

Coordonnateur de la fiabilité

Demande R-4173-2021

Normes de fiabilité en suivi de modifications (version anglaise)



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Demande R-4173-2021

Standard Development Timeline

This section is maintained by the drafting team during the development of the standard and will be removed when the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees (Board).

Description of Current Draft

This is the final draft of the proposed standards for a formal 10-day comment and ballot period.

Completed Actions	Date
Standards Committee approved Standard Authorization Request (SAR) for posting	February 20, 2019
SAR posted for comment	February 25 – March 27, 2019
45-day formal comment period with ballot	January – March 2020
45-day formal comment period with additional ballot	May 7 – June 22, 2020
45-day formal comment period with second additional ballot	July 28 – September 10, 2020

Anticipated Actions	Date
10-day final ballot	October 2020
Board adoption	November 2020

A. Introduction

- 1. Title: Cyber Security Electronic Security Perimeter(s)
- 2. Number: CIP-005-67
- **3. Purpose:** To manage electronic access to BES Cyber Systems by specifying a controlled Electronic Security Perimeter in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the BES.

4. Applicability:

4.1. Functional Entities: -For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of functional entities will be collectively referred to as "Responsible Entities." -For requirements in this standard where a specific functional entity or subset of functional entities are the applicable entity or entities, the functional entity or entities are specified explicitly.

4.1.1. Balancing Authority

- **4.1.2.** Distribution Provider that owns one or more of the following Facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the BES:
 - **4.1.2.1.** Each underfrequency Load shedding (UFLS) or undervoltage Load shedding (UVLS) system that:
 - **4.1.2.1.1.** is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and
 - **4.1.2.1.2.** performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.
 - **4.1.2.2.** Each Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) where the RAS is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - **4.1.2.3.** Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - **4.1.2.4.** Each Cranking Path and group of Elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a Blackstart Resource up to and including the first interconnection point of the starting station service of the next generation unit(s) to be started.

4.1.3. Generator Operator

4.1.4. Generator Owner

4.1.5. Interchange Coordinator or Interchange Authority

4.1.6.4.1.5. Reliability Coordinator

4.1.7.4.1.6. Transmission Operator

4.1.8.4.1.7. Transmission Owner

- **4.2. Facilities:** For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following Facilities, systems, and equipment owned by each Responsible Entity in Section 4.1 above are those to which these requirements are applicable. For requirements in this standard where a specific type of Facilities, system, or equipment or subset of Facilities, systems, and equipment are applicable, these are specified explicitly.
 - **4.2.1. Distribution Provider:** One or more of the following Facilities, systems and equipment owned by the Distribution Provider for the protection or restoration of the BES:
 - **4.2.1.1.** Each UFLS or UVLS System that:
 - **4.2.1.1.1.** is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and
 - **4.2.1.1.2.** performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.
 - **4.2.1.2.** Each RAS where the RAS is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - **4.2.1.3.** Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - **4.2.1.4.** Each Cranking Path and group of Elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a Blackstart Resource up to and including the first interconnection point of the starting station service of the next generation unit(s) to be started.
 - **4.2.2.** Responsible Entities listed in 4.1 other than Distribution Providers: All BES Facilities.
 - **4.2.3.** Exemptions: The following are exempt from Standard CIP-005-67:
 - **4.2.3.1.** Cyber Assets at Facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.

- **4.2.3.2.** Cyber Assets associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete Electronic Security Perimeters.
- **4.2.3.3.** The systems, structures, and components that are regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under a cyber security plan pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Section 73.54.
- **4.2.3.4.** For Distribution Providers, the systems and equipment that are not included in section 4.2.1 above.
- **4.2.3.5.** Responsible Entities that identify that they have no BES Cyber Systems categorized as high impact or medium impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.
- 5. Effective Date: See Implementation Plan for Project 20162019-03.
- 6. Background: Standard CIP-005 exists as part of a suite of CIP Standards related to cyber security, which require the initial identification and categorization of BES Cyber Systems and require a minimum level of organizational, operational and procedural controls to mitigate risk to BES Cyber Systems.

Most requirements open with, "Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented [processes, plan, etc.] that include the applicable items in [Table Reference]." The referenced table requires the applicable items in the procedures for the requirement's common subject matter.

The term *documented processes* refers to a set of required instructions specific to the Responsible Entity and to achieve a specific outcome. This term does not imply any particular naming or approval structure beyond what is stated in the requirements. An entity should include as much as it believes necessary in its documented processes, but it must address the applicable requirements in the table.

The terms *program* and *plan* are sometimes used in place of *documented processes* where it makes sense and is commonly understood. For example, documented processes describing a response are typically referred to as *plans* (i.e., incident response plans and recovery plans). Likewise, a security plan can describe an approach involving multiple procedures to address a broad subject matter.

Similarly, the term *program* may refer to the organization's overall implementation of its policies, plans, and procedures involving a subject matter. Examples in the standards include the personnel risk assessment program and the personnel training program. The full implementation of the CIP Cyber Security Standards could also be referred to as a program. However, the terms *program* and *plan* do not imply any additional requirements beyond what is stated in the standards.

Responsible Entities can implement common controls that meet requirements for multiple high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems. For example, a single training program could meet the requirements for training personnel across multiple BES Cyber Systems.

Measures for the initial requirement are simply the documented processes themselves. Measures in the table rows provide examples of evidence to show documentation and implementation of applicable items in the documented processes. These measures serve to provide guidance to entities in acceptable records of compliance and should not be viewed as an all-inclusive list.

Throughout the standards, unless otherwise stated, bulleted items in the requirements and measures are items that are linked with an "or," and numbered items are items that are linked with an "and."

Many references in the Applicability section use a threshold of 300 MW for UFLS and UVLS. This particular threshold of 300 MW for UVLS and UFLS was provided in Version 1 of the CIP Cyber Security Standards. The threshold remains at 300 MW since it is specifically addressing UVLS and UFLS, which are last ditch efforts to save the Bulk Electric System. A review of UFLS tolerances defined within regional reliability standards for UFLS program requirements to date indicates that the historical value of 300 MW represents an adequate and reasonable threshold value for allowable UFLS operational tolerances.

"Applicable Systems" Columns in Tables:

Each table has an "Applicable Systems" column to further define the scope of systems to which a specific requirement row applies. The CSO706 SDT adapted this concept from the National Institute of Standards and Technology ("NIST") Risk Management Framework as a way of applying requirements more appropriately based on impact and connectivity characteristics. The following conventions are used in the "Applicability Systems" column as described.

- **High Impact BES Cyber Systems** Applies to BES Cyber Systems categorized as high impact according to the CIP-002 identification and categorization processes.
- **High Impact BES Cyber Systems with Dial-up Connectivity** Only applies to high impact BES Cyber Systems with Dial-up Connectivity.
- High Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity Only applies to high impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity. This also excludes Cyber Assets in the BES Cyber System that cannot be directly accessed through External Routable Connectivity.
- Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems Applies to BES Cyber Systems categorized as medium impact according to the CIP-002 identification and categorization processes.

- Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at Control Centers Only applies to medium impact BES Cyber Systems located at a Control Center.
- Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with Dial-up Connectivity Only applies to medium impact BES Cyber Systems with Dial-up Connectivity.
- Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity Only applies to medium impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity. This also excludes Cyber Assets in the BES Cyber System that cannot be directly accessed through External Routable Connectivity.
- Protected Cyber Assets (PCA) Applies to each Protected Cyber Asset associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System.
- Electronic Access Points (EAP) Applies at Electronic Access Points associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System.
- Physical Access Control Systems (PACS) Applies to each Physical Access
 Control System associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or
 medium impact BES Cyber System.
- Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS) Applies to each Electronic Access Control or Monitoring System associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System. Examples may include, but are not limited to, firewalls, authentication servers, and log monitoring and alerting systems.

B. Requirements and Measures

- **R1.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-005-67* Table R1 Electronic Security Perimeter. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning and Same Day Operations].
- **M1.** Evidence must include each of the applicable documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-005-67* Table R1 Electronic Security Perimeter and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

	CIP-005-67 Table R1 – Electronic Security Perimeter			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures	
1.1	 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: PCA Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: PCA 	All applicable Cyber Assets connected to a network via a routable protocol shall reside within a defined ESP.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a list of all ESPs with all uniquely identifiable applicable Cyber Assets connected via a routable protocol within each ESP.	
1.2	 High Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated: PCA Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated: PCA 	All External Routable Connectivity must be through an identified Electronic Access Point (EAP).	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, network diagrams showing all external routable communication paths and the identified EAPs.	

	CIP-005- <mark>67</mark> Table R1 – Electronic Security Perimeter			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures	
1.3	Electronic Access Points for High Impact BES Cyber Systems Electronic Access Points for Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems	Require inbound and outbound access permissions, including the reason for granting access, and deny all other access by default.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a list of rules (firewall, access control lists, etc.) that demonstrate that only permitted access is allowed and that each access rule has a documented reason.	
1.4	 High Impact BES Cyber Systems with Dial-up Connectivity and their associated: PCA Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with Dial-up Connectivity and their associated: PCA 	Where technically feasible, perform authentication when establishing Dial- up Connectivity with applicable Cyber Assets.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a documented process that describes how the Responsible Entity is providing authenticated access through each dial-up connection.	
1.5	Electronic Access Points for High Impact BES Cyber Systems Electronic Access Points for Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at Control Centers	Have one or more methods for detecting known or suspected malicious communications for both inbound and outbound communications.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation that malicious communications detection methods (e.g. intrusion detection system, application layer firewall, etc.) are implemented.	

- **R2.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented processes that collectively include the applicable requirement parts, where technically feasible, in *CIP-005-67 Table R2 –Remote Access Management*. [Violation Risk Factor: *Medium*] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning and Same Day Operations].
- M2. Evidence must include the documented processes that collectively address each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-*005-67 Table R2 – Remote Access Management and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

	CIP-005-67 Table R2 – Remote Access Management				
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures		
2.1	 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: PCA Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated: PCA 	For all Interactive Remote Access, utilize an Intermediate System such that the Cyber Asset initiating Interactive Remote Access does not directly access an applicable Cyber Asset.	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, network diagrams or architecture documents.		
2.2	 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: PCA Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated: PCA 	For all Interactive Remote Access sessions, utilize encryption that terminates at an Intermediate System.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, architecture documents detailing where encryption initiates and terminates.		

	CIP-005- <mark>67</mark> Table R2 – Remote Access Management			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures	
2.3	 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: PCA Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated: PCA 	Require multi-factor authentication for all Interactive Remote Access sessions.	 An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, architecture documents detailing the authentication factors used. Examples of authenticators may include, but are not limited to, Something the individual knows such as passwords or PINs. This does not include User ID; Something the individual has such as tokens, digital certificates, or smart cards; or Something the individual is such as fingerprints, iris scans, or other biometric characteristics. 	

	CIP-005-67 Table R2 – Remote Access Management			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures	
2.4	High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: • PCA Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated: • PCA	Have one or more methods for determining active vendor remote access sessions (including Interactive Remote Access and system-to-system remote access).	 Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, documentation of the methods used to determine active vendor remote access (including Interactive Remote Access and system-to-system remote access), such as: Methods for accessing logged or monitoring information to determine active vendor remote access sessions; Methods for monitoring activity (e.g. connection tables or rule hit counters in a firewall, or user activity monitoring) or open ports (e.g. netstat or related commands to display currently active ports) to determine active system to system remote access sessions; or Methods that control vendor initiation of remote access such as vendors calling and requesting a second factor in order to initiate remote access. 	

	CIP-005- <mark>67</mark> Table R2 – Remote Access Management			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures	
2.5	 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: PCA Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated: PCA 	Have one or more method(s) to disable active vendor remote access (including Interactive Remote Access and system-to-system remote access).	 Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, documentation of the methods(s) used to disable active vendor remote access (including Interactive Remote Access and system-to-system remote access), such as: Methods to disable vendor remote access at the applicable Electronic Access Point for system-to-system remote access; or Methods to disable vendor Interactive Remote Access at the applicable Intermediate System. 	

- **R3.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented processes that collectively include the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-005-7 Table R3 –Vendor Remote Access Management for EACMS and PACS. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning and Same Day Operations].*
- M3. Evidence must include the documented processes that collectively address each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-*005-7 Table R3 – Vendor Remote Access Management and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

	CIP-005-7 Table R3 – Vendor Remote Access Management for EACMS and PACS			
<u>Part</u>	Applicable Systems	<u>Requirements</u>	<u>Measures</u>	
<u>3.1</u>	EACMS and PACS associated with High Impact BES Cyber Systems EACMS and PACS associated with Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity	Have one or more method(s) to determine authenticated vendor- initiated remote connections.	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, documentation of the methods used to determine authenticated vendor-initiated remote connections, such as: Methods for accessing logged or monitoring information to determine authenticated vendor-initiated remote connections.	
<u>3.2</u>	EACMS and PACS associated with High Impact BES Cyber Systems EACMS and PACS associated with Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity	Have one or more method(s) to terminate authenticated vendor- initiated remote connections and control the ability to reconnect.	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, documentation of the methods(s) used to terminate authenticated vendor-initiated remote connections to applicable systems. Examples include terminating an active vendor-initiated shell/process/session or dropping an active vendor-initiated connection in	

	CIP-005-7 Table R3 – Vendor Remote Access Management for EACMS and PACS			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures	
			<u>a firewall. Methods to control the</u> <u>ability to reconnect, if necessary,</u> <u>could be: disabling an Active</u> <u>Directory account; disabling a security</u> <u>token; restricting IP addresses from</u> <u>vendor sources in a firewall; or</u> <u>physically disconnecting a network</u> <u>cable to prevent a reconnection.</u>	

C. Compliance

- 1. Compliance Monitoring Process
 - 1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority: "Compliance Enforcement Authority" (CEA) means NERC or the Regional Entity, or any entity as otherwise designated by an Applicable Governmental Authority, in their respective roles of monitoring and/or enforcing compliance with mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards in their respective jurisdictions.
 - 1.2. Evidence Retention: The following evidence retention period(s) identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement AuthorityCEA may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full-time period since the last audit.

The applicable entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement AuthorityCEA to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

- Each applicable entity shall retain evidence of each requirement in this standard for three calendar years.
- If an applicable entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.
- The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.
- **1.3.** Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program: As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, "Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program" refers to the identification of the processes that will be used to evaluate data or information for the purpose of assessing performance or outcomes with the associated Reliability Standard.

Violation Severity Levels

D.#	Violation Severity Levels			
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1.			The Responsible Entity did not have a method for detecting malicious communications for both inbound and outbound communications. (1.5)	The Responsible Entity did not document one or more processes for <i>CIP-005-6</i> <i>Table R1 – Electronic</i> <i>Security Perimeter</i> . (R1) OR The Responsible Entity did not have all applicable Cyber Assets connected to a network via a routable protocol within a defined Electronic Security Perimeter (ESP). (1.1) OR External Routable Connectivity through the ESP was not through an identified EAP. (1.2) OR The Responsible Entity did not require inbound and outbound access permissions and deny all other access by default. (1.3) OR

- "	Violation Severity Levels			
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
				The Responsible Entity did not perform authentication when establishing dial-up connectivity with the applicable Cyber Assets, where technically feasible. (1.4)
R2.	The Responsible Entity does not have documented processes for one or more of the applicable items for Requirement Parts 2.1 through 2.3.	The Responsible Entity did not implement processes for one of the applicable items for Requirement Parts 2.1 through 2.3.	The Responsible Entity did not implement processes for two of the applicable items for Requirement Parts 2.1 through 2.3; OR	The Responsible Entity did not implement processes for three of the applicable items for Requirement Parts 2.1 through 2.3; OR
			The Responsible Entity did not have either: one or more method(s) for determining active vendor remote access sessions (including Interactive Remote Access and system- to-system remote access) (2.4); or one or more methods to disable active vendor remote access (including Interactive Remote Access and system- to-system remote access) (2.5).	The Responsible Entity did not have one or more method(s) for determining active vendor remote access sessions (including Interactive Remote Access and system-to-system remote access) (2.4) and one or more methods to disable active vendor remote access (including Interactive Remote Access and system-to-system remote access) (2.5).

D.#	Violation Severity Levels			
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
<u>R3.</u>	The Responsible Entity did not document one or more processes for CIP-005-7 Table R3 – Vendor Remote Access Management for EACMS and PACS. (R3)	The Responsible Entity had method(s) as required by Part 3.1 for EACMS but did not have a method to determine authenticated vendor-initiated remote connections for PACS (3.1). OR The Responsible Entity had method(s) as required by Part 3.2 for EACMS but did not have a method to terminate authenticated vendor-initiated remote connections for PACS (3.2).	The Responsible Entity didnot implement processesfor either Part 3.1 or Part3.2. (R3)ORThe Responsible Entity hadmethod(s) as required byPart 3.1 for PACS but didnot have a method todetermine authenticatedvendor-initiated remoteconnections for EACMS(3.1).ORThe Responsible Entity hadmethod(s) as required byPart 3.2 for PACS but didnot have a method toterminate authenticatedvendor-initiated remoteconnections for EACMS(3.1).ORThe Responsible Entity hadmethod(s) as required byPart 3.2 for PACS but didnot have a method toterminate authenticatedvendor-initiated remoteconnections or control theability to reconnect forEACMS (3.2).	The Responsible Entity did not implement any processes for <i>CIP-005-7</i> Table R3 – Vendor Remote Access Management for EACMS and PACS. (R3) OR The Responsible Entity did not have any methods as required by Parts 3.1 and 3.2 (R3).

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Associated Documents

None.

- Implementation Plan for Project 2019-03
- CIP-005-7 Technical Rationale

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	1/16/06	R3.2 — Change "Control Center" to "control center."	3/24/06
2	9/30/09	Modifications to clarify the requirements and to bring the compliance elements into conformance with the latest guidelines for developing compliance elements of standards. Removal of reasonable business judgment. Replaced the RRO with the RE as a responsible entity. Rewording of Effective Date. Changed compliance monitor to Compliance Enforcement Authority.	
3	12/16/09	Updated version number from -2 to -3 Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees.	
3	3/31/10	Approved by FERC.	
4	12/30/10	Modified to add specific criteria for Critical Asset identification.	Update
4	1/24/11	Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Update
5	11/26/12	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Modified to coordinate with other CIP standards and to revise format to use RBS Template.
5	11/22/13	FERC Order issued approving CIP-005-5.	
6	07/20/17	Modified to address certain directives in FERC Order No. 829.	Revised
6	08/10/17	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	
6	10/18/2018	FERC Order approving CIP-005-6. Docket No. RM17-13-000.	
<u>7</u>	<u>TBD</u>	Modified to address directives in FERC Order No. 850	

Standard Development Timeline

This section is maintained by the drafting team during the development of the standard and will be removed when the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees (Board).

Description of Current Draft

This is the final draft of proposed standard for formal 10-day comment period.

Completed Actions	Date
Standards Committee approved Standard Authorization Request (SAR) for posting	February 20, 2019
SAR posted for comment	February 25 – March 27, 2019
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Anticipated Actions	Date
10-day final ballot	October 2020
Board adoption	November 2020

A. Introduction

- **1. Title:** Cyber Security Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments
- **2. Number:** CIP-010-**3**<u>4</u>
- **3. Purpose:** To prevent and detect unauthorized changes to BES Cyber Systems by specifying configuration change management and vulnerability assessment requirements in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems from compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the Bulk Electric System (BES).

4. Applicability:

4.1. Functional Entities: For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of functional entities will be collectively referred to as "Responsible Entities." For requirements in this standard where a specific functional entity or subset of functional entities are the applicable entity or entities, the functional entity or entities are specified explicitly.

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 - **4.2.2.** Responsible Entities listed in 4.1 other than Distribution Providers: All BES Facilities.
 - **4.2.3.** Exemptions: The following are exempt from Standard CIP-010-34:
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- 5. Effective Date: See Implementation Plan for Project 20162019-03.
- 6. Background: Standard CIP-010 exists as part of a suite of CIP Standards related to cyber security, which require the initial identification and categorization of BES Cyber Systems and require a minimum level of organizational, operational and procedural controls to mitigate risk to BES Cyber Systems.

Most requirements open with, "Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented [processes, plan, etc.] that include the applicable items in [Table Reference]." The referenced table requires the applicable items in the procedures for the requirement's common subject matter.

The term *documented processes* refers to a set of required instructions specific to the Responsible Entity and to achieve a specific outcome. This term does not imply any particular naming or approval structure beyond what is stated in the requirements. An entity should include as much as it believes necessary in its documented processes, but it must address the applicable requirements in the table.

The terms *program* and *plan* are sometimes used in place of *documented processes* where it makes sense and is commonly understood. For example, documented processes describing a response are typically referred to as *plans* (i.e., incident response plans and recovery plans). Likewise, a security plan can describe an approach involving multiple procedures to address a broad subject matter.

Similarly, the term *program* may refer to the organization's overall implementation of its policies, plans, and procedures involving a subject matter. Examples in the standards include the personnel risk assessment program and the personnel training program. The full implementation of the CIP Cyber Security Standards could also be referred to as a program. However, the terms *program* and *plan* do not imply any additional requirements beyond what is stated in the standards.

Responsible Entities can implement common controls that meet requirements for multiple high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems. For example, a single training program could meet the requirements for training personnel across multiple BES Cyber Systems.

Measures for the initial requirement are simply the documented processes themselves. Measures in the table rows provide examples of evidence to show documentation and implementation of applicable items in the documented processes. These measures serve to provide guidance to entities in acceptable records of compliance and should not be viewed as an all-inclusive list.

Throughout the standards, unless otherwise stated, bulleted items in the requirements and measures are items that are linked with an "or," and numbered items are items that are linked with an "and."

Many references in the Applicability section use a threshold of 300 MW for UFLS and UVLS. This particular threshold of 300 MW for UVLS and UFLS was provided in Version 1 of the CIP Cyber Security Standards. The threshold remains at 300 MW since it is specifically addressing UVLS and UFLS, which are last ditch efforts to save the BES. A review of UFLS tolerances defined within regional reliability standards for UFLS program requirements to date indicates that the historical value of 300 MW represents an adequate and reasonable threshold value for allowable UFLS operational tolerances.

"Applicable Systems" Columns in Tables:

Each table has an "Applicable Systems" column to further define the scope of systems to which a specific requirement row applies. The CSO706 SDT adapted this concept from the National Institute of Standards and Technology ("NIST") Risk Management Framework as a way of applying requirements more appropriately based on impact and connectivity characteristics. The following conventions are used in the applicability column as described.

- **High Impact BES Cyber Systems** Applies to BES Cyber Systems categorized as high impact according to the CIP-002-5.1 identification and categorization processes.
- Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems Applies to BES Cyber Systems categorized as medium impact according to the CIP-002-5.1 identification and categorization processes.
- Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS) Applies to each Electronic Access Control or Monitoring System associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System. Examples may include, but are not limited to, firewalls, authentication servers, and log monitoring and alerting systems.

- **Physical Access Control Systems (PACS)** Applies to each Physical Access Control System associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System with External Routable Connectivity.
- Protected Cyber Assets (PCA) Applies to each Protected Cyber Asset associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System.

B. Requirements and Measures

- **R1.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented process(es) that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-010-*<u>34</u> *Table R1 Configuration Change Management*. [*Violation Risk Factor: Medium*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*].
- **M1.** Evidence must include each of the applicable documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-010-34* Table R1 Configuration Change Management and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

	CIP-010-84 Table R1 – Configuration Change Management				
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures		
1.1	 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	 Develop a baseline configuration, individually or by group, which shall include the following items: 1.1.1. Operating system(s) (including version) or firmware where no independent operating system exists; 1.1.2. Any commercially available or open-source application software (including version) intentionally installed; 1.1.3. Any custom software installed; 1.1.4. Any logical network accessible ports; and 1.1.5. Any security patches applied. 	 Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to: A spreadsheet identifying the required items of the baseline configuration for each Cyber Asset, individually or by group; or A record in an asset management system that identifies the required items of the baseline configuration for each Cyber Asset, individually or by group. 		
1.2	High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: 1. EACMS;	Authorize and document changes that deviate from the existing baseline configuration.	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to:		
Final Dra	ft of CIP-010-4				

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
	 PACS; and PCA Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: EACMS; PACS; and PCA 		 A change request record and associated electronic authorization (performed by the individual or group with the authority to authorize the change) in a change management system for each change; or Documentation that the change was performed in accordance with the requirement.
1.3	 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: EACMS; PACS; and PCA Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: EACMS; PACS; and PCA 	For a change that deviates from the existing baseline configuration, update the baseline configuration as necessary within 30 calendar days of completing the change.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, updated baseline documentation with a date that is within 30 calendar days of the date of the completion of the change.
1.4	High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems	For a change that deviates from the existing baseline configuration: 1.4.1. Prior to the change, determine required cyber security controls in CIP-005 and CIP-007 that could be impacted by the change;	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a list of cyber security controls verified or tested along with the dated test results.

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
	and their associated: 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA	 1.4.2. Following the change, verify that required cyber security controls determined in 1.4.1 are not adversely affected; and 1.4.3. Document the results of the verification. 	
1.5	High Impact BES Cyber Systems	 Where technically feasible, for each change that deviates from the existing baseline configuration: 1.5.1. Prior to implementing any change in the production environment, test the changes in a test environment or test the changes in a production environment where the test is performed in a manner that minimizes adverse effects, that models the baseline configuration to ensure that required cyber security controls in CIP-005 and CIP-007 are not adversely affected; and 	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a list of cyber security controls tested along with successful test results and a list of differences between the production and test environments with descriptions of how any differences were accounted for, including of the date of the test.
		1.5.2. Document the results of the testing and, if a test environment was used, the differences between the test environment and the production environment,	

	CIP-010-34 Table R1 – Configuration Change Management				
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures		
		including a description of the measures used to account for any differences in operation between the test and production environments.			
1.6	High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: <u>1. EACMS; and</u> <u>1.2. PACS</u> Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: <u>1. EACMS; and</u> <u>1.2. PACS</u> Note: Implementation does not require the Responsible Entity to renegotiate or abrogate existing contracts (including amendments to master agreements and purchase orders). Additionally, the following issues are beyond the scope of Part 1.6: (1) the actual terms and conditions of a procurement contract; and (2) vendor performance and adherence to a contract.	 Prior to a change that deviates from the existing baseline configuration associated with baseline items in Parts 1.1.1, 1.1.2, and 1.1.5, and when the method to do so is available to the Responsible Entity from the software source: 1.6.1. Verify the identity of the software source; and 1.6.2. Verify the integrity of the software obtained from the software source. 	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to a change request record that demonstrates the verification of identity of the software source and integrity of the software was performed prior to the baseline change or a process which documents the mechanisms in place that would automatically ensure the identity of the software source and integrity of the software.		

- **R2.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented process(es) that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-010-34* Table R2 Configuration Monitoring. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning].
- **M2.** Evidence must include each of the applicable documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-010-34* Table R2 Configuration Monitoring and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

	CIP-010-84 Table R2 – Configuration Monitoring				
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures		
2.1	High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:1. EACMS; and2. PCA	Monitor at least once every 35 calendar days for changes to the baseline configuration (as described in Requirement R1, Part 1.1). Document and investigate detected unauthorized changes.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, logs from a system that is monitoring the configuration along with records of investigation for any unauthorized changes that were detected.		

CIP-010-34 – Cyber Security — Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments

- **R3.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented process(es) that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-010-3 Table R3– Vulnerability Assessments*. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning and Operations Planning]
- **M3.** Evidence must include each of the applicable documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-010-3 Table R3 Vulnerability Assessments* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

	CIP-010-34 Table R3 – Vulnerability Assessments				
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures		
3.1	 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: 1. EACMS; 2. PACS; and 3. PCA 	At least once every 15 calendar months, conduct a paper or active vulnerability assessment.	 Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to: A document listing the date of the assessment (performed at least once every 15 calendar months), the controls assessed for each BES Cyber System along with the method of assessment; or A document listing the date of the assessment and the output of any tools used to perform the assessment. 		

CIP-010- <mark>84</mark> Table R3 – Vulnerability Assessments				
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures	
3.2	High Impact BES Cyber Systems	 Where technically feasible, at least once every 36 calendar months: 3.2.1 Perform an active vulnerability assessment in a test environment, or perform an active vulnerability assessment in a production environment where the test is performed in a manner that minimizes adverse effects, that models the baseline configuration of the BES Cyber System in a production environment; and 	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a document listing the date of the assessment (performed at least once every 36 calendar months), the output of the tools used to perform the assessment, and a list of differences between the production and test environments with descriptions of how any differences were accounted for in conducting the assessment.	
		3.2.2 Document the results of the testing and, if a test environment was used, the differences between the test environment and the production environment, including a description of the measures used to account for any differences in operation between the test and production environments.		

CIP-010-34 Table R3 – Vulnerability Assessments				
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures	
3.3	High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: 1. EACMS; <u>and</u> 2. PCA	Prior to adding a new applicable Cyber Asset to a production environment, perform an active vulnerability assessment of the new Cyber Asset, except for CIP Exceptional Circumstances and like replacements of the same type of Cyber Asset with a baseline configuration that models an existing baseline configuration of the previous or other existing Cyber Asset.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a document listing the date of the assessment (performed prior to the commissioning of the new Cyber Asset) and the output of any tools used to perform the assessment.	
3.4	 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: EACMS; PACS; and PCA Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: EACMS; PACS; and PCA 	Document the results of the assessments conducted according to Parts 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 and the action plan to remediate or mitigate vulnerabilities identified in the assessments including the planned date of completing the action plan and the execution status of any remediation or mitigation action items.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a document listing the results or the review or assessment, a list of action items, documented proposed dates of completion for the action plan, and records of the status of the action items (such as minutes of a status meeting, updates in a work order system, or a spreadsheet tracking the action items).	

CIP-010-34 – Cyber Security — Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments

- **R4.** Each Responsible Entity, for its high impact and medium impact BES Cyber Systems and associated Protected Cyber Assets, shall implement, except under CIP Exceptional Circumstances, one or more documented plan(s) for Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media that include the sections in Attachment 1. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning and Operations Planning]
- M4. Evidence shall include each of the documented plan(s) for Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media that collectively include each of the applicable sections in Attachment 1 and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation of plan(s) for Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media. Additional examples of evidence per section are located in Attachment 2. If a Responsible Entity does not use Transient Cyber Asset(s) or Removable Media, examples of evidence include, but are not limited to, a statement, policy, or other document that states the Responsible Entity does not use Transient Cyber Asset(s) or Removable Entity does not use Transient Cyber Asset(s) or Removable Entity does not use Transient Cyber Asset(s) or Removable Entity does not use Transient Cyber Asset(s) or Removable Entity does not use Transient Cyber Asset(s) or Removable Entity does not use Transient Cyber Asset(s) or Removable Entity does not use Transient Cyber Asset(s) or Removable Entity does not use Transient Cyber Asset(s) or Removable Entity does not use Transient Cyber Asset(s) or Removable Media.

C. Compliance

- 1. Compliance Monitoring Process
 - **1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority:** "Compliance Enforcement Authority" (CEA) means NERC or the Regional Entity, or any entity as otherwise designated by an Applicable Governmental Authority, in their respective roles of monitoring and/or enforcing compliance with mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards in their respective jurisdictions.
 - 1.2. Evidence Retention: The following evidence retention period(s) identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement AuthorityCEA may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full-time period since the last audit.

The applicable entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement AuthorityCEA to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

- Each applicable entity shall retain evidence of each requirement in this standard for three calendar years.
- If an applicable entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.
- The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.
- **1.3.** Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program: As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, "Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program" refers to the identification of the processes that will be used to evaluate data or information for the purpose of assessing performance or outcomes with the associated Reliability Standard.

Violation Severity Levels

_ "		Violation Se	verity Levels	
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1.	The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented a configuration change management process(es) that includes only four of the required baseline items listed in 1.1.1 through 1.1.5. (1.1)	The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented a configuration change management process(es) that includes only three of the required baseline items listed in 1.1.1 through 1.1.5. (1.1)	The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented a configuration change management process(es) that includes only two of the required baseline items listed in 1.1.1 through 1.1.5. (1.1) OR The Responsible Entity has a process as specified in Part 1.6 to verify the identity of the software source (1.6.1) but does not have a process as specified in Part 1.6 to verify the integrity of the software provided by the software source when the method to do so is available to the Responsible Entity from the software source. (1.6.2)	The Responsible Entity has not documented or implemented any configuration change management process(es). (R1) OR The Responsible Entity has documented and implemented a configuration change management process(es) that includes only one of the required baseline items listed in 1.1.1 through 1.1.5. (1.1) OR The Responsible Entity does not have a process(es) that requires authorization and documentation of changes that deviate from the existing baseline configuration. (1.2) OR

R #		Violation Sev	erity Levels	
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
				The Responsible Entity does not have a process(es) to update baseline configurations within 30 calendar days of completing a change(s) that deviates from the existing baseline configuration.(1.3)
				OR
				The Responsible Entity does not have a process(es) to determine required security controls in CIP-005 and CIP- 007 that could be impacted by a change(s) that deviates from the existing baseline configuration. (1.4.1)
				OR
				The Responsible Entity has a process(es) to determine required security controls in CIP-005 and CIP-007 that could be impacted by a change(s) that deviates from the existing baseline configuration but did not verify and document that

D. "		Violation Severity Levels				
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL		
				the required controls were not adversely affected following the change. (1.4.2 & 1.4.3)		
				OR		
				The Responsible Entity does not have a process for testing changes in an environment that models the baseline configuration prior to implementing a change that deviates from baseline configuration. (1.5.1)		
				OR		
				The Responsible Entity does not have a process to document the test results and, if using a test environment, document the differences between the test and production environments. (1.5.2)		
				OR		
				The Responsible Entity does not have a process as		

D.#	Violation Severity Levels				
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
				specified in Part 1.6 to verify the identity of the software source and the integrity of the software provided by the software source when the method to do so is available to the Responsible Entity from the software source. (1.6)	
R2.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The Responsible Entity has not documented or implemented a process(es) to monitor for, investigate, and document detected unauthorized changes to the baseline at least once every 35 calendar days. (2.1)	
R3.	The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented vulnerability assessment processes for each of its applicable BES Cyber Systems, but has performed a vulnerability assessment more than 15 months, but less than 18 months, since the last	The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented vulnerability assessment processes for each of its applicable BES Cyber Systems, but has performed a vulnerability assessment more than 18 months, but <u>less than 21</u> months, since the last	The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented vulnerability assessment processes for each of its applicable BES Cyber Systems, but has performed a vulnerability assessment more than 21 months, but less than 24 months, since the last	The Responsible Entity has not implemented any vulnerability assessment processes for one of its applicable BES Cyber Systems. (R3) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more	

D.#	Violation Severity Levels				
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
	assessment on one of its applicable BES Cyber Systems. (3.1) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented active vulnerability assessment processes for Applicable Systems, but has performed an active vulnerability assessment more than 36 months, but less than 39 months, since the last active assessment on one of its applicable BES Cyber Systems. (3.2)	assessment on one of its applicable BES Cyber Systems. (3.1) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented active vulnerability assessment processes for Applicable Systems, but has performed an active vulnerability assessment more than 39 months, but less than 42 months, since the last active assessment on one of its applicable BES Cyber Systems. (3.2)	assessment on one of its applicable BES Cyber Systems. (3.1) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented active vulnerability assessment processes for Applicable Systems, but has performed an active vulnerability assessment more than 42 months, but less than 45 months, since the last active assessment on one of its applicable BES Cyber Systems. (3.2)	documented vulnerability assessment processes for each of its applicable BES Cyber Systems, but has performed a vulnerability assessment more than 24 months since the last assessment on one of its applicable BES Cyber Systems. (3.1) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented active vulnerability assessment processes for Applicable Systems, but has performed an active vulnerability assessment more than 45 months since the last active assessment on one of its applicable BES Cyber Systems.(3.2) OR The Responsible Entity has implemented and documented one or more	

D #		Violation Sev	erity Levels	
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
				vulnerability assessment processes for each of its applicable BES Cyber Systems, but did not perform the active vulnerability assessment in a manner that models an existing baseline configuration of its applicable BES Cyber Systems. (3.3) OR
				The Responsible Entity has implemented one or more documented vulnerability assessment processes for each of its applicable BES Cyber Systems, but has not documented the results of the vulnerability assessments, the action plans to remediate or mitigate vulnerabilities identified in the assessments, the planned date of completion of the action plan, and the

D.#	Violation Severity Levels				
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
				execution status of the mitigation plans. (3.4)	
R4.	The Responsible Entity documented its plan(s) for Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media, but failed to manage its Transient Cyber Asset(s) according to CIP-010-3, Requirement R4, Attachment 1, Section 1.1. (R4)	The Responsible Entity documented its plan(s) for Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media, but failed to implement the Removable Media sections according to CIP-010-3, Requirement R4, Attachment 1, Section 3. (R4)	The Responsible Entity documented its plan(s) for Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media, but failed to authorize its Transient Cyber Asset(s) according to CIP-010-3, Requirement R4, Attachment 1, Section 1.2. (R4)	The Responsible Entity failed to document or implement one or more plan(s) for Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media according to CIP-010- 3, Requirement R4. (R4)	
	OR	OR	OR		
	The Responsible Entity documented its plan(s) for Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media, but failed to document the Removable Media sections according to CIP-010-3, Requirement R4, Attachment 1, Section 3. (R4) OR The Responsible Entity	The Responsible Entity documented its plan(s) for Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media plan, but failed to document mitigation of software vulnerabilities, mitigation for the introduction of malicious code, or mitigation of the risk of unauthorized use for Transient Cyber Assets managed by the Responsible	The Responsible Entity documented its plan(s) for Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media, but failed to implement mitigation of software vulnerabilities, mitigation for the introduction of malicious code, or mitigation of the risk of unauthorized use for Transient Cyber Assets managed by the Responsible		
	documented its plan(s) for	Entity according to CIP-010-	Entity according to CIP-010-		

D #	Violation Severity Levels				
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
	Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media, but failed to document authorization for Transient Cyber Assets managed by the Responsible Entity according to CIP-010-3, Requirement R4, Attachment 1, Section 1.2. (R4)	3, Requirement R4, Attachment 1, Sections 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5. (R4) OR The Responsible Entity documented its plan(s) for Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media, but failed to document mitigation of software vulnerabilities or mitigation for the introduction of malicious code for Transient Cyber Assets managed by a party other than the Responsible Entity according to CIP-010-3, Requirement R4, Attachment 1, Sections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3. (R4)	3, Requirement R4, Attachment 1, Sections 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5. (R4) OR The Responsible Entity documented its plan(s) for Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media, but failed to implement mitigation of software vulnerabilities or mitigation for the introduction of malicious code for Transient Cyber Assets managed by a party other than the Responsible Entity according to CIP-010- 3, Requirement R4, Attachment 1, Sections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3. (R4)		

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Associated Documents

None.

- Implementation Plan for Project 2019-03.
- CIP-010-4 Technical Rationale

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	11/26/12	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Developed to define the configuration change management and vulnerability assessment requirements in coordination with other CIP standards and to address the balance of the FERC directives in its Order 706.
1	11/22/13	FERC Order issued approving CIP-010-1. (Order becomes effective on 2/3/14.)	
2	11/13/14	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Addressed two FERC directives from Order No. 791 related to identify, assess, and correct language and communication networks.
2	2/12/15	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Replaces the version adopted by the Board on 11/13/2014. Revised version addresses remaining directives from Order No. 791 related to transient devices and low impact BES Cyber Systems.
2	1/21/16	FERC Order issued approving CIP-010-3. Docket No. RM15-14-000	
3	07/20/17	Modified to address certain directives in FERC Order No. 829.	Revised

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
3	08/10/17	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	
3	10/18/2018	FERC Order approving CIP-010-3. Docket No. RM17-13-000.	
<u>4</u>	TBD	Modified to address directives in FERC Order No. 850.	

CIP-010-<u>34</u> - Attachment 1

Required Sections for Plans for Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media

Responsible Entities shall include each of the sections provided below in their plan(s) for Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media as required under Requirement R4.

Section 1. Transient Cyber Asset(s) Managed by the Responsible Entity.

- **1.1.** <u>Transient Cyber Asset Management</u>: Responsible Entities shall manage Transient Cyber Asset(s), individually or by group: (1) in an ongoing manner to ensure compliance with applicable requirements at all times, (2) in an ondemand manner applying the applicable requirements before connection to a BES Cyber System, or (3) a combination of both (1) and (2) above.
- **1.2.** <u>Transient Cyber Asset Authorization</u>: For each individual or group of Transient Cyber Asset(s), each Responsible Entity shall authorize:
 - **1.2.1.** Users, either individually or by group or role;
 - **1.2.2.** Locations, either individually or by group; and
 - **1.2.3.** Uses, which shall be limited to what is necessary to perform business functions.
- **1.3.** <u>Software Vulnerability Mitigation</u>: Use one or a combination of the following methods to achieve the objective of mitigating the risk of vulnerabilities posed by unpatched software on the Transient Cyber Asset (per Transient Cyber Asset capability):
 - Security patching, including manual or managed updates;
 - Live operating system and software executable only from read-only media;
 - System hardening; or
 - Other method(s) to mitigate software vulnerabilities.
- **1.4.** <u>Introduction of Malicious Code Mitigation</u>: Use one or a combination of the following methods to achieve the objective of mitigating the introduction of malicious code (per Transient Cyber Asset capability):
 - Antivirus software, including manual or managed updates of signatures or patterns;
 - Application whitelisting; or
 - Other method(s) to mitigate the introduction of malicious code.
- **1.5.** <u>Unauthorized Use Mitigation</u>: Use one or a combination of the following methods to achieve the objective of mitigating the risk of unauthorized use of Transient Cyber Asset(s):

- Restrict physical access;
- Full-disk encryption with authentication;
- Multi-factor authentication; or
- Other method(s) to mitigate the risk of unauthorized use.
- **Section 2.** Transient Cyber Asset(s) Managed by a Party Other than the Responsible Entity.
 - **2.1.** <u>Software Vulnerabilities Mitigation</u>: Use one or a combination of the following methods to achieve the objective of mitigating the risk of vulnerabilities posed by unpatched software on the Transient Cyber Asset (per Transient Cyber Asset capability):
 - Review of installed security patch(es);
 - Review of security patching process used by the party;
 - Review of other vulnerability mitigation performed by the party; or
 - Other method(s) to mitigate software vulnerabilities.
 - **2.2.** <u>Introduction of malicious code mitigation</u>: Use one or a combination of the following methods to achieve the objective of mitigating malicious code (per Transient Cyber Asset capability):
 - Review of antivirus update level;
 - Review of antivirus update process used by the party;
 - Review of application whitelisting used by the party;
 - Review use of live operating system and software executable only from read-only media;
 - Review of system hardening used by the party; or
 - Other method(s) to mitigate malicious code.
 - **2.3.** For any method used to mitigate software vulnerabilities or malicious code as specified in 2.1 and 2.2, Responsible Entities shall determine whether any additional mitigation actions are necessary and implement such actions prior to connecting the Transient Cyber Asset.

Section 3. Removable Media

- **3.1.** <u>Removable Media Authorization</u>: For each individual or group of Removable Media, each Responsible Entity shall authorize:
 - **3.1.1.** Users, either individually or by group or role; and
 - **3.1.2.** Locations, either individually or by group.
- **3.2.** <u>Malicious Code Mitigation</u>: To achieve the objective of mitigating the threat of introducing malicious code to high impact or medium impact BES Cyber

Systems and their associated Protected Cyber Assets, each Responsible Entity shall:

- **3.2.1.** Use method(s) to detect malicious code on Removable Media using a Cyber Asset other than a BES Cyber System or Protected Cyber Assets; and
- **3.2.2.** Mitigate the threat of detected malicious code on Removable Media prior to connecting the Removable Media to a high impact or medium impact BES Cyber System or associated Protected Cyber Assets.

CIP-010-34 - Attachment 2

Examples of Evidence for Plans for Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media

- Section 1.1:- Examples of evidence for Section 1.1 may include, but are not limited to, the method(s) of management for the Transient Cyber Asset(s). This can be included as part of the Transient Cyber Asset plan(s), part of the documentation related to authorization of Transient Cyber Asset(s) managed by the Responsible Entity or part of a security policy.
- Section 1.2: Examples of evidence for Section 1.2 may include, but are not limited to, documentation from asset management systems, human resource management systems, or forms or spreadsheets that show authorization of Transient Cyber Asset(s) managed by the Responsible Entity. Alternatively, this can be documented in the overarching plan document.
- Section 1.3: Examples of evidence for Section 1.3 may include, but are not limited to, documentation of the method(s) used to mitigate software vulnerabilities posed by unpatched software such as security patch management implementation, the use of live operating systems from read-only media, system hardening practices or other method(s) to mitigate the software vulnerability posed by unpatched software. Evidence can be from change management systems, automated patch management solutions, procedures or processes associated with using live operating systems, or procedures or processes associated with system hardening practices. If a Transient Cyber Asset does not have the capability to use method(s) that mitigate the risk from unpatched software, evidence may include documentation by the vendor or Responsible Entity that identifies that the Transient Cyber Asset does not have the capability.
- Section 1.4: Examples of evidence for Section 1.4 may include, but are not limited to, documentation of the method(s) used to mitigate the introduction of malicious code such as antivirus software and processes for managing signature or pattern updates, application whitelisting practices, processes to restrict communication, or other method(s) to mitigate the introduction of malicious code. If a Transient Cyber Asset does not have the capability to use method(s) that mitigate the introduction of malicious code, evidence may include documentation by the vendor or Responsible Entity that identifies that the Transient Cyber Asset does not have the capability.
- Section 1.5: Examples of evidence for Section 1.5 may include, but are not limited to, documentation through policies or procedures of the method(s) to restrict physical access; method(s) of the full-disk encryption solution along with the authentication protocol; method(s) of the multi-factor authentication solution; or documentation of other method(s) to mitigate the risk of unauthorized use.
- Section 2.1: Examples of evidence for Section 2.1 may include, but are not limited to, documentation from change management systems, electronic mail or procedures that document a review of installed security patch(es); memoranda, electronic

mail, policies or contracts from parties other than the Responsible Entity that identify the security patching process or vulnerability mitigation performed by the party other than the Responsible Entity; evidence from change management systems, electronic mail, system documentation or contracts that identifies acceptance by the Responsible Entity that the practices of the party other than the Responsible Entity are acceptable; or documentation of other method(s) to mitigate software vulnerabilities for Transient Cyber Asset(s) managed by a party other than the Responsible Entity. If a Transient Cyber Asset does not have the capability to use method(s) that mitigate the risk from unpatched software, evidence may include documentation by the Responsible Entity or the party other than the Responsible Entity that identifies that the Transient Cyber Asset does not have the capability.

- Examples of evidence for Section 2.2 may include, but are not limited to, Section 2.2: documentation from change management systems, electronic mail or procedures that document a review of the installed antivirus update level; memoranda, electronic mail, system documentation, policies or contracts from the party other than the Responsible Entity that identify the antivirus update process, the use of application whitelisting, use of live of operating systems or system hardening performed by the party other than the Responsible Entity; evidence from change management systems, electronic mail or contracts that identifies the Responsible Entity's acceptance that the practices of the party other than the Responsible Entity are acceptable; or documentation of other method(s) to mitigate malicious code for Transient Cyber Asset(s) managed by a party other than the Responsible Entity. If a Transient Cyber Asset does not have the capability to use method(s) that mitigate the introduction of malicious code, evidence may include documentation by the Responsible Entity or the party other than the Responsible Entity that identifies that the Transient Cyber Asset does not have the capability.
- Section 2.3: Examples of evidence for Section 2.3 may include, but are not limited to, documentation from change management systems, electronic mail, or contracts that identifies a review to determine whether additional mitigations are necessary and that they have been implemented prior to connecting the Transient Cyber Asset managed by a party other than the Responsible Entity.
- Section 3.1: Examples of evidence for Section 3.1 may include, but are not limited to, documentation from asset management systems, human resource management systems, forms or spreadsheets that shows authorization of Removable Media. The documentation must identify Removable Media, individually or by group of Removable Media, along with the authorized users, either individually or by group.
- <u>Section 3.2</u>: Examples of evidence for Section 3.2 may include, but are not limited to, documented process(es) of the method(s) used to mitigate malicious code such as results of scan settings for Removable Media, or implementation of ondemand scanning. Documented process(es) for the method(s) used for mitigating

the threat of detected malicious code on Removable Media, such as logs from the method(s) used to detect malicious code that show the results of scanning and that show mitigation of detected malicious code on Removable Media or documented confirmation by the entity that the Removable Media was deemed to be free of malicious code.

Standard Development Timeline

This section is maintained by the drafting team during the development of the standard and will be removed when the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees (Board).

Description of Current Draft

This is the second draft of proposed standard for formal 45-day comment period.

Completed Actions	Date
Standards Committee approved Standard Authorization Request (SAR) for posting	February 20, 2019
SAR posted for comment	February 25 – March 27, 2019
45-day formal comment period with ballot	January – March 2020
45-day formal comment period with additional ballot	May 7 – June 22, 2020
45-day formal comment period with second additional ballot	July 28 – September 10, 2020

Anticipated Actions	Date
10-day final ballot	October 2020
Board adoption	November 2020

A. Introduction

- 1. Title: Cyber Security Supply Chain Risk Management
- 2. Number: CIP-013-<u>+2</u>
- **3. Purpose:** To mitigate cyber security risks to the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System (BES) by implementing security controls for supply chain risk management of BES Cyber Systems.
- 4. Applicability:
 - **4.1. Functional Entities:** For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of functional entities will be collectively referred to as "Responsible Entities." For requirements in this standard where a specific functional entity or subset of functional entities are the applicable entity or entities, the functional entity or entities are specified explicitly.

4.1.1. Balancing Authority

- **4.1.2.** Distribution Provider that owns one or more of the following Facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the BES:
 - **4.1.2.1.** Each underfrequency Load shedding (UFLS) or undervoltage Load shedding (UVLS) system that:
 - **4.1.2.1.1.** Is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and
 - **4.1.2.1.2.** Performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.
 - **4.1.2.2.** Each Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) where the RAS is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - **4.1.2.3.** Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
- 4.1.3. Generator Operator
- 4.1.4. Generator Owner
- 4.1.5. Reliability Coordinator
- 4.1.6. Transmission Operator

4.1.7. Transmission Owner

- **4.2.** Facilities: For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following Facilities, systems, and equipment owned by each Responsible Entity in 4.1 above are those to which these requirements are applicable. For requirements in this standard where a specific type of Facilities, system, or equipment or subset of Facilities, systems, and equipment are applicable, these are specified explicitly.
 - **4.2.1. Distribution Provider:** One or more of the following Facilities, systems and equipment owned by the Distribution Provider for the protection or restoration of the BES:
 - **4.2.1.1.** Each UFLS or UVLS System that:
 - **4.2.1.1.1.** Is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and
 - **4.2.1.1.2.** Performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.
 - **4.2.1.2.** Each RAS where the RAS is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - **4.2.1.3.** Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - **4.2.1.4.** Each Cranking Path and group of Elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a Blackstart Resource up to and including the first interconnection point of the starting station service of the next generation unit(s) to be started.
 - **4.2.2.** Responsible Entities listed in 4.1 other than Distribution Providers: All BES Facilities.
 - **4.2.3.** Exemptions: The following are exempt from Standard CIP-013-12:
 - **4.2.3.1.** Cyber Assets at Facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.
 - **4.2.3.2.** Cyber Assets associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete Electronic Security Perimeters (ESPs).

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- **4.2.3.3.** The systems, structures, and components that are regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under a cyber security plan pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Section 73.54.
- **4.2.3.4.** For Distribution Providers, the systems and equipment that are not included in section 4.2.1 above.
- **4.2.3.5.** Responsible Entities that identify that they have no BES Cyber Systems categorized as high impact or medium impact according to the identification and categorization process required by CIP-002-5, or any subsequent version of that Reliability Standard.
- 5. Effective Date: See Implementation Plan for Project <u>20162019</u>-03.

B. Requirements and Measures

- R1. Each Responsible Entity shall develop one or more documented supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s) for high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems. and their associated Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS) and Physical Access Control Systems (PACS). The plan(s) shall include: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]
 - 1.1. One or more process(es) used in planning for the procurement of BES Cyber Systems and their associated EACMS and PACS to identify and assess cyber security risk(s) to the Bulk Electric System from vendor products or services resulting from: (i) procuring and installing vendor equipment and software; and (ii) transitions from one vendor(s) to another vendor(s).
 - **1.2.** One or more process(es) used in procuring BES Cyber Systems, and their associated EACMS and PACS, that address the following, as applicable:
 - **1.2.1.** Notification by the vendor of vendor-identified incidents related to the products or services provided to the Responsible Entity that pose cyber security risk to the Responsible Entity;
 - **1.2.2.** Coordination of responses to vendor-identified incidents related to the products or services provided to the Responsible Entity that pose cyber security risk to the Responsible Entity;
 - **1.2.3.** Notification by vendors when remote or onsite access should no longer be granted to vendor representatives;
 - **1.2.4.** Disclosure by vendors of known vulnerabilities related to the products or services provided to the Responsible Entity;
 - **1.2.5.** Verification of software integrity and authenticity of all software and patches provided by the vendor for use in the BES Cyber System and their associated EACMS and PACS; and
 - **1.2.6.** Coordination of controls for (i) vendor-initiated Interactive Remote Access, and (ii) system to system remote access with a vendor(s).
- **M1.** Evidence shall include- one or more documented supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s) as specified in the Requirement.
- R2. Each Responsible Entity shall implement its supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s) specified in Requirement R1. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium]
 [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]

Note: Implementation of the plan does not require the Responsible Entity to renegotiate or abrogate existing contracts (including amendments to master agreements and purchase orders). Additionally, the following issues are beyond the

scope of Requirement R2: (1) the actual terms and conditions of a procurement contract; and (2) vendor performance and adherence to a contract.

- M2. Evidence shall include documentation to demonstrate implementation of the supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s), which could include, but is not limited to, correspondence, policy documents, or working documents that demonstrate use of the supply chain cyber security risk management plan.
- **R3.** Each Responsible Entity shall review and obtain CIP Senior Manager or delegate approval of its supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s) specified in Requirement R1 at least once every 15 calendar months. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]
- M3. Evidence shall include the dated supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s) approved by the CIP Senior Manager or delegate(s) and additional evidence to demonstrate review of the supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s). Evidence may include, but is not limited to, policy documents, revision history, records of review, or workflow evidence from a document management system that indicate review of supply chain risk management plan(s) at least once every 15 calendar months; and documented approval by the CIP Senior Manager or delegate.

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority:

"Compliance Enforcement Authority" (CEA) means NERC or the Regional Entity, or any entity as otherwise designated by an Applicable Governmental Authority, in their respective roles of monitoring and/or enforcing compliance with mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards in their respective jurisdictions.

1.2. Evidence Retention:

The following evidence retention period(s) identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement AuthorityCEA may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Responsible Entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement AuthorityCEA to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

- Each Responsible Entity shall retain evidence of each requirement in this standard for three calendar years.
- If a Responsible Entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.
- The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program

As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, "Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program" refers to the identification of the processes that will be used to evaluate data or information for the purpose of assessing performance or outcomes with the associated Reliability Standard.

Violation Severity Levels

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
R1.	The Responsible Entity developed one or more documented supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s) which include the use of process(es) in planning for procurement of BES Cyber Systems, and their associated EACMS and PACS, to identify and assess cyber security risk(s) to the BES as specified in Part 1.1, and include the use of process(es) for procuring BES Cyber systems and their associated EACMS and PACS, as specified in Part 1.2, but the plans do not include one of the parts in Part 1.2.1 through Part 1.2.6.	The Responsible Entity developed one or more documented supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s) which include the use of process(es) in planning for procurement of BES Cyber Systems, and their associated EACMS and PACS, to identify and assess cyber security risk(s) to the BES as specified in Part 1.1, and include the use of process(es) for procuring BES Cyber systemsSystems and their associated EACMS and PACS, as specified in Part 1.2, but the plans do not include two or more of the parts in Part 1.2.1 through Part 1.2.6.	The Responsible Entity developed one or more documented supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s), but the plan(s) did not include the use of process(es) in planning for procurement of BES Cyber Systems, and their associated EACMS and PACS, to identify and assess cyber security risk(s) to the BES as specified in Part 1.1, or the plan(s) did not include the use of process(es) for procuring BES Cyber systemsSystems and their associated EACMS and PACS, as specified in Part 1.2.	The Responsible Entity developed one or more documented supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s), but the plan(s) did not include the use of process(es) in planning for procurement of BES Cyber Systems, and their associated EACMS and PACS, to identify and assess cyber security risk(s) to the BES as specified in Part 1.1, and the plan(s) did not include the use of process(es) for procuring BES Cyber systemsSystems and their associated EACMS and PACS, as specified in Part 1.2. OR The Responsible Entity did not develop one or more documented supply chain cyber security risk	

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
				management plan(s) as specified in the Requirement.	
R2.	The Responsible Entity implemented its supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s) including the use of process(es) in planning for procurement of BES Cyber Systems, and their associated EACMS and PACS, to identify and assess cyber security risk(s) to the BES as specified in Requirement R1 Part 1.1, and including the use of process(es) for procuring BES Cyber systemsSystems and their associated EACMS and PACS, as specified in Requirement R1 Part 1.2, but did not implement one of the parts in Requirement R1 Part 1.2.1 through Part 1.2.6.	The Responsible Entity implemented its supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s) including the use of process(es) in planning for procurement of BES Cyber Systems, and their associated EACMS and PACS, to identify and assess cyber security risk(s) to the BES as specified in Requirement R1 Part 1.1, and including the use of process(es) for procuring BES Cyber systemsSystems and their associated EACMS and PACS, as specified in Requirement R1 Part 1.2, but did not implement two or more of the parts in Requirement R1 Part 1.2.1 through Part 1.2.6.	The Responsible Entity implemented its supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s), but did not implement the use of process(es) in planning for procurement of BES Cyber Systems, and their associated EACMS and PACS, to identify and assess cyber security risk(s) to the BES as specified in Requirement R1 Part 1.1, or did not implement the use of process(es) for procuring BES Cyber systemsSystems and their associated EACMS and PACS, as specified in Requirement R1 Part 1.2.	The Responsible Entity implemented its supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s), but did not implement the use of process(es) in planning for procurement of BES Cyber Systems, and their associated EACMS and PACS, to identify and assess cyber security risk(s) to the BES as specified in Requirement R1 Part 1.1, and did not implement the use of process(es) for procuring BES Cyber systemsSystems and their associated EACMS and PACS, as specified in Requirement R1 Part 1.2; OR The Responsible Entity did not implement its supply	

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
				chain cyber security risk management plan(s) specified in the requirement.	
R3.	The Responsible Entity reviewed and obtained CIP Senior Manager or delegate approval of its supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s) but did so more than 15 calendar months but less than or equal to 16 calendar months since the previous review as specified in the Requirement.	The Responsible Entity reviewed and obtained CIP Senior Manager or delegate approval of its supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s) but did so more than 16 calendar months but less than or equal to 17 calendar months since the previous review as specified in the Requirement.	The Responsible Entity reviewed and obtained CIP Senior Manager or delegate approval of its supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s) but did so more than 17 calendar months but less than or equal to 18 calendar months since the previous review as specified in the Requirement.	The Responsible Entity did not review and obtain CIP Senior Manager or delegate approval of its supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s) within 18 calendar months of the previous review as specified in the Requirement.	

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Associated Documents

- Link to the Implementation Plan and other important associated documents. for Project 2019-03
- CIP-013-2 Technical Rationale

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	07/20/17	Respond to FERC Order No. 829.	
1	08/10/17	Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees.	
1	10/18/18	FERC Order approving CIP-013-1. Docket No. RM17-13-000.	
Responsible Entities are not required to renegotiate or abrogate existing contracts (including amendments to master agreements and purchase orders) when implementing an updated plan (i.e., the note in Requirement R2 applies to implementatio n of new plans and updated plans).2	TBD	Modified to address directive in FERC Order No. 850.	

Final Draft of CIP-013-2 October 2020

Rationale

Requirement R1:

The proposed Requirement addresses Order No. 829 directives for entities to implement a plan(s) that includes processes for mitigating cyber security risks in the supply chain. The plan(s) is required to address the following four objectives (Order No. 829 at P. 45):

- (1) Software integrity and authenticity;
- (2) Vendor remote access;
- (3) Information system planning; and
- (4) Vendor risk management and procurement controls.

The cyber security risk management plan(s) specified in Requirement R1 apply to high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems.

Implementation of the cyber security risk management plan(s) does not require the Responsible Entity to renegotiate or abrogate existing contracts (including amendments to master agreements and purchase orders), consistent with Order No. 829 (P. 36).

Requirement R1 Part 1.1 addresses the directive in Order No. 829 for identification and documentation of cyber security risks in the planning and development processes related to the procurement of BES Cyber Systems (P. 56). The security objective is to ensure entities consider cyber security risks to the BES from vendor products or services resulting from: (i) procuring and installing vendor equipment and software; and (ii) transitions from one vendor(s) to another vendor(s); and options for mitigating these risks when planning for BES Cyber Systems.


Requirement R1 Part 1.2 addresses the directive in Order No. 829 for procurement controls to address the provision and verification of security concepts in future contracts for BES Cyber Systems (P. 59). The objective of Part 1.2 is for entities to include these topics in their plans so that procurement and contract negotiation processes address the applicable risks. Implementation of the entity's plan related to Part 1.2 may be accomplished through the entity's procurement and contract negotiation processes. For example, entities can implement the plan by including applicable procurement items from their plan in Requests for Proposals (RFPs), negotiations with vendors, or requests submitted to entities negotiating on behalf of the Responsible Entity such as in cooperative purchasing agreements. Obtaining specific controls in the negotiated contract may not be feasible and is not considered failure to implement an entity's plan. Although the expectation is that Responsible Entities would enforce the securityrelated provisions in the contract based on the terms and conditions of that contract, such contract enforcement and vendor performance or adherence to the negotiated contract is not subject to this Reliability Standard.

The objective of verifying software integrity and authenticity (Part 1.2.5) is to help ensure that software installed on BES Cyber Systems is not modified prior to installation without the

awareness of the software supplier and is not counterfeit. Part 1.2.5 is not an operational requirement for entities to perform such verification; instead, it requires entities to address the software integrity and authenticity issue in its contracting process to provide the entity the means by which to perform such verification under CIP-010-3.

The term *vendor(s)* as used in the standard is limited to those persons, companies, or other organizations with whom the Responsible Entity, or its affiliates, contract with to supply BES Cyber Systems and related services. It does not include other NERC registered entities providing reliability services (e.g., Balancing Authority or Reliability Coordinator services pursuant to NERC Reliability Standards). A *vendor,* as used in the standard, may include: (i) developers or manufacturers of information systems, system components, or information system services; (ii) product resellers; or (iii) system integrators.

Collectively, the provisions of CIP 013 1 address an entity's controls for managing cyber security risks to BES Cyber Systems during the planning, acquisition, and deployment phases of the system life cycle, as shown below.



Notional BES Cyber System Life Cycle

Requirement R2:

The proposed requirement addresses Order No. 829 directives for entities to periodically reassess selected supply chain cyber security risk management controls (P. 46).

Entities perform periodic assessment to keep plans up-to-date and address current and emerging supply chain-related concerns and vulnerabilities. Examples of sources of information that the entity could consider include guidance or information issued by:

- NERC or the E-ISAC
- ICS-CERT
- Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre (CCIRC)