to identify BES Cyber System Information from entity’s information protection program; or • Indications on information (e.g., labels or classification) that identify BES Cyber System Information as designated in the entity’s information protection program; or • Training materials that provide personnel with sufficient knowledge to recognize BES Cyber System Information; or • Repository or electronic and physical location designated for housing BES Cyber System Information in the entity’s information protection program.

CIP-011-1 Table R1 – Information Protection			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirement	Measure
1.2	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; and 2. PACS 	<p>Procedure(s) for protecting and securely handling BES Cyber System Information, including storage, transit, and use.</p>	<p>Examples of acceptable evidence include, but are not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Procedures for protecting and securely handling, which include topics such as storage, security during transit, and use of BES Cyber System Information; or • Records indicating that BES Cyber System Information is handled in a manner consistent with the entity’s documented procedure(s).

- R2.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented processes that collectively include the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-011-1 Table R2 – BES Cyber Asset Reuse and Disposal*. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning].
- M2.** Evidence must include each of the applicable documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-011-1 Table R2 – BES Cyber Asset Reuse and Disposal* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-011-1 Table R2 – BES Cyber Asset Reuse and Disposal			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.1	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	<p>Prior to the release for reuse of applicable Cyber Assets that contain BES Cyber System Information (except for reuse within other systems identified in the “Applicable Systems” column), the Responsible Entity shall take action to prevent the unauthorized retrieval of BES Cyber System Information from the Cyber Asset data storage media.</p>	<p>Examples of acceptable evidence include, but are not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Records tracking sanitization actions taken to prevent unauthorized retrieval of BES Cyber System Information such as clearing, purging, or destroying; or • Records tracking actions such as encrypting, retaining in the Physical Security Perimeter or other methods used to prevent unauthorized retrieval of BES Cyber System Information.

CIP-011-1 Table R2 – BES Cyber Asset Reuse and Disposal			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.2	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	<p>Prior to the disposal of applicable Cyber Assets that contain BES Cyber System Information, the Responsible Entity shall take action to prevent the unauthorized retrieval of BES Cyber System Information from the Cyber Asset or destroy the data storage media.</p>	<p>Examples of acceptable evidence include, but are not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Records that indicate that data storage media was destroyed prior to the disposal of an applicable Cyber Asset; or • Records of actions taken to prevent unauthorized retrieval of BES Cyber System Information prior to the disposal of an applicable Cyber Asset.

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process:

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority:

The Regional Entity shall serve as the Compliance Enforcement Authority (“CEA”) unless the applicable entity is owned, operated, or controlled by the Regional Entity. In such cases the ERO or a Regional Entity approved by FERC or other applicable governmental authority shall serve as the CEA.

1.2. Evidence Retention:

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the CEA may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Responsible Entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its CEA to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

- Each Responsible Entity shall retain evidence of each requirement in this standard for three calendar years.
- If a Responsible Entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.
- The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes:

- Compliance Audit
- Self-Certification
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Investigation
- Self-Reporting
- Complaint

1.4. Additional Compliance Information:

- None

2. Table of Compliance Elements

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-011-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1	Operations Planning	Medium	N/A		<p>The Responsible Entity has implemented a BES Cyber System Information protection program which includes one or more methods to identify BES Cyber System Information and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (1.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity has implemented a BES Cyber System Information protection program which includes one or more methods to identify BES Cyber System Information but did not identify, assess, or correct the</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity has not documented or implemented a BES Cyber System Information protection program (R1).</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-011-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
					deficiencies. (1.1) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented a BES Cyber System Information protection program which includes one or more procedures for protection and secure handling BES Cyber System Information and has identified deficiencies but did not assess or correct the deficiencies. (1.2) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented a BES Cyber System Information protection program which includes one or more procedures for protection and secure handling BES Cyber System Information but did not identify,	

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels (CIP-011-1)			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
					assess, or correct the deficiencies. (1.2)	
R2	Operations Planning	Lower	N/A	The Responsible Entity implemented one or more documented processes but did not include processes for reuse as to prevent the unauthorized retrieval of BES Cyber System Information from the BES Cyber Asset. (2.1)	The Responsible Entity implemented one or more documented processes but did not include disposal or media destruction processes to prevent the unauthorized retrieval of BES Cyber System Information from the BES Cyber Asset. (2.2)	The Responsible Entity has not documented or implemented any processes for applicable requirement parts in CIP-011-1 Table R2 – BES Cyber Asset Reuse and Disposal. (R2)

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. Associated Documents

None.

Guidelines and Technical Basis

Section 4 – Scope of Applicability of the CIP Cyber Security Standards

Section “4. Applicability” of the standards provides important information for Responsible Entities to determine the scope of the applicability of the CIP Cyber Security Requirements.

Section “4.1. Functional Entities” is a list of NERC functional entities to which the standard applies. If the entity is registered as one or more of the functional entities listed in Section 4.1, then the NERC CIP Cyber Security Standards apply. Note that there is a qualification in Section 4.1 that restricts the applicability in the case of Distribution Providers to only those that own certain types of systems and equipment listed in 4.2. Furthermore,

Section “4.2. Facilities” defines the scope of the Facilities, systems, and equipment owned by the Responsible Entity, as qualified in Section 4.1, that is subject to the requirements of the standard. As specified in the exemption section 4.2.3.5, this standard does not apply to Responsible Entities that do not have High Impact or Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems under CIP-002-5’s categorization. In addition to the set of BES Facilities, Control Centers, and other systems and equipment, the list includes the set of systems and equipment owned by Distribution Providers. While the NERC Glossary term “Facilities” already includes the BES characteristic, the additional use of the term BES here is meant to reinforce the scope of applicability of these Facilities where it is used, especially in this applicability scoping section. This in effect sets the scope of Facilities, systems, and equipment that is subject to the standards.

Requirement R1:

Responsible Entities are free to utilize existing change management and asset management systems. However, the information contained within those systems must be evaluated, as the information protection requirements still apply.

The justification for this requirement is pre-existing from previous versions of CIP and is also documented in FERC Order No. 706 and its associated Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.

This requirement mandates that BES Cyber System Information be identified. The Responsible Entity has flexibility in determining how to implement the requirement. The Responsible Entity should explain the method for identifying the BES Cyber System Information in their information protection program. For example, the Responsible Entity may decide to mark or label the documents. Identifying separate classifications of BES Cyber System Information is not specifically required. However, a Responsible Entity maintains the flexibility to do so if they desire. As long as the Responsible Entity’s information protection program includes all applicable items, additional classification levels (e.g., confidential, public, internal use only, etc.) can be created that go above and beyond the requirements. If the entity chooses to use classifications, then the types of classifications used by the entity and any associated labeling should be documented in the entity’s BES Cyber System Information Program.

The Responsible Entity may store all of the information about BES Cyber Systems in a separate repository or location (physical and/or electronic) with access control implemented. For example, the Responsible Entity's program could document that all information stored in an identified repository is considered BES Cyber System Information, the program may state that all information contained in an identified section of a specific repository is considered BES Cyber System Information, or the program may document that all hard copies of information are stored in a secured area of the building. Additional methods for implementing the requirement are suggested in the measures section. However, the methods listed in measures are not meant to be an exhaustive list of methods that the entity may choose to utilize for the identification of BES Cyber System Information.

The SDT does not intend that this requirement cover publicly available information, such as vendor manuals that are available via public websites or information that is deemed to be publicly releasable.

Information protection pertains to both digital and hardcopy information. R1.2 requires one or more procedures for the protection and secure handling BES Cyber System Information, including storage, transit, and use.

The entity's written Information Protection Program should explain how the entity handles aspects of information protection including specifying how BES Cyber System Information is to be securely handled during transit in order to protect against unauthorized access, misuse, or corruption and to protect confidentiality of the communicated BES Cyber System Information. For example, the use of a third-party communication service provider instead of organization-owned infrastructure may warrant the use of encryption to prevent unauthorized disclosure of information during transmission. The entity may choose to establish a trusted communications path for transit of BES Cyber System Information. The trusted communications path would utilize a logon or other security measures to provide secure handling during transit. The entity may employ alternative physical protective measures, such as the use of a courier or locked container for transmission of information. It is not the intent of this standard to mandate the use of one particular format for secure handling during transit.

A good Information Protection Program will document the circumstances under which BES Cyber System Information can be shared with or used by third parties. The organization should distribute or share information on a need-to-know basis. For example, the entity may specify that a confidentiality agreement, non-disclosure arrangement, contract, or written agreement of some kind concerning the handling of information must be in place between the entity and the third party. The entity's Information Protection Program should specify circumstances for sharing of BES Cyber System Information with and use by third parties, for example, use of a non-disclosure agreement. The entity should then follow their documented program. These requirements do not mandate one specific type of arrangement.

Requirement R2:

This requirement allows for BES Cyber Systems to be removed from service and analyzed with their media intact, as that should not constitute a release for reuse. However, following the

analysis, if the media is to be reused outside of a BES Cyber System or disposed of, the entity must take action to prevent the unauthorized retrieval of BES Cyber System Information from the media.

The justification for this requirement is pre-existing from previous versions of CIP and is also documented in FERC Order No. 706 and its associated Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.

If an applicable Cyber Asset is removed from the Physical Security Perimeter prior to action taken to prevent the unauthorized retrieval of BES Cyber System Information or destroying the data storage media, the responsible entity should maintain documentation that identifies the custodian for the data storage media while the data storage media is outside of the Physical Security Perimeter prior to actions taken by the entity as required in R2.

Media sanitization is the process used to remove information from system media such that reasonable assurance exists that the information cannot be retrieved or reconstructed. Media sanitization is generally classified into four categories: Disposal, clearing, purging, and destroying. For the purposes of this requirement, disposal by itself, with the exception of certain special circumstances, such as the use of strong encryption on a drive used in a SAN or other media, should never be considered acceptable. The use of clearing techniques may provide a suitable method of sanitization for media that is to be reused, whereas purging techniques may be more appropriate for media that is ready for disposal.

The following information from NIST SP800-88 provides additional guidance concerning the types of actions that an entity might take to prevent the unauthorized retrieval of BES Cyber System Information from the Cyber Asset data storage media:

Clear: One method to sanitize media is to use software or hardware products to overwrite storage space on the media with non-sensitive data. This process may include overwriting not only the logical storage location of a file(s) (e.g., file allocation table) but also may include all addressable locations. The security goal of the overwriting process is to replace written data with random data. Overwriting cannot be used for media that are damaged or not rewriteable. The media type and size may also influence whether overwriting is a suitable sanitization method [SP 800-36].

Purge: Degaussing and executing the firmware Secure Erase command (for ATA drives only) are acceptable methods for purging. Degaussing is exposing the magnetic media to a strong magnetic field in order to disrupt the recorded magnetic domains. A degausser is a device that generates a magnetic field used to sanitize magnetic media. Degaussers are rated based on the type (i.e., low energy or high energy) of magnetic media they can purge. Degaussers operate using either a strong permanent magnet or an electromagnetic coil. Degaussing can be an effective method for purging damaged or inoperative media, for purging media with exceptionally large storage capacities, or for quickly purging diskettes. [SP 800-36] Executing the firmware Secure Erase command (for ATA drives only) and degaussing are examples of acceptable methods for purging.

Degaussing of any hard drive assembly usually destroys the drive as the firmware that manages the device is also destroyed.

Destroy: There are many different types, techniques, and procedures for media destruction. Disintegration, Pulverization, Melting, and Incineration are sanitization methods designed to completely destroy the media. They are typically carried out at an outsourced metal destruction or licensed incineration facility with the specific capabilities to perform these activities effectively, securely, and safely. Optical mass storage media, including compact disks (CD, CD-RW, CD-R, CD-ROM), optical disks (DVD), and MO disks, must be destroyed by pulverizing, crosscut shredding or burning. In some cases such as networking equipment, it may be necessary to contact the manufacturer for proper sanitization procedure.

It is critical that an organization maintain a record of its sanitization actions to prevent unauthorized retrieval of BES Cyber System Information. Entities are strongly encouraged to review NIST SP800-88 for guidance on how to develop acceptable media sanitization processes.

Rationale:

During the development of this standard, references to prior versions of the CIP standards and rationale for the requirements and their parts were embedded within the standard. Upon BOT approval, that information was moved to this section.

Rationale for R1:

The SDT's intent of the information protection program is to prevent unauthorized access to BES Cyber System Information.

Summary of Changes: CIP 003-4 R4, R4.2, and R 4.3 have been moved to CIP 011 R1. CIP-003-4, Requirement R4.1 was moved to the definition of BES Cyber System Information.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.1) CIP-003-3, R4; CIP-003-3, R4.2

Change Rationale: (Part 1.1)

The SDT removed the explicit requirement for classification as there was no requirement to have multiple levels of protection (e.g., confidential, public, internal use only, etc.) This modification does not prevent having multiple levels of classification, allowing more flexibility for entities to incorporate the CIP information protection program into their normal business.

Reference to prior version: (Part 1.2) CIP-003-3, R4

Change Rationale: (Part 1.2)

The SDT changed the language from "protect" information to "Procedures for protecting and securely handling" to clarify the protection that is required.

Rationale for R2:

The intent of the BES Cyber Asset reuse and disposal process is to prevent the unauthorized dissemination of BES Cyber System Information upon reuse or disposal.

Reference to prior version: (Part 2.1) CIP-007-3, R7.2

Change Rationale: (Part 2.1)

Consistent with FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 631, the SDT clarified that the goal was to prevent the unauthorized retrieval of information from the media, removing the word “erase” since, depending on the media itself, erasure may not be sufficient to meet this goal.

Reference to prior version: (Part 2.2) CIP-007-3, R7.1

Change Rationale: (Part 2.2)

Consistent with FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 631, the SDT clarified that the goal was to prevent the unauthorized retrieval of information from the media, removing the word “erase” since, depending on the media itself, erasure may not be sufficient to meet this goal.

The SDT also removed the requirement explicitly requiring records of destruction/redeployment as this was seen as demonstration of the existing requirement and not a requirement in and of itself.

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	11/26/12	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Developed to define the information protection requirements in coordination with other CIP standards and to address the balance of the FERC directives in its Order 706.
1	11/22/13	FERC Order issued approving CIP-011-1. (Order becomes effective on 2/3/14.)	

This appendix establishes specific provisions for the application of the standard in Québec. Provisions of the standard and of its appendix must be read together for the purposes of understanding and interpretation. Where the standard and appendix differ, the appendix shall prevail.

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Cyber Security — Information Protection
2. **Number:** CIP-011-1
3. **Purpose:** No specific provision
4. **Applicability:**

Functional Entities

No specific provision

Facilities

This standard only applies to the facilities of the Main Transmission System (RTP) and to the facilities specified for the Distribution Provider. In application of this standard, any reference to the terms "Bulk Electric System" or "BES" shall be replaced by the terms "Main Transmission System" or "RTP" respectively.

Additional Exemptions

The following are exempt from this standard:

- Generating facilities with a nameplate capacity of 300 MVA or less, unless the facility comprises one or more units that can be synchronized with neighboring systems.
- Step-up substations of generating facilities identified in the preceding point.

5. **Effective Date:**

5.1. Adoption of the standard by the Régie de l'énergie: Month xx, 201x

5.2. Adoption of the appendix by the Régie de l'énergie: Month xx, 201x

5.3. Effective date of the standard and its appendix in Québec: Month xx, 201x

6. **Background:** No specific provision

B. Requirements and Measures

No specific provision

C. Compliance

1. **Compliance Monitoring Process**
 - 1.1. **Compliance Enforcement Authority**

The Régie de l'énergie is responsible, in Québec, for compliance enforcement with respect to the reliability standard and its appendix that it adopts.

1.2. Evidence Retention

No specific provision

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes

No specific provision

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

No specific provision

2. Table of Compliance Elements

No specific provision

D. Regional Variances

No specific provision

E. Interpretations

No specific provision

F. Associated Documents

No specific provision

Guidelines and Technical Basis

No specific provision

Rationale

No specific provision

Revision History

Revision	Adoption Date	Action	Change Tracking
0	Xx month 201x	New appendix	New